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This project hypothesizes that Jamaica should be more developed given its natural and 
human resource endowment.   In light of Jamaica’s agricultural underdevelopment, the project 
utilizes an agricultural framework to assess the processes by which politico-economic forces 
have shaped development in Jamaica and the larger Caribbean since independence.  The project 
conjectures that both externally-driven and domestically- motivated forces have impeded 
Jamaica’s development and investigates the extent to which these forces have forestalled national 
development.  In so doing, the research tests the validity of the following competing theories of 
development for Jamaica: neoliberalism and dependencia.  
The Jamaican experience is highlighted as a case study that is representative of and 
generalizable to the Caribbean at large.  As the Caribbean country that is arguably the most 
structurally adjusted in the region, with significant ties to the United States, the Jamaican 
experience can be viewed in the (dominant) neoliberal paradigm as the “best case scenario” for 
development in the region, one that should have “made it.”  As Elsie Le Franc (1994) stated, 
“one can always identify ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in any situation of change, but it is necessary to 
try to tackle that more difficult issue of whether or not any identifiable winners can function, and 
most important, expand in a market economy.”  The research therefore demonstrates how 
structural adjustment conditionalities; bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade realities; limited 
investment into local agriculture; and overall domestic apathy and lack of agricultural reform 
have played out in what has been argued to be a model case for socioeconomic expansion, and 
how they have shaped that country’s development and options in our rapidly globalizing market 
economy.  The project’s research findings reveal the conception of development, neoliberal or 
dependency, that is more relevant to Jamaica’s experience.  Finally, recognizing that mainstream 
strategies of development have not eradicated the problems of Caribbean underdevelopment, the 
project proposes an alternate model of development that reflects the voice of all segments of 
society and has at its core a strong state that fosters technological innovation, encourages export 
diversification, and channels investment to improve Jamaica’s production, productivity, and 
competitiveness in the international political economy.  
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My aim is to sketch a total analysis of contemporary Jamaican society; to 
suggest the ways in which political, economic and social relationships, and 
actors’ models, are articulated with each other in a changing and dynamic 
fashion.  A hopeless task, and one for which I am not properly equipped.  
Yet a task that must be attempted; the alternative is to be merely academic, 
for the sign of the merely academic is its distance from the complexities of 
real life.
Adam Kuper, Changing Jamaica
Now what is my position?  What is the position of all of us because we fall 
in the category of the black West Indian intellectual, a privilege in our 
society?  What do we do with that privilege?  The traditional pattern is that 
we join the Establishment, the black educated man in the West Indies is as 
much a part of the system of oppression as the bank managers and the 
plantation overseers…How do we break out of this Babylonian 
Captivity?…[T]he intellectual, the academic, within his own discipline, 
has to attack those distortions which…imperialism [has] produced in all 
branches of scholarship.
Walter Rodney, The Groundings with my Brothers
Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who could have acted; the 
indifference of those who should have known better; the silence of the voice of 





GROW ECONOMY! Grow! But the economy won't grow! What makes economies grow, flourish and 
prosper?…Inflation has been tamed, the Net International Reserves are bulging, the Bank of Jamaica 
intervenes from time to time to save the dollar  But a bright, vibrant, healthy, entrepreneurial people, 
blessed with abundant resources of many kinds can't seem to get it together and build a strong, productive 
economy.  Something is fundamentally wrong.
Martin Henry, Values and Attitudes and the Economy, Jamaica Gleaner, 10 April 2003
Agriculture is central to the development promise of this [Doha] trade round for two reasons.  Most of the 
world's poor work in agriculture and most of the world's protectionism is directed at agriculture.  Some 70 
per cent of the world's poor live in rural areas and earn their income from agriculture.
Global Economic Prospects 2004, World Bank
We frequently hear supposedly well-informed commentators and luncheon and dinner speakers saying that 
developing countries like Jamaica should concentrate on increasing production, removing obstacles to 
private sector investment, liberalise, maintain a realistic exchange rate and increase exports while pursuing 
‘sound macroeconomic policies’.   Once these occur, they posit growth and development would 
automatically take place.  When others point to the constraints which are imposed by the international 
economic system and multilateral institutions, this is dismissed as “making excuses for underperformance”.   
The reason why some Third World countries don't grow, these persons say, is that their Governments are 
corrupt, inefficient and irresponsible, more intent on blaming external forces than accepting culpability for 
their misdeeds.
Ian Boyne, Ja, Cancun, and the Int’l Economy, Jamaica Gleaner, 14 September 2003
Overview
This research project addresses the relationship that exists between agriculture, 
trade, and socioeconomic development.  The project employs as a case study, Jamaica, a 
natural resource economy in which agriculture figures prominently as one of the 
country’s leading employers, a historically significant contributor to gross domestic 
product (GDP), and a key element of rural development.1  The research question at issue 
in this project is why despite Jamaica’s natural and human resource capacity and 
agricultural potential the country is still so poor.  According to the economic 
1 Agriculture employs approximately 25 percent of Jamaica’s population.  In 2002, agriculture constituted 
6.6 of total real GDP, a drop from 7.3 percent in 2001.  From 1997 to 2000 agriculture’s contribution to 
GDP was 7.9 percent, 7.8 percent, 8.0 percent, and 7.0 percent respectively.  See PIOJ 2003, Chapters 3 
and 8.
2
development literature, agricultural development is essential to countries’ overall growth 
and advancement.  This is especially so for developing natural resource economies like 
Jamaica where a large percentage of the population depends on agriculture for their 
income, livelihood, and sustenance.  According to Bruce Johnston and John Mellor, two 
features distinguish the agricultural sector in developing countries and the role it plays in 
economic growth.2  Firstly, agriculture is a leading employer in these countries and a 
major source of industry.  However, although these countries—Jamaica included—
commit a large amount of resources, mainly land and labor, the resources are used at low 
levels of productivity and therefore produce meager output and inadequate income.  
Secondly, many developing countries have de-emphasized agriculture to provide capital 
to other seemingly more promising sectors.  Johnston and Mellor term this phenomenon 
the “secular decline” of agriculture in favor of higher-income activities intended to 
catapult per capita incomes GDP.  In the case of Jamaica, agriculture has been de-
emphasized to leverage bauxite/alumina and tourism.  Ironically, the secular decline of 
agriculture in Jamaica has not produced the kind of structural transformation Johnston 
and Mellor predicted.  If anything, Jamaica seems worse off with severely diminished 
food security, ubiquitous tracts of mined-out unproductive land, and a tourist industry 
that is so susceptible to external shocks that it cannot be counted on long-term as a 
sustainable source of national revenue.  Not only has Jamaica’s agricultural production, 
productivity, and competitiveness declined precipitously, after four decades of 
independence Jamaica remains a primary commodity producer that is highly dependent 
on its metropolitan trading partners for everything from inputs, financing, to markets.  
2 Bruce F. Johnston and John W. Mellor, “The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development,” The 
American Economic Review 51, 4 (September 1961): 566-593.
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Agriculture is vital to Jamaica’s future if for nothing else because it has been the 
country’s economic mainstay for over 600 years, still employs over one-quarter of the 
population, and has important backward and forward linkages to other sectors.  As such, 
no study of Jamaica’s development—or lack thereof—would be complete without 
consideration of agriculture.  
In view of the importance of agriculture to socioeconomic development, the 
project spotlights Jamaica’s agricultural sector as the framework for analyzing the 
reasons for the country’s relative underdevelopment and poor performance given 
Jamaica’s natural factor endowment and comparative advantage in agriculture, Jamaica’s 
longtime integration in world agricultural trade, and the promise agriculture posed for 
Jamaica’s post-independence growth and development vis-à-vis the international 
economic system.  In essence, the project targets Jamaica’s agricultural sector as the 
internal context in which to evaluate the reasons for the country’s economic stagnation.  
To explore the effect of both international and domestically motivated forces, the project 
examines the ways in which external and internal politico-economic forces have shaped 
agricultural development in Jamaica and the larger Caribbean over the past 30 years.  
Given Jamaica’s natural factor endowment of fertile soil, abundant water stocks, and 
year-round warm weather in combination with a large labor force in need of work, it is 
ideally suited for production of a number of agricultural products.  Indeed, over its 
history, Jamaica has been a leading producer and exporter of some of the world’s most 
highly demanded products such as sugar, bananas, coffee, tobacco, even marijuana (aka 
ganja in Jamaican vernacular).  Because Jamaica is a natural resource economy, these 
products have constituted the country’s principal exports on world markets.  However, 
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contrary to the rewards promised by the theory of trade by comparative advantage, 
Jamaica’s agricultural potential has not been fully maximized, nor has Jamaica developed 
to the extent that Adam Smith, the originator of that theory, would have predicted.  On 
the contrary, Jamaica, like many of its Caribbean neighbors, is poor and underdeveloped 
despite its natural factor endowment, strong agricultural exports that are popular 
worldwide, considerable mineral reserves, and human resource capacity.  This research 
asks why and begs the question of whether today’s neoliberal trade/finance regime, with 
all its supposed benefits for individual nation states and the international system of states, 
is working for developing countries like Jamaica operating within that regime.  This 
research probes the reasons for Jamaica’s agricultural decline, and with it national 
underdevelopment, and proposes possible explanations.  Hypotheses for Jamaica’s 
continued poverty and underdevelopment are outlined below.
Hypotheses
One possible explanation for Jamaica’s underdevelopment is the deleterious 
impact of external pressures that have retarded development from without.  These forces 
include, among others: the country’s colonial legacy of plantation economy; too-rapid 
trade liberalization under World Bank-International Monetary Fund (IMF) mandated 
structural adjustment lending; rich country agricultural subsidies, tariff barriers, and food 
dumping; and bilateral preferential trade arrangements that fostered dependency in 
Jamaica and retarded its development.  These forces played significant roles in Jamaica’s 
post-independence evolution as a sovereign state.  Indeed, there is much controversy 
about the extent to which these forces facilitated—or, alternatively, stymied—this 
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evolution, thus no analysis of the country’s development would be complete without 
investigation of the specific effect(s) each has had therein.  The following hypothesis will 
therefore be evaluated:
H1: External factors retarded Jamaica’s development by exacerbating the colonial 
plantation economic legacy of underdevelopment and associated dependent development.  
H1a: Structural adjustment lending retarded Jamaica’s development by 
skyrocketing the country’s debt and debt service obligations, which diminished 
reinvestment into the economy; by pushing increasingly large numbers of small 
farmers off the land and into urban unemployment; and by entrenching the 
emphasis on export-led development based on select primary exports to the 
detriment of cultivating full agro-industrial capacity fundamental to developed 
country economies and attaining food security.
H1b: Multilateral and bilateral trade arrangements retarded Jamaica’s 
development by discriminating against processed exports that would increase 
Jamaica’s value-added, thereby discouraging the full maximization of Jamaican 
agro-industry; by protecting developed country market hegemony in not 
penalizing the perpetuation by those countries of high tariff barriers to products of 
developing country export interest; and by attacking the preferential trade 
arrangement (PTA) as antithetical to the “free” trade regime, forcing a challenge 
to the premise that developing countries, by nature of their underdevelopment, are 
entitled to special and differential (S&D) treatment while transitioning to the 
“free” trade regime.
H1c: Rich country agricultural subsidies, domestic and export, encourage 
overproduction of surpluses that are “dumped” in poor countries like Jamaica 
under the guise of food aid or sold at artificially low prices that undermine 
domestic production, productivity, and competitiveness.  
Another possible explanation for Jamaica’s underdevelopment is the harmful 
impact of domestically motivated forces that have impeded development from within.  
These forces breed inefficiency and degenerative instability which undermine economic 
growth and development and include, among others: weak institutions in both the public 
and private spheres; inadequate and/or inappropriate use of technology; poor farming 
infrastructure, especially roads for transporting goods from farmgate to market; private 
sector apathy and dependence on government to mobilize growth; and tribal politics 
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based on clientelism and rent-seeking, which has entrenched the retardate plantation 
economy in Jamaica.  Each force is common to developing, post-colonial, natural-
resource economies.  Jamaica is no exception.  In light of the negative effect such forces 
can have on national economic performance, they must be considered in any analysis of a 
country’s development so as to not unfairly target external forces.  The following 
hypothesis will therefore be evaluated:
H2: Domestically motivated forces impeded Jamaica’s development from within by 
perpetuating the colonial plantation economic legacy of underdevelopment and 
associated dependent development.  
H2a: Tribal politics and clientelism impeded Jamaica’s development by allowing 
business elites to co-opt government to further their middle/upper class agenda 
which typically coincided with the interests of international business, not the 
interest of the Jamaican masses, many of whom are small farmers.
H2b: Apathetic and complacent dependence on PTAs for their guaranteed high 
price points for primary commodity exports precipitated quota shortfalls and 
discouraged innovation and expansion into higher value production.
H2c: Weak institutions, manifested in a dearth of transformative agricultural 
reform projects and initiatives and in pervasive bureaucratic inefficiencies and 
malfeasance, impeded Jamaica’s development.
A final explanation for Jamaica’s economic problems is the existence in Jamaica 
of embedded structures of underdevelopment that are attributable to both externally-
driven and internally-motivated forces.  These include, among others: Jamaica’s 
pervasive land inequality, stagnation of domestic agriculture, dependence on PTAs as 
export vehicles, high cost of capital which limits producer access to funds for retooling, 
and lack of agricultural diversification for both export and domestic consumption.  The 
related hypothesis evaluated in the research is:
H3: Embedded structures of underdevelopment established by external forces and 
entrenched by domestic forces perpetuated the colonial plantation economic legacy of 
underdevelopment and associated dependent development
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Given Jamaica’s enduring poverty and underdevelopment, the research investigates 
whether the aforementioned external and domestically-motivated forces have in fact 
facilitated the country’s agricultural underdevelopment and, by extension, its general 
underdevelopment vis-à-vis more advanced countries.    
Development and development economics are hot topics of interest to both 
theoreticians and laypersons and have been so since the independence movements of the 
1950s and 1960s in the Third World.  Since that time, it has become glaringly obvious 
that the majority of people living in this part of the world—comprising roughly three-
fourths of the world’s people—live in conditions of extreme deprivation.3  Indeed, it 
seems as if many of these countries have not thrown off the yoke of colonization to build 
robust, autonomous national economies with thriving industries and enhanced societal 
well-being.  These countries, particularly those in Africa and much of Latin America, 
remain poor and depend on metropolitan countries and international financial institutions 
for their very lifeblood in the form of loans and aid.  As Michael Todaro explained,
[w]idespread poverty and growing income and asset inequalities, rapid 
population growth, low levels of literacy and nutritional intake, rising 
levels of urban unemployment and underemployment, stagnating 
agriculture and relative rural neglect, chronic foreign-debt problems, 
inadequate and often inappropriate educational and health delivery 
systems, inflexible institution and administrative structures, significant 
vulnerability to external economic, technological, and cultural forces of 
dominance and dependence, and the difficult choices regarding trade-offs 
between modernization and cultural preservation—these and other 
problems are pervasive and in fact often define the nature of 
underdevelopment in Third World nations.4
3 According to the United Nations Development Programme, more than one-fifth of the world's people live 
in extreme poverty, on little more than US$1.00 a day.  
4 Todaro 1994, xxx. 
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Development economics arose as a field of study to assess these problems and provide 
solutions.5  The field has undergone profound changes over recent decades.  “Old clichés 
and shibboleths about necessary conditions and historical determinants have been 
replaced by a healthy agnosticism and a refreshing willingness to focus on specific 
problems and real issues.  The very meaning of the term development has been altered 
from an almost exclusive association with aggregate economic growth to a much broader 
interpretation that encompasses questions of poverty, inequality, and unemployment 
also.”6
Development economics can be classified as part of the larger body of 
international political economy (IPE).  Scholars have grouped the various theories of IPE 
into several categorizations.  Of these, Robert Gilpin’s is particularly well known.7
Gilpin identified three primary schools of IPE: nationalist, including mercantilist, realist, 
and statist theories; liberal; and Marxist.8  Theories of development fit loosely into this 
categorization.  These include neoclassical economics (liberal), world-
5 Todaro (1994, 8) delineated three fields of study impacting on the study of development: traditional 
economics, political economy, and development economics.  Traditional economics focuses on the most 
efficient, least-cost allocation of scarce productive resources and the long-term growth of these such that 
they produce an ever-increasing amount of goods and services.  Traditional economics assumes economic 
“rationality” and decision-making that is completely materialistic, individualistic, and self-interested.  
Political economy builds upon traditional economics but considers also the social and institutional 
processes through which political and economic elites influence the allocation of scarce productive 
resources.  Political economy is therefore concerned with the issue of power in economic decision-making.  
Development economics goes beyond political economy to devise functional solutions to the societal 
problems wrought by the less-than-optimal manifestation of traditional economic principles in poor country 
contexts and the misuse of power by both domestic and external elites.  In other words, development 
economics addresses not just traditional economic fundamentals but also the structural and institutional—
economic, social, political—processes necessary for ameliorating conditions for the poverty-stricken 
masses of the world’s developing countries.  Because the principles of traditional economics often do not 
hold up in imperfect markets—that is most markets in/between developed and developing countries alike—
this research gives more credence to political economy and development economics as the bases for 
probing and devising potential solutions to the problems facing developing countries such as Jamaica.
6 Todaro 1994, xxv.
7 See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), chapter 2.
8 Crane and Amawi 1997, 5.
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systems/dependency theory and the developmental state (nationalist), and Marxism 
(Marxist).9  In general, the literature on development argues the pros and cons of the 
various modes of production—from feudalism to mercantilism to capitalism to 
socialism—with which society has come into contact.  Key figures identified in the early 
literature argued for and against the freely functioning market.  On one side were the 
mercantilists, who argued that state intervention was essential for ensuring a properly 
functioning market sans disequilibria.  On the other side, the classical liberals argued that 
a market left to its own devices balances supply and demand and produces optimal results 
for all transactors.10  The contemporary 21st century debate, centered on the extent to 
which the global (liberal) capitalist economy benefits the world’s poor countries and the 
poor within them, has its roots in this polemic.  To this extent, contemporary 
development theory either proclaims the virtues of capitalism or denounces it for its 
downsides.  Jorge Larrain explained the dichotomy as follows: “[a]s capitalism becomes 
increasingly internationalized and a thoroughly integrated world market is created, 
development theories will respond not just to the class struggles and social contradictions 
of isolated capitalist countries but to the contradictions and conflicts emerging in the 
world capitalist system, especially those derived from the decolonization process, the 
emergence and challenge of socialist countries and the increasing separation between 
peripheral and central capitalist countries.”11  Indeed, due to the changes wrought by 
9 See Gereffi and Fonda (1992) for an elaboration of these and other theoretical perspectives.  Those 
interested in the issues of underdevelopment and dependency should also see Ronald Chilcote (1984) for an 
excellent study of reformist and revolutionary development theory applied to the Third World experience.
10 Since then the trajectory of development theory has traveled various twists and turns where each new 
ideological school challenged the preceding school.  Not surprisingly, in light of this evolutionary path, we 
are witnessing in 2003 a backlash to neoliberalism, the dominant model, in favor of protected nationalist 
markets.  This backlash is particularly pronounced in Latin America where a group of the region’s most 
economically and strategically prominent countries are leading the charge.
11 Larrain 1989, 2-3.
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capitalism’s tendency for “creative destruction,” development theorists subscribe to any 
of several development “camps” involving scholars with the opinion that capitalism 
promotes development regardless of context and those arguing otherwise.  Scholars 
belonging to the first group are loosely classified as orthodox theorists and those to the 
second group as radical theorists.  The latter camp can be further subdivided into two 
groups—those (reformist) scholars arguing that capitalism promotes a less- than-optimal 
development, but development nonetheless, and those (revolutionary) scholars arguing 
that because capitalism promotes stagnation, it must be eliminated.  
This project explores the various paradigms of development from classical 
mercantilist political economy onwards and applies them to the experiences of Jamaica 
and the Commonwealth Caribbean.  In so doing, the research identifies the failed 
paradigms that have been utilized in analyses of the Caribbean experience, and explores 
alternative models of development that are more relevant to the Jamaican context, its 
history, its position in the international economic system, and its prospects for a fuller 
integration into the world-trading regime.  The project thus highlights the theoretical 
perspectives—namely, the institutionalization of the plantation economy from without 
and within, which has fostered associated dependent development in Jamaica—that best 
explains Jamaica’s experience in the international political economy and prescribes the
strategies that should be taken in the future to facilitate genuine development in Jamaica 
and other Caribbean countries, and more effectively integrates the region into the 
international economic system such that it is no longer relegated to underdevelopment 
and interminable dependency.
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Why Underdevelopment, or Associated Dependent Development?
Although the world’s per capita income has increased in recent decades and an 
increasing number of people worldwide have escaped the bondage of poverty, there are 
still pockets of extreme poverty remaining and the economic divide between the global 
north and the global south is still very much a politico-economic reality.  Moreover, 
many countries of the global south lack the technological advancement, societal 
cohesion, and economic development that are characteristic of the global north.  To be 
sure, as Brazil’s President “Lula” da Silva noted in his first meeting with U.S. president 
George W. Bush, economic asymmetries between wealthy northern countries and poor 
southern ones are pervasive and must be reduced if there is any hope of forging a stable 
integrated global economy.12  These asymmetries are not random; they stem from the 
skewed trade between rich and poor countries that has characterized the international 
political economy for centuries, facilitating development in rich countries and 
underdevelopment—i.e., development that is dependent on and associated with rich 
country development—in poor countries like Jamaica.  The asymmetries are particularly 
apparent in agricultural trade.  According to Nicholas Stern, senior vice president and 
chief economist at the World Bank: 
European, Japanese and U.S. agricultural subsidies and barriers to farm 
and textile imports from developing countries prevent the poor from 
exploiting their comparative advantage.  Removing such barriers would 
expand the market for goods from the developing world, increase 
investment in labor-intensive sectors and thus enable more people to 
improve their lives and escape from poverty.  The benefits to poor people 
in developing countries of removing rich countries’ trade barriers would 
12 James Dao, “Brazilian Meets Bush and Vows to Cooperate on Freer Trade,” New York Times, 11 
December 2002.
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be more than twice the $50 billion in annual development aid that rich 
countries now provide.13
Logic dictates that underdevelopment is directly related to poverty.  According to 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), more than 25 percent of the 
world’s population still lives in absolute poverty without access to safe drinking water, 
adequate nutrition, sanitation, or healthcare.14  The global north contains most of the 
world’s developed economies.  These countries have all the trappings of wealth; they are 
urbanized, have made the transition from agricultural production to service-based 
knowledge economies, have high literacy rates and accessible healthcare systems, and 
have food security with lots of food to go around and people with the resources for 
acquiring it.  The global south, on the other hand, is largely impoverished and contains a 
majority of the world’s people, many of whom are destitute, homeless, hungry, illiterate, 
disease-ridden, and generally incapable of contributing to their countries’ productive 
capacity and growth.  Writing in 1966, Jagdish Bhagwati’s noted that:
The world we live in presents a picture of appalling contrasts.  While few 
countries are immensely prosperous nearly two-thirds of the population 
subsists on substandard incomes.  Illiteracy, bad housing, lack of medical 
care and malnutrition are prevalent throughout most of Asia, Africa, the 
Middle East and Latin America.  These facts can no longer be ignored.  
Indeed they have come to dominate intellectual thought and political 
action to an unprecedented degree in our time.15
Indeed, this has been the case for centuries.  Adam Smith, for example, penned the 
following words in his famous 1776 treatise The Wealth of Nations: “No society can 
surely be flourishing and happy, of which by far the greater part of the numbers are poor 
13 Nicholas Stern, “Freeing the Poor,” International Herald Tribune, 19 December 2002.
14 UNDP 1997, 3.
15 Jagdish Bhagwati, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: World University Press, McGraw 
Hill Book Co, 1966): 9.
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and miserable.”16  According to the World Bank, 10.8 percent of Latin Americans lived 
below the official poverty line of $1.08/day in 2000, compared with 11 percent in 1990.17
The figures are slightly higher for the population living at or below $2.15/day: 27.6 
percent in 1990 and 26.3 percent in 2000.  The Inter-American Development Bank 
presents another view of the situation.  “Approximately 35 percent of the population in 
Latin America and the Caribbean lives with less than US$2.00 dollars a day (in 
purchasing power parity). Though the incidence of poverty (measured by the headcount 
ratio) dropped in the nineties, the number of poor increased and the ratio of poor people 
continues to be 3 percent higher than in 1980.”18 The figures are even more startling for 
Africa; an astounding 46.30 percent of sub-Saharan Africans lived below the poverty line 
in 1998.  Unfortunately, the situation has not changed much in the almost 50 years since 
Dr. Bhagwati wrote his glaring indictment of the global economy.  Yet many pundits 
insist that globalization and trade liberalization has placed the world’s poor countries on a 
“rising tide” of economic advancement.19  A recent Washington Post commentary 
elaborated this position, revealing its caveats:
Has globalization helped or hurt the world's poor? It depends on how you 
calculate it…Poverty experts at the World Bank, led by Martin Ravallion, 
argue that what counts isn't countries but people. Using household surveys 
around the world, they have found that the poverty rate in developing 
countries -- those living on less than $1 a day -- has fallen from about one-
third to one-quarter while the income gap between rich and poor has 
remained about the same.  Now come two independent researchers --
Xavier Sala-i-Martin of Columbia University and Surjit Bhalla for the 
Institute of International Economics -- who argue it's better to use data 
from national gross-domestic-product accounts than household surveys, 
16 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, (Quoted in Todaro 1997, 137)
17 See http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/index.htm, the World Bank’s Global Poverty 
Monitoring website.
18 See http://www.iadb.org/sds/pov/site_16_e.htm. 
19 See, for example, the 2001 World Bank paper Trade, Growth, and Poverty authored by David Dollar and 
Aart Kraay.
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and then make various adjustments for purchasing power and education. 
And when they do, they find that the global poverty rate has fallen below 
15 percent while the income gap between the global rich and poor has 
decreased.  One problem for things-are-getting-better globalizers, 
however: Almost all the poverty gains have come in just two countries, 
China and India, which have slowly and only partially privatized and 
opened their economies.20
Despite the “gains” of globalization which these pundits so eagerly reference, 
much of the Caribbean remains mired in poverty, so much so that one questions the 
extent to which the region has gained from globalization and trade/financial 
liberalization.  The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) reported the region’s 2002 performance as follows: “Regional 
economic activity is expected to fall 0.5% in 2002. The economies most affected include 
Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, while the rest have seen gross domestic product 
(GDP) stagnate. For the second year in a row, per capita GDP growth in Latin America 
and the Caribbean was negative (-1.9%).  The region has already experienced half a 
decade of low economic growth amidst adverse conditions in the world economy.”21  The 
situation in Jamaica is dire.  Despite a strong human and natural resource endowment, 
more than 50 percent of Jamaicans are unemployed and at least 16.9 percent are living 
below the poverty line.22  Jamaica, despite its small size and colonial history, has always 
20 “Policy Watch,” Washington Post, 29 September 2002.
21 See http://www.eclac.org/. 
22 According to the International Labour Organization’s statistics for 2001, 50.9 percent of Jamaicans did 
not work at all and 52.5 percent were unemployed for 12+ months. See 
http://www.ilocarib.org.tt/digest/jamaica/jam17.html.  Much controversy surrounds the issue of the exact 
number of Jamaicans who currently live below the poverty line.  According to the UNDP, that figure is a 
mere 16 percent.  See http://www.undp.org/fojam/poverty.htm.  The 2001 Survey of Living Conditions 
cited a figure of 16.9 percent.  See http://www.npep.org.jm/Poverty_in_Jamaica/poverty_in_jamaica.html.  
Curiously, this seems an artificially low figure and represents a marked reduction in the poverty rate at a 
time of spiraling unemployment.  It also marks a decline from the 2000 figure of 18.7 percent.  The 
Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) has conceded that remittances from expatriate Jamaicans have helped 
span the divide between the country’s increasing unemployment and decreasing poverty.
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been a key player in the international political economy.  As Britain’s star colony, 
Jamaica posed great importance as one of the world’s largest producers of sugar, 
bananas, and other agricultural commodities.  During the 20th century when the Cold War 
came to dictate national security and, by extension, the formation of alliances, Jamaica 
acquired new geopolitical significance due to its proximity to the United States and Cuba, 
the U.S.’ communist neighbor to the south.  After centuries of Britain’s colonial 
stewardship, the U.S. began courting Jamaica’s loyalty with millions of dollars in 
investment and aid.  Yet, for all its endowments, indigenous and acquired, Jamaica in 
2002 had a GDP real growth rate of 1.1 percent and per capita GDP of $3,700 adjusted 
for purchasing power parity.23  Despite its advances in tourism and bauxite mining, 
Jamaica is undoubtedly still a poor country with underdeveloped productive capacity.  
According to a member of Jamaica’s parliament:
Commentators may argue and disagree over the level of poverty now 
overwhelming the country. When is someone living in poverty or 
experiencing conditions of poverty? From the ivory tower of the 
university, or the air-conditioned office of business, one rarely gets a 
glimpse of abject poverty. Until one visits the cardboard villas of the inner 
cities or the squatter communities in the rural districts, it is not possible to 
really understand the extent and depth of the country's poverty. If 
members of so-called civil society see how poverty-stricken Jamaicans 
live, their stomach would turn and they would retch. Right on the gully 
banks of Barbican or Grants Pen, people live in dire poverty and in 
conditions not really fit for human habitation.24
23 See the CIA’s World Factbook 2002 at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/jm.html.  
According to the factbook, Jamaica’s economy, which depends on tourism and bauxite, has been stagnant 
since 1995.  The CIA’s economic statistics, particularly its unemployment figure of a very low 16 percent 
(2000 est.), are subject to interpretation.
24 Delroy Chuck, “The Politics of Poverty,” Jamaica Gleaner, 11 December 2002.
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Orlando Patterson, professor of sociology at Harvard University, has publicly disputed 
the contention that conditions in Jamaica and, indeed most of the Caribbean, are 
improving:
The bad news is that Jamaica's attempts at economic development have 
largely failed. Here, as in Puerto Rico and most other Caribbean islands, 
post-independence attempts at industrialization have fallen apart. Jamaica 
now has vast shantytowns; unemployment at depression levels; and high 
rates of economic inequality, crime and drug abuse. The government has 
met many conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund in 
return for much-needed loans: a stable annual inflation rate of 5.8 percent, 
falling interest rates, adequate international reserves and the return of 
positive growth. But at the same time, public debt is nearly 160 percent of 
the gross domestic product and interest consumes more than half of all 
government expenditure, leaving little to address the social problems.25
Clearly, Jamaica is not developing such that the average Jamaican is better off now than 
he was 30 years ago when Jamaica first embraced the neoliberal logic of development.  
This statement, of course, raises questions of what constitutes “better off.”  Clearly, 
consumption has increased due to the ever-expanding amount and variety of imported 
goods flowing into the country.  However, the jury is still out on whether development in 
the form of expanded societal and national economic well-being is occurring in Jamaica.  
Jamaica’s Geographical and Socio-political Context
Jamaica is situated in the Caribbean Sea, one of the four islands of the Greater 
Antilles located in the northwestern section of Caribbean region.  Located just under two 
hours south of Miami by air, Jamaica is integrally connected with both North America 
and the Caribbean Basin, which includes the island states located in the Caribbean Sea 
and the countries of Central America and the northernmost portion of South America.  
For most of its history, the island’s geographical context has rendered it vulnerable to the 
25 Orlando Patterson, The New York Times, 23 July 2001.
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vicissitudes of geopolitics.  From Columbus’ “discovery” and annexation of the island in 
1494 for the Spanish crown to its subsequent colonization by the British and 
contemporary subservience to American hegemony, Jamaica has been subjected to and 
manipulated by external forces outside its control.  Indeed, as a former colonial territory, 
Jamaica was established and maintained to serve the needs of its colonizing power.26
During its period of domination, each metropolitan country used Jamaica’s resources to 
further its own aims and expand its economy.  Britain was particularly successful in this 
regard, using revenues from Jamaica’s sugar industry to fuel its Industrial Revolution and 
attain the position of world superpower.  Although colonization has ended in theory, 
many country and regional scholars allege that the spirit of colonialism continues 
unchecked in Jamaica, albeit in the form of neocolonialism perpetuated by various 
external and foreign-influenced domestic actors, and has hindered the country’s 
development potential by causing massive systemic underdevelopment.27
Jamaica is located to the south of Cuba and the east of Hispaniola, the island 
comprising Haiti and the Dominican Republic.  It’s capital city, Kingston, is located in 
the southeastern section of the island.  Jamaica is one of the largest islands in the 
Caribbean, with a landmass of 10,990 sq km, slightly smaller than the state of 
Connecticut.28  In July 2003, Jamaica’s population numbered 2,695,867 persons.  
Jamaicans are of African descent primarily, but they also represent other ethnic 
26 Jamaica has had three primary colonizers, two of these—Spain and Britain—de jure and one—the United 
States of America—de facto.  
27 Britain granted independence in 1962 after Jamaica withdrew from the short-lived West Indies 
Federation.  However, Britain, the European Union, and the USA have all been instrumental in shaping 
Jamaica’s post-independence politics, economy, and culture, mostly to their own ends.
28 See the CIA’s Factbook at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/goes/jm.html for more descriptive 
information and statistics about Jamaica.  Much of the descriptive and statistical information detailed in this 
“Historiography” section was abstracted from this website.
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backgrounds.  Many Jamaicans have European, Chinese, Indian, and Middle Eastern 
ancestry resulting from centuries of foreign immigration to the island in search of work 
and opportunity.29  This heritage is evident in the people’s features and in the country’s 
food and culture.  Jamaicans are a relatively young people; just under 30 percent of the 
population is under 14 years of age, 63 percent is between 15 and 64 years of age, and 
seven percent is 65 years of age and older.  Jamaica’s official language is English, but 
many Jamaicans speak Patois—a fusion of African and English words—informally.  
Eighty five percent of the population is literate.30
Jamaica has been an independent country since August 6, 1962, when Britain 
granted its then colony full independence.  Jamaica system of government is defined in 
its Rule of Law outlined in the country’s Constitution and its legal system is based on 
English common law.  Kingston, the capital city, is Jamaica’s seat of government.  
Jamaica has a constitutional parliamentary democracy, a variation of the British system.31
Its Parliament is charged with making the country’s laws and managing the country’s 
finances.  The Cabinet, the nucleus of Parliament, is its primary policy-making vehicle.  
Jamaica’s major political parties are the People’s National Party (PNP) led by Percival 
James (PJ) Patterson and the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) led by Edward Seaga.  The PNP 
is currently in power, with PJ Patterson presiding as Jamaica’s prime minister.
29 Jamaica’s ethnic groups are as follows: black 90.9%; East Indian 1.3%; white 0.2%; Chinese 0.2%; 
mixed 7.3%; and other 0.1%,
30 Literacy is defined here as the percentage of people age 15 and over who has ever attended school.
31 As Ellen Grigsby (1999) explains, democracies are variations of one of two general types of executive-
legislative structures: the presidential system or the parliamentary system.  “Presidential systems are ones 
in which executive-legislative relations operate as follows: a) executives and legislatures are elected in 
distinct, separate elections for fixed terms of office; b) executives cannot be removed by votes of no 
confidence; and c) executive power is separated from legislative power…In contrast, parliamentary systems 
are ones in which a) legislatures select executive leadership; b) executives can be removed by votes of no 
confidence and new elections may be necessitated; and c) executive and legislative powers are combined—
not separated—in order to forge a working partnership between the two branches of government” (251 and 
252).
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The central government has three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.  
The executive branch is comprised of the head of state, the reigning British monarch 
represented in Jamaica by the governor general; the head of government, the prime 
minister; the deputy prime minister; and the Cabinet.32  The legislative branch is 
comprised of a bicameral Parliament consisting of a 21-member Senate and a House of 
Representatives.33  The judicial branch is comprised of the Supreme Court and the Court 
of Appeal.34  Jamaica’s local government is comprised of parish councils, one for each of 
the 14 parishes.  Along with cultivating robust national and local politics, Jamaica 
actively participates in several international organizations including the Caribbean 
Community or CARICOM, United Nations, Association of African Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) States, G-77, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Interpol, and 
Organization of American States (OAS).  Jamaica also maintains diplomatic personnel 
worldwide.
The Politics of Agriculture in Jamaica
Decision making in Jamaica tends to follow a pluralist model but with a caveat.  
Politicians openly promote political tribalism and rent-seeking amongst their 
constituencies to cultivate and foster voter loyalty and maintain control of entire 
communities through a culture of manipulation and intimidation.  This has escalated 
political crime and violence in Jamaica.  All adult Jamaicans have the right to vote.  
32 Queen Elizabeth II has presided as Jamaica’s head of state since February 6, 1952 and Sir Howard Felix 
Cooke has presided as governor general since August 1, 1991.  Prime Minister Percival James (PJ)
Patterson has presided since March 30, 1992.
33 The governor general, with advice from the prime minister and the leader of the opposition, appoints the 
senators and members of the House of Representatives are elected by popular vote.  
34 The governor general appoints Supreme Court judges on the recommendation of the prime minister.
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There tends to be close ties between government and industry. In the agricultural sector 
this is seen in lawmakers’ involvement in business activity.   Many government officials 
own businesses and operate equally as lawmakers and businessmen.  Some ministers 
farm recreationally but the researcher is not aware of any significant involvement in 
commercial farming activity.  In general, ministers like most Jamaican elites, are highly 
educated professionals who tend to have worked previously in service capacities such as 
law, medicine, and commerce.  
Regarding the political mindset vis-à- vis Jamaica’s agricultural future, decision-
making tends to be highly contentious as is the norm in democratic societies, but once the 
minister of agriculture issues a directive, that directive is generally implemented by 
stakeholders in a collaborative fashion.  After years of endorsing strict import 
liberalization for agricultural and other consumer goods, Jamaica’s decision-makers 
are emphasizing the need to improve and increase domestic crop production and 
productivity.  People are gradually realizing that strict reliance on imported food is a 
drain on the economy in that it depletes valuable foreign exchange reserves.  Moreover, 
they are utilizing the country’s pluralist political structure and process to make their 
views heard.  This has resulted in increased interest amongst decision makers in 
promoting production and consumption of Jamaican food crops and other products.  This 
resurgent philosophy is consistent with Michael Manley’s “Eat What You Grow” 
campaign, which he promoted during his first term in office in the 1970s.  Incidentally, 
this campaign failed due to a lack of popular support stemming from the chronic food 
shortages the country experienced at the time due a lack of foreign exchange caused by 
capital flight in response to Manley’s radical philosophy.  
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In general, government, industry, and civil society are allied in support of 
Jamaican agriculture.  The problem, however, stems from their lack of vision and will in
devising a comprehensive national development strategy featuring agriculture as a 
cornerstone.  Civil society is generally recognized to be vocal in its critique of faulty 
political decision-making and policies. However, civil society is perceived to be weak in 
their activism for change.  But, according to persons interviewed for this research, this is 
changing as civil society becomes more activist for change.  Recently, for example, civil 
society organizations have been pressing for increased local involvement in farming as a 
means of fostering productive activity, increasing domestic production, and reducing 
unemployment.  Civil society is also actively encouraging local consumption of Jamaica-
produced food.  The “Eat Jamaica” campaign begun in early 2004 is instructive in this 
regard.  The minister of agriculture, who wields the real power in initiating and effecting 
change in agricultural decision-making, has been responding to these demands by civil 
society.  He is obligated to respond per his mandate to regularly go out into the field, 
observe progress or lack thereof, and respond to stakeholder complaints and requests for 
change.  By all accounts, this response has trickled down throughout the Ministry of 
Agriculture and is diffusing to other ministries in a process of developmental change.
Jamaica in the International Political Economy
Due to its low GDP level—general and per capita—relative to advanced 
industrialized countries, Jamaica is widely considered a Third World developing country.  
For the year 2000, the most recent year for which reliable statistics are available, 
Jamaica’s general and per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) were 
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$10.08 billion and $3,800 respectively.35  After an extended period of negative GDP 
growth during the late 1990s, Jamaica’s real GDP growth rate in 2000 was a nominal 0.2 
percent.  The economy grew by 1.7 percent in 2001 and 0.8 percent in 2002.  In 2002, 
Jamaica’s unemployment rate was a high 16 percent, and 34.2 percent of its people lived 
below the poverty line.  Jamaica’s primary economic sectors are agriculture, services, 
extractive (mineral), and manufacturing.  Key industries are tourism, bauxite, sugar, 
textiles, rum, and light manufactures.  The country’s GDP composition by (amalgamated)
sector in 2002 was: agriculture with 6 percent, industry with 31 percent, and services with 
63 percent.  By occupation, 60 percent of the labor force works in services, 21 percent in 
agriculture, and 19 percent in industry.  Despite the concentration of labor in services, 
Jamaica is very much an agricultural country and agriculture continues to be an economic 
mainstay inasmuch as the country is still considered a primary commodity exporter and 
secondary product/service importer.  Unfortunately, however, agriculture does not 
generate the type of revenue the country needs to thrive.  That said, key agriculture 
products are sugarcane, bananas, coffee, citrus, and cocoa, and Jamaica’s primary export 
commodities are alumina, bauxite, sugar, bananas, and rum.  For the most part, Jamaica 
imports mainly agricultural and industrial inputs—namely machinery, transport 
equipment, construction materials—food, and fuel.  Shockingly, despite its natural 
suitability to farming, Jamaica is a net importer of food.  Unfortunately for the 
government’s coffers, Jamaica also routinely suffers a trade deficit.  In 2000, for 
example, Jamaica’s exports earned $1.7 billion while the country imported $3 billion 
35 Many of the statistics found in this and the next paragraph were taken from the online CIA Factbook
published by the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. government.  See
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/jm.html.
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worth of goods.  Compounding the country’s problems is the huge external debt it has 
amassed.  
According to the CIA Factbook, Jamaica’s economic woes are many, including: 
“high interest rates; increased foreign competition, the weak financial condition of 
business in general resulting in receiverships or closures and downsizings of companies; 
the shift in investment portfolios to non-productive, short-term high yield instruments; a 
pressured, sometimes sliding, exchange rate; a widening merchandise trade deficit; and a 
growing internal debt for government bailouts to various ailing sectors of the economy, 
particularly the financial sector.”36  What the CIA does not mention, at least not 
explicitly, is the extent to which external actors—including the CIA itself—have created 
Jamaica’s difficulties.  Many scholars and groups outside the Caribbean tend to place the 
blame squarely on Jamaicans for the predicament they find themselves in today.  
However, as any enlightened student of contemporary world affairs understands, a 
depressed political economy in today’s era of globalization is usually a product of the 
action and influence of forces acting from both within and without said political 
economy.  Jamaica is no exception.  Certainly, given its history as a formerly colonized 
territory of a major European metropolitan power and its geopolitical significance given 
its location just south of the United States, Jamaica has always been a pawn of those with 
a vested interest in shaping the international political economy, and Jamaica’s destiny in 
it, to their own advantage often under the guise of acting for the country’s benefit.  
Whether their agenda wrought stability and prosperity for Jamaica was not necessarily 
important.  What mattered instead was the nature and magnitude of the payoff for those 
36 www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/jm.html.
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who wielded power and influence in, and over, the country.  In some cases, they were 
foreign actors; in others, the culprits were locals.  
Since gaining independence in the 1950s-60s, Jamaica and other Caribbean 
countries have undergone tremendous changes from both within their borders and 
without.  For most countries, the decade following independence was a time of growth 
and relative prosperity.  Contrary to the expectations of their colonizers and other 
external actors, the countries transitioned from colonial territories to independent 
countries without much internal dislocation.  Many of them, Jamaica included, made 
significant strides in managing their own affairs and, in the process, engendered progress 
in the economic and social spheres.37  It was during this period that Jamaica and its 
developing country counterparts formed the New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
and began to question the established world order and their inferior place in it.  As 
Wendell Bell explained, they began “seeking new world views and theoretical 
explanations to serve as organizing principles to challenge the old international order that 
had permitted the rich nations to become richer and intercountry inequality to increase.  
And it sent them toward new international economic relations in which there would be, if 
they had their way, equity in international trade, increased local control over 
multinational corporations, and a limitation on the foreign exploitation of local natural 
resources.”38  However, this bravado began to dissipate in the Caribbean during the mid 
to late 1970s when the first of a series of global economic crises hit the region and set the 
stage for a fundamental alteration of economic and social relations both within the region 
37 McIntyre 1991, x.
38 Bell 1977, 683-684.
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and between the region and powerful external actors, namely the international financial 
institutions (IFIs), the United States, and former European metropolitan powers, now one 
body in the form of the European Union (EU).
As former colonial territories, Jamaica and other Caribbean countries have always 
been highly vulnerable to the vagaries of the external economy.  Independence made 
them even more so as they could no longer rely on guaranteed assistance or stewardship 
from metropolitan governments.  During the 1970s, the global economy contracted and 
all states, developed and developing, felt the blow to their economies.  The post-war era 
of rapid economic growth had ended and worldwide economic contraction took its place.  
This contraction was precipitated by a series of externally driven economic shocks from 
the fall of the U.S. dollar, the oil crisis, and ultimately the depression of the 1980s, 
causing recession in developed economies and a massive decline in commodity prices, 
which decimated natural resource economies dependent on traditional primary product 
exports.   The oil and debt crises were particularly significant in this regard.
The oil crisis
Soaring oil prices during the 1970s led developing countries to take on 
large debts from international commercial banks.  Nevertheless, the Third World 
felt renewed dynamism as the oil-producing developing countries’ new power in 
the international political economy led to the emergence of the new international 
economic order (NIEO) among the world’s developing countries.  This new order 
gave additional leverage to the developing countries as they advanced their 
development goals with economic nationalism through the mid to late 1970s 
before plunging commodity prices eventually forced an ideological reorientation.
The debt crisis
Plunging commodity prices during the late 1970s to early 1980s 
compounded the effects of the oil crisis and forced developing countries to take 
on additional loans.  Because the international commercial banks from which 
they had borrowed previously were leery about extending them new loans in the 
face of their already significant debt loads, developing countries turned to the 
IMF and World Bank to request multilateral loans and to get their seal of 
approval for qualifying for new loans from the commercial banks.
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As Ramesh Ramsaran noted, there has been much debate about the roles played 
by internal policies and external factors in the economic crisis of the 1970s and 80s.  
“Depressed commodity prices, developments in technology, rising import prices, high 
interest rates, high fuel prices, increased protectionism in the industrial countries, and 
reduced capital flows have all been cited as contributing to the economic difficulties of 
developing countries.”39  Also blamed, especially by external lending agencies, have been 
questionable internal policy decisions, inept economic management, and corruption.40
Indeed, so heavy is the focus on internal factors that the multilateral financial institutions 
have propagated the notion that the countries heavily affected by the crisis could have 
moderated its impact and, by extension, could grow in difficult economic circumstances 
if they pursued the “right” policies, and such policies should be adopted universally by all 
countries.41  These “right” policies, since delineated in the “Washington Consensus,” 
have guided the course of economic reform worldwide since the late 1970s.42  For 
developing countries that sought financial assistance from external funding sources in the 
aftermath of the crisis, externally-dictated reform was compelled by international 
financial organizations such as the World Bank and IMF, which made structural 
adjustment based on the Washington Consensus a condition of financial assistance.  Most 
39 Ramsaran 1992, 2.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 The term “Washington Consensus” was coined in 1989 by economist John Williamson and refers to a list 
of policy recommendations for countries interested in reforming their economies.  These recommendations 
have been instrumental in shaping economic reforms in the developing and post-communist worlds.  The 
recommendations are as follows: fiscal discipline; redirected public expenditure; tax reform; financial 
liberalization; adoption of a single, competitive exchange rate; trade liberalization; elimination of barriers 
to foreign direct investment; privatization of state owned enterprises; deregulation of market entry and 
competition; and ensuring secure property rights.  See John Williamson, ed. Latin American Adjustment: 
How much has Happened (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990).
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countries seeking assistance—poor and desperate as they were, and in many cases still 
are—were sufficiently prostrate and vulnerable that they overlooked the conditionalities 
and agreed to implement expeditiously the required reforms despite their projected 
deleterious impact on the people and societies within the countries.  These reforms, 
particularly trade liberalization, would ultimately become the sine qua non for 
membership in the international economic system governed by the “holy trinity”—the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization—and would 
reinforce the pattern of skewed development established by the plantation economy in 
these countries, their longstanding mode of production and export.43
Scholars contend that the plantation economy, which emphasizes production of 
primary commodities for export and import of processed goods from abroad, is 
institutionalized in Jamaica and has retarded its development trajectory.  George 
Beckford, for example, argued vigorously and persuasively in his many works on the 
subject that the plantation economy brought to Jamaica by imperialist forces forced 
Jamaica to produce and supply raw materials for rich metropolitan countries, providing 
them the material they needed to fuel their industrial development.44  This research 
vindicates Beckford’s contention by tracing Jamaica’s economic history and validating 
that the plantation economy is in fact ingrained in Jamaica and has been so since the 
Europeans first arrived on its soil, claimed it as a colony, and molded its economy to 
serve their food security and development purposes.  The research also confirms 
43 Metropolitan countries such as the United States wield substantial, if not controlling, power in these 
organizations.  Ironically, they have not been compelled to implement Bank-Fund structural adjustment 
reforms.  On the contrary, despite their membership in these organizations, they continue to practice 
flagrant trade protectionism against each other’s exports and against products of export interest—and, thus, 
development— for developing countries.
44 George Beckford, Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World
(Jamaica: Maroon Publishing House, 1972).
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Beckford’s assertion that certain domestically-motivated forces have worked with 
externally-driven forces throughout Jamaica’s history to institutionalize the plantation 
economy in Jamaica and ensure their privileged and protected places in the established 
order within Jamaica and the world-trading regime.  The plantation economy is so 
entrenched in Jamaica that many Jamaicans cannot look beyond the preferential trade 
arrangement (PTA), which grants Jamaica duty-free access to certain rich country 
markets for a coterie of mainly unprocessed goods, to envision a fate for their country 
other than producer and supplier of raw sugar, banana, and other primary commodities.45
Jamaicans have also tended, due to the acclimatizing plantation economy, to value goods 
produced externally over those produced at home.  Hence, Jamaica is a net-importer of 
goods, including food, and has negligible manufacturing capacity for what is expected of 
a country located so close to the super-developed United States.  Jamaica imports so 
much of what it consumes that it no longer produces enough of its traditional exports to 
meet its PTA quotas.  Shockingly, it has had to import sugar and bananas from 
neighboring Latin America in recent years to service its quotas.  
This research contends that Jamaica’s future, indeed its very survival, requires a 
reversal its declining production and productivity in agriculture and attainment of 
considerable value-added production capacity to buttress and supplement its capabilities 
in primary commodity production.  Clearly, Jamaica must formulate and implement a 
more effective national development policy with agricultural diversification, innovation, 
and productivity as a cornerstone.  This is the way of the industrial age through which the
international political economy is passing and is essential for survival in the knowledge-
45 See Appendix A for a backgrounder on PTAs.  The PTA’s impact on Jamaica’s development is assessed 
in detail in Chapter 4 of this paper.
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based information age into which the world economy is moving.  However, action by 
Jamaica alone is not a panacea for development.  Because they overwhelm developing 
country goods produced in spite of internally-motivated constraints, external challenges 
are typically more destructive than internal negligence.  Prominent among these 
externally-driven challenges are rich country tariff barriers, production and export 
subsidies, and food dumping under the guise of food aid programs—all of which reduce 
developing country competitiveness in their own markets and restrict developing country 
access to rich country markets.  According to the World Bank, “[h]igh trade barriers 
imposed by industrial countries on agriculture and processed food imports, along with 
agricultural subsidies, have contributed to the decline in developing countries’ share of 
world trade in these commodities.”46  While Jamaica must eliminate internally-motivated 
constraints on national development, the onus is on resource-rich developed countries and 
international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and 
IMF—all controlled by developed countries—to eradicate the externally-driven 
constraints that marginalize developing countries like Jamaica in the world-trading 
regime.47  The following section delineates a few of the more insidious externally-driven 
constraints on Jamaica’s agricultural development.
Agriculture, Trade, and Development in the International Political 
Economy – Where Jamaica Fits In
The world is becoming increasingly interdependent due to globalization powered 
by technology and trade.  Globalization, the convergence of a global political economy, is 
46 World Bank 2001, x.
47 Voting shares in the IMF and Word Bank are dictated by member countries’ size and influence in the 
global economy.  See Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country Perspectives (Anthem 
Press, 2003) for an explanation of power and voting share allocation in the Bretton Woods institutions.  
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sweeping the world and has forced integration on various levels—economic, political, 
cultural, and social.  Countries, from the small island economies of the Caribbean to the 
large diversified economies of the industrialized North, and everything in between, find 
themselves inextricably linked in a new global economy characterized by an 
unprecedented cross-border mobility of goods, services, capital and people.  This new 
global economy differs from the one conceived by Adam Smith and expounded upon in 
his 1776 treatise The Wealth of Nations in that Smith did not envision today’s mobility of 
capital.  The literature on globalization suggests that mobile capital is the phenomenon 
that links the world’s economies to the degree we see in today’s global economy, and 
expanded trade facilitated by liberalization is its engine of growth.  “Free trade” grounded 
in economic liberalization is the premise of today’s global trading regime.  Indeed, 
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), which administers the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other multilateral trade agreements to 
which the majority of the world’s countries subscribe,48 compels countries to liberalize 
their economic systems in accordance with the Washington Consensus to gain full access 
to other countries’ markets and the multilateral financial institutions.  However, Jamaica 
and many developing countries opened their economies during the 1970s and 80s, long 
before the World Trade Organization came into being, when they accepted World Bank-
IMF loans with structural adjustment conditionalities mandating trade and financial 
liberalization.  
48 These agreements include the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Agreement on Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto 
Sanitary Measures (SPS).   There are currently 146 members of the World Trade Organization.
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As discussed previously, the 1980s were a period of great hardship for the 
Caribbean and much of the developing world.  In the aftermath of the oil crisis of the 
previous decade, many countries accumulated large debts from commercial banks and, 
due to a decline in real incomes because of falling commodity prices, were unable to 
repay their loans.  Consequently, despite a reluctance to acquire yet more debt, they 
sought assistance from the multilateral lending agencies, namely the World Bank and 
IMF.  It is not surprising that “[p]ersistent economic decline, high debt levels, and foreign 
exchange problems force countries to succumb easily to [loan] programs even if they 
themselves are skeptical with respect to their ability to restore growth.”49  Unfortunately, 
most debtor countries, including Jamaica, today owe unsustainable debt amounts to the 
multilateral lending institutions, international commercial banks, and individual 
industrialized countries.  Indeed, some debtor countries pay more to service their debts 
than they pay into their public service budgets and many routinely face a net outflow of 
capital.50  There is no standard formula for development.  The World Bank-IMF model 
treats all creditor countries as if they were a monolith requiring the same treatment and 
remedial course of action.51  Indeed, the Bank-Fund’s model of development presupposes 
that the same set of policies can be applied across the board to all countries regardless of 
contextual differences.  This approach disregards Sartori’s warning against conceptual 
49 Ramsaran 1992, 3.
50 According to Bear Stearns, the investment banking and securities firm the Government of Jamaica has 
contracted, Jamaica’s public sector debt stands at 150 percent of GDP and its domestic debt is 94.1 percent 
(as of July 2003).
51 Payer (1979) asserted that the World Bank has co-opted expertise on agricultural—and, indeed, all—
development issues.  “The World Bank is the largest single lender for agricultural development in the 
world.  For that reason alone it would deserve to be the focus of our inquiry.  More than that, though, it is 
the keystone of a structure built up through its own efforts which includes most other actors on the 
development scene from capitalist countries, coordinating them and subordinating them to its ‘empire’.  
This ensures that there can be no major challenges to the Bank’s pretended monopoly of development 
wisdom nor competition from rival sources of funds” (294).  
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stretching and, consequently, subjects the creditor countries to a host of ills that could 
have been prevented, or at least moderated, had the Bank-Fund considered particular 
internal conditions when devising a remedial course of action.52
For the most part, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) have not had the 
prescribed effect in Jamaica and other recipient countries.  On the contrary, SAPs 
exacerbated poverty, inequality, and instability wherever they were implemented.   By 
weakening the state and reducing its ability to provide its people basic public services, 
SAPs contracted the provision of education, health, and housing services.  In Jamaica, for 
example:
Real expenditure on social services was cut by 41 percent over the ten-year 
period, 1975/6-1985/6.  The share of government expenditure devoted to debt 
service climbed from 21 percent in 1980/81 to 44 percent in 1986/7…Real 
spending on education per Jamaican below 15 years of age fell by 40 percent 
between 1981/2 and 1985/6, most of this being concentrated in the two fiscal 
years following the 1984 IMF agreement.  The impact on the quality of the 
educational services provided has been quite dramatic.  One indicator is the rate 
of passes in high school leaving exams (GCE O level and CXC) which fell from 
62 percent in 1980 to 34 percent in 1985…Total real spending on health was cut 
by 35 percent between 1982/3 and 1985/6 alone…Low-cost housing is another 
item which fell casualty to adjustment programmes.  Capital expenditure on 
housing in 1985/6 had fallen to some 11 percent only of the level of 1982/3…The 
costs of purchasing the least-cost basket of minimum food requirements for a 
five-person household, as determined by the Jamaican Ministry of Health, 
increased by 429 percent over the six-year period June 1979 to July 1985.53
Structural adjustment also devastated Jamaica’s agriculture sector.  To be sure, the IMF 
and World Bank paid particular attention to agriculture when devising loan programs, 
providing large sums of money to help Jamaica and other developing countries 
52 For a detailed discussion of conceptual stretching, see Sartori Giovanni, “Concept Misinformation in 
Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1991, pp. 1033-1053.
53 These figures were taken from a study by the Working Group on Debt of the Association of Caribbean 
Economists (ACE) analyzing the effect of Jamaica’s SAPs from 1977 with the country’s first IMF 
agreement.  The study is outlined in Girvan et al. (1990).
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“modernize” their agricultural sectors.  Cheryl Payer illuminated the World Bank’s 
interest in helping poor country farmers weather the crises: 
It is not coincidental that the Bank’s new interest in the productive 
potential of the small farmer comes just at the time large agribusiness 
firms are realizing that their future lies not in the direct ownership of vast 
tracts of land, but in control over production through contracts with 
producer-suppliers (and, at the other end, control over markets)…Certain 
crops which in the past were grown only on plantations, because tight 
control of cultivation practices and speedy delivery to the processing plant 
were imperative, are now grown by smallholders clustered around a 
smaller plantation and processing plant run by a company which provides 
technical supervision, inputs, and processing for the outgrowers, who have 
to sell their crops through the company.54
Jamaica’s structural adjustment program eliminated its commodity boards, curtailed the 
number of extension officers in the field, eliminated food subsidies, removed import 
quantitative restrictions, and contracted import tariffs.55  Critics therefore argue that the 
costs of adjustment far outweigh any benefits that have resulted from the process.  In 
Jamaica, social costs included: declining living standards; deteriorating health, 
educational, and housing infrastructures; human resource deficiencies; and pervasive high 
emigration levels.56  Economic costs for Jamaica were numerous and included: 1) 
exacerbated dependent development and marginalization; 2) altered production structures 
precipitating a decline in manufacturing and a bias towards agricultural segments 
specializing in production for export, not for segments producing for domestic 
54 Payer 1979, 300.  Payer contended that much of the Bank’s “aid” intended for recipient countries’ 
poorest farmers is appropriated by local elites to serve their own interests.  This too is symptomatic of the 
plantation economy imperative.  In this case, the imperative manifests as collusion between external and 
local elites to entrench the dominance in the developing country of external capital in exchange for the 
buttressing of local elite power and control.  “So, while gently deploring the subversion of its good 
intentions by local elites and the lack of government interest in rural reform, the Bank is a major force 
ensuring the survival of that government and those rural elites” (306). 
55 Singh 1995, 256.
56 Le Franc 1994, xi-xiii.
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consumption; 3) declining food security; 4) a sharply devalued currency that is just about 
worthless in foreign exchange markets and which render exports cheap and imports 
dear—a significant problem since Jamaica imports a large portion of what residents 
consume; 5) a rapid increase in low-skilled, low-wage enterprises with a concomitant 
decrease in high-skilled, high-wage enterprises; 6) and an informalization of the 
country’s economy due to the decrease in jobs in traditionally-labor intensive sectors 
such as agriculture and mining.  The Bank’s interest reflected, and continues to reflect, 
the plantation economy imperative—that is, the rendering of developing country 
producers dependent on, and subordinate to, external financing and support.  Overall, the 
implementation of structural adjustment in Jamaica has caused a steady decline in the 
country’s economic prospects and a less than ideal integration into the world-trading 
regime.  
Hence, despite the convergence of economic systems worldwide due to trade 
liberalization, contradictions like agricultural subsidization and food dumping pervade 
the world-trading regime.  Liberalization may carry the promise of economic growth and 
development but debate is widespread about the extent to which free trade translates to 
fair trade, certainly with regards to question of full access to other countries’ markets.  
Some countries in the new global economy have highly developed economies while 
others are trying to play catch up.  Indeed, development is the key concern and challenge 
for many countries of the South.  Many of these countries, including Jamaica, have 
opened their economies and are linked to the world-trading regime, yet they do not reap 
its benefits.  Some development experts argue that the problem stems from conditions 
internal to the countries while others blame it on external factors such as the vestiges of 
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colonialism and continued neo-colonialism.  Whatever the explanation, the majority of 
the world’s countries are poor and desperate to gain a surer foothold in the world-trading 
regime in order to improve their economic condition.
Utilizing Adam Smith’s logic, and David Ricardo’s after him, trade proponents 
argue that free trade according to the theory of comparative advantage, wherein countries 
produce for export what they do efficiently based on their factor endowment and import 
what they produce inefficiently, benefits all countries equally with the cumulative trades 
serving the good of all.  Several trade models—including the Ricardian model, 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, and specific factors model—substantiate their argument.  Yet, 
although both liberalization and the logic of comparative undergird the WTO, many 
countries have not reaped the promised benefits of either.  Membership in the WTO, and 
trade according to its principles, has certainly not served them well.  These countries, 
most of which are underdeveloped, are not given full access to the markets of their 
advanced country counterparts for their traditional exports, e.g., sugar, fruits, cotton, and 
rice.  It can be argued that neoliberal economists, who in large part have defined the free 
trade ideology, use the logic of comparative advantage to persuade these developing 
countries that they should not try to attain the requisite industrial capacity and capability 
for manufacturing finished goods because their natural factor endowment is more ideally 
suited to the production of primary commodities.  Given the necessity of acquiring 
manufacturing capacity and capability for competing effectively in today’s diversified 
global economy, the illogic and insidiousness of this argument is glaring.  Consequently, 
Jamaica and developing countries everywhere have begun to question the WTO promise 
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of equity and parity for all member countries and have begun to confront their 
subordinate status in the international political economy.  
Theoretical Framework
The research focuses on material that assesses trade and development from 
various theoretical perspectives.  To better understand the Jamaican socioeconomic 
experience and Jamaica’s position in the world trade regime, the research traces the 
evolution of development theory from classical liberal political economy roots to 
neoliberalism, the contemporary mainstream expression of development theory, and 
contextualizes Jamaica’s experience in this theoretical trajectory.  The historical 
theoretical examination encompasses  (in the order listed) classical mercantilism, 
classical liberal political economy, the German Historical School (classical mercantilism 
revisited), Marxist political economy, neoclassical political economy, Keynesian political 
economy, modernization theory, dependency/world systems theory, and neoliberalism.  
Theories of development generally reflect the prevailing mode(s) of production.  
Therefore, capitalism has shaped development theory, both orthodox and radical, because 
it has been the dominant mode of production for centuries.  However, much of this 
theoretical canon is faulty and cannot be applied universally because development 
theorists have tended to obfuscate the fact that capitalism did not develop consistently 
across the world.  Scholars across the cannon formulated their theory based on the 
historical experience of their own countries.  Since Europeans and North Americans 
formulated most mainstream development theory, this of course meant that the cannon 
(with the exception of the Marxist and dependencia challenges to mainstream 
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development theory) reflects the European and North American experience.  Scholars 
also tended to blame countries that did not “modernize” in line with the developed 
country model.  Consequently, most development theory is applicable only to the world’s 
developed countries.  Given the prominence of neoliberalism in mainstream development 
theory and policy, this research undertook careful consideration of its applicability to the 
Jamaican experience.  The research ultimately recognizes the critical component of the 
cannon as more relevant to the developing country experience and explored this 
critique—and the various schools within the critique—as the answer to Jamaica’s 
problems.  
Methodology 
The research employs a methodology utilized by Vincent A. Mahler—a
longitudinal case study at the middle range of generality to assess the relevance of 
dependency theory to a particular historical relationship—i.e., the relationship between 
Jamaica’s agricultural production and trade and the international political economy—and 
the extent to which this relationship fostered development in Jamaica.57  This historical 
case study methodology allows the researcher to infer from the findings a generalized 
conclusion for the Caribbean and other similarly situated developing countries.  The 
research assesses the obstacles to development that have plagued the Commonwealth 
Caribbean over the 30-year period from 1970-2000 and prescribes solutions to the 
problems.  The researcher hypothesizes that constraints from without and within have 
57 Mahler 1981, 470.  In Mahler’s terminology, the middle range of generality is “the analysis of relations 
between developed countries and a particular type of Third World country for a particular mode of contact 
over an extended period of time.” 
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exacerbated associated dependent development in Jamaica and the Caribbean by 
retarding agricultural development, worsening socioeconomic welfare, and stymieing 
self-reinforcing, sustainable growth and development.  To identify and assess the major 
obstacles to, and chances for, development facing developing countries, the experience of 
the Commonwealth Caribbean is evaluated in macro and the Jamaican experience is 
situated in the context of the wider Commonwealth Caribbean and the Third World at 
large.  Jamaica was chosen as the primary case study because it one of the region’s (and, 
indeed, the world’s) most structurally adjusted countries, and one with which extra-
regional organizations and countries are extremely engaged.  In addition, Jamaica is a 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) founding member and a strong supporter of the 
regional integration movement in the Caribbean.  Given the extent of the country’s 
progress on liberalization and its relationship and involvement with external actors 
grounded in the neoliberal school of development, one likely presumes that Jamaica is the 
Caribbean’s most economically developed country.  The research tests this hypothesis 
and offer explanations for any findings to the contrary.  With regard to CARICOM’s role 
in Caribbean development, the researcher contends that CARICOM must play a more 
proactive role in economic strategy and planning and must incorporate the voices of all 
segments of the Caribbean’s people—government, business, and civil society—to help its 
member states manage the deleterious effects of the other external factors and engender 
the type of self-reliant development that will finally ameliorate, if not break, the chains of 
economic dependency and marginalization.
The researcher collected both qualitative and quantitative data and used content 
analysis, interviews, archival research, and participant observation to interpret this data.  
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The researcher also assessed aggregate economic data at the macro and micro levels to 
ascertain agricultural and more general economic trends in Jamaica and the Caribbean.  
The research employs a joint national and global level of analysis.  The researcher 
assesses the extent to which Jamaica achieved select measures of development over the 
period under review and the role played by external and internal forces in effecting, or 
impeding, this development.  These measures include: degree of food security; 
GDP/GNP growth; diversification and expansion of industrial infrastructure; 
modernization of agriculture; and effective integration into the world-trading regime.58
In investigating regional macroeconomic data, the researcher considered that official data 
on economic indicators in poor and developing regions are often weak and may conceal 
more than they reveal.59  Regional data are also often imbalanced by the strongest 
economies of the region.  The researcher attempted to overcome these data limitations by 
locating and reviewing (additional) comparable statistics compiled by extra-regional 
organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank, which, theoretically, should 
not include the same biases.  
The researcher gathered preliminary data in the United States.  Sources of 
information included: the IMF, World Bank, Inter-American and other development 
banks; university libraries; the WTO; CARICOM; international and regional 
organizations such as the United Nations and Organization of American states; the 
Internet; various think tanks; and Latin American/Caribbean policy institutes and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  After doing an extensive literature review of 
58 This was measured by calculating annual FDI levels, import/export ratios, and proportion of semi-
finished and finished manufactured goods in exports.
59 Ghai and Hewitt de Alcántara 1991, 14.
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the key theoretical perspectives at issue in the research, the researcher targeted reports 
generated by the IMF, World Bank, United Nations, WTO, CARICOM, Inter-American 
Development Bank, Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and other regional 
development banks for a more nuanced region and country specific analysis.  While 
doing this secondary research, the researcher also conducted first-round interviews to 
begin generating primary research data.60  Interview prospects residing in the U.S. 
included ambassadors and other diplomatic personnel from Latin America and the 
Caribbean; staff of key multilateral and regional organizations such as the United 
Nations, World Bank, IMF, Organization of American States, Inter-American 
Development Bank, and CARICOM; and expatriate Jamaicans and other Caribbean 
persons who could speak authoritatively about the Jamaican/Caribbean economic 
experience over the period under review.   
After completing the U.S.-based secondary research and first round interviews, 
the researcher traveled to the Caribbean to conduct the bulk of the project’s primary 
research and examine secondary research material that are not readily available in the 
United States, such as government reports, Jamaica Gleaner (newspaper) archives, and 
CARICOM and Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) resources.  Given its significance 
to the project, Jamaica was the primary research destination.  There, the researcher 
conducted her second-round interviews targeting key public sector, private sector, and 
civil society leaders and other stakeholders in Jamaica’s agricultural development who 
could provide insight on Jamaica’s development over the period under review.  The 
researcher was particularly interested in persons who could contribute substantively to 
60 See Appendix B for the researcher’s list of interview questions.
41
the research by revealing and/or corroborating areas of development facilitated or 
impeded by internal and external economic forces.  
The researcher chose the Jamaica-based interview prospects based on her reading 
of the literature on Caribbean economic development and of key Jamaican newspapers, 
namely the Jamaica Gleaner and Jamaica Observer.  The newspapers were crucial in this 
regard.  Daily reading via the Internet enabled the researcher to monitor agriculture-
related developments as they occurred on the ground and identify for interviews the key 
organizations and players within them.  Prior to her departure, the researcher determined 
that the relevant groups to try to interview were public sector agencies charged with 
agriculture, trade, and finance matters; private sector agricultural enterprises, including 
farmers; organized labor; farmer membership groups; and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) with interest in agriculture, trade, and development.  With respect 
to agriculture, the key Jamaican actor groups can be roughly classified as governmental, 
private sector, domestic civil society, and international organization.  Even within these 
categories, however, there are differences of opinion and different interests represented.  
For example, government officials have varying perspectives on the role agriculture plays 
in Jamaica’s development.  Some officials, namely those in the Ministry of Agriculture, 
are emphatic about the importance of agriculture to economic development and argue 
convincingly that government must prioritize agriculture in its strategy for growth and 
development.  Other officials, namely those in the finance and commerce ministries, are 
ambivalent about the issue.  Some are even dismissive of agriculture.
Groups targeted in the government were high-level officials and experts on 
agriculture and trade working within relevant ministries.  These included the ministries of 
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agriculture, commerce, finance, and foreign affairs and trade. Other governmental 
organizations targeted for interviews included the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), 
Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), National Export-Import Bank of Jamaica, 
Development Bank of Jamaica, the Rural Agricultural Development Authority (RADA), 
Sugar Company of Jamaica, Jamaica Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO), and the 
Agricultural Development Corporation.  The researcher succeeded in interviewing high-
level officials of all these organizations.  These public sector entities reflected varying 
perspectives.  It was important to get at these different perspectives through personal 
interviews to gain a nuanced understanding of the different levels of influence, different 
views on policies, and the extent to which public sector officials had a personal (i.e., 
business) stake in agriculture that has influenced their agency in policy making, 
implementation, and analysis.  
The researcher also targeted members of the private sector, particularly farmers—
both smallholder and large-scale—and the agro-industry companies that have attained 
significant export market share in the U.S. and/or EU.  It was important to talk with 
farmers to learn from those most intimately involved in agriculture about the challenges 
and constraints they face.  Due to the widely divergent constraints and opportunities 
facing smallholders vis-à-vis largescale farmers, the researcher made it a point to talk 
with both types of farmers to gain a nuanced understanding of the different levels of 
farmer influence in agricultural policymaking, the extent of external involvement in the 
larger commercial enterprises, and whether external involvement in local farming 
enterprises endows a predisposition for success through income generation.  Agro-
industry companies included Jamaica Producers, Walkerswood Foods, J Wray and 
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Nephew Ltd., and Grace, Kennedy, and Company.  With these groups, the researcher 
addressed the methodologies they employed within Jamaica—i.e., their agency in 
domestic policymaking that produced governmental action in their favor—and in external 
markets to attain product diversification, export capacity, and market share in “hard to 
crack” international markets.  Other private sector entities targeted for interviews 
included the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica, Dairy Industries Ltd., TruJuice, 
Jamaica Exporters Association, Coffee Industries Ltd., Jamaica Chamber of Commerce, 
Jamaica Manufacturers Association, Worthy Park Sugar Factory, and the Council of 
Caribbean Agribusiness Association.  The researcher asked the same questions of these 
groups to attain a better understanding of why there is not a more significant agro-
industrial presence in Jamaica and why some agro-industries grow and succeed and 
others do not.  The researcher succeeded in interviewing high-level officials of all but one 
of these organizations.  
In addition to government and the private sector, it was also deemed critical to 
interview members of civil society because these groups have increased their agency in 
national policymaking as an important intermediary between government and industry.  
These civil society organizations reflected varying perspectives.  It was important to get 
at these different perspectives through personal interviews to gain a nuanced 
understanding of the different levels of influence, different views on policies, and the 
extent to which they have mobilized (or impeded) policy action on agriculture that 
enhanced societal welfare by increasing socioeconomic development.  The researcher 
targeted leaders of Jamaica’s labor unions, including: the JLP affiliated Bustamante 
Industrial Trade Union (BITU), the PNP affiliated National Workers’ Union (NWU), the 
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Union of Schools, Agriculture, and Allied Workers, and the Jamaica Confederation of 
Trade Unions, an umbrella organization of Jamaica’s trade unions.  Getting at the 
perspective of union leaders was crucial to this research in that it enabled the researcher 
to identify areas in agricultural policymaking and implementation where labor resisted 
agricultural development, choosing instead to maintain the labor-intensive, non-
mechanized status quo in order to preserve agriculture as a large employer of labor.  
Other civil society groups targeted for interviews included: the agricultural member and 
interest group organizations (All-Island Cane Farmers Association, All-Island Banana 
Growers Association, and Jamaica Agricultural Society); agricultural development 
organizations (Jamaica Agricultural Development Foundation, Caribbean Agricultural 
Research and Development Institute, Caribbean Regional Human Resource Development 
Program for Economic Competitiveness, and Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on 
Agriculture); and the quasi-governmental/industry commodity boards (Banana Industry 
Board, Coffee Industry Board, and Sugar Industry Authority).  The researcher succeeded 
in interviewing high-level officials of all these organizations.
The researcher had two primary foci in each interview: firstly, investigating the 
role each stakeholder entity—both the individual being interviewed and his/her 
organization—has played in facilitating or impeding Jamaica’s agricultural development 
and secondly, exploring the contribution—both previous and potential—of the various 
organizations to any national development strategy forged by a tripartite coalition of 
Jamaica’s public and private sectors in collaboration with civil society interest groups.  
Once she constructed her Jamaica-based interview list, the researcher contacted interview 
prospects from her home base in the U.S. by phone and/or email to schedule interviews.  
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This was done for approximately 75 percent of the Jamaica-based interview prospects, 
enabling the researcher to start conducting interviews immediately upon her arrival in 
Jamaica.  The researcher also employed the snowball technique to identify additional 
interview prospects once on the ground in Jamaica.  While in Jamaica, the researcher 
observed several meetings in which national leaders addressed Jamaica’s agricultural and 
national development policy and goals for the future.  This research strategy, participant 
observation, was key to this research because it helped reveal the extent to which 
domestically motivated forces mobilize or stymie development.  Conducting field 
research in Jamaica also provided the researcher ready access to the faculty and staff at 
the main campus of the University of the West Indies (UWI).61  After completing the 
field research component in Jamaica, the researcher returned to the United States to 
finalize U.S.-based secondary research and synthesize the research findings to complete 
the dissertation.  
The next four chapters of the dissertation analyze the various theoretical and 
methodological formulations of development, agriculture in the world-trading regime, 
agriculture in Jamaica’s political economy, and the way forward for Jamaica.  The final 
chapter revisits the hypotheses posed in this chapter and presents prescriptions for 
Jamaica’s way forward such that it is no longer consigned to plantation economy and 
associated dependent development. 
61 With satellite campuses across the Caribbean, UWI’s origin and growth stemmed from regional 
collaboration.  As such, it is a key component in this research.  
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Chapter 2
Theoretical and Methodological Formulations of Development and 
Underdevelopment
But while they prate of economic laws, men and women are starving.  We must lay hold of the fact that 
economic laws are not made by nature.  They are made by human beings.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1932
Capitalism is the extraordinary belief that the nastiest of men, for the nastiest of reasons, will somehow 
work for the benefit of us all.
John Maynard Keynes
[There is an] urgent need to revive development theory, not as a branch of policy-oriented social science within the 
parameters of an unquestioned capitalist world order, but as a field of critical enquiry about the contemporary 
dynamics of that order itself, with the imperative policy complications for the survival of civilized and decent life, 
and not just in the ex-colonial countries.
Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory (1996, 43)
What is Development?  Underdevelopment?
The debate about what constitutes development is quite contentious.  Although 
the literature abounds on the issue and question of development, there is no international 
consensus on a definition.  A standard definition of development highlights national 
productive capacity, emphasizing the state’s ability to “produce economic wealth, which 
in turn transforms society from a subsistence—or agricultural—based economy to one 
where most of society’s wealth is derived from the production of manufactured goods 
and services.”62  The concept of underdevelopment, typically addressed in the 
dependency literature, generally encompasses low GNP per capita, low rates of GNP per 
capita growth, high rates of inequality in income distribution, bureaucratic authoritarian 
political regimes, and the regime’s inability to meet the basic needs of its population.63
Dependistas, proponents of the dependency school of development, allege that 
dependency causes underdevelopment.  To be sure, dependency and underdevelopment 
62 Balaam and Veseth 1996.
63 Farmer 1999, 2.
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are multifaceted concepts that underscore various phenomena; the choice of phenomena 
depends on the stream of theory one supports.64  Some development theorists stress basic 
economic indicators while others argue that no definition of development would be 
complete without consideration of the socio-political context in which an economy exists 
and functions.  
For most economists, development is limited to pure economics.  Not 
surprisingly, they consider an expanded gross national product (GNP) or gross national 
income (GNI) and the accumulation of wealth the prima facie definition of national 
development.  In fact, “prior to the 1970s, development was nearly always seen as an 
economic phenomenon in which rapid gains in overall and per capita GNP growth would 
either ‘trickle down’ to the masses in the form of jobs and other economic opportunities 
or create the necessary conditions for the wider distribution of the economic and social 
benefits of growth.  Problems of poverty, unemployment, and income distribution were 
of secondary importance to ‘getting the growth job done.’”65  Some scholars disagree 
with an explicit focus on income as the indicator of development.  Rourke and Boyer 
explained that “[g]ross national income in either absolute or per capita form should be 
used cautiously as a yardstick of economic strength because it does not measure the 
distribution of wealth among a population. There are countries (most notably, the oil-rich 
countries of the Middle East) where per capita GNI is high but where the bulk of the 
wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, leaving the remainder in 
poverty. Even within countries in which wealth is more evenly distributed (such as those 
in North America or Western Europe), there is a tendency for dollars or pounds or francs 
64 Farmer 1999, 2.
65 Todaro 1994, 15.
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or marks to concentrate in the bank accounts of a relatively small percentage of the 
population. Yet the maldistribution of wealth tends to be greatest in the less developed 
countries, where the per capita GNI is far lower than in North America and Western 
Europe, and poverty is widespread.”66
During the 1970s, development was redefined from an explicit focus on 
GDP/GNI to an emphasis on reducing or eliminating poverty, inequality, and 
unemployment within the context of an expanding economy.67  This was the era of the 
“growth with equity” approach to development.  Dudley Seers captured the logic 
underlying the redefinition in his address to the Eleventh World Conference of the 
Society for International Development: 
The questions to ask about a country’s development are therefore: What 
has been happening to poverty?  What has been happening to 
unemployment?  What has been happening to inequality?  If all three of 
these have declined from high levels then beyond doubt this has been a 
period of development for the country concerned.  If one or two of these 
central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it 
would be strange to call the result “development” even if per capita 
income doubled.68
For sociologically inclined development economists such as Seers who recognize the 
limitations of using GNP or GNI as the prima facie indicator of national development, 
development encompasses less empirically-based “human needs” indicators such as 
social welfare, income equality, environmental stewardship, empowerment and 
utilization of women, and, probably the most controversial and nebulous of indicators, 
66 See John T. Rourke and Mark A. Boyer, World Politics: International Politics on the World Stage, Brief, 
Fourth Edition, (New York: Mc-Graw Hill, 2001).  Also see http://highered.mcgraw-
hill.com/sites/007248179x/student_view0/chapter11/web_map_1.html.  
67 Todaro 1994, 15.
68 Dudley Seers, The Meaning of Development, presented at the Eleventh World Conference of the Society 
for International Development, New Delhi, 1969.
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quality of life.  The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) spans the divide 
between the two groups by including both empirically and normatively based indicators 
as part of its human development index (HDI).  The UNDP aims to put people back at the 
center of the development process and the HDI is the centerpiece of the UNDP's basic 
human needs perspective, which recognizes ways other than economic indicators to 
measure development.  The HDI, as defined by the UNDP, strives to: 
…capture as many aspects of human development as possible in 
one simple, composite index and to produce a ranking of human 
development achievements. 
The concept of human development is much deeper and richer than what 
can be captured in any composite index or even by a detailed set of statistical 
indicators.  Yet it is useful to simplify a complex reality—and that is what the 
HDI set out to do.  It is a composite index of achievements in basic human 
capabilities in three fundamental dimensions—a long and healthy life, knowledge 
and a decent standard of living.  Three variables have been chosen to represent 
these three dimensions—life expectancy, educational attainment and income.69
Thus, recognizing that “[g]rowth is not the end of development—but…the absence of 
growth of is,” the HDI encompasses not only economic factors but also the environment, 
politics, and social welfare in a balanced perspective on development.
Amartya Sen, a prominent development scholar, agrees with the UNDP’s 
conception of development.  Sen has argued that expansion of freedom is both the 
primary end and the principal means of development.  “Development consists of the 
removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little 
opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency…It concentrates particularly on the roles 
and interconnections between certain crucial instrumental freedoms, including economic 
opportunities, political freedoms, social facilities, transparency guarantees, and protective 
69 UNDP 1997, 44.
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security.  Societal arrangements, involving many institutions (the state, the market, the 
legal system, political parties, the media, public interest groups and public discussion 
forums, among others) are investigated in terms of their contribution to enhancing and
guaranteeing the substantive freedoms of individuals, seen as active agents of change, 
rather than as passive recipients of dispensed benefits.”70  Several scholars share Sen’s 
point of view.  Edgar Owens, for example, presented the following insight in his 1987 
book: “Development has been treated by economists as if it were nothing more than an 
exercise in applied economics, unrelated to political ideas, forms of government, and the 
role of people in society.  It is high time we combine political and economic theory to 
consider not just ways in which societies can become more productive but the quality of 
the societies which are supposed to become more productive—the development of people 
rather than the development of things.”71  Even the World Bank—which throughout the 
1980s, endorsed economic growth as the goal of development—has joined the 
bandwagon.  It declared in its 1991 World Development Report, using normative 
language that previously would have been unheard of, that:
The challenge of development…is to improve the quality of life.  Especially in the 
world’s poor countries, a better quality of life generally calls for higher 
incomes—but it involves much more.  It encompasses as ends in themselves 
better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner 
environment, more equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom, and a 
richer cultural life.72
In keeping with the sociologically-oriented models, this project proposes the 
following definition of development, which merges the national income expansion 
70 Sen 1999, xii-xxiii.
71 Edgar Owens, The Future of Freedom in the Developing World: Economic Development as Political 
Reform (New York: Pergamon Press, 1987), xv.
72 World Bank, World Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 4.
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perspective with the institutional enhancement perspective—a process of societal 
advancement and enrichment featuring the commonly accepted measures of 
human/societal and national economic well-being: national income expansion, sectoral 
productivity, employment, poverty reduction, inequality, food security, and security of 
person and property.  Jamaica falls short on all these norms and thus, does not measure 
up to this definition of development—one that many developed world residents would 
argue is quite reasonable.  Due to its enormous debt, underutilized and/or mismanaged 
productive capacity, rampant crime, and the pervasive poverty of its people, Jamaica fits 
any of various unattractive descriptions, including but not limited to, undeveloped, 
underdeveloped, Third World, poor, and developing.  Delroy Chuck, opposition member 
of Jamaica’s parliament, captured the country’s plight in an editorial commentary 
published in the Jamaica Gleaner: “[b]y any realistic measure, Jamaica sinks into deeper 
poverty. Curiously, we consume like a First World country, at least by a small minority, 
but certainly not producing like one. We import more than we export and, consequently, 
our balance of payments with the rest of the world gets worse and there is no immediate 
prospect of reversing the downward slide. We survive and enjoy a decent quality of life 
from loans, grants, remittances and the proceeds of the drugs trade and, if any or all of 
these should stop, our economy would implode and certainly crash. Jamaica is not
producing and unless economic policies are reversed persistent poverty is the logical 
outcome.”73
Given Jamaica’s post-colonial record, the country has not achieved autonomous, 
self-sustaining development.  Indeed, some country specialists would argue that despite 
its resource endowment, both natural and human, Jamaica has retrogressed in recent 
73 Delroy Chuck, “The Politics of Poverty,” Jamaica Gleaner, 11 December 2002.
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decades on certain development indicators including productivity and competitiveness.  
Jamaica’s declining productive capacity is particularly marked in the agriculture sector 
and has escalated since independence.  Agriculture constitutes a significant part of 
countries’ socio-economies because it is linked to rural development, culture, and food 
security.74  Jamaica’s agricultural production, productivity, and competitiveness are 
eroding due to both internal negligence and external challenges.  Jamaica is still a largely 
rural country.  In many communities outside Kingston and Montego Bay—Jamaica’s two 
main cities—a majority of residents are farmers, and many more Jamaicans nationwide 
farm for supplemental income.  Agriculture is without question a vital component of 
Jamaica’s socio-economy, employing one-fourth of the populace and providing food for 
the rural poor.   Therefore, the country’s post-independence agricultural decline is of 
great concern and is the focus of much debate.  Given the essential linkage in natural 
resource economies between agricultural development and overall economic 
development, Jamaica’s agricultural deterioration is directly related to its stagnant growth 
and development.  Jamaica’s economic decline in the face of its considerable natural and 
human resource endowment begs the question of why and provides the impetus for this 
research.
Models of Development
Development theory has moved full circle since its genesis.  With each paradigm 
shift, the leading paradigm either critiqued or borrowed from preceding theories.  In 
either case, the new paradigm synthesized concepts embodied in preceding paradigms.  
74 The United States’ recent passage of the bioterrorism law requiring prior registration with the Food and 
Drug Administration of all food imports, including souvenir food items transported into the country by 
commercial airline passengers returning home from vacation, demonstrates the importance of agriculture to 
national security.
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As development theory evolved, mercantilism gave way to classical liberal political 
economy, classical liberal political economy to Marxism, Marxism to neoclassical 
economics, neoclassical economics to modernization theory, modernization theory to 
dependency/world systems theory, and, most recently, dependency/world systems theory 
to neoliberalism.  In a clear illustration of the Hegelian/Marxian principle of dialectical 
change, neoliberalism—currently the dominant paradigm of development—represents a 
resurgence of neoclassical economics grounded in classical liberal political economy.  
And, even more interestingly, the mounting backlash against the neoliberal model revisits 
the structuralist development paradigms of Marxism and dependency/world systems 
theory.  With each sea change, the leading development paradigm has responded to 
society’s ever-evolving mode of production and the class relations spawned by the new 
mode(s).  Until very late in the 20th century, different models of development were 
espoused, reflecting the presence of divergent modes of production.  Indeed, socialism, 
and with it Marxism-Leninism, figured quite prominently in the world economy until 
very recently.  However, the demise of the Soviet Union and the resulting end of the Cold 
War discredited socialist ideals and enshrined neoclassical ideals of liberal democracy 
and free market capitalism as the ideological bastions of the new post-Cold War world.75
Development paradigms fit generally into one of two categories, orthodox or 
radical political economy.76  Radical economic theory—such as Marxist and 
dependency/world systems theories—was popular in the Third World after the 
independence movements of the 1950s and 60s.  However, the past two decades have 
75 Neoclassical development theory resurfaced as neoliberalism during the late 1970s/early 1980s, well 
before the end of the Cold War.  But the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 cemented its supremacy over 
competing structuralist theories of development.
76 Ramphall 1994, 45.
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witnessed the discrediting of the radical theories and the ascendancy of orthodox 
neoliberal economic theory—an outgrowth of neoclassical economics—proclaiming the 
virtues of the free market and modernization and propagated by the multilateral Bretton 
Woods lending institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
As Ramphall speculated,
[t]he type of development policy currently being implemented in the 
Caribbean is the quintessential manifestation of modernity and maintains a 
strong subject-object dichotomy.  The subject…is represented by the 
phalanx of “experts” whose function it is to dispense development to the 
poor, the objects.  These experts include academicians both within and 
outside the Caribbean, government planners and other local bureaucrats, 
foreign consultants and international aid agency officials.77
All too often, these “experts” propagate a subject that serves to legitimize their existence 
and, thus, remunerate them handsomely for their work regardless of its validity for the 
region under analysis or its benefits for the people of the region.  In this instance, the 
“subject” that has been perpetuated and legitimized throughout the Caribbean—and, 
indeed, the world—over the past three decades is neoliberalism.  Whether it has benefited 
its “object,” the region’s poor, remains to be seen.  Perhaps for this reason, the world is 
currently witnessing a backlash against the neoliberal theory of development or, as 
neoliberalism’s critics widely proclaim, the lack of development in much of the 
developing world over the past 30 years under the aegis of neoliberalism.78
To fully comprehend the nature of and reasons for this backlash, we must trace 
the evolution of development theory from classical liberal political economy roots to its 
contemporary manifestation—neoliberalism.  As Jorge Larrain pointed out, the evolution 
77 Ramphall 1994, 53.
78 The backlash is particularly pronounced in Latin America where the failed economies of Argentina, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, and other countries have prompted popular outrage and vehemence against the 
neoliberal policies that many feel precipitated the crisis.
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of development theory was determined by, and linked to, the evolution of the capitalist 
mode of production.  Indeed, because a theory of development is embedded in and 
emanates from a particular economic mode of production, it cannot be analyzed in 
isolation from said mode.  Capitalism has been the dominant mode of production for 
much of the history of written development theory.  So it is no surprise that much of this 
canon of theoretical work was written in relation to, and in some instances in reaction to, 
capitalism.  Capitalism has been the key force in shaping development theory—both 
orthodox and radical—over the centuries since the first political economists documented 
their thoughts on how economic relations within and among states should manifest.  
Unfortunately, however, these political economists frequently misinterpreted the nature 
of capitalism and often did not understand—or refused to acknowledge—that capitalism 
was not homogeneous wherever it rooted in the world.  Therefore, despite their scholarly 
one-model- fits-all assertions, development theory cannot be universal or deterministic.  
As Larrain noted, well-founded development theory must incorporate the specificity of 
historical processes and class struggle to grasp the heterogeneity that can exist within a 
capitalist framework such as exists in today’s global economy and within each state unit 
that comprises said economy.79
Classical Mercantilist Political Economy
Going back in history to the beginning of development theory—or, more 
accurately, to the first scholars who penned their thoughts on the subject—we encounter 
the mercantilists who wrote in relation to the then dominant feudal mode of production.  
79 Larrain 1989, viii.
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Mercantilism reigned in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries, from the feudal era to 
the emergence of the modern nation-state at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution.  
Mercantilism is, in essence, “…a doctrine of extensive state regulation of economic 
activity in the interest of the national economy.”80  The medieval state craved power, 
which translated into the subordination of social and economic interests to the state 
interest.  Because the state used merchants to secure wealth for the national treasury, the 
merchant class was quite powerful during this period.  Consequently, merchants were 
quite agreeable about an economic regime that favored their financial interests.81  Indeed, 
merchants and governments typically colluded to finance business ventures—with the 
merchants acting as agents of the state—that promised great returns for both the merchant 
investor and the state.  To neutralize foreign competition and tilt the balance of trade in 
its favor, the state intervened heavily into the economy, creating protected markets and 
dynastic monopolies in the trade of bullion and goods, which emphasized import of 
bullion and export of goods to maximize the state’s balance of trade.  According to Crane 
and Amawi,
Domestically, extensive intervention takes the form of consolidating the 
national economy and more effective collection of revenues.  
Internationally, intervention takes the form of protectionism, the lasting 
contribution of mercantilism to the lexicon of IPE.  A state’s balance of 
trade is considered a central element of the international balance of power.  
The state must run a balance of trade surplus, maintaining an inflow of 
specie, to support its position in the international system of self-interested 
states…[Mercantilism’s] acceptance made sense sociologically in that it 
evolved simultaneously with the rise of the modern state.  State-building 
absolutist princes encouraged and embraced mercantilist thought.82
80 See Jacob Viner, “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries,” World Politics 1:1 (October 1948).
81 The state’s practice of awarding exclusive charters for exploration and trade to prominent merchants is of 
particular relevance here.
82 Crane and Amawi 1997, 5.
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To the extent that it served their needs, this arrangement was not disputed by the landed 
elite, society’s other powerful class, which also stood to gain from increased national 
wealth.83
Mercantilism prioritized national wealth measured by the accumulation of gold, 
silver, and other precious metals.  International trade was seen in Hobbesian and 
Machiavellian terms as a zero-sum game where one country’s win was another’s loss.  
Therefore, following the economic premise that a state needed to sell more than it buys, 
i.e., achieve a trade surplus—and that which is sold must exceed the value of that which 
is bought—in order to make a profit and augment their treasuries, states pushed exports 
of manufactured goods and limited imports of such.  To stimulate export trade with their 
colonies abroad, states awarded charters to specific companies in a highly regulated 
environment, which led to the creation of powerful monopolies such as the British and 
Dutch East India Companies.84  These companies transported cloth, tools, and other 
manufactures to the colonies and return with exotic foods, spices, and other foreign-
produced goods for sale in the home market.  However, metropolitan countries were quite 
particular about the foreign products they allowed into the home market.  The state 
emphasized economic self-sufficiency and promoted a strong agricultural sector in order 
83 However, a schism of interests would occur with the emergence of capitalism when significant numbers 
of the merchant class became persuaded by the logic of free trade propounded by classical liberal political 
economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo.  The rising bourgeoisie eventually deemed 
mercantilism unsatisfactory because it was highly monopolized, enabling only a privileged few to 
participate in the economic system and reap the gains of the state’s increasing wealth.  Their changing 
priorities would instigate the toppling of the feudal order, displacing both the peasantry and much of the 
landed elite.
84 The British East India Company was chartered in 1600 by the British crown to expand Britain’s trade 
with India; the company’s activities in India paved the way for British rule there.  The Dutch East India 
Company was chartered in 1602 by the government of the Netherlands to expand trade between the 
government and its colonies in Asia.  The government granted the company a monopoly of trade east of the 
Cape of Good Hope and west of the Strait of Magellan.  The company established the colony of Cape 
Town in what is now modern day South Africa to serve as an outpost for use on the long voyage to/from 
Asia.  The descendants of the settlers there—known as Afrikaners—would eventually institute the system 
of apartheid oppressing South Africa’s native peoples.
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to maintain national food security, so trading companies were not permitted to import 
competing products.  Moreover, in order to promote a favorable balance of trade and 
discourage the formation (or consolidation) of competitive industries abroad, the state 
placed higher tariffs on imported manufactures than on primary goods.  
Key early mercantilist theorists include Gerard de Malynes (1586-1623), Edward 
Misselden (1608-1634), Thomas Mun (1571-1641), and A. Serra (15?-16?), all of whom 
were prominent merchants of their time.85  Together, these theorists outlined the 
prevalent politico-economic ideas of the (medieval) era preceding the emergence of 
capitalism.86  Malynes and Serra were the more conservative theorists of the group.  In 
keeping with the sentiment of the day, they encouraged states to export as much as 
possible and keep their bullion at home in order to maintain a favorable balance of trade.  
Serra, one of the first to explain the concept of the balance of trade, illustrated how a 
shortage of bullion resulted from a balance of payments deficit.  Malynes demonstrated 
how a capital outflow lowered prices at home and increased the prices of imported goods.  
He also encouraged the state to increase tariffs on imports and impose exchange controls 
to further enhance its terms of trade.  Mun and Misselden were less conventional than 
Serra and Malynes.  Misselden challenged the popular view of the day that currency 
fluctuation responded exclusively to institutional machinations with his assertions that the 
ebb and flow was due in large part to international trade flows.  Mun also challenged the 
status quo, asserting that the state should not hoard bullion or encumber trade because 
85 See excerpts from the Penguin Dictionary of Economics at 
http://www.xrefer.com/entry.jsp?xrefid=445782 for more information about these theorists along with 
overviews of mercantilism, international trade, and other concepts of economic theory and practice.  Much 
of the descriptive information in this paragraph was abstracted from this site.
86 Friedrich List, Alexander Hamilton, and others would reiterate many of these ideas two centuries later in 
opposition to the then dominant classical liberal  political economy.
59
such action precipitated retaliation from trading partners which, in turn, led to higher 
prices at home.  However, like the other three theorists, he encouraged the state to attain 
trade surpluses to achieve and maintain a favorable balance of trade.
The medieval state played an active role in the mercantilist economy; along with 
its provision of charters, regulation of international trade, and other means of intervention 
into the economy, the state often sponsored voyages of conquest abroad in search of gold 
and silver to expand national coffers.87  In this environment, development theory per se 
was unknown.  The focus was on national (European) economic growth and territorial 
expansion; the colonies established by the metropolitan powers served only to facilitate 
this growth and expansion.  To be sure, metropolitan governments gave little thought 
about colonial development.  On the contrary, in true mercantilist form, they focused 
exclusively on how the colonies could enhance their national wealth, power, and prestige.  
This meant that the colonies were to provide bullion, food not produced at home, and 
other primary commodities cheap and, as the primary markets for metropolitan goods, 
buy metropolitan exports dear—a skewed model of trade that has endured for centuries 
into the present day for many colonies, including Jamaica.  
Mercantile capitalism—the system which sanctioned Britain’s colonization of the 
Caribbean and establishment of the primary commodity export-led model of production 
and trade in Jamaica and throughout the Caribbean as Britain’s economic raison de ‘etre
for establishing colonies there—was the bridge between mercantilism and capitalism, 
which would ultimately take three primary forms: mercantile, (competitive) industrial, 
and financial capitalism.  Merchants such as Mun and Misselden, along with the social 
87 This is how colonization came to figure so significantly in the expansion of Britain, Spain, France, and 
other European metropolitan powers.
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forces leading to and emanating from the collapse of the feudal order, provided the 
impetus behind the transition from mercantilism to capitalism or, more accurately, from 
mercantile capitalism to the more competitive industrial capitalism.  Jorge Larrain 
described the transition as follows:
Capitalism emerged from the contradictions of feudal society, in particular 
from the class struggles which led to the breakdown of serfdom and the 
undermining of peasant ownership of land.  These processes culminated in 
the conscious political struggles of the bourgeoisie which sought to 
dismantle those medieval institutions that presented such obstacles to the 
increase in productivity as the restrictions on free trade and on the 
personal freedom of workers, the restrictive practices of guilds, the 
prohibition of charging interest on loans, and so on.88
It was during this time that the concept of development first appeared.  According to 
Larrain, “[t]he very concept of development appears rather late, in close connection with 
the emergence of capitalism and the critique of feudal society.  This is because, before 
the arrival of capitalism, there existed mainly agricultural societies whose productive 
forces—limited by feudal property relations—changed very slowly over the years and 
whose output was consequently relatively stagnant.  It was capitalism that for the first 
time allowed productive forces to make a spectacular advance, thus making it possible for 
the idea of material progress and development to arise.”89
The classical liberal theorists were the first to incorporate explicit themes of 
progress and development in their analyses.  Even then, the conception of development 
was linked to the existence of historically determined social conflicts—in this case, the 
emerging bourgeoisie’s struggle against the ebbing feudal order—although the theorists 
did not utilize a class analysis.  This linkage has been enduring, even when theoretical 
88 Larrain 1989, 1.
89 Larrain 1989, 1.  See also M. Dobb, Economic Growth and Underdeveloped Countries (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1963), 8 and R. Brenner, “The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism,” in T.H. 
Aston and C.H.E. Philpin, eds, The Brenner Debate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 214.
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propagators—i.e., those in the liberal tradition—chose to minimize or ignore the 
influence of historically determined social conflicts on capitalism’s evolution.90  Karl 
Marx was the first to explicitly link the processes of development and social conflict in 
the political economy literature.  He argued, for instance, that “the development of 
political economy and of the opposition to which it gives rise keeps pace with the real
development of the social contradictions and class conflicts inherent in capitalist 
production.”91  Marx’s logic would influence future scholars for years to come and 
helped shape the debate in much of the post-colonial Third World.  But before discussing 
Marx in greater detail, we must first explore the roots of liberal political economy which 
Marx and the dependistas criticized with much vitriol.
Classical Liberal Political Economy
Classical liberalism appeared with the rise of the Industrial Revolution and has at 
its core the competitive capitalist market.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the classical 
liberals considered the mercantilist economic system—with its focus on state 
interventionism—woefully unproductive and archaic.  In competitive capitalism, 
productivity is key.  Hence, with the transition from mercantilism to competitive 
capitalism, a states’ wealth was measured by the value of goods it produced in a specified 
unit of time, not its accumulation of bullion.  This was, of course, a fundamental change 
for society and the intensity of the change was reflected in the social dislocation that 
manifested amongst the peasantry in the interest of maximizing productivity.  Peasants, 
formerly serfs tied to lands owned by feudal lords, moved to the new urban industrial 
90 Larrain 1989, 2.
91 Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1969), vol. III, 501.
62
centers en masse in search of jobs.  For the first time in Europe’s history, people were 
forced off the land to work in factories made profitable by the emergence of mechanized 
production.  And work they did, often under extremely dangerous conditions.  Men, 
women, and children—who could no longer rely on a feudal patron to supply their basic 
needs in exchange for agricultural labor—toiled long hours in filthy, unsafe, and
overcrowded factories, providing the labor capital needed to fuel the burgeoning 
industrial machine created by the new capitalist mode of production.  
The mechanization of production was not an isolated development.  The 
accompanying Reformation, Renaissance, and Enlightenment unleashed a number of 
transformative forces, including: the increased secularization of society and the 
separation of church and state; the development of education and the sciences; and a 
challenge to the feudal state’s legitimacy wrought by the social contract theories of 
Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau.  These forces radically altered societal relations and 
instigated a new politico-economic order.  The modern state had arrived and, with it, the 
populace developed a spirit of nationalism and became aware of their individualism vis-
à-vis the state and their ability to think rationally as individuals without needing a church-
designated intermediary to act or intercede on their behalf.92  Its positive effects 
notwithstanding, the societal transformation caused much immiseration and social 
dislocation amongst the masses.  For the first time in history, families and communities 
disintegrated as people left the land their families had inhabited for centuries—and the 
communal, collectivist way of life that had been their norm—in search of work.  
92 The feudal state ceased to exist in 1648 with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia, which marked the 
end of the Thirty Years War in Europe.  The treaty terminated the previously entrenched system of papal 
governance, replacing it with geographically and politically separate, sovereign states.
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Industrial capitalism, with all its excesses and tendency to produce cycles of productivity 
alternated with cycles of stagnation, became entrenched as society’s modus operandi,
initially in Europe and eventually throughout the world. As history—illuminated by 
Marxist and the structuralist theorists—would later demonstrate, some people gained 
immensely from their country’s appropriation, or misappropriation, of this new mode of 
production, while others lost miserably.  
Classical liberalism, prominent during the 18th and 19th centuries, was developed 
by the middle class, which, with the emergence of the modern state, challenged the 
landed aristocracy and the divine right of kings to institute a less monopolistic, more 
egalitarian political economy.  Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and other theorists—all of 
whom were prominent members of Britain’s new industrial bourgeoisie—elucidated the 
principles of the emergent classical liberal school.  In general, they broadened their 
(mercantilist) predecessors’ views of capital accumulation as the primary means of 
building national wealth to incorporate the logic of a free market economy, both domestic 
and international.  However, Smith, Ricardo, and other classical political economists 
disagreed vehemently with the mercantilists on several issues.  Primary among these was 
the emphasis on state intervention and protectionism, which they claimed harmed—not 
helped—the national interest.  They also believed that mercantilism stifled people’s 
intrinsic rationality, economic ingenuity and resourcefulness, so they urged government 
to abandon its regulatory role and assume a more limited function to allow individuals the 
freedom to enter into and/or forsake economic pursuits as they saw fit.  Among the 
classical liberals’ basic economic tenets were: 1) primacy to the individual who, imbued 
with rationality, acted in market transactions to maximize his self-interest; 2) Adam 
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Smith’s concept of a self-regulating market that equilibrates the forces of supply and 
demand by the invisible hand of the market itself;93 3) David Ricardo’s logic of 
comparative advantage, which extended the law of domestic supply and demand to 
international trade; 4) Thomas Malthus’ notion of population growth regulated by natural 
means such as disease, famine, etc., not by government intervention; 5) and survival of 
the fittest in the face of exposure to market forces, a crude theory of natural selection 
postulated by Herbert Spencer and later refined by Charles Darwin.  Overall, classical 
liberalism has three cores: moral, economic, and political.  The moral core stresses the 
basic values and rights that citizens have in relation to nature, including personal, civil, 
and social liberty.  The economic core, extols capitalism as the most efficient of all 
modes of production and emphasizes the individual’s freedom of contract, including, but 
not limited to, his right to own property and to produce and consume.  Finally, the 
political core stresses individual consent, popular sovereignty, and representation.94
These ideas were quite influential given society’s readiness to embrace a new 
mode of production in the post-feudal order in the interest of expanding Britain’s wealth 
and power, and individual accumulation of wealth and capital.  Smith and Ricardo were 
particularly influential and their ideas about trade still figure prominently in the 
theoretical underpinnings of today’s world trading regime.  As such, their ideas are 
examined in some detail below.  Smith contended that international trade should be 
93 Karl Polanyi (1944), who elaborated the concept of the market society subordinating societal relations to 
the market, diverged from Adam Smith on the notion of the self-regulating market.  He argued that the self-
regulating market was a creation of state inaction and, once this self-regulating market was taken to the 
extreme extent, the state had to intervene in order to protect society.  These interventions would ultimately 
destroy the market.  For more on this line of thought, see the discussion of Keynesian political economy 
later in the chapter.  
94 Interestingly, Locke included important caveats.  For instance, one’s right to participate in government 
was based on the ownership of property.  Moreover, there was a hierarchy of rights with economic rights at 
the top, so one’s social and political rights was determined by his wealth. 
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regulated by the invisible hand of the market, and not by the state as had been 
commonplace in the preceding medieval era.  Ironically, an element of hypocrisy 
undergirds Smith’s rationale in that he did not endorse an immediate, across-the-board 
implementation of free trade.  He noted in The Wealth of Nations that “freedom of trade 
should be restored only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and 
circumspection.  Were those high duties and prohibitions taken away all at once, the 
disorder which this would occasion might no doubt be very considerable.”  Yet, Smith 
derided the mercantilist focus on using of government intervention to promote exports 
over imports in order to maintain a positive balance of trade.  In his opinion, “[t]hose 
arguments were partly solid and partly sophistical.  They were solid so far as they 
asserted that the exportation of gold and silver in trade might frequently be advantageous 
to the country.  They were solid too, in asserting that no prohibition could prevent their 
exportation, when private people found any advantage in exporting them.  But they were 
sophistical in supposing, that either to preserve or to augment the quantity of those metals 
required more the attention of government, than to preserve or to augment the quantity of 
any other useful commodities, which the freedom of trade, without any such attention, 
never fails to supply in the proper quantity.”95  Believing wholeheartedly in the 
equilibrating logic of supply and demand and perfect competition—which we know are 
mythical constructs in today’s global economy given the reality of subsidies, tariffs, 
quotas, and other trade-distorting policies utilized by most trading nations—Smith 
observed that:
95 See Adam Smith, “Of the Principle of the Commercial or Mercantile System,” The Wealth of Nations
(New York: Modern Library, 1937).
66
We trust with perfect security that the freedom of trade, without any 
attention of government, will always supply us with the wine which we 
have occasion for: and we may trust with equal security that it will always 
supply us with all the gold and silver which we can afford to purchase or 
to employ, either in circulating our commodities, or in other uses…The 
quantity of every commodity which human industry can either purchase or 
produce, naturally regulates itself in every country according to the 
effectual demand, or according to the demand of those who are willing to 
pay the whole rent, labour and profits which must be paid in order to 
prepare and bring it to market.96
Trade is an essential national enterprise because “[b]y opening a more extensive market 
for whatever part of the produce of their labour may exceed the home consumption, it 
encourages them to improve its productive powers, and to augment its annual produce to 
the utmost, and thereby to increase the real revenue and wealth of the society.”97
Smith also criticized the mercantilist tendency to cultivate all manner of domestic 
industry in order to limit imports.  He, instead, encouraged countries to produce and trade 
products they could produce most cheaply and efficiently.  In his words, “[i]f a foreign 
country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better 
buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in 
which we have some advantage.  The general industry of the country, being always in 
proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished, not more than 
that of the above-mentioned artificers; but only left to find out the way in which it can be 
employed to the greatest advantage.”98  Ricardo, extending Smith’s rationale for free
trade, argued that if countries specialized in goods which they could produce with 
comparative advantage, they could potentially overcome the limitation of purely 
agricultural production and ultimately increase their profits.  On the level of the 
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.  
98 See Adam Smith, “Of Restraints Upon the Importation from Foreign Countries of Such Goods as Can Be 
Produced at Home,” The Wealth of Nations (New York: Modern Library, 1937).
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international economy, trade by comparative advantage would expand the international 
division of labor and improve the well-being of all trading states.  Ricardo claimed that: 
It is not, therefore, in consequence of the extension of the market that the 
rate of profit is raised, although such extension may be equally efficacious 
in increasing the mass of commodities, and may thereby enable us to 
augment the funds destined for the maintenance of labour, and the 
materials on which labour may be employed.  It is quite as important to 
the happiness of mankind, that our enjoyments should be increased by the 
better distribution of labour, by each country producing those commodities 
for which by its situation, its climate, and its other natural or artificial 
advantages, it is adapted, and by their exchanging them for the 
commodities of other countries, as that they should be augmented by a rise 
in the rate of profits.99
This system of production and trade “distributes labor most effectively and most 
economically: while, by increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses general 
benefit, and binds together, by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the universal 
society of nations throughout the civilized world.”100
However, Ricardo based his logic of comparative advantage on a vital caveat, one 
that contemporary neoliberal theorists commonly overlook or evade.  With the 
presumption that capital is immobile, Ricardo rests his theory of the (now) outdated 
concept of barter, assuming that countries will simply trade one commodity of value for 
another.  In his opinion, which was based in reality at the time he wrote his text, 
“[e]xperience…shows that the fancied or real insecurity of capital, when not under the 
immediate control of its owner, together with the natural disinclination which every man 
has to quit the country of his birth and connexions, and intrust himself, with all his habits 
fixed, to a strange government and new laws, check the emigration of capital.”101  This, 
99 See David Ricardo, “On Foreign Trade,” The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (New York: 
E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1960).
100 Ibid.  
101 Ibid.  
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we know, is no longer the case.  In today’s globalized economy, investors are not the 
timid people they were during Ricardo’s day, and capital is no longer immobile or 
confined to national boundaries.  On the contrary, capital today is characterized by 
temerity and the inclination to brave new, possibly unstable national markets if doing so 
increases its chances of gaining profit.  This important qualification—today’s mobility of 
capital—in effect debunks Ricardo’s (and Smith’s) logic of trade by comparative 
advantage and, by extension, brings into question the logic of the world trading regime.  
Clearly, a country’s propensity for development rests on more than its purely factor 
endowment-based comparative advantage for trade in a (purported) free trading system.  
Two schools of thought, the German Historical school and Marxist political 
economy challenged classical liberal political economy by critiquing the central tenets of 
its celebrated mode of production: the self-regulating capitalist market; international trade 
according to comparative advantage; and, for the Marxists especially, the lack of 
attention to, or obfuscation of, class struggle and conflict in capitalist market relations.  
The German Historical School was comprised notably of Friedrich List and Alexander 
Hamilton, who although not explicitly a member of the school, subscribed to its ideals.  
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels originated Marxist political economy.
German Historical School — Mercantilism Revisited
The German Historical School, led by Friedrich List, was essentially a revision of 
classical mercantilism.  List and his counterparts critiqued classical liberalism’s focus on 
the individual and argued for a resurgence of economic nationalism with the state at 
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center stage.  They believed that certain states—namely the less developed states of 
Europe—should be allowed to utilize state intervention and protectionism to jumpstart 
their economies and become industrialized.  List stressed the importance of having a 
diversified economy and a strong manufacturing sector for increasing a state’s productive 
capacity and stimulating growth and development.  Indeed, to foster development, the 
state must move from agricultural production to manufacturing by utilizing and 
maximizing the nation’s natural and human resource capacity in what will be a mutually 
reinforcing relationship.  In List’s view, a society’s well-being and wealth is determined 
not by what it can buy but by what it can make.102  Moreover, societies became 
dependent or independent based on their ability to produce goods for domestic 
consumption.103  Manufacturing, and with it the ability to trade finished goods, will 
thereby enhance the value of agriculture and propel development.104
Manufactories and manufacturers are the mothers and children of 
municipal liberty, of intelligence, of the arts and sciences, of internal and 
external commerce, of navigation and improvements in transport, of 
civilization and political power.  They are the chief means of liberating 
agriculture from its chains, and of elevating it to a commercial character 
and to a degree of art and science, by which the rents, farming profits, and 
wages are increased, and greater value is given to landed property.  The 
popular [Adam Smith] school has attributed this civilizing power to 
foreign trade, but in that it has confounded the mere exchanger with the 
originator.105
List believed the classical liberals were mistaken in confusing values of exchange, not 
values of productive powers, as the true measure of a country’s productivity and, 
102 Fallows 1993.
103 Ibid.
104 List’s logic would become the basis of the dependency school’s argument for import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) as the means of achieving industrialized status and development.  The Japanese also 
found List’s logic highly persuasive—more so than the laissez-faire logic of the classical liberals—when, in 
the aftermath of Commodore Perry’s shocking visit in 1853, it undertook modernization to reduce its 
vulnerability to outside forces.  The rapid advances of the Meiji era, from 1868 to 1912, resulted from 
heeding List’s advice.
105 See List, The National System of Political Economy, Second Book, chapter 12, 133-148.
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ultimately, prosperity.  “The prosperity of a nation is not, as Say believes, greater in 
proportion in which it has amassed more wealth (i.e., values of exchange), but in the 
proportion in which it has developed its powers of production.”106  Low-skilled laborers 
produce powers of exchange, but advanced scientific and technical capacity is essential 
for producing powers of production.  “In the doctrine of mere values, these producers of 
the productive powers can of course only be taken into consideration so far as their 
services are rewarded by values of exchange.”107
One should not underestimate the importance of honing a country’s powers of 
production for said country’s prosperity vis-à-vis its competitiveness in international 
trade.  “The foreign trade of a nation must not be estimated in the way in which 
individual merchants judge it, solely and only according to the theory of values (i.e., by 
regarding merely the gain at any particular moment of some material advantage); the 
nation is bound to keep steadily in view all these conditions on which its present and 
future existence, prosperity, and power depend…The nation must sacrifice and give up a 
measure of material property in order to gain culture, skill, and powers of united 
production; it must sacrifice some present advantages in order to insure to itself future 
ones.”108  To quote List, “the forces of production are the tree on which wealth grows.”  
Unlike the classical liberals—and like Marx, but to a lesser degree—List acknowledged 
the conflictual nature of international relations.  He felt classical liberalism glossed over 
the tensions that simmered below the surface of the international political economy and 
supported an economic ideology that not only justified the superior position of the 
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.  The last sentence of this quote is part of the logic underlying the formation of regional trade 
arrangements and explains why countries, such as those of the European Union, would sacrifice autonomy 
for the benefits of belonging to a more powerful grouping of countries.
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industrialized countries, but allowed them through the theory of trade by comparative 
advantage to advance their wealth and power faster than, and at the expense of, less 
advanced countries such as Germany.  List and his counterparts believed this system was 
inherently perverse and unjust.  Unfortunately, however, their arguments lacked the 
methodological rigor necessary to combat the highly persuasive logic of free trade and 
comparative advantage.109  Consequently, although List profoundly critiqued classical 
liberalism, he conceded to its logic of free trade, a compromise that reflected a significant 
negation of classical mercantilist ideology.  
Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, promoted classical mercantilist ideas 
quite successfully.  Hamilton, living and writing in the aftermath of the American 
Revolution, wanted to see America develop industrial capacity rivaling that of its 
nemesis, Britain.  Like List, he questioned the extent to which the classical liberals’ logic 
of free trade and comparative advantage, which had served Britain so well, would allow 
the newly minted United States of America to industrialize at a suitably rapid pace.  In 
short, Hamilton doubted whether free market capitalism would serve America’s best 
interests.110  America in the late 1770s was primarily rural, agricultural, and undeveloped.  
To be sure, its economy was no match for Britain’s (then superpower) economy and even 
lagged behind some of the less advanced nations of Europe.111  Yet the U.S.A. was able 
109 Crane and Amawi 1997, 6.
110 Aaron Burr shot Alexander Hamilton on July 11, 1804 during their famous duel.  Prior to his death, 
Hamilton wrote his Report on Manufacturers, which he submitted to Congress on December 5, 1791.  In it 
he argued that the newly independent United States should nurture industries with tariffs and subsidies to 
compete with the British.  Thomas Jefferson, who envisioned the United States developing by way of the 
individualistic yeoman farmer, challenged Hamilton’s logic.  However, the US government eventually 
conceded to Hamilton’s logic and implemented his plan throughout the 19th century and into the early 20th
century.
111 Britain had become the world’s politico-economic hegemon by the turn of the eighteenth century, 
superseding Spain, Holland, and France due its leadership of, and wealth generated by, the Industrial 
Revolution.  By the early nineteenth century, the notion of a world economy dominated by one country, 
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to industrialize shortly after achieving independence due in large part to Hamilton’s 
conviction of the benefits to be wrought for national welfare from economic nationalism 
and his ability to convince his fellow policy makers to legislate protectionist practices as 
part and parcel of the new country’s public policy.  Hamilton was concerned with 
national economic development as a factor of national self-reliance and security.  He felt 
that agriculture, although important, was secondary to manufacturing as the foundation 
upon which an economy should be based.  His Report on Manufactures outlines his ideas 
on how the United States (and by extension any underdeveloped country) should 
approach industrial and manufacturing development in order to invigorate the economy 
and catapult the country into the realm of economic superpowers.   Hamilton believed 
that the state is the agent of economic development.  Therefore, it is incumbent on the 
state to actively promote industrialization.  This, of course, was a direct contravention of 
classical liberalism’s endorsement of the freely functioning market as the agent of 
development.  Hamilton undoubtedly believed that the classical liberals’ ideas were based 
in economic illusion, even delusion, not the reality of an unbalanced international 
political economy.  Not surprisingly, his ideas (and List’s) were incorporated into the 
Third World’s import-substitution-industrialization policies of the 1950s-1970s and are 
Britain, had emerged.  Prior to that time, the world’s economic and political powers—Spain, Holland, 
France, and Britain—were not sufficiently developed to see the need for a system of worldwide free trade.  
However, when Britain realized that 1) it was extremely inefficient to try to feed its rapidly growing 
population via domestic agriculture and 2) it needed massive amounts of labor to feed its burgeoning 
industrial machine, it abandoned its protective tariffs to institute a regime of “free trade” wherein it 
imported food and other raw materials from its colonial territories at cheap prices and, in exchange, 
exported manufactures to those territories at not so cheap prices.  This freed the country’s labor, formerly 
engaged in agriculture, to work in its factories.  However, its benefits for Britain notwithstanding, the new 
system of free trade buoyed by the logic of comparative advantage set up the system of unfair terms of 
trade between Britain and other metropolitan countries and their dependencies that persists to this day.  
Much of this information in this footnote was abstracted from Dell 1963, 6-10.
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still promulgated today by developing country economic nationalists who hope to help 
their countries become self-reliant industrialized manufacturing powers.
Stanley Dell was one of these economists.  Writing in 1963, Dell remarked that 
while “[i]t is customary in these days to speak of inward-looking tendencies in the 
European and Latin American common markets as wholly bad, and of outward- looking 
tendencies as wholly good…[t]he history of the United States shows that the building up 
of the internal economy on the basis of heavy protection was a major element in the 
integration of the country.  Indeed, the very same factors that made it advantageous for 
Britain to base its international policies upon laissez-faire and free trade during the 
nineteenth century created a need for protection in other less advanced countries such as
the United States and Germany.  If the United States was to cease being an economic 
dependency of Britain and develop a growing volume of internal trade, it would have to 
set up its own industries to replace imports from Britain.  In view of Britain’s 
technological lead, this inevitably meant protection for United States infant industries.”112
With Hamilton’s lobbying in favor of mercantilist ideals, the U.S. government adopted 
highly interventionist policies and protected its markets from foreign competition.  This 
enabled American business interests to create import substituting industries, nurture these 
infant industries, and develop full industrial capacity in short order.  Abraham Lincoln 
observed at the height of this progress: “I don’t know much about the tariff.  But I know 
this much.  When we buy manufactured goods abroad we get the goods and the foreigner 
gets the money.  When we buy the manufactured goods at home, we get both the goods 
and the money.”  A century after Hamilton submitted his Report on Manufacturers, 
William McKinley commented about the United States, echoing the spirit of Lincoln’s 
112 Dell 1963, 9.
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observation: “We lead all nations in agriculture; we lead all nations in mining; we lead all 
nations in manufacturing.  These are the trophies which we bring after twenty-nine years 
of a protective tariff.”  Indeed, “[w]hile American industry was developing, the country 
had no time for laissez-faire.  After it had grown strong, the United States began 
preaching laissez-faire to the rest of the world—and began to kid itself about its own 
history, believing its slogans about laissez-faire as the secret of its success.113  Hamilton, 
fully cognizant of the conflictual nature of the international economy, openly 
acknowledged this conflict and, by persuading the state to embrace economic nationalism 
in contravention of internationally accepted economic ideals, helped deflect the negative 
consequences that would have afflicted the country had it thrown open its markets to 
trade and attempted to compete in the free market international economy of the day 
before it had attained the requisite productive capacity and competitiveness.  
Marxist Political Economy
Marxist political economy, developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and 
later expanded by countless theoreticians, responded to the struggles of the new industrial 
working class—the proletariat.  In so doing, Marxism diverged from liberal political 
economy, both classical liberalism and its neoclassical adherent, which treated class 
struggle in the economic sphere as non-existent or, at best, latent.  Marx diverged from 
the liberals in another manner: whereas liberals believed that society—or, more 
113 Fallows 1993.  Thomas McCraw, an economic historian of the Harvard Business School, has explained 
that while the United States never practiced protectionism in the tradition of the classical mercantilists, “it 
did exhibit for 150 years after the Revolution a pronounced tendency toward protectionism, mostly through 
the device of the tariff” (Fallows 1993).
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specifically, rational individuals acting in their own self-interest—shaped the economy, 
Marx believed that the economy shaped society.  Marx was more interested in studying 
the domestic operation of the capitalist mode of production than in developing a theory of 
IPE or development.  That said, his analyses of capitalism yielded findings that were 
construed into theories of both the international economy and international development.  
One such Marx finding turned IPE theory was his conclusion that (domestic) capitalism 
and the international economy evolves in an interactive, dialectical manner—i.e., one 
shapes the other.  When applied to the analysis of why capitalist development occurs in 
one country, or group of countries, but not another—the question at issue in this 
research—this concept is very compelling.  Therefore, a Marxist-inspired conceptual 
framework will be utilized in this project. 
Marx was particularly fascinated with the role the economic structure plays in 
socio-political affairs.  He had a materialist view of society in which the superstructure, 
or society’s institutions and processes, is conditioned by its economic structure, or 
infrastructure, comprised of the means of production and the relations of production.114
In the tradition of Fuerbach, Marx contended that a person’s being determines his 
consciousness, and the material conditions in which people find themselves are the 
motivating forces in the history of society.  Marx’s method of analysis—historical 
materialism—was influenced by both Fuerbach and Hegel’s portrayal of dialectics.115
114 The superstructure encompasses political, ideological, legal, and religious institutions such as the state, 
churches, values, and ideologies.  The means of production are essentially the material forces that facilitate 
production, i.e., tools, factories, equipment, skills, technology, and knowledge.  The relations of 
production, on the other hand, is essentially the class structure determined by those who own and control 
the means of production and those who do not.
115 Hegel believed that a universal spirit determines reality; in his conception of historical materialism, 
Marx substituted economic relations for Hegel’s idealism.  Dialectical change examines society in terms of
history and social progress.  Its driving force is the struggle of contradictory tendencies, the thesis and anti-
thesis, to produce a new reality, the synthesis, which becomes the thesis of a new triad.  For more on 
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Although Marx rejected capitalism because of its tendency to perpetuate exploitation and 
inequality, he envisioned it as a natural phase in the evolution towards socialism, the 
most equitable of all modes of production.  Marx’s contention with capitalism is 
illustrated in his labor theory of value.  In it he defines the concept of alienation where 
the worker, despite his labor, is separated from the product he fashions, from nature, and 
from other workers.  Labor becomes a commodity, forcing one to sell his talent for wages 
instead of using said talent to produce for oneself.  Capital therefore subordinates labor 
and divides the world into two classes; most people fall into the proletariat class while a 
small minority rises into the capitalist bourgeoisie class.  The proletariat’s tendency to 
provide surplus labor invites capitalist exploitation whereby any surplus value produced 
by the proletariat is appropriated by the bourgeoisie and reinvested to buy more 
machines, raw materials, and commodified labor to fuel the capitalist machine.  Marx’s 
key agents of social change are social classes acting within structural limits established 
by dominant forces of production and production relations.  Indeed, conflict between the 
bourgeoisie and proletariat is inevitable.  It is incumbent upon the proletariat to gain the 
requisite social consciousness for organizing itself to overthrow the capitalist system in 
favor of a more egalitarian, socialist system.
As stated previously, Marx focused more on the domestic economy than the 
international.  Nevertheless, there are two interpretations of Marx’s thoughts on why 
capital expands overseas.116  The following excerpt from the Communist Manifesto 
illustrated one view: “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases 
Hegel’s analysis see his Phenomenology of Mind (1807), Science of Logic (1812-16), Encyclopedia of 
Philosophical Sciences (1817).  For more on Marx’s interpretation of Feuerbach’s logic, see his Theses on 
Feuerbach.
116 These two interpretations are explored in detail in Crane and Amawi 1997, 83-84.
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the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe.”  In other words, as capitalism 
develops domestically and the proletariat becomes increasingly impoverished, consumer 
demand for commodities decreases.  The accumulation of capital, dependent on the 
realization of surplus value, or profit, from the sale of commodities decreases 
concomitantly.  Capital therefore expands overseas as the owners of capital, the 
bourgeoisie, goes in search of new markets in which to sell its commodities in order to 
realize more surplus value and accumulate yet more capital.  
In another view of Marx, illustrated in his “Rise of Manufactures” in the German 
Ideology, capital expands overseas due not to internal contradictions, but simply in 
response to the lure of new opportunities beckoning abroad.  Marx outlined three phases 
in the development of manufacturing, or industrial capitalism, leading to the rise of the 
industrial bourgeoisie and the expansion of capital abroad.117  In the first phase, which 
occurred during the feudal era in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, 
manufacturing expands and transitions away from the medieval guild system into 
international trade.  This was an era of massive socioeconomic transformation, 
witnessing the expansion of domestic capitalism and international trade, creation of new 
sources of wealth, and the rise of a new industrial bourgeoisie.  As Crane and Amawi 
noted, “[w]here once trade was ‘inoffensive exchange,’ it is now highly competitive, 
marked by mercantilism and colonization.  This competitiveness cannot be explained by 
underconsumption; the capitalist mode of production is hardly established.”118  The 
second phase, which occurred from the mid-seventeenth to the late eighteenth century, 
brought the development of mature mercantilism and the rise of the “big bourgeoisie,” 
117 Much of the information below describing the three phases was abstracted from Crane and Amawi 1997, 
84-85.
118 Crane and Amawi 1997, 84.
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aka the merchant class which, by capitalizing on the trade benefits accrued from state 
protectionism, became the most powerful group of the bourgeoisie.119  During this period, 
trade and manufacturing became concentrated in Britain and a great demand rose 
worldwide for British goods.  This had three outcomes that would serve to empower 
Britain in terms of its industrial capacity and its position in the world economy: it 
invigorated domestic industrial development, expanded Britain’s trade with the outside 
world, and increased the world’s reliance on Britain’s exports.  
Britain’s manufacturing and trade hegemony was consolidated in the early part of 
the third phase, only to be challenged in the latter part by other countries’ increasing 
manufacturing development and ensuing forays into international trade.120  Protectionism 
once again reared its ugly head in Britain and its new competitors alike.  “This period, 
covering the nineteenth century, is characterized by universalized international 
competition and the ascendance of manufacturers over merchants.  Protectionism 
becomes merely a rearguard action against the onslaught of free trade.”121  Marx’s 
historical analysis of the development of industrial capitalism accurately portrays events 
as they occurred and, as such, is more plausible than the liberals’ analysis, which would 
have us believe that the freely functioning market alone, devoid of class interests and 
power dynamics, fueled capitalist development domestically and internationally.  
However, his conviction that capitalism would ultimately give way to socialism has been 
unfounded—an analytical weakness which moderates the impact of his argument.
119 The contrast here is made to the “petty bourgeoisie,” class, aka the small-scale manufacturers, which 
predominated during the first phase.  This would change during the third phase when the manufacturers 
would once again regain their supremacy as the most powerful sector of the bourgeoisie.
120 The United States, following Alexander Hamilton’s protectionist philosophy, and capitalizing on an 
ever-increasing amount of immigrant (proletariat) labor willing to fuel its industrial machine, developed its 
industrial capacity during this period and rose to become Britain’s primary manufacturing competitor.
121 Crane and Amawi 1997, 84.
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Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Nikolai Bukharin, and Rudolf Hilferding 
elaborated on the interpretation of Marx’s view of capitalist development as imperialist 
expansion.122  Lenin, famous for his theory of imperialism as the highest stage of 
capitalism, argued that capital expands abroad due to domestic underconsumption: “The 
necessity of exporting capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has 
become ‘overripe’ and (owing to the backward state of agriculture and the impoverished 
state of the masses) capital cannot field ‘profitable’ investment.”123  As Crane and Amawi 
pointed out, Lenin’s underconsumptionist bias misses the complexity of Marx’s historical 
analysis of the ways in which international economic forces shaped capitalism’s 
development.  This limitation notwithstanding, Lenin’s theory is compelling in that it 
explains the West’s imperialistic colonization and export of capitalism to previously un-
colonized areas of the South after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85.124  In fact, Lenin’s 
theory can be interpreted as taking up where Marx left off in his third phase of capitalist 
development.   Protectionism at that time was rampant in the developed countries so they 
needed to expand into “virgin” markets if they hoped to acquire new sources of raw 
materials and continue accumulating wealth in order to invest in yet more industrial 
development at home.  And that they did.  After the Berlin Conference ended, the United 
States and the developed countries of Europe colonized the continent of Africa and much 
of the East.  In doing so—because, per Lenin’s analysis, the newly colonized areas were 
converted into “service stations” with the sole purpose of fuelling their colonizers’ 
122 See Lenin, Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism (1916); Luxemburg, The Accumulation of 
Capital (1913); and Bukharin, Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital (1924); 
123 Crane and Amawi 1997, 85.
124 With the imperative of securing new sources of raw material for industrial production and new markets 
for exporting manufactures, the governments of the United States and Western Europe met in Berlin, 
Germany to divide up and annex the portions of Africa and Asia that had not been colonized previously.
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continued capitalist development—they planted the seeds of capitalist underdevelopment 
in those areas, much like the earlier European colonization of the New World had done in 
Jamaica and other Caribbean countries.  
The 6th Congress of the Third International in 1928 officially recognized the 
validity of Lenin’s theory of imperialism in explaining Third World underdevelopment.  
“The first step was to concede that for as long as the colonial bond was not broken, the 
development of Third World countries would be temporarily arrested.  [The Congress 
thus affirmed] that imperialism is an obstacle to the development of and industrialization 
of colonial countries.”125  Unfortunately, the proposed solution of national 
independence—when it finally began in the 1950s—did not engender development 
throughout the Third World as expected.  Herein lies the quandary of development theory 
and the rationale for this research targeting Jamaica, a Third World country that—
although it possesses vast agricultural potential—has not experienced the post-colonial 
development that the 1928 Congress would have predicted.
Neoclassical Political Economy 
Neoclassical economics grew out of the classical liberal school.  The neoclassical 
school originated in the late 19th century in tandem with the behavioral revolution and 
around the same time that Lenin was developing his theory of capitalist development as 
imperialist expansion. Key neoclassical theorists include Alfred Marshall, Léon Walras, 
and William Stanley Jevons.126  Like their classical liberal predecessors, neoclassical 
125 Larrain 1989, 9.
126 See Marshall, Principles of Economics (1890); Walras, Elements of Pure Economics (1874); and Jevons, 
Theory of Political Economy (1871).
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theorists advocated a self-regulating liberal capitalist economy based on laissez-faire and 
free trade based on comparative advantage.  They believed that self-regulation and free 
trade fostered a balanced economy with an ensuing social order characterized by equality.  
The neoclassicists garnered support for their theoretical position by extolling the virtues 
of capitalism at a time when public support for, and confidence in, the free market was at 
its peak.  The industrial revolution of the 19th century was driven by unregulated 
capitalism and those who benefited from the industrial innovations—owners of capital 
and laborers alike—were the system’s biggest champions and, thus, were quite receptive 
to the neoclassicists’ argument for laissez-faire capitalism.  Capitalism, they asserted, 
cloaks itself in modernity; is driven by profit, investment, accumulation, expansion, and 
consumption; thrives on competition and entrepreneurship; and requires a complementary 
context—i.e., a facilitative political/legal/social/cultural enabling environment—in which 
to function maximally.  Hence, neoclassical theory is grounded in the core assumptions 
that the market is the most efficient allocator of scarce resources; the market is most 
equitable, particularly to those who work hard; and rewards are proportional to one's 
output.  Therefore, the state has no real role except to act as a neutral arbiter.  The 
principle of self-regulation implies that perfect competition is inherent in the market, 
therefore no single buyer or seller can unilaterally affect price.  Relations in the market 
are viewed as frictionless exchanges of equal value.  Under these conditions, one assumes 
that the market is balanced or in equilibrium, an ideal situation that exists when the 
supply offered in the marketplace is depleted by the demand for said supply.
The premise of perfect competition is the invisible hand principle, first 
proclaimed by Adam Smith in his famous treatise of 1776, The Wealth of Nations. 
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According to this principle, government interference with free competition is not only 
unnecessary but also damaging because every market actor is guided to pursue his own 
selfish good and, in so doing, achieves the best situation for everyone.127  Each actor 
competes with other actors and thus, maximizes his interests.  There are many competing 
firms and each firm is well informed about quality and about each other's prices.128  The 
orderly outcome benefits everyone.  Another core assumption of neoclassicism is the idea 
the market is balanced or in equilibrium.  Competitive equilibrium occurs at the 
intersection point of the supply and demand curves.129  In other words, the equilibrium 
price is the price at which the amount of goods supplied in the market is equal to the 
amount demanded by the market.130  The central question in equilibrium analysis is the 
following: who or what apportions the scarce resources of the market?  According to 
Samuelson, the mechanism of competitive market price allocates resources in a process 
of “rationing by the purse.”131  Market actors utilize their “money votes” to purchase 
resources according to their desire or need for said resources.132  The notion of 
countervailing power in the marketplace implies that when market actors actively seek 
their own interests everything ultimately balances out. 
Perfect competition and equilibrium implies that market actors have complete 
information about the market mechanism and about all other market actors.  Indeed, the 
acquisition of this information is costless.  When it is costless to transact, the efficient 
competitive solution of neoclassical economics holds true.133  Essentially, “the 
127 Samuelson 1973, 43.
128 Samuelson 1973, 63.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Samuelson 1973, 67.
132 Samuelson 1973, 71.
133 North 1996, 15.
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competitive structure of efficient markets leads the parties to arrive costlessly at the 
solution that maximizes aggregate income regardless of the initial institutional 
arrangements.”134  This is the basic premise of the Coase Theorem.  Herein lies the 
assumption that equilibrium exists when market actors maximize their preferences; 
barring irrationality, market actors will always strive to maximize their wealth.  
Furthermore, according to game theory, wealth-maximizing individuals will cooperate 
with other actors when they have complete information about the past performances of 
these other actors.135  This ensures the existence of order and equilibrium in the market.  
According to the principle of rational choice implicit in neoclassical economic analysis, 
individuals reveal internal sets of preferences through the choices they make.  In essence, 
the standard neoclassical model of transaction and exchanges assumes that “commodities 
are identical, the market is concentrated at a single point in space, and the exchange is 
instantaneous.  Moreover, individuals are fully informed about the exchange commodity 
and both parties know the terms of trade.  As a result, no effort is required to effect 
exchange other than to dispense with the appropriate amount of cash.”136  This is the 
standard neoclassical Walrasian model, which negates the interplay of transaction costs in 
the exchange process.137
The basic assumption of capitalism is that all entrants into the market are driven 
by materialist motives.  Neoclassical economics extends the capitalist metaphor to areas 
of nature and human activity.  Individuals know what they want and their preferences are 
allegedly driven by rational material calculation for material benefit—the material benefit 
134 North 1996, 15.
135 North 1996, 12.
136 North 1996, 30.
137 North 1996, 30.
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at issue is earned income potential.  Neoclassical economics also assumes that the current 
distribution of assets is optimal; any intervention will decrease the aggregate welfare of 
the entire system.  This is the basic ideological premise of Pareto optimality.  With an 
absence of market domination and exploitation, all households are considered equal, thus 
current resource allocation is deemed equitable.  Consequently, the state's only role is that 
of a neutral arbiter, enforcing competitive behavior among private actors.  As neutral 
arbiter, the state serves the following non-economic functions: sets distributional 
boundaries, defends property rights, provides for international defense, fosters positive 
values, intervenes when private actors do things that endanger the community, and passes 
pro-market regulations to prevent the formation of monopolistic or oligopolistic factions.  
The state should in no way interfere with the functioning of the laissez-faire market, 
which needs no external regulation because it is inherently self-regulating.
Neoclassical political economy ambitiously (or naively) assumes the absence of 
exploitation and domination in the market.  It also takes for granted, quite erroneously, 
that market transactions always take place under conditions of perfect competition and 
that all market actors have complete information.  Its theory of equilibrium and exchange, 
in its quest to demonstrate the tendency towards market stability, overlooks the existence 
of class and sectoral conflict that pervades market relations.138  As a result, socio-
economic questions such as the unequal distribution of wealth and income are ignored.  
When applied to trade, neoclassical political economy glosses over developed countries’ 
relative economic superiority and related political power in market transactions vis-à-vis 
developing countries to create the illusion of a level playing field among market actors 
138 See Edward J. Nell, Economics: The Revival of Political Economy in Social Research (1972): 77-78.
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devoid of transaction costs and, consequently, attributes developing country failings 
solely to their own weaknesses and deficiencies.139
Keynesian Political Economy
John Maynard Keynes’ contribution to development theory rests primarily in the 
formulation of his General Theory, which fundamentally altered the universally accepted 
view of the role of government in the economy and, by extension, society.  Keynes’ 
General Theory, expounded in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(1936), contravened the then prevailing neoclassical logic of laissez-faire liberal 
capitalism which obligated states to follow a “hands-off” policy of non-intervention 
regardless of the social chaos that could be triggered by an imploding free market.  
Keynes, unlike the neoclassicists, openly acknowledged that capitalism did not produce 
indefinite periods of economic expansion.  On the contrary, capitalism—given its 
tendency for creative destruction—produced cycles of both boom and bust.140  State 
intervention is therefore essential for mitigating the societal impact of the bust cycles.
Keynes, who wrote his General Theory at the height of the Great Depression, 
argued that in times of economic downturn and decreasing private sector investment, the 
state should intervene in the market to ensure full employment and prevent a dangerous 
cycle of declining investment, increased unemployment, decreased consumption, and yet 
less incentive for private capital to invest, leading eventually to spiraling unemployment 
139 Modernization theory and neoliberalism, the intellectual offspring of neoclassical political economy, 
also postulate this overly simplified and unfortunate attribution.
140 Joseph Schumpeter (1942) outlined capitalism’s tendency for creative destruction.  Schumpeter argued 
that socialism is inevitable because the excesses of capitalism eventually bring about its demise.
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and social misery as had occurred in the Great Depression.141  While the policy of non-
intervention ensured that market equilibrium would be reached, it did nothing to mitigate 
the social dislocation that invariably accompanied rising unemployment precipitated by 
decreasing private sector investment.  Keynes, as explained by Robert Skidelsky, 
believed that “[s]tability of internal economic conditions was the essential requirement of 
social stability; this precluded a laissez-faire attitude to the three chief determinants of the 
standard of life: population, money, and saving and investing.”142  Keynes, therefore, 
encouraged states to become economic actors by regulating key enterprises to moderate 
the potential excesses of the free-market capitalist economy and its erratic business 
cycles.  This was essentially Keynes’ public goods rationale for state interventionism.  
Keynes’ logic was extremely influential. 143  Indeed, it dictated economic policy in post-
World War II America, most prominently in Roosevelt’s New Deal programs and the 
creation of the welfare state.  It would also prove quite persuasive for Third World 
economists hoping to develop their post-colonial national economies.  His legacy is still 
felt today in that people worldwide believe economies should be managed to secure 
objectives such as full employment, stable prices, a healthy balance of payments, and a 
satisfactory growth rate.144  Additionally, most contemporary governments, whatever 
their neoliberal rhetoric, continue to endorse the mixed economy.
141 Friedrich Hayek (1944), who wrote around the same time as Keynes, advocated precisely the opposite 
course of action.  Hayek stated, contrary to Keynes and Schumpeter, that socialism is not inevitable.  
Therefore, planning is both unwarranted and inadvisable.  Competition, not planning, is the ideal.  Milton 
Friedman, another influential Keynes opponent, led the Chicago School of free market libertarianism 
during the 1960s and 70s.  One of the best known living economists, Friedman has written numerous works 
extolling the virtues of laissez-faire capitalism.  Of these, Capitalism and Freedom (1962), written with his 
wife Rose D. Friedman, is considered his seminal work.
142 Skidelsky 1992, chapter 7.
143 Keynes’ logic retained its influence through the late 1970s when the neoliberal critique, popularized by 
Reagan-Thatcherism, was mounted.  
144 Skidelsky 1992, chapter 7.
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The Modern Global Economy and the New Models of Development
The modern global economy began after World War II.  The first half of the 
twentieth century, prior to WWII, was marked by war, trade protectionism, and a 
debilitating great depression that devastated the world economy.  Immediately after the 
war, the United States led other nations in creating a system of international governance 
to promote international cooperation, consolidate world peace, foster international 
security, and invigorate the post-war world economy.145  This resulted in the 
establishment of the United Nations and a triumvirate international economic 
bureaucracy comprised of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).146  Each organization received a 
distinct mandate aimed at thwarting any resurgence of the forces that had caused the 
Great Depression and world war.  The World Bank, IMF, and GATT were designed to 
reconstruct economies—both national and international—and foster global economic 
interaction and harmonization.  Due to their explicit trade and development functions, the 
GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, and IMF are of particular 
relevance to this research.  Each organization has figured prominently in the development 
debate.  The World Bank and IMF especially did much to rebuild the damaged 
economies of Europe, a necessary first step for jumpstarting a world economy decimated 
145 In 1944, the U.S. hosted the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences at which delegates from 
around the world laid the groundwork for achieving these aims.  
146 The GATT, initially conceived as the International Trade Organization (ITO) but not created as such 
due to lack of U.S. support, transmuted into the WTO in 1994 during the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations.
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by war.147  In accordance with the period’s “social-democratic ethos,” the economic 
blueprint for the post-war world order featured the Keynesian principle of state 
intervention to provide public goods and ensure adequate levels of employment.148
Ironically, however, Keynesian economics was soon challenged as a model of 
development policy.  Modernization theorists, who asserted that liberal capitalist 
democratization per the experience of the world’s advanced countries spurred economic 
development, mounted the first challenge.  The second, and more potent, challenge, was 
mounted by neoliberal theorists and practitioners who disparaged state interventionism as 
a means of curing the market’s “ills” and urged a return to laissez-faire economics, 
liberalization, and unregulated trade.  Neoliberal political economy has proven victorious 
in the battle of development theories.  Indeed, the World Bank, IMF, and WTO—the 
“holy trinity” of international financial institutions (IFIs)—are steeped in the neoliberal 
tradition.  Consequently, by means of their agency in transactions with client/member 
nations, neoliberal principles are now entrenched worldwide and dictate policy in, and 
for, a majority of the world’s countries.
Modernization Theory
Modernization theory evolved after World War II as a derivative of neoclassical 
political economy.  For the first time in the trajectory of IPE theory, a theory of 
147 Under the stewardship and direction of the United States, the majority shareholder in both organizations, 
the IMF and World Bank implemented the Marshall Plan designed to rebuild war-torn Europe and return to 
the United States its traditional trading partners in order to ensure its continued growth and, by extension, 
global economic expansion.
148 As a testament to his influence on economic policymaking, Keynes was invited to help draft the plan to 
create the new post-war economic system.  As Colin Leys explained, the sentiment of the day included a 
“commitment to planning and its conviction that economic problems would yield to the actions of 
benevolent states endowed with sufficient supplies of capital and armed with good economic analysis” 
(Leys 1996, 8).
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development now dealt specifically with the Third World, albeit by extrapolating the 
First World experience to poorer countries.  Per modernization logic, First World 
countries transformed from traditional, agricultural societies to modern, industrial states 
by means of laissez-faire economics.  In other words, by freeing individuals to work, 
produce, and trade in their own self-interest, free-market capitalism facilitates 
development.149
The post-war period was a time of social, economic, and political transformation 
worldwide.  Europe was undergoing reconstruction, via the Marshall Plan implemented 
by the U.S. government and spearheaded by the new Bretton Woods institutions.  In 
addition, colonial structures—established during the two principal eras of European 
colonization in the South and East—had begun to crumble.  The rise of the Soviet bloc in 
the post-war era shifted the balance of power and introduced a new ideological rift in the 
global political economy, one that would dictate national policymaking and formation of 
strategic alliances for years to come.  According to Rajani Kanth, “[t]he emergent 
socialist republic of the Soviet Union, though weak and impoverished in itself, was 
nonetheless to provide for the next seventy years political, diplomatic, and military 
support for both national liberation struggles and struggles for socialist transformation, 
within the context of what was eventually to be termed the ‘Third World’ or, more 
apologetically, the ‘developing countries.’”150  The historically dominant western 
governments had to act if they hoped to maintain power and reign in the new state 
upstarts.  
149 Farmer 1999, 9-10.
150 Kanth 1994, 3.
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Modernization theorists advanced their cause by propagating a western-centered 
liberal capitalist democratic theory of development.  The advanced countries had grown 
and developed ostensibly because they had faithfully and unerringly pursued free-market 
economics.  Hence, the modernizationists exhorted the world’s new (and largely poor) 
ex-colonies to follow the path to development that their more advanced counterparts had 
so successfully embraced, or risk interminable backwardness.  In doing so, they 
attempted to coax these soon-to-be independent countries away from the socialist path 
made attractive to them by the Soviet Union’s pledges of monetary aid and technical 
assistance for development in exchange for alliance.  Colin Leys interpreted this course 
of events through a lens focused on geopolitical strategic interests: 
[modernization theory’s leading exponents] were most closely connected 
to the American state and accepted its purposes, including its intense 
preoccupation with combating communism.  Some modernization 
theorists were serious cold warriors—Gabriel Almond, Edward Shilis, 
Lucien Pye and Samuel Huntington, for example—others merely accepted 
the Cold War and were content to see themselves as the ‘liberal’ wing of 
American development studies, believing that modernization would in any 
case bring democracy as well as economic growth.  Very few at that time 
publicly questioned the identification of modernization studies with the 
aims of U.S. foreign policy.151
Key modernization theorists of the day included Ragnar Nurkse, Walt Rostow, Alexander 
Gerschenkron, and W. Arthur Lewis, a Caribbean national.  These theorists largely 
addressed the economic factors that promoted and stifled growth, emphasizing the role 
domestic forces played in either perpetuating backwardness or expediting 
modernization.152  Other theorists extrapolated modernization theory to address issues of 
151 Leys 1996, 10 and Irene Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World
(Boulder: Westview, 1985).  
152 Nurkse, Patterns of Trade and Development (1959); Rostow (1960); Gerschenkron, Economic 
Backwardness in Historical Perspective (1962); Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (1955).
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democratization, political culture, and the link between these and economic growth.153
Modernization scholars applied neoclassical economic theory to the developing country 
experience when the issue of “Third World” (under)development was first emerging on 
the global radar.  “Interestingly, when scholars of political economy turned their attention 
to the underdeveloped world after WWII, there was a tendency to return to the nineteenth 
century liberal paradigm, which had failed the developed world in the [early] twentieth 
century, and apply it to developing countries as a guide for development.”154  By the 
1950s, faith in Keynesian development economics was on the downslide.  Gunnar Myrdal 
highlighted India as a case in point of the “failed” paradigm, claiming that the Indian 
state was soft and incapable of serving as a rational, benevolent enforcer of the national 
interest.155  However, Mrydal’s glib assessment of the Indian state oversimplified the 
complex problems that plagued the Third World and “lay beyond the conceptual and 
empirical scope of mainstream—i.e., neo-classical—economics.”156  These limitations, 
notwithstanding, neoclassical economics expressed in a new guise—as modernization 
theory—replaced Keynesian economics as the new development paradigm and the 
answer to why Third World countries were resistant to modernizing change.
153 These theorists include Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), Barrington Moore (1966), Lucien Pye (1966), 
Samuel Huntington (1968), Gabriel Almond (1960), and Sydney Verba (1965).  See also David Apter’s 
The Politics of Modernization (1965).  Lipset is famous for his argument that “democracy is related to the 
state of economic development…The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain 
democracy” (1963, 31).  Pye postulated that underdevelopment stems from internal structural impediments 
to development.  Almond and Verba took the cultural approach, arguing that the absence of a “civic 
culture” in traditional societies impeded their development.  Robert Putnam elaborated on this premise in 
his landmark work Making Democracy Work (1993), an analysis of cultural and economic transformation 
in Italy.    
154 Farmer 1999, 9.
155 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Enquiry Into the Poverty of Nations (New York: The Twentieth 
Century Fund, 1968), Vol. I, p. 66.  See also Chapter 18, sections 13-14.
156 Leys 1996, 8.
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Ronald H. Chilcote has characterized modernization theories as “ethnocentric, 
biased in favor of a particular economic path, ideological in their Western assumption of 
pluralistic politics, and dogmatic in their insistence upon a continuous progression 
through historical stages.”157  Given its evident theoretical and empirical limitations, it is 
not surprising that modernization theory incited a scathing critique.158  Like neoliberalism 
would one day be misapplied to developing countries, modernization theory was even 
more so as it advocated the problematic stage theory of development developed by Walt 
Rostow and expanded by Alexander Gerschenkron.159  Stage theory asserted the—since 
proven untenable—premise that all countries are destined to follow a pre-determined, 
directional process of growth from undeveloped to developed, unimpeded by 
destabilizing external forces.160  Modernization theory thus asserted the “pull yourself up 
by your bootstraps” development mentality, arguing that a country’s lack of economic 
development is due to internal deficiencies that impeded, or stalled, its development 
momentum causing it to deviate from the proper evolutionary development path taken by 
the advanced countries.  “By eliminating the importance of climate, especially in the 
tropics and subtropics, the role of social organizations and institutions, and the effects of 
income and levels of living, Western economic theory led the poor countries to believe 
157 Chilcote 1984, 11.
158 The critique took shape in the dependency school originated by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and developed by countless development theoreticians and 
practitioners.  In true Marxist/Hegelian dialectical fashion, dependency theory itself provoked an even more 
scathing and enduring critique: neoliberalism.
159 Rostow (1960) and Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (1962).
160 This “stage theory” of economic development typified early development theory.  Stage theory asserts 
that states develop in a linear process and all states pass through the same historical stages of development.  
The Third World exists at an earlier (undeveloped) stage of development and the First World at an 
advanced (developed) stage.  Interestingly, some stage theorists did see holes in their theory and carved out 
caveats.  Gerschenkron, for instance, recognized that different periods could exhibit different types of 
development.  For example, a “backward” country could advance faster than had an industrialized country 
if it had access to and adopted forms of technology available in the industrialized country.  Using this logic, 
Gerschenkron credited Soviet Russia and Meiji Japan as the exceptions.
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that they only had to close a ‘time lag’ to catch up with the West.  This was no more than 
Marxism, but in the West such a fact was concealed and simplified by the theories of 
‘stages of growth.’  In this sense the poor countries were fed a one-dimensional 
development process which was teleologically optimistic.”161  Illustrative of this mindset 
is a 1951 United Nations report demonstrating modernization theory’s disdain for 
anything that perpetuates traditional ways of life and, by extension, impedes modernity:
Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to 
disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and large 
numbers of people who cannot keep up with progress have to have their 
expectations of a comfortable life frustrated.
Needless to say, given the proven intractability of poverty and underdevelopment in the 
world’s poorest nations, this mentality oversimplifies the problem and overstates the 
solution.  Clearly, more is at stake than the perpetuation of national social and cultural 
traditions.  Dependency theorists attacked this limitation and challenged the 
modernization premise that “[c]ontact with industrialized nations is desirable for LDCs in 
order to learn the proper path to development through the example, aid, trade, and 
technology sharing of the industrialized states.  It is this classic liberal modernization 
paradigm from which the dependency perspective arose as a reaction after WWII.”162
Dependency/World Systems Theory
The dependency school of development theory evolved in reaction to the 
modernization school and has been shaped by theorists grounded in the Marxist tradition.  
Marxist theorists’ ideas on class dynamics, the state, relations of production, power, and 
161 Vallianatos 1976, 11.
162 Farmer 1999, 11.
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imperialism influenced this generation of social science theorists concerned about the 
disparate levels of development evident in the global economy, the reasons for these 
disparities, and the obstacles/stimuli to development.  Dependency theorists wrote, and 
continue to write, most vigorously against theorists grounded in the neoclassical 
economic tradition, particularly those purporting the logic of free market capitalism, 
economic liberalization, and trade according to comparative advantage as the sole recipe 
for sustained, balanced growth and development.  Contrary to their liberal colleagues, 
who wrote about (positivist) development, the dependistas’ work encapsulated the 
various theories of (negativist) underdevelopment.  In general, dependency theorists 
agree that a few countries hold the world’s politico-economic power to the detriment and 
subjugation of the majority of countries, most of which are poor, developing countries, 
and see little hope for a more equitable transformation.
Theotonio dos Santos’ conceptualization of dependency is widely accepted.163
Dos Santos defined dependency as “a situation in which the economy of certain countries 
is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the 
former is subjected.  The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, 
and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some 
countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other 
countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which 
can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development.”164  He 
outlined three historical forms of dependency: colonial dependency in which trade 
163 Chilcote 1984, 60.
164 Dos Santos 1970, 231.
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monopolies were granted over the land, mines, and labor in the annexed territories; 
financial-industrial dependency during the imperialist period of the late 19th century when 
international capital expanded from the center to dominate a newly-augmented periphery; 
and a new “post-WWII” dependency characterized by the predominance of industrial-
financial capital embodied by the multinational corporation and oriented towards the 
internal markets of underdeveloped countries.165
There are various streams of dependency theory.  Raúl Prebisch, an economist 
writing under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA)166 during the post war era, formulated the dependency theory of 
economic development, which rejected the explicit post-WWII emphasis on 
modernization theory advocating open trade and free market capitalism as the vehicles of 
growth and development.  Dependencia extended Keynesianism to the Third World 
context, with an international component of power relations between states that have and 
states that have not.  Prebisch argued that, contrary to assertions by development 
economists and popular opinion of the day, international trade had not effected economic 
development in all participating countries, particularly the former colonial territories in 
the Third World.  Instead, international trade had reinforced the uneven development 
instigated and perpetuated by colonialism, which had altered the institutional, production, 
and socio-economic structures of the colonized territories towards the First World, and, 
consequently, had generated structural problems in these territories which would forever 
165 Chilcote 1984, 61.
166 ECLA has since been widened to include the Caribbean countries.  It is now the United Nations 
Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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disadvantage them in trade amongst themselves and, even more so, with their former 
colonizers and other First World countries.  
In this regard, Prebisch built on Karl Marx’s notions of capitalist subordination of 
the proletariat (the Third World) by the bourgeoisie (the First World) and Vladimir Lenin 
and Rosa Luxemborg’s notions of capitalist imperialism of poor countries by rich 
countries.  He also borrowed heavily from mercantilist theory formulated by Freidrich 
List and advanced by Alexander Hamilton.167  Prebisch’s formulation of dependency 
theory asserted that the world’s nations were aligned in a center-periphery relationship 
and the poorest countries—those in the Third World—had been relegated to the 
production of raw materials for fueling the First World’s industrial manufacturing 
capacity and, consequently, were resigned to a dependent status in the world economy.168
Indeed, “with distorted national institutions and economic structures, Third World 
countries were defenseless to the distortionary development implied by trade-induced 
interaction with heavily-financed First World monopolistic capitalism.”169  Prebisch thus 
broke with his predecessors’ conception of development as growth and capital-formation 
wherein Latin American, African, and Asian countries were seen as the earlier 
“underdeveloped” versions of the world’s industrialized countries that would eventually 
develop along the lines of the United States and western Europe.170  In this regard, 
167 Both List and Hamilton advocated government intervention into the economy to cultivate manufacturing 
capacity.  While both deemed agriculture critical for a nation’s economic viability, neither believed a 
country could sustain itself economically and compete effectively with more advanced nations through 
agricultural production alone.  Therefore, neither was convinced by—and, indeed, both strongly 
criticized—Adam Smith’s laissez-faire economic model of production and trade based on the logic of 
comparative advantage.  
168 Much of the discussion here of dependencia was abstracted from the New School University’s Center 
for Economic Policy website: http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/develop.htm.
169 See http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/prebisch.htm.
170 See the earlier references to stage theory developed by Walt Rostow and Alexander Gerschenkron. 
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Prebisch rejected other development theorists’ tendency of conceptual stretching by 
which they ascribed a uniform pattern of development to all countries regardless of 
particular contextual circumstances.171
Prebisch, like Keynes, advocated government intervention into the economy to 
increase savings and output growth, but he focused more on the Third World 
government’s role in hastening industrialization to place the periphery on a path of 
autonomous, self-sustaining growth and development.  He proposed import-substitution, 
rather than trade and export-led development, as the vehicle of industrialization, arguing 
that a degree of protection—via restriction of imports—was essential for initiating and 
sustaining industrialization in the periphery and, thus, for breaking the periphery’s 
dependence on the center.172  This view of the relationship between government and 
markets paved the way for the model of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) that 
many Caribbean countries implemented during the 1960s and 70s.   The state became a 
strongly interventionist entity that nurtured infant industry, owned large shares of public 
enterprise, and employed lots of people in large bureaucracies.  However, as time would 
tell, the extent of Caribbean government intervention into the economy, particularly the 
nationalization of various foreign enterprises due to economic nationalism, eventually 
became problematic for metropolitan governments, international financial institutions, 
and foreign corporations who all objected strongly to this course of events.173
171 Giovanni Sartori discusses conceptual stretching in “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics.”  
American Political Science Review 64: 1033-53 (1970).
172 This is the essence of the Prebisch-Singer thesis highlighting Prebisch and Hans Singer’s conviction that 
protectionism by way of import substitution was the developing world’s path out of lasting 
periperhalization and dependency.  Both Prebisch and Singer doubted that trade and export-orientation was 
the solution.  Hans Singer later moderated his tone to argue that industrialization could benefit developing 
countries so long as their terms of trade were not unfavorable.
173 Michael Manley’s nationalization of Jamaica’s bauxite corporations, hotels, and agricultural estates was 
especially censured.  Manley’s actions during this period would return to haunt him in the future when 
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Along with Prebisch’s work and that of the ECLA school, the contributions of 
several other scholars to the dependency canon have particular applicability to the 
Jamaican case.174  Andre Gunder Frank, famous for his theses on underdevelopment and 
dependency, asserted that the relationship between developed metropoles, or advanced 
industrialized centers, and underdeveloped satellites, or poor peripheral countries, was a 
manifestation of capitalist expansion since the sixteenth century and the center’s 
centuries-long exploitation of the periphery.  In Frank’s view, underdevelopment was not 
a natural state, but one cultivated by the negative impact of capitalism.175  Frank’s views 
were quite controversial and sparked much vitriol from critics who questioned his 
unidimensional emphasis on purely external obstacles to development.  Frank presented a 
pointed critique of modernization theory, particularly the premise that all countries were 
predestined to follow a linear process of development.  “Underdevelopment is not 
original or traditional…The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though 
they may have been undeveloped.”176  Frank outlined several hypotheses as follows.177
First, countries are aligned in a metropole-satellite relationship wherein the metropoles 
tend to develop and the satellites to underdevelop.  The metropoles are divided into two 
groups: world metropoles that are not satellites of any country and secondary metropoles 
that are satellites of the world metropoles and subject to the underdevelopment that 
Jamaica’s declining economic condition would force him to ask (beg?) the World Bank and IMF for 
financial assistance.
174 Other influential dependency theorists include Arghiri Emmanuel, Osvaldo Sunkel, Celso Furtado, 
Theotonio dos Santos, Ruy Mauro Marini, Ernest Mandel, and lastly Immanuel Wallerstein, who 
articulated the related but distinct world systems theory. Influential Caribbean dependency thinkers include 
Walter Rodney, George Beckford, Norman Girvan, Carl Stone, Michael Witter, and Michael Manley.  
These and other scholars comprised the Caribbean radical new political economy school discussed below.
175 See A.G. Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment, Monthly Review 18 (September 1966), p. 17-
31.  Also see Chilcote 1984, 11.  Gunder Frank would later moderate his argument in response to criticism
from his peers and after dependency theory was discredited.  
176 Frank 1966, 17, 18.
177 Frank 1966, 35-30.  See also Chilcote 1984, 86-87.
99
bedevils all satellite countries.  Second, satellites tend to develop when their ties to the 
metropoles are weakest.  Third, contrary to the logic of modernization theory, 
“backward” countries were not isolated and precapitalist in the past.  On the contrary, 
they were able to supply capital and primary commodities to the metropoles.  However, 
they deteriorated after they were abandoned by the metropoles.  Fourth, the large 
plantation-style estate was the dominant model of production in the satellites whereas 
industrial enterprises predominated in the metropoles.  Fifth, the satellites’ decline stems 
not from the alleged isolation and pre-capitalist orientation but from the decline of 
agriculture and mining in areas abandoned by the metropoles.  In a nutshell, 
“underdevelopment as we know it today, and economic development as well, are the 
simultaneous and related products of the development…of a single integrated economic 
system: capitalism.”178
Frank’s hypotheses invigorated the development debate by bringing dependency 
theory into the mainstream.  He proposed class struggle as the solution to the problem of 
capitalist underdevelopment; the colonial structure of international capitalism had 
empowered a national bourgeoisie that represented imperial interests, so an anti-
imperialist struggle was by nature a class struggle against capitalism itself.179  Frank’s 
ideas attracted both derision and praise.  Theoreticians and policymakers throughout the 
newly independent Third World accepted his ideas.  Theoreticians outside the Third 
World, on the other hand, attacked his ideas as unfounded and empirically 
unsophisticated.  Although Frank’s ideas generated a lot of controversy, he still figures 
178 Frank 1975, 43.
179 A.G. Frank, Latin America—Underdevelopment or Revolution: Essays on the Development of 
Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
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prominently in the development debate.  Foster-Caster offered the following explanation 
for Frank’s enduring legacy:
Frank’s great merit is to have, at a certain place and time, stated the new 
paradigm [opposing traditional diffusionist theories of development] with 
such brute force that no one could possibly confuse it with anything else.  
Historically, this was perhaps necessary: later—in fact immediately—the 
critiques began, and it was discovered that Baran or the Latin American 
“structuralist” school had said it all before (to the extent that this is true, 
Frank never denied it), and that Frank’s formulations are extremely crude: 
he saw capitalism everywhere, because he doesn’t distinguish a mode of 
production from a social formation, and he wrongly assumes that 
exchange relations dominate production and that metropolis-satellite 
structures come before classes, and so on and so on…What is in danger of 
being forgotten is that it was only because of Frank that we can now 
supersede him!180
Frank clearly exaggerated the stultifying effects of capitalism, and of external forces in 
general, on development.  As Novack surmised, his analysis “is highly oversimplified.  It 
leaves no room for complex historical situations, combined class relations and 
contradictory socioeconomic formations.”181  Nevertheless, some of his ideas—
particularly the metropole-satellite dynamic denoted in hypothesis #1—have explanatory 
force in delineating the problem of underdevelopment in the Caribbean.182
Pablo González Casanova’s analysis of internal colonialism is quite persuasive 
and captures the process of post-colonial transformation (or lack thereof) that has 
occurred in Jamaica.  His approach is two-dimensional: “one which allows the 
typification of colonialism as an integral phenomenon, changeable from an international 
to an internal category; and another which permits us to see how the phenomenon has 
180 Aiden Foster-Carter, “From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of 
Underdevelopment,” World Development 4 (March 1976): 167-180.
181 G. Novack, “The Permanent Revolution in Latin America,” Intercontinental Press 8 (November 16, 
1970): 981.
182 Frank developed his metropole-satellite hypothesis in several works.  See in particular Frank (1967).
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occurred in a new nation which has reached the ‘takeoff stage.’”183  He postulated that the 
colonial structure and influence do not magically disappear after a country is granted 
formal independence.  On the contrary, the newly independent country’s international 
and internal structure typically remains unaltered.  “The new nations preserve, above all, 
the dichotomous character and contradictory types of relations similar to those found in 
colonial society.”184  Indeed, according to an official of Jamaica’s Banana Industry 
Board, the country’s agricultural production structure was not altered at independence 
because it was difficult to revolutionize the entire productive and trading structure while 
forging a new nation.185  Internal colonialism is therefore structural—it emanates from 
the policies of the new state and of the metropolis (to use Gunder Frank’s terminology) 
which continues to dominate and exploit the country.  This perpetuates dependence and 
ultimately underdevelopment.186
Ernest Mandel extends this thesis, claiming that the systems of development and 
underdevelopment are reciprocal and surplus profit is achieved at the expense of less 
developed countries and regions.187  “Hence development takes place only in 
juxtaposition with underdevelopment; it perpetuates the latter and itself develops thanks 
to this perpetuation.”188  Indeed, the industrialized countries accrued surplus value—and 
therefore accumulated wealth—by virtue of their exploitation of poor countries in the 
183 Casanova in Horowitz et al., Radicalism in Latin America: A Documentary Report on Left and 
Nationalist Movements (New York: Random House, 1969), 121.
184 Casanova in Horowitz et al., Radicalism in Latin America: A Documentary Report on Left and 
Nationalist Movements (New York: Random House, 1969), 130.
185 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
186 Casanova’s analysis of internal colonialism will be explored further in later chapters of this research, 
particularly in reference to Jamaica’s experience in the world trade and investment regimes.
187 Chilcote 1984, 75.
188 Mandel 1975, 102.
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Third World, i.e., by extracting surplus profit from the Third World.189  This schema is 
characteristic of the capitalist world system wherein cycles of development and 
underdevelopment occur at different times in different regions and in different sectors.
In the age of freely competitive capitalism its predominant weight lay in 
the regional juxtaposition of development and underdevelopment.  In the 
age of classical imperialism it lay in the international juxtaposition of 
development in the imperialist states and underdevelopment in the 
colonial and semicolonial countries.  In the age of late capitalism it lies in 
the overall industrial juxtaposition of development in growth sectors and 
underdevelopment in others, primarily in the imperialist countries but also 
in the semicolonies in a secondary way.190
Mandel, like Casanova, asserted that the developing country’s fortune is tied to the 
interests of united local and foreign capital; metropolitan interests coalesce with those of 
local elites in the age of late capitalism at which point the phenomenon of unequal 
exchange becomes the primary form of exploitation.  
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s thesis on associated dependent development 
extends the thesis developed by Casanova and Mandel.  Cardoso, who wrote the seminal 
Dependency and Development (1979) with Enzo Faletto and who, until early 2003, was 
president of Brazil, used a dialectical approach to explaining underdevelopment 
highlighting “not just the structural conditioning of social life, but also the historical 
transformation of structures by conflict, social movements, and class struggles.”191
Cardoso and Faletto’s analysis of dependency considered domestic forces of change and 
189 This phenomenon is known today as repatriation of profits.  Repatriation, by pre-empting local 
investment of profits, mitigates against local capital accumulation and therefore perpetuates host (satellite) 
country underdevelopment while promoting home (metropolis) country development.
190 Mandel 1975, 103.
191 Cardoso and Faletto 1979, x.
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linked them to processes occurring in the global sphere.  Their conception of structural 
dependency thus related internal and external forces.192
We conceive the relationship between external and internal forces as 
forming a complex whole whose structural links are not based on mere 
external forms of exploitation and coercion, but are rooted in coincidence 
of interests between local dominant classes and international ones, and on 
the other side, are challenged by local dominated groups and classes.193
External forces include metropole governments, multinational corporations (MNCs), 
imported technology, and international financial institutions.  Their interests are 
expressed in the local economy by virtue of their alliance with local elites; “[d]omination 
of external forces may appear as an internal force through the practices of local classes 
and groups whose interests and values coincide with those of foreign ones.”194  Hence 
“the analysis of structural dependency aims to explain the interrelationships of classes 
and nation-states at the level of the international scene as well as at the level internal to 
each country.”195  Concordant to the conservative (neoclassical) emphasis on 
industrialization and capital accumulation as the means of growth and development, 
Cardoso and Faletto underscored the extent to which these processes have progressed in 
the periphery.    
They identified two types of dependency existing in the periphery: enclave 
economies, in which local production is controlled by foreign capital, and economies 
controlled by the local bourgeoisie.196   An economy is deemed dependent “when the 
accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic component 
192 Chilcote 1984, 41.
193 Cardoso and Faletto 1979, xvi.
194 Chilcote 1984, 41.
195 Cardoso and Faletto 1979, xvii-xviii.
196 Cardoso and Faletto 1979, xix.
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inside the system.”197  Indeed, dependency may continue even after developing countries 
have diversified beyond production of primary commodities if their production of capital 
goods is inadequate for ensuring their expansion and reproduction.  Dependency in this 
scenario is termed the “new dependency” wherein peripheral industrialization begets 
production for elite consumption, not for mass consumption as occurs in the advanced 
countries.  Underdevelopment and dependency are directly linked in that the former 
stems from the latter.  “The situation of underdevelopment came about when commercial 
capitalism and then industrial capitalism expanded and linked to the world market non-
industrial economies that went on to occupy different positions in the overall structure of 
the capitalist system.”198  Thus, contrary to Frank’s view that capitalism promotes only 
stagnation in the periphery, Cardoso and Faletto asserted that capitalism can, and often 
does, promote development therein—albeit a development that is tied to, and dependent 
on, the development occurring in the center.  Herein lies the logic underlying their 
“associated dependent development” thesis.  
Cardoso developed this thesis in later works.199  Using the Brazilian experience as 
the model, he declared that associated dependent development tends to occur under 
authoritarian political regimes embracing, even cultivating, an “increased 
interdependence in production activities at the international level” and “a modification of 
the patterns of dependence that condition, or set constraints and limits to, the 
development of policies of the countries located at the periphery of the international 
197 Cardoso and Faletto 1979, xx.
198 Cardoso and Faletto 1979, 17.
199 Cardoso and Faletto’s 1979 work was translated to English from the original 1969 version written in 
Portuguese.  For Cardoso’s elaboration of the associated dependent development thesis see the following 
articles: “Dependency and Development in Latin America,” New Left Review 74 (July-August 1972): 83-95 
and Alfred Stepan, “Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications,” ed., 
Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press): 142-176.
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capitalist system.”200  This political dynamic complements, and is complemented by, the 
predominance of industrial-financial capital embodied by the multinational corporation 
throughout the international economic system, including the periphery.  The 
multinational corporation stimulates productive forces in the periphery, as it does in the 
center, and increases the generation of surplus value and, by extension, capital 
accumulation.  “Thus, as foreign capital directs itself toward the manufacturing and 
selling of products to be consumed by the domestic bourgeoisie, it can stimulate 
development in some segments of the economy of a dependent country.”201
“Development under this set of conditions implies, quite obviously a definite articulation 
with the international market…Development in this situation also depends on 
technological, financial, organizational, and market connections that only multinational 
corporations can assure.”202  Dependent capitalism therefore remains underdeveloped 
because it must respond to the demands of transnational capital and because it cannot 
independently ensure capital accumulation.  “Dependent capitalism must bear all the 
consequences of absorbing capital-intensive, labor-saving technology…It is crippled 
because it lacks a fully developed capital goods sector.  The accumulation, expansion, 
and self-realization of local capital require and depend on a dynamic outside itself; it 
must insert itself into the circuit of international capitalism.”203  In other words, “[t]he 
alleged backwardness of these economies is not due to a lack of integration with 
capitalism but…on the contrary, the most powerful obstacles to their full development 
come from the way in which they are joined to this international system and its laws of 
200 Chilcote 1984, 43.
201 Chilcote 1984, 44.
202 Cardoso 1973, 149.
203 Cardoso 1973, 163.
106
development.”204  The only solution to the problem of associated dependent development 
is a complete revolutionary break with international capitalism in favor of socialism, 
which is highly unlikely as such a transformation would require the political will of 
domestic elites tied to international capital and vested in maintaining the status quo.  
Consequently, Cardoso advocated a reformist, evolutionary approach to development 
emphasizing the national bourgeoisie as the primary agent of development.205
Samir Amin’s conception of dependency and underdevelopment as a 
manifestation of the confluence of internal and external forces is compatible with the 
analyses of Cardoso/Faletto and Dos Santos.  Amin defined underdevelopment in terms 
of unevenness of productivity, disarticulation of the economy, and external domination 
due to dependence.206  External dependence is prevalent in underdeveloped countries 
where businesses tend to rely on foreign capital and trade.  Underdeveloped countries 
participating in world trade typically export primary commodities and import 
manufactured goods, an exchange Amin deemed unequal and dependent.  
Underdevelopment is ensured because local production relies on foreign investment and 
imported capital goods to thrive.  Moreover, because multinational corporations tend to 
repatriate their profits back to their home countries, capital outflow—another factor 
contributing to underdevelopment—is usually a byproduct of foreign capital investment.  
204 Dos Santos 1970, 235.  Dos Santos, like Cardoso, wrote about the “new dependency.”  However, his 
depiction of dependent development was more incendiary than Cardoso’s.  He wrote, for example, that 
“[w]e call this combined development because it is the combination of these inequalities [in the form of 
unequal trade relations between the center and periphery] and the transfer of resources from the most 
backward and dependent sectors to the most advanced and dominant ones which explains the inequality, 
deepens it, and transforms it into a necessary and structural element of the world economy” (Dos Santos 
1970, 231).
205 Dos Santos, on the other hand—like most dependistas—advocated a revolutionary break with 
international capitalism as the recourse most likely to propel genuine, self-reinforcing development in the 
periphery.
206 Chilcote 1984, 100.
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“These conditions necessitate a rapid growth of exports so as to offset the accelerating 
growth of imports brought about by urbanization and the insufficient local production of 
food; rapid increases in administrative expenses in proportion to the needs of the local 
economy; unequal income distribution, resulting in consumption by the privileged strata; 
and inadequate industrialization, necessitating imports of capital goods.”207  These 
conditions have a detrimental impact on development.  “Whereas at the center, growth is 
development—that is, it has an integrating effect—in the periphery growth is not 
development, for its effect is to disarticulate.  Strictly speaking, growth in the periphery, 
based on integration into the world market, is development of underdevelopment.”208
Amin argued, in Marxist fashion, that class relations on a world scale fueled the
disarticulation of peripheral economies.  “The social contradictions characteristic of 
capitalism are thus on a world scale, that is, the contradiction is not between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat of each country considered in isolation, but between the 
world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat.  The world bourgeoisie and this world 
proletariat exist in a context not of the capitalist mode of production but of the system of 
capitalist formations—which…means the formations at the center and the formations in 
the periphery.”209  This logic reinforces the theory—developed to varying degrees by 
Casanova, Mandel, Cardoso/Faletto, and Dos Santos—that peripheral fortunes are tied to 
the interests of allied foreign and local capital, in whose alliance the domination of 
external forces is expressed as an internal force, namely a demand for imported luxury 
goods rather than the production of staple goods (i.e., domestic agricultural products) for 
207 Chilcote 1984, 101.
208 Amin 1974, 1:18-19.
209 Amin 1974, 1:24.
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mass consumption.  According to Amin, the periphery can take one of two paths to 
capitalism: dependent or autocentric development.  He encouraged developing countries 
to contravene the rules of international trade and investment and create autonomous 
national economies to nurture development and break the cycle of unequal development.  
However, like Cardoso, Amin acknowledged that implementing this revolutionary 
socialist solution would be quite difficult given the entrenchment of the international 
capitalist economy and the power of local elites vested in maintaining the status quo.   
This project utilizes a conceptual framework that merges the analyses of Cardoso 
and Amin, and, to a lesser extent, Casanova and Mandel.  The phenomenon of internal 
colonialism/imperialism developed by these scholars is particularly persuasive and 
relevant to the Jamaican experience.  As Casanova discussed, Jamaica’s colonial 
structure persists 40 years post-independence.  With it, the economic and social norms of 
colonialism continue to plague the country and thwart its development, illustrating the 
plantation economy at work.  Local elites, for example, collude with external interests to 
further their own interests despite the deleterious impact such action—capital flight for 
investment abroad being one example—poses for the country and its masses.  To be sure, 
Jamaica’s fortune is tied to united local and foreign capital and is subject to harmful 
forces occurring from both without and within.  By all accounts, Jamaica is integrated 
into the world economy; it has strong mining and tourism industries and trades actively 
with a number of developed and developing countries.  However, it has not been able to 
accumulate the kind of capital necessary to fuel investment for industrial development.  
Cardoso and Amin’s analyses provide keen insight into Jamaica’s problems and lead one 
to believe that Jamaica’s agricultural industries are stuck in an “enclave economy” rut 
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where local production is controlled by foreign capital and working in tandem with local 
elites who facilitate domestic subordination to external control because it benefits them 
indirectly.  This scenario illustrates the collaboration of external and internal forces in 
Third World economies to create the “new dependency,” which “disarticulates” the local 
economy and produces only “associated dependent development” or the “development of 
underdevelopment.”
The application of dependency theory and other theories of development to the 
Caribbean context is examined in detail below.  But first we explore the basic tenets of 
neoliberalism, the most recent model of development and the model on which much of 
the Caribbean’s present agricultural, trade, and investment policy is based.
Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism, the contemporary manifestation of neoclassical economics, is the 
dominant development paradigm of the post-Cold War global economy.  The neoliberal 
revolution began in the United States and Europe during the late 1970s and consolidated 
in the 1980s with the electoral wins of Ronald Reagan in the U.S. and Margaret Thatcher 
in Britain and the subsequent entrenchment of Reagan-Thatcherism worldwide.  The U.S. 
and UK have always wielded great influence in the international financial institutions 
which, in turn, wielded great power over much of the developing world, most of which 
was actively seeking financing to help their recovery from the oil and debt crises of the 
late 1970s/early 1980s.  The stage was thus set for the conveyance worldwide—via the 
IFIs, namely the World Bank and IMF, and national development organizations such as 
USAID—of the doctrine of liberalization embodied in the Washington Consensus.  
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Twenty-plus years later, neoliberalism is still the dominant model of development 
informing policy worldwide, and the international structure of power and influence—in 
the IFIs and between the IFIs and developing countries—remains largely unchanged.  
Colin Leys reflected on the policy shift: 
What made possible the triumph of neo-liberalism in mainstream 
development thinking was material, not ideal: the radical transformation in 
both the structure and the management of the world economy that had 
begun in the 1960s, and which finally seemed to offer the possibility of 
creating for the first time in history a truly unified global capitalist 
economy—and one regulated, if at all, only by institutions reflecting the 
interests of transnational capital.  Neo-liberalism articulated the goals and 
beliefs of the dominant forces that stood to benefit from this process, and 
pushed it forward.  Social-democratic parties and labour movements tried 
to resist it, but the ‘new right’ succeeded in neutralizing this resistance and 
initiating its own market-orientated project in one industrial country after 
another.  The ‘development community’, which was either part of the state 
apparatuses of these countries or depended critically on them for funding, 
was bound to come into line.210
In a profound critique of dependency theory and, indeed, all social-democratic 
theories, neoliberalism reverted development theory back to neoclassical economics, 
entrenching free-market capitalism once again throughout the international economic 
system.211  Michael Todaro explained the neoliberal conviction that free market 
capitalism is the panacea for Third World growth and development:
The [liberal theorists] argue that by permitting competitive free markets to 
flourish, privatizing state-owned enterprises, promoting free trade and 
export expansion, welcoming investors from developed countries, and 
eliminating the plethora of government regulations and price distortions in 
factor, product and financial markets, both economic efficiency and 
economic growth will be stimulated…What is needed, therefore, is not a 
reform of the international economic system or a restructuring of dualistic 
developing economies or an increase in foreign aid or attempts to control 
population growth or a more effective central planning system.  Rather, it 
is simply a matter of promoting free markets and laissez-faire economics 
210 Leys 1996, 19.
211 Key neoliberal theorists include Milton Friedman, Bela Balassa, Anne Krueger, Deepak K. Lal, P.T. 
Bauer, Ian Little, and William J. Baumol.  
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within the context of permissive governments that allow the ‘magic of the 
marketplace’ and the ‘invisible hand’ of market prices to guide resource 
allocation and stimulate economic development.212
This conviction dominates trade and development policies worldwide and is brandished 
throughout the developing world by the advanced countries and the international 
financial institutions which, to a large degree, shape the world trade and investment 
regimes in which countries must function in today’s integrated economy.  Yet, for all of 
neoliberalism’s popularity and influence, its proponents carry the taint of hypocrisy.  
While they proclaim the virtues of classical liberal political economy, they themselves 
disavow its rules when expedient for their purposes.  By breaking the rules of capitalism 
when they see fit to protect their own interests—typically to the detriment of poorer, less 
powerful forces—they weaken the appeal of the “free market.”  Hence, according to 
Harvard University professor of international political economy Dani Rodrik, "neo-
liberalism is to neo-classicism what astrology is to astronomy." If the market was 
allowed to function per the invisible hand as Adam Smith characterized it, it could 
potentially be a positive force for development.  However, as Rajan and Zingales 
explained, “capitalism’s biggest political enemies are the executives in pinstriped suits 
extolling the virtues of competitive markets with every breath while attempting to 
extinguish them with every action.”213  These “executives” are ensconced in powerful 
advanced country government bureaucracies, the international financial institutions, and 
transnational corporations where they hold sway over the international economic system 
and perpetuate the inequality of global trade rules, slanted, as they have been for 
212 Todaro 1994, 85-86.
213 Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales, Saving Capitalism From the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power 
of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity (New York: Crown Business, 2003).
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centuries, in favor of powerful business elites and their constituencies.  The regrettable 
irony here is neoliberalism’s censure of protectionism and market regulation by the 
world’s poor, coexisting almost seamlessly with its disregard of the same by the world’s 
wealthy and powerful.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the jury is still out on whether 
neoliberal development theory benefits all countries equally—i.e., via the logic of trade 
by comparative advantage—and, more specific to the Caribbean, whether it has 
facilitated or impeded development in Jamaica and other countries of the region.  If 
neoliberal theory has impeded development in the Caribbean, we must ask why and 
investigate other model(s) that will likely hasten development in Jamaica and other 
Caribbean countries.
Application of Development Theory to the Caribbean Context
Economic development theory that informs contemporary Caribbean development 
policy is grounded in the orthodox neoclassical tradition.  However, this was not always 
so.  Bernal et al. identified three schools of Caribbean economic thought that have 
informed Caribbean development policy since World War II: the Lewis school, the 
radical school of the new school of political economy, and the Marxist political economy 
school.214  Pantin outlined the periods during which these schools of thought prevailed: 
post-World War II to 1960- 1965; 1960-1965 to 1975-1980; and 1975-1980 to the 
present.215  We are currently witnessing a backlash to the neoliberal thinking that 
undergirds the third period and laid the foundation for economic liberalization via the 
214 Bernal et al. 1984, 5-96.
215 Pantin 1994, 51.
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implementation of World Bank-IMF structural adjustment programs.  The recent crisis in 
Argentina illustrates the reason for the backlash.  Argentina, like other Latin 
American/Caribbean countries, borrowed heavily from the IMF during the 1980s and 
1990s and, consequently, had to implement the Bank-Fund’s mandated structural 
adjustment reforms.  For years, Argentina implemented the reforms so consistently with 
the mandate that it was considered an A-plus student of the IMF and a poster child of 
neoliberalism.  However, disaster struck recently when Argentina defaulted on its debt 
and suffered weeks of social chaos in response to its rapidly declining economic 
condition.  As Joseph Stiglitz216 cautioned in the 12 May 2002 issue of the Washington 
Post, whereas the IMF and its supporters hold Argentina responsible for the crisis due to 
its alleged profligate government and populist practices, 
[t]o understand what happened in Argentina, we need to look to the economic 
reforms that nearly all of Latin America undertook in the ‘80s.  Countries 
emerging from years of poverty and dictatorship were told that democracy and the 
markets would bring unprecedented prosperity.  And in some countries, such as 
Mexico, the rich few have benefited.  More broadly, though, economic 
performance has been dismal, with growth little more than half of what it was in 
the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s.  Disillusionment with “reform”—neoliberal style—has 
set in.  Argentina’s experience is being read: This is what happens to the A-plus 
student of the IMF.  The disaster comes not from not listening to the IMF, but 
rather from listening.
The Lewis school, which gained prominence in Pantin’s first period, elucidated 
how a developing country lacking adequate professional, skilled and productive labor, 
industrial capitalists, and physical capital, but possessing a large quantity of unskilled 
labor, could foster economic growth and development.217  Lewis felt developing 
216 Joseph Stiglitz is a professor of finance and economics at Columbia University who received the Nobel 
Prize in Economics in 2001.  He is a former senior vice president and chief economist at the World Bank.
217 Lewis 1954, 131-191.  Sir William Arthur Lewis was an economist who wrote the first internationally 
recognized Caribbean-oriented development strategy for the region.  His proposed export-led 
industrialization strategy, termed industrialization by invitation, was written in response to the Moyne 
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countries should emphasize their comparative advantage in abundant, low-cost labor to 
attract foreign capitalists who would invest in industry producing for the domestic market 
and would reinvest their profits in the local economy enabling it to develop 
manufacturing capacity for export markets.  To attract foreign investment and develop a 
model of export-led industrialization, Lewis advised developing country governments to 
restrict imports, but only to give the investors control over the domestic market, supply 
them with factories and trained labor, and offer incentives such as tax holidays, tax 
rebates on imported machinery and equipment, and subsidies.218
Both the radical new political economy and Marxist schools, which gained 
ascendancy during Pantin’s second period, were highly critical of the Lewis school for 
what they felt were its perpetuation of the colonial structure of foreign domination and its 
subjugation of domestic resources to foreign capital and control.219  Whereas Lewis saw 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as a benign means from which to jumpstart Caribbean 
economic development, proponents of the radical school—which included, among others, 
Walter Rodney, George Beckford, Norman Girvan, Carl Stone, Michael Witter, Lloyd 
Best, Owen Jefferson, and Michael Manley—viewed FDI as a pernicious means by 
which foreign interests could insert themselves into vulnerable economies enabling them 
to eventually co-opt the societies in which the capital resides, and cause perpetual 
underdevelopment.  Foreign multinational corporations (MNCs), they argued, “embodied 
all the negative features of the foreign-owned plantation [and] were responsible for the 
Commission report—written in 1945 after the labor rebellion that paralyzed the region—which argued that 
despite the collapse of commodity prices during the Great Depression the region should nonetheless retain 
its traditional primary specialization in the international division of labor.  Lewis served as vice-chancellor 
of the University of the West Indies during the early 1960s and advised various governments in the 
formulation of their early development plans.  He wrote extensively on Caribbean development.
218 Griffith 1994, 105.
219 The radical political economy school is similar ideologically to the dependency school.
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drainage of capital from the regions.  Furthermore, MNCs promoted few interindustry 
linkages and prevented the local economy from developing an internal dynamic.”220  In 
their estimation, countries hoping to achieve the highest levels of growth and 
development must control their resources and environment by cultivating economic self-
reliance and self-sufficiency.
The Marxist school has been less influential in Caribbean economic thought than 
the Lewis and radical schools.  Rooted in Karl Marx’s analysis of capitalist development, 
the Marxists advocated an alternative, non-capitalist path to development because they 
believed that underdevelopment stems from dependence on multinational corporations, 
inadequate inter-industry linkages, unequal exchange, and the extraction of surplus value 
via the MNCs’ repatriation of profits back to their home countries.  The Marxists 
therefore advised Third World governments to socialize the means of production, limit 
the amount of foreign investment, and be highly interventionist in the economic process 
in order to effect growth and development.  While quite a few post-independence 
Caribbean governments toyed with following the Marxist path, only Cuba actually went 
all the way.  The others did not, either because they were not persuaded by the Marxist 
logic or they were dissuaded, even compelled, by external forces to abandon nascent 
Marxist tendencies.  Yet, despite the lack of acceptance by development theorists, some 
tenets of Marxist theory are quite persuasive when applied to the Caribbean context.  A 
good example is the neo-Marxist theory of imperialism refined by Paul Baran, explaining 
why underdevelopment and backwardness persisted in the Third World even after 
220 Griffith 1994, 105.
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independence.221  Baran contended that after a country is granted formal independence, 
imperialist metropoles forge alliances with the local elites to perpetuate colonialism in a 
new “neo-colonialist” guise.222  Domestic resources are drained away from the local 
economy to the metropolis, as had occurred prior to independence, and more is wasted on 
luxury domestic consumption, which together hinders local capital accumulation and 
development.223  The state is therefore an instrument of the ruling class, an implication 
first made by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto.224  Baran’s anatomization 
of the problem of post-colonial underdevelopment and backwardness utilizes cogent class 
analysis, taking into account social conflict and contradiction in both the domestic and 
international spheres.225  This is, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, an 
important methodological strategy for dissecting and understanding the problem, which 
persists to this day 20 years after Baran made his assessment.
Many Caribbean intellectuals and bureaucrats embraced the radical schools 
during the second period, which lasted from the early to mid ‘60s to the late ‘70s.  For 
most foreign-trained Caribbean economists returning home to the region during this 
period, and who informed the development policy implemented in the region thereafter, 
the dominant ideological perspective was still the neoclassical paradigm in which they 
had been schooled.  However, the majority had become persuaded by the Keynesian 
variant—which they saw in action in Britain during the early post-World War II period 
221 Baran, Paul Sweezy, Ernest Mandel, A.G. Frank, and other neo-Marxists were profoundly influenced by 
Hans Singer, Raúl Prebisch, and Gunnar Myrdal.
222 Casanova, Mandel, Cardoso, and Amin all developed this “internal colonialism/imperialism” thesis.  Of 
these, Amin’s analysis is most consistent with Baran’s.
223 See A.N. Agarwala and S.P. Singh, eds, The Economics of Underdevelopment (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1975) and The Political Economy of Growth (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).
224 Marx and Engels noted that the executive of the state “is but a committee for managing the affairs of the 
whole bourgeoisie” (1958, 36).
225 Carlene Edie (1991) developed Baran’s thesis in application to the Caribbean context.
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and in the United States during its New Deal era—which advocated government 
intervention into the market to moderate the excesses of capitalism and increase savings 
to enhance output growth.  They were also influenced by Raúl Prebisch and Andre 
Gunder Frank of the dependency school, who encouraged the new post-colonial countries 
to throw off the yoke of capitalist imperialism—and by correlation, underdevelopment 
and dependency—and embrace a nationalist path to development.  They recommended 
that developing countries undertake import-substitution-industrialization to nurture 
autonomous economies and develop self-reliance as the path out of underdevelopment.  
Unfortunately, although the region did undertake industrialization shortly after the 
independence movements of the 1950s and 60s, their model of import substitution 
industrialization did not include a strategy for developing technological innovation, 
knowledge-based production, and export diversification—three keys for competing 
effectively in today’s global economy.226  Indeed, “restricted competition and the 
isolation from technological developments served in many cases to create structures that
could not come to terms with trends in the world economy.  Increased state intervention 
in the economy was to some extent the failure of industrial policy.”227  Officials in power 
simply could not see beyond the region’s comparative advantage in abundant natural 
resources and unskilled labor; they felt these regional factor endowments, together with 
captive domestic and regional markets, were sufficient to sustain the region indefinitely.  
226 Consistent with List’s imperative that developing countries cultivate their powers of production as their 
means of increasing prosperity, Daniel Bell illustrated society’s transition from an industrial society to a 
post-industrial, “knowledge” society where scientists and research personnel predominate and the economy 
becomes science-based and shifts from goods production to service provision.  See Bell, The Coming of 
Post Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973). This transition is 
currently occurring in the industrialized economies, e.g., the United States, Japan, and those of Western 
Europe.  Unfortunately, much of the developing world is being left behind.
227 Ramsaran 1992, 3.
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They were buoyed in their optimism (or, perhaps, naiveté) by the leverage the Cold War 
presented.  Before the fall of the Soviet Union, developing countries generally, and 
especially strategically placed countries like those of the Caribbean Basin, played the 
ideological camps—the Soviet Union and the United States—off each other.  As Griffith 
noted, each camp provided to cooperative countries aid, investment funds, and increased 
access to their markets in order to further their military and political objectives, and the 
Caribbean was only too willing to play along provided they received the means for 
pursuing their development goals.  Their geopolitical advantage, however, would come to 
an end with the fall of the Soviet Union, which ironically coincided with a host of global 
events that together halted in its tracks the Caribbean’s attempt at ISI-led development 
and self-reliance and instituted a regime of economic liberalization in the classical 
laissez-faire tradition, disavowing state interventionism and protectionism in the tradition 
of ISI.  This would precipitate the region’s downward slide into unsustainable debt, 
exacerbated poverty, and dependent development.
Although current Caribbean development theory and policy are grounded in the 
neoliberal tradition, it does not fit the Caribbean’s history, context, or economic structure.  
Neoliberalism is based on, and evolved from, the experience of countries that were not 
subject to the historical processes—e.g., extended colonialism and prolonged 
imperialistic extraction of resources by metropolitan powers—to which today’s 
developing countries were subjected and, consequently, have not suffered protracted 
underdevelopment.  On the contrary, most (if not all) developed countries industrialized 
via state protectionism and patronage before they liberalized their economic systems.  
Therefore, comparing contemporary developed and developing country experiences—
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which, coincidentally, has been the domain of developed country economists formulating 
theory to be propagated by the multilateral trade and finance institutions controlled by 
developed countries—is like relating apples to oranges, and urging developing countries 
to fully liberalize their economic systems before they industrialize is pernicious at best.
This project examines these and other theoretical shortcomings and argues that 
the formulation of Jamaican economic policy based strictly on neoliberal assumptions 
constitutes a misapplication of theory due to Jamaica’s unique history, context, and 
needs.  Moreover, the grounding of policy purely in neoliberal theory without caveats to 
address the country’s unique particularities sets up a system that will promote only 
limited growth and development while increasing unemployment and poverty.  Jamaica’s 
current economic path will not likely beget the knowledge-based industrialization and 
improved human and national economic well-being necessary for instituting genuine self-
reinforcing development.  It will instead perpetuate Jamaica’s underdevelopment and will 
reinforce Jamaica’s harmful dependence on metropolitan countries and the international 
financial institutions.  Obviously, Jamaica and the larger Caribbean should employ a new 
model of development.  
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Chapter 3: Agriculture in World Trade
In global terms, the broad result of policy interventions in agriculture has been that too little is produced in 
developing countries and too much in developed countries.  In this situation a particular responsibility rests 
on the shoulders of policy-makers in developed countries to unwind the major distortions of agricultural 
trade which have resulted from the pursuit of policies which encourage excessive production.
Nikos Alexandratos, World Agriculture Toward 2000: An FAO Study
Reducing these subsidies and removing agricultural trade barriers is one of the most important things that 
rich countries can do for millions of people to escape poverty all over the world.  It’s not an exaggeration to 
say that rich countries’ agricultural policies lead to starvation.
Ian Goldin, vice president for external affairs, World Bank
Our aspirations and demands clash with the lack of understanding, selfishness, colossal interests, and 
enormous technological, economic, military and political power of the world's rich countries. We have no 
alternative but to struggle for recognition of our demands. We constitute the vast majority of mankind, and 
our rights and interests cannot continue to be trampled underfoot forever…We need to struggle without 
respite for an end to the unequal trade that depresses our export income, shifts the cost of the inflation 
generated in developed countries onto our economies and ruins our peoples.
Developing world must stand together, edited excerpt from a Zambian Post editorial, Toronto Star, 8 April 
2003.
Overview
Neoliberal theory asserts that integration into the world economy promotes 
economic growth, development, and poverty reduction.  Trade in the view of 
neoliberalism is the vehicle of integration and, by implication, the vehicle of growth.  
Most, if not all, the major international financial institutions sanction and promulgate this 
view.  The World Bank, for example, states on its website that “in today’s economically 
integrated world, trade matters more than ever before.  There is compelling evidence that 
openness to trade is associated with increased growth.  Indeed, trade and investment have 
driven much global growth for the last three decades and can be a powerful locomotive 
for development.”  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) elucidates the following cost-
benefit analysis of trade liberalization: 
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On the one hand, the benefits accrue because of lower input costs for 
producers owing to the reduced tariffs, a wider variety of goods available 
to consumers at lower prices, and enhanced export prospects as 
employment and output increase in the exportable goods and service
sectors.  On the other hand, tariff cuts could lead to a reduction in output 
and employment in certain sectors that face greater competition from 
lower-cost foreign products.  The net outcome invariably depends on the 
structure of the economy and the flexibility of wages and prices to allow 
the full readjustment of relative prices following trade liberalization.  In 
most countries, the beneficial effects are likely to predominate.228
Not surprisingly, anti-globalization activists argue the converse, that economic 
integration is creating an increasingly wide gap between the rich and poor—both among 
and within countries.229  The International Forum on Globalization, for example, 
proclaims on its website that “globalization policies have contributed to increased
poverty, increased inequality between and within nations.”230
Trade has increased exponentially since the launch of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.  This expansion has been particularly significant 
since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994 at the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT.  According to the IMF, world trade has 
averaged a growth of 6 percent per year over the past 20 years, prompting rapid growth 
of the world economy.  However, as the IMF and other multilateral trade and financial 
organizations have indicated, world trade has not achieved the degree of liberalization—
that is, full liberalization manifested by free trade—which neoliberal theory advocates as 
228 Janet Stotsky et al. “Trade Liberalization in the Caribbean.” Finance & Development 37:2 (June 2000).
229 For example, see Debi Barker and Jerry Mander, eds., Does Globalization Help the Poor? A Special 
Report  (San Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, 2002), with articles by scholar-activists
Martin Khor (Third World Network), Vandana Shiva (Foundation for Science, Technology, and Ecology), 
John Cavanagh (Institute for Policy Studies), and Walden Bello (Focus on the Global South) among others.
230 See www.ifg.org.  The IFG was founded in 1994 after the passage of the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT.   Per the website, the IFG 
aims to: 1) expose the multiple effects of economic globalization in order to stimulate debate, and 2) seek 
to reverse the globalization process by encouraging ideas and activities which revitalize local economies 
and communities, and ensure long term ecological stability.
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the ideal state of affairs.  “World trade has the potential to act as a powerful motor for the 
reduction of poverty, as well as for economic growth, but that potential is being lost.  The 
problem is not that international trade is inherently opposed to the needs and interests of 
the poor, but that the rules that govern it are rigged in favor of the rich.”231  Almost a 
decade after the WTO was established, many countries still practice protectionism and 
retain trade barriers.  Such protectionism not only contravenes the classical liberal 
conception of market efficiency, it also thwarts market performance as measured against 
the yardsticks of effectiveness, equity, food security, sustainability of resource use, and 
people’s livelihood.232  The nature and extent of trade restrictions vary from country to 
country and across sectors.  However, the treatment of agriculture in the multilateral trade 
regime has demonstrated that free trade in farm goods is not an objective that all 
countries are actively pursuing.  According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), developing countries generally maintain low and even negative 
protection of agricultural producers, whereas industrialized countries generally maintain 
high price and producer-income supports.233  Viewed cynically, “free” trade can be 
construed as an ideal held out by the industrialized countries as an ace in the hole for 
securing further liberalization from developing countries in areas of interest to the 
former.234  After all, “[r]emaining trade barriers in industrial countries are concentrated in 
231 Oxfam International 2002, Summary pg. 3.
232 Tilburg et al. analyze the relationship between market structure and market performance during a 
liberalization process from both a micro and macro viewpoint.  Market performance is measured against 
the standards noted above.  See Tilburg et al., eds., Agricultural Markets Beyond Liberalization (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000): 4.
233 Alexandratos 1988, 188.
234 For instance, the industrialized countries are seeking further liberalization on trade in industrial goods 
and  in services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  With regards to trade in 
industrial goods, the US in November 2002 proposed a worldwide elimination of tariffs on manufactured 
products by 2015.  Curiously, however, agro-industrial products were excluded from the proposal.  For an 
analysis of the proposal in light of the US’ recent protectionist decisions on steel and agriculture, see Can 
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the agricultural products and labor-intensive manufactures in which developing countries 
have a comparative advantage.  Further trade liberalization in these areas particularly, by 
both industrial and developing countries, would help the poorest escape from extreme 
poverty while also benefiting the industrial countries themselves.”235  Statements like 
these issued by the IMF, one of the “holy trinity” of organizations governing world trade 
and financial relations, prompts curiosity about the extent to which the gains in 
international trade and the growth of the world economy have benefited developing 
countries like Jamaica. 236
Many developing countries are still natural resource economies that specialize 
according to the liberal logic of comparative advantage in primary commodity 
production.  Some of these countries, Jamaica included, have diversified into other 
sectors including tourism, mineral extraction, and labor-intensive manufacturing.  
However, because these sectors are relatively new, highly capital-intensive, and 
extremely vulnerable to the whims of highly speculative foreign investment and external 
shocks, they have had a volatile record in many developing countries and, 
notwithstanding their realized and prospective enhancement of gross domestic product 
(GDP), are precarious means of earning foreign exchange.  Agriculture, on the other 
hand, has been more reliable because it is not as capital-intensive and its two most 
important factor endowments—land/environment and labor—are bountiful in the 
countries themselves.  For most developing countries, Jamaica included, agriculture 
America kick-start the Doha round, The Economist, 29 November 2002.  With regards to trade in services, 
the “Singapore Issues”—investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and 
trade facilitation—are of primary concern.
235 Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries: an IMF Issues Brief (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, November 2001).
236 The other two are the World Bank and World Trade Organization.
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remains one of the largest employers of labor and provides a substantial percentage of the 
country’s foreign exchange earnings.  Agriculture is, in a nutshell, these countries’ bread 
and butter and agricultural trade their most reliable pathway to development and reduced 
dependence on external assistance.  Yet, although “Jamaica is indeed a green and lush 
island…the reality is that very few of its independent farmers are able to make even a 
reasonable living.  Recent studies have even suggested that as many as ten percent of 
rural children suffer from malnutrition.”237  Clearly, something is wrong with this picture.  
Noted below is a simplified linear illustration of the neoliberal logic of growth 
and development via trade for natural resource economies:
agricultural production→agricultural trade→foreign exchange earnings with which to 
invest in national growth and development→reduced external dependence
The model invokes certain precepts concerning trade liberalization and development.  
Firstly, because lower tariffs translate into lower food prices and greater variety of 
foodstuffs due to increased imports, it assumes that liberalization fosters greater food 
security for importing countries.  However, this presumption is valid only if the majority 
of the population are consumers, not producers—clearly not the case for natural resource 
economies such as Jamaica.  “In reality, in many developing countries, a large percentage 
of the population are food producers whose livelihoods are threatened by increasing
imports.  When farmers can no longer contribute to the national economy, then food 
security and the entire economy will suffer.”238  Secondly, it assumes that increased 
imports promote competition and efficiency.  However, if the amount of imports in poor 
countries overwhelms domestic farmers not privy to generous government-funded safety 
237 Harrison 2001, 10.
238 Phillips 2001, 12.
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nets, impoverishment, not innovation, is the likely result.  “Competition alone is 
inadequate.  Fair prices and appropriate technology transfer are also essential for the short 
and long term food security of developing countries.  In short, domestic producers must 
be given sufficient latitude to develop a strong economic base without isolating 
themselves from the international market.”239  Thirdly, the model implies certain 
assumptions negating the influence of constraints on development, both internal and 
external.  It assumes that the countries will: maximize their natural factor endowments in 
production; have access to and/or be able to purchase the requisite technical inputs; be 
able to sell their products freely in rich country markets; and will efficiently utilize and/or 
invest their foreign exchange earnings into national development towards the 
achievement of reduced external dependency.  
This research assesses the extent to which these internal and external constraints 
have impeded Jamaica’s development.  Developing countries must avoid or overcome 
various constraints to propel national development.  Among the agriculture-related 
constraints impeding Jamaica’s development are: 1) internal—land tenure irregularities; 
neglect of the agriculture sector by national policymakers due to rent-seeking and 
clientelism; inadequate technical capacity for enhancing production; weak regional 
cooperation and collaboration; and 2) external—restricted access to developed country 
markets; massive foreign debt; structural adjustment conditionalities mandating too-rapid 
liberalization of trade and financial markets; membership in preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) encouraging specialization on a few primary commodities; subsidized 
239 Ibid.
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agricultural production and export; and food dumping by developed countries.240  All 
have played a role in facilitating underdevelopment and dependency in Jamaica.  
However, two constraints—restricted access to advanced country markets and rich 
country agricultural subsidization—stand out as longstanding, intractable, and the “magic 
bullet” for change.  If, after 50+ years under a multilateral trading regime, rich 
countries—where poor countries must sell their exports in order to grow and develop—
still subsidize their agriculture sectors, a leading cause of food dumping in poor 
countries, and impose barriers to developing country exports, agricultural goods key 
among these, developing countries will remain underdeveloped and dependent on these 
very countries.  
To be sure, if developing countries such as Jamaica cannot grow and develop by 
trading according to the logic of comparative advantage in that which they do best, either 
the (liberal/neoliberal) theory on which the international trading regime is based is 
flawed, or the regime, ostensibly grounded in said theory, has in fact undermined the 
theory and is based on subterfuge, privileging one group of actors—the rich and 
powerful—to the detriment of another, less powerful, group.  This subterfuge, if that is 
what it is,241 will guarantee the continued underdevelopment and dependency of 
developing countries like Jamaica unless they open their eyes to the situation and muster 
the political will, both internal and external, to change the status quo for the benefit of 
240 Key PTAs for Jamaica are the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the US’ Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), the EU’s Lomé-Cotonou Agreement, and Canada’s CARIBCAN.  See Chapter 4 for a 
detailed discussion of the implications of these agreements for Jamaica’s development.
241 The caveat is presented to acknowledge David Ricardo’s qualification of the theory of comparative 
advantage on capital immobility which, given today’s mobility of capital, is moot in the international 
political economy.  Therefore, purporting that today’s world trading regime is grounded in Ricardo’s logic 
of comparative advantage—an argument commonly asserted by many neoliberal defenders of the regime—
is subterfuge indeed.  This subterfuge obscures the inequities that underlie the regime and, since trade is 
such a crucial component of the global economy, the international economic system.
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their masses who do not belong to the rich and powerful group.242  Advanced country 
protectionism in agricultural trade must be obliterated as a key step towards leveling the 
playing field for, and invigorating development in, the poorer countries of the world 
trading regime.  Liberalizing access to developed country markets for developing country 
exports will give them the incentive to remedy internal macroeconomic and 
microeconomic obstacles to agricultural productivity in order to boost trade capacity and 
competitiveness and will over time equip them to more effectively counteract the other 
constraints to development.  Petit and Subramanian acknowledged this link between 
external constraints and supply response in developing countries and, ten years later, their 
words still ring true: 
Even with the desired supply response, agricultural trade is influenced by 
forces beyond the control of governments in developing countries.  The 
movement of international prices of commodities may turn out to be 
detrimental to the pace of policy reform…For many commodities, 
international prices depend on the trade policies pursued by developed 
countries, and these are intimately related to their domestic agricultural 
policies.  Current difficulties faced by GATT negotiators reflect this 
situation.  The resulting uncertainties have considerably slowed down the 
pace of reform within developing countries, thereby affecting agricultural 
producers in these countries who could otherwise have gained by 
capitalizing on the comparative advantage they possess.243
242 By all accounts, developing countries are becoming more active and vocal at the WTO, lobbying to 
ensure that the negotiations address their special needs and concerns vis-à-vis their industrialized 
counterparts.  For example, with regards to the Doha Round’s services negotiations, Bridges Weekly Trade 
News Digest reported that “[e]ven if the services negotiations have been held back by the lack of will in 
other areas, the number, the type of focus and main aspects of developing country requests shows a raise of 
interest and an important level of sophistication and engagement by developing countries in current 
negotiations” (7:9, 13 March 2003).
243 Petit and Subramanian 1993, 64.
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Why Agriculture
In the words of James P. Houk, agriculture occupies a special niche in the trade 
policy arena.  Agriculture has always been a sensitive topic in world trade negotiations.  
In fact, although discussed during successive rounds of the GATT, agriculture did not 
come under the purview of the multilateral trade framework until relatively recently, 
during the Uruguay Round which established the WTO.244   Since then, agriculture has 
been a significant polemic between developing and developed countries and between 
certain developed country blocs, namely the US and EU.  Many trade experts agree that 
agriculture—not services, investment, or even intellectual property—is the bedrock of the 
multilateral trade regime and the crux on which all progress rests.  The FAO forecasts 
that full-scale liberalization in agricultural trade would raise incomes and decrease 
poverty in poor countries—particularly those in Latin America and the Caribbean—
which would enhance development and reduce external dependency:
Preliminary results, based on the application of a general equilibrium 
model, point, in general, to some positive overall effects for developing 
countries’ economies following liberalization of industrialized countries’ 
agricultural policies.  Developing countries’ real incomes are estimated to 
increase, although there are important differences in the magnitude of this 
increase between the various developing country economic groups and 
geographical regions.  As in the case of trade-oriented liberalization 
studies, the Latin American and Caribbean region would be the major 
beneficiary region.  All developing country regions, however, are 
estimated to improve their terms of trade, as a result of an estimated 
decrease in the real prices of manufactured and equipment goods exported 
by OECD countries following liberalization in their agricultural sectors.  
Moreover, all developing country regions are estimated to benefit in terms 
of improvements in rural incomes, thus contributing to a more equitable 
distribution of incomes between the urban and rural population.245
244 See the WTO Backgrounder in Appendix C for a detailed description of the WTO’s form and function.
245 Alexandratos 1988, 196.
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Liberalization would increase world prices, decrease world price volatility, and increase 
the volume of world trade.  Most importantly for developing countries such as Jamaica, 
the knowledge that their exports will command higher prices on international markets 
would stimulate and innovate domestic production, reduce their consumption, and 
facilitate import substitution for both domestic consumption and export.246  Development 
would increase and dependency would decrease proportionally. Liberalization would 
therefore unleash the gains from trade now constrained by developed country 
protectionism in violation of the Adam Smith’s principle of laissez-faire and David 
Ricardo’s trade by comparative advantage.  Yet, despite the anticipated advantages for 
developing countries, agricultural reform is stymied by multilateral discord, which has 
slowed WTO momentum and threatens to derail the current Doha Round—a prospect that 
the world trading regime can ill afford after the Seattle Ministerial debacle in 1999.  Put 
simply, developing countries have gotten fed up with developed country agricultural 
protectionism and they are refusing to accede to any WTO negotiation that does not 
prioritize agricultural reform reducing developed country trade barriers against 
developing country farm exports.  As indicated in The Economist,
[a]lmost no progress has been made since [the Doha Round] began, for 
one big reason. Although the Doha agenda is broad, embracing industrial 
tariffs, services, anti-dumping rules and so on, one issue lies at its heart: 
agriculture. Developing countries feel that they were short-changed in the 
previous Uruguay round, and are determined not to let it happen again. 
Their priority is farm-trade liberalisation. But rich countries are not ready 
to cut subsidies to farmers.
America is at best hypocritical over this: the monstrous farm bill signed by 
George Bush last May raised subsidies to farmers by 80%. But the 
Americans have since proposed to cut all farm subsidies to no more than 
246 Alexandratos 1988, 193.
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5% of the value of production, and to abolish all export subsidies.247
Japan has, as usual, been wholly unhelpful: unbelievably, it has proposed 
in the Doha talks to reduce its already tiny quota on imported rice. But the 
real villain of the piece is the European Union, which has failed to produce 
any serious proposals to reform its disgraceful common agricultural policy 
(CAP).248
As an illustration of agriculture’s sensitivity in WTO negotiations, the WTO 
failed to meet the 31 March 2003 deadline for establishing a negotiating framework for 
agriculture for the Doha Round.  Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi expressed his 
disappointment over the setback: “The failure to meet the deadline for agreeing to 
agriculture negotiating modalities is a great disappointment for us all. Negotiators must 
redouble their efforts in agriculture and all other areas of negotiation between now and 
the September [2003] Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico.”249  The inability of 
WTO members’ to agree on a modalities framework came as no surprise to trade experts, 
not least Stuart Harbinson, the then chair of the WTO Committee on Agriculture who 
wrote the draft modalities documents that were overwhelmingly panned by WTO 
members.  The draft modalities met with opposition from WTO members on all sides of 
the debate: the EU and Japan criticized them for being overly ambitious on reduction 
targets; the US and the Cairns Group250 denounced them for not being ambitious enough; 
and the developing countries lamented their inadequate attention to special and 
247 The US has proposed the global elimination of all agricultural export subsidies and a limit on domestic 
farm subsidies of 5 percent of total domestic production.  See Doubts about Doha, The Economist, 13 
November 2002.  Curiously, the proposal was made shortly after the passage of the highly trade restrictive 
2002 farm bill.
248 “Deadlocked in Doha,” The Economist, 27 March 2003.
249 WTO press release, Farm talks miss deadline; but ‘work must go on’, says Supachai, 31 March 2003.
250 The Cairns Group is comprised of 17 agricultural exporting countries.  Current members are Argentina, 
Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Paraguay, Philipines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.  Fourteen members are developing 
countries.  Australia and New Zealand are the OECD’s least protectionist member countries.  Formed in 
1986, the Cairns Group exemplifies successful coalition building and lobbying in trade negotiations.  For 
more information, see http://www.cairnsgroup.org/index.html.
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differential treatment.251  Up to and including the Cancun Ministerial, WTO members 
remained far apart on what they deemed appropriate negotiating modalities.  In fact, 
discord over agriculture was a primary cause of the disintegration of the Cancun 
Ministerial.252  According to a WTO spokesman, the modalities negotiations highlighted 
the divergent views of WTO members and emphasized agriculture as an area of particular 
concern; failure to reach agreement on negotiating modalities could endanger the new 
trade round.  EU agriculture commissioner Franz Fischler, recognizing early in the new 
Round that the March deadline was idealistic, forecasted at the start of 2003 that 
agreement would not be reached prior to the fifth WTO ministerial to be held in 
September 2003 in Cancun, Mexico.253  His prediction rang true.  In March 2004, six 
months after the failed Cancun Ministerial, WTO members still have not reached 
agreement on agriculture negotiating modalities, and the outlook for concluding the Doha 
Round by January 2005 as scheduled is bleak.  While on a visit to Washington, D.C. in 
February 2004, European Community trade commissioner Pascal Lamy commented on 
the stalemate in the WTO: “without progress in agriculture, there won’t be any 
progress.”254
251 Developing countries are given special and differential treatment under the Enabling Clause of the 
GATT.  The Enabling Clause created a permanent legal basis for the operation of the General System of 
Preferences (GSP).  In effect, it gave developing countries “flexibility” in applying trade rules to meet their 
“essential” development needs.
252 The Ministerial fell apart when the G-20, a group of developing countries formed to protest the WTO’s 
failure to act in the interest of developing countries, with particular regard to developed country agricultural 
protectionism, engendered the walkout from the negotiation of many developing countries.  
253 See Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 7, no. 3, 29 January 2003.
254 See Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, vol. 8, no. 7, 26 February 2004.  Timothy Groser, the new 
chair of the WTO Committee on Agriculture, has scheduled the first post-Cancun agriculture negotiation 
session for 22-26 March 2004.
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How Protectionism Distorts Trade in Agricultural Goods 
According to the FAO, “[t]he global agricultural trade environment has seriously 
deteriorated in recent years.  The main symptoms are that agricultural commodity prices 
on world markets became depressed as never before, surplus stocks reached record levels, 
costs of agricultural support programmes rocketed, agricultural export revenues of many 
countries declined, and encounters in agricultural trade policy, in particular over export 
subsidies, have intensified.”255  Agriculture’s intractability stems in large part from its 
importance to national food security.  In addition, farm lobbies in advanced countries 
tend to be very powerful and this power allows them to wield great influence in national 
policymaking to secure the protectionist policies on which their livelihood depends.  “In 
most developed nations, both farm and rural populations have dwindled to less than 15 
percent of the total as people are drawn into other more rapidly growing fields of 
employment.  Yet the political influence of rural producers and their representatives 
usually has remained strong enough to prevent a rapid erosion of protective programs 
begun when the number of producers was larger.”256  In a truly free trade system, these 
farmers would not survive without generous governmental support.  Realizing this, 
developed country farmers are not hesitant to use their power at the ballot box and their 
sway over public opinion to pressure their representatives into making policy that keeps 
them in business despite the economic inefficiencies that underlie such policy and distort 
international trade.257  Agricultural protectionism in whatever guise causes tremendous 
255 Alexandratos 1988, 201.
256 Houk 1986, 25.
257 For instance, given George W. Bush’s (pre-presidency) reputation as a free-trader, one must assume that 
he had a special reason for signing off on the highly protectionist 2002 farm bill.  Experts agree that he 
wanted to win the farm belt’s support for trade promotion authority (TPA), the authorization granted the 
president by Congress to negotiate international trade agreements.  Viewed optimistically, his compromise 
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dislocation in the economy, both domestic and international.  Timothy Josling explained 
the economic illogic of maintaining high agricultural tariffs relative to tariffs on goods in 
other sectors of the economy:
By raising domestic prices above the cost of imports, the government 
gives farmers the wrong incentive to produce and reduces the contribution 
that the sector makes to the national economy.  The cost of inputs into the 
production process can easily exceed the value of output.  Under these 
circumstances, the contribution to the output of the economy is 
negative…Support for one sector puts a burden on others...Governments 
that give direct payments from the government treasury to agriculture, 
instead of (or in addition to) the protection offered by tariffs, must raise 
taxes and curtail other desired spending or run large budget deficits.  Even 
rich countries where agriculture is a small part of the economy can find 
such side effects a drag on the economy.258
High tariffs, particularly tariff peaks and tariff escalation, distort trade by 
impeding the flow of goods into a country.259  “Tariff ‘peaks’ within product groups, 
often exceeding 50 percent or, in agriculture, 100 percent, are concentrated in labor-
intensive products of significant export interest to developing countries, and particularly 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs).”260  Coincidentally, the developing country exports 
most at risk for tariff peaks are products that compete with developed country farm 
goods—namely dairy, sugar, fruits, and cereals.  Tariff peaks restrict market access and 
tariff escalation, by penalizing the creation of value-added to primary commodities, 
“…hampers the diversification of exports, limits the accumulation of skills and capital, 
and thus helps perpetuate dependence on a small number of unprocessed goods whose 
can be interpreted as a concession made in the short-term to achieve full trade liberalization in the longer-
term.  Needless to say, most developing countries do not take this optimistic view; they take the pessimistic 
view that the US, like the EU, has a vested interest in shielding its farmers from competition posed by 
lower-priced developing country farm imports.
258 Josling 1998, 8.
259 Tariff peaks are tariffs of 15 percent or higher.  Tariff escalation occurs when tariffs on processed goods 
exceed tariffs on primary goods.
260 The United Nations classifies the world’s (49) poorest countries as LDCs.  Jamaica is not one of these 
countries.
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world demand grows little and whose prices are volatile.”261  Other mechanisms of 
agricultural restriction are subsidies and quotas.  Of these, subsidies are particularly 
destructive.  By linking payouts to production, subsidizing governments encourage 
overproduction and, ultimately, the flooding of world markets with surplus capacity.262
Artificially-induced price deflation is the eventual, and unfortunate, result.  Consumers 
benefit from low prices, but such price depression harms countries reliant on commodity 
exports for their foreign exchange earnings.  Moreover, more intrinsic to the logic of free 
trade, subsidization to facilitate production contravenes the logic of both comparative and 
competitive advantage.  Surely, it is nonsensical (and pernicious) when the countries that 
have comparative AND competitive advantages in agricultural production are effectively 
incapacitated by rich country subsidization in their export of farm goods and their ability 
to earn a fair price for their labor.  
Yet, despite the evidence of economic irrationality and inequity, many developed 
countries maintain entrenched systems of agricultural protection to boost the production 
and export of their farm goods to the detriment of developing country production and 
exports.  In this way, “[t]rade is reinforcing global poverty and inequality because the 
international trading system is managed to produce these outcomes.  The rules of the 
game reflect the power of vested interests.”263  As illustrated in a New York Times op-ed, 
subsidized rich country surplus farm goods decimate developing country agricultural 
261 Improving Market Access: Toward Greater Coherence Between Aid and Trade (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, March 2002).
262 To reduce the problem of overproduction linked to subsidization, governments have been encouraged to 
decouple support—that is, delink the payment of subsidies from production.  Franz Fischler, EU agriculture 
commissioner, has proposed linking EU agricultural subsidies to environmental and animal-welfare 
standards rather than supply, but the proposal encountered much resistance within the EU.
263 Oxfam International, 2002, Summary pg. 5.
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sectors and unfairly privilege developed country farmers, who often are not the world’s 
most efficient agricultural producers:
When Mexican [Jamaican, Bangladeshi, or any developing country 
national] corn farmers tramp through their fields behind donkey-drawn 
plows, they have one goal: to eke out a living. Increasingly, however, they 
find themselves saddled with mountains of unsold produce because 
farmers in Kansas and Nebraska sell their own corn in Mexico at prices 
well below those of the Mexicans. This is not primarily due to higher 
efficiency. The Americans’ real advantage comes from huge taxpayer-
provided subsidies that allow them to sell overseas at 20 percent below the 
actual cost of production. In other words, we subsidize our farmers so 
heavily that they can undersell poor competitors abroad. And just to make 
sure, we have tariff barriers in place that make it extremely hard for many 
third world farmers to sell in the United States. The same is true for their 
efforts to sell in Europe and Japan. The world’s farming system is rigged 
in favor of the rich.264
Most poor countries cannot compete, not only because they lack the financial resources to 
subsidize at similar levels but also because they are precluded from subsidization by the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA);265 only those countries that subsidized 
farm goods prior to the Uruguay Round were allowed to continue subsidizing afterwards, 
albeit at lower rates.  Hence, many developing countries have neglected their own 
agricultural sectors, choosing instead to depend on developed country agricultural aid and 
imports for domestic consumption.
Many economists deride subsidization and other forms of government largesse as 
not only profligate, but also counterproductive in the grander scheme of trade 
liberalization.  “Washington's payouts to politically powerful farmers and big 
264 The Hypocrisy of Farm Subsidies, New York Times (1 December 2002).
265 Many developing countries claimed zero level of support when GATT members were negotiating the 
terms of the AoA during the Uruguay Round because they had lacked the resources to subsidize their 
agricultural sectors in the base year (1986-88) adopted by the AoA.  Consequently, they cannot introduce 
new forms of amber box support under the AoA.  This inequity is just one of the numerous developed 
country biases that are intrinsic to the AoA and, indeed, the WTO.  The different categories (i.e., colors) of 
support permissible under the AoA are discussed later in this chapter.
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agribusiness threaten to derail the Administration's ambitious plans to extend NAFTA 
throughout the Western Hemisphere and to craft bilateral free trade deals around the 
globe.  That should come as no surprise. After all, creating a free-trade zone of the 
Americas depends on convincing fragile, agriculture-dependent economies such as 
Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay [not to mention the even more fragile agriculture-
dependent small island economies of the Caribbean] that they won't be overwhelmed by 
U.S. farm exports artificially priced low.”266  The US is by no means the only advanced 
country that subsidizes its agricultural sector excessively and, from the point of view of 
developing countries, unfairly.  According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
& Development (OECD), rich countries subsidize their farm sectors to the tune of $311 
billion a year, twice the income developing countries earn from farm exports.  By 
comparison, US farmers receive 20 percent of their income from subsidies, EU farmers 
31 percent, and Japanese farmers 59 percent.  And, according to the IMF: 
Industrial countries maintain high protection in agriculture through an 
array of very high tariffs, including tariff peaks (tariffs above 15 percent), 
tariff escalation (tariffs that increase with the level of processing), and 
restrictive tariff quotas (limits on the amount that can be imported at a 
lower tariff rate).  Average tariff protection in agriculture is about nine 
times higher than in manufacturing.  In addition, agricultural subsidies in 
industrial countries, which are equivalent to 2/3 of Africa’s total GDP, 
undermine developing countries’ agricultural sectors and exports by 
depressing world prices and pre-empting markets.  For example, the 
European Commission is spending 2.7 billion euro per year making sugar
profitable for European farmers at the same time it is shutting out low-cost 
imports of tropical sugar.267
266 Paul Magnusson, Commentary: “Farm Subsidies: A Blight on the Economy,” BusinessWeek (9 
September 2002).
267 Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries: an IMF Issues Brief (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, November 2001).
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It goes without saying that subsidization to this degree marginalizes farmers in countries 
like Jamaica that are dependent on agriculture as a primary source of income.  
In the words of Martin Khor, a developing country (Malaysian) economist and 
trade activist affiliated with the Third World Network, “the whole system is unbelievably 
irrational and unjust.”  Clearly, legislators beholden to their agricultural constituencies 
pass laws that are favorable to domestic farming and, in multilateral negotiating fora, 
fight to entrench these preferences in the world trading regime. Farmers in developing 
countries, on the other hand, tend to be very fragmented and weak.  They wield little to 
no influence on national policymakers and, as a result, their interests are usually rendered 
secondary to other, more powerful constituencies.  Their voice is even more enfeebled by 
their countries’ inability to persuade advanced countries to eradicate their barriers to 
agricultural products of export interest to developing countries.  With little hope of 
selling their farm goods to rich countries in order to boost their GDPs, many developing 
country governments have either marginalized or abandoned agriculture altogether.  This, 
in large part, explains why agriculture has deteriorated so drastically in Jamaica and other 
developing countries, both in contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) and national 
food security.  Throughout the 50+ year tenure of the GATT, protectionism on the part of 
advanced country agricultural interests, and the powerlessness of developed countries to 
alter the status quo substantially in their favor, have made agriculture almost sacrosanct 
in multilateral trade negotiations.  The battle at the WTO has yielded clear-cut winners 
and losers.  Advanced country agricultural interests have grown more powerful and 
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prosperous while developing country farmers have been largely marginalized and 
squeezed out of the world trade regime.268
This is not to say that some developing countries are not protectionist.  Indeed, 
like their developed counterparts, many impose barriers to foreign trade.  According to 
the IMF, “[many developing countries themselves have high tariffs.  On average, their 
tariffs on the industrial products they import are three to four times as high as those of 
industrial countries, and they exhibit the same characteristics of tariff peaks and 
escalation.  Tariffs on agriculture are even higher (18 percent) than those on industrial 
products.”269  However, it seems counterintuitive to argue that restricted market access 
for developed country farm goods harms developing country agriculture and 
development, especially when developed countries—the EU, US and Japan chiefly—
argue the reverse logic as their rationale for protecting their farmers.  Not coincidentally, 
this reverse logic allows them to nurture vibrant agricultural sectors via the use of trade 
restrictions.  Moreover, it is markedly unclear to which developing countries the IMF is 
referring.  Logic and evidence from its own structural adjustment programs (SAPs) 
implemented in many developing countries throughout Latin America/the Caribbean and 
Africa dictate that the likely suspects surely cannot be countries from these regions.  
These countries, as part of the conditionalities mandated by their SAPs, liberalized their 
trade and financial regimes so comprehensively that the IMF itself has acknowledged the 
deleterious impact such across-the-board liberalization has had on these countries.  To 
268 The world’s farmers do not constitute a homogeneous group.  As discussed, farmers hail from either 
advanced or developing countries.  Another significant distinction is the large “corporate” farmer versus the 
smallholder.  The smallholder, the class to which the majority of developing country farmers belong, is 
increasingly marginalized in the world trade regime.  Even in OECD countries, farm trade policies are 
heavily biased against small farmers (Messerlin 2003).  
269 Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries: an IMF Issues Brief (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, November 2001).
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quote a recent IMF report documenting the effects of financial integration on developing 
countries, “[a]n objective reading of the vast research effort to date suggests that there is 
no strong, robust and uniform support for the argument that financial globalization [aka 
global integration via liberalization] per se delivers a higher rate of economic growth.”270
The IMF’s retraction of its endorsement of foreign investment as a panacea for 
developing country growth is shocking but not surprising to people who live in the 
countries that effected such liberalization prior to achieving a modicum of broad-based 
development—social, economic, and institutional—following the example set by the 
developed countries and, more recently, India, China, and the newly-industrialized 
countries (NICs) of East Asia.  
Despite its factor endowment and suitability for agricultural production and trade, 
Jamaica imports a significant amount of food for domestic consumption.  According to 
Jamaica TradePoint, a gateway for facilitating external trade with Jamaican companies, 
Jamaica’s expenditures (in $US million) on imported food increased steadily during the 
1990s: 244.2 in 1994, 343.5 in 1995, 366.9 in 1996, 445.0 in 1997, 466.5 in 1998, and 
453.5 in 1999.  In contrast, its annual earnings (in $US million) from food exports were 
erratic and generally quite low: 209.5 in 1994, 261.1 in 1995, 278.1 in 1996, 267.9 in 
1997, 236.0 in 1998, and 234.6 in 1999.271  In every year cited, Jamaica—a lush tropical 
country with ample natural and human resources for producing enough food to feed its 
populace—spent more on imported food than it earned from agricultural exports.  
Because the country is a net-food importer, it is absurd to suggest that the country is 
underdeveloped because it restricts agricultural trade.  If anything, certainly given the 
270 Eswar Prasad et al., Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical 
Evidence (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, March 2003).
271 See Jamaica TradePoint’s statistics at http://www.jamaicatradepoint.com/BizInfo/import.asp. 
140
developed country example, the reverse logic seems more plausible.  In a statement to the 
third session of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Foreign Trade Seymour Mullings described Jamaica’s experience with trade 
liberalization: 
Jamaica, a heavily trade-dependent country, in which imports and exports 
of goods and services account for over 100 per cent of gross domestic 
product, has seen increases in total trade.  These increases however, have 
been primarily the results of an expansion in the level of imports which 
more than doubled between 1988 and 1998.  Exports grew by only 49 per 
cent.  Imports during the 1990s have expanded by 66 per cent, while 
exports grew by only 42 percent.  Imports into Jamaica are now twice the 
level of exports with the fastest growing component being consumer 
goods which have more than doubled between 1994 and 1998.  Since 
1990, Jamaica has continually registered a trade deficit which has grown 
by 25 per cent between 1995 and 1997.272
Mr. Mullings illustrated the disproportionate impact that trade liberalization—initially 
under World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programs and eventually under the WTO—
has had on small economies, which tend to have a very high trade to GDP ratio, the result 
of their historical dependence on export-led development.273  In another WTO statement, 
this one submitted to the fourth special session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture 
meeting in November 2000, Jamaica referred to the “acute vulnerability of the 
agricultural sector as a result of trade liberalization measures undertaken autonomously 
under structural adjustment programmes.  This has already had severe repercussions on 
272 World Trade Organization, WT/MIN(99)/ST/90, December 2, 1999, (99-5314).
273 The model of export-led development practiced by small island states like Jamaica emphasizes export of 
primary commodities in return for import of manufacturers.  This model, established very early in 
Jamaica’s history as the basis of plantation agriculture, reinforces the historical pattern of developing 
country dependence on advanced country financial resources, technical expertise, and export of 
manufactured goods—the latter supported in developed countries by adding value to the very primary 
commodities they imported from developing countries for a pittance.   In today’s world trading regime, 
developing countries are penalized with tariff escalation for creating value-added derivatives of primary 
commodities.  In so doing, developing country industrialization is forestalled, even discouraged.
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the farming agricultural sector.  Further liberalization aggravates the domestic 
situation.”274
To recap, various issues have complicated the agriculture debate and increased its 
sensitivity in trade negotiations.  High tariff barriers and entrenched non-tariff barriers 
such as subsidies and quotas are paramount but are not the only problems.  In a recently 
published volume on agricultural trade policy, Kennedy and Woo noted that “[s]everal 
persistent trade issues must be addressed.  Among these, agricultural protection levels are 
high relative to those of other goods, while certain nontariff barriers remain.  In addition, 
export subsidies, credits, and limited market access continue to distort world agricultural 
markets.  Domestic support disciplines have little effect in most countries, and some 
commodities remain largely outside the reform process.”275  The controversy surrounding 
genetically modified food, labeling, environmental stewardship, and sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures has also bedeviled agricultural trade negotiations.276  Other trade-
impactive issues include: the relationship between regional trade agreements (RTAs) and 
the WTO; the role of state trading enterprises (STEs) in agricultural trade; the booming 
agricultural biotechnology industry; and the interface between trade and the 
environment.277  The disparate, and often polemical, positions of developed and 
developing WTO members also merit special attention.  Developing countries are 
274 World Trade Organization, G/AG/NG/W/86, 6 December 2000, (00-5277).
275 Kennedy and Woo 2002, 2.
276 Of these, only the sanitary and phytosanitary issue is regulated under the WTO regime, via the 
Agreement on Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).  These issues 
are alternately lauded and derided by interest groups across the globe.  With the exception of genetically 
modified foods, such regulations on trade in agricultural goods are generally opposed by developing 
countries due to the countries’ lack of resources for monitoring and implementation.  Moreover, there is a 
presumption in developing countries that such regulations—particularly requirements for environmental 
stewardship and minimum sanitary and phytosanitary standards—are really intended as de facto non-tariff 
barriers to trade. 
277 Kennedy and Woo 2002, 2.
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increasingly exercising their voice in WTO negotiations.  This primarily post-Uruguay 
phenomenon has altered the scope and tone of WTO negotiations and has forced 
developed countries to reckon with the concerns and interests of their less affluent 
counterparts.  China, with its hybrid developing/developed and authoritarian/liberal 
economic tendencies, is proving to be another force to be reckoned with.  To be sure, 
“[d]iverse country and regional perspectives will influence and complicate the ability to 
negotiate future trade liberalization.  Of particular importance are the positions of the 
United States, the European Union, the Cairns Group, China, and the developing 
countries.”278
A brief characterization of the various trade-constricting issues is presented 
below.  RTAs have become significant players in the global economy.279  These 
arrangements offer preferential trade privileges to members and restrict trade with 
countries external to the arrangement.  Therefore, the incentive to join such arrangements 
is quite high, and most countries belong to at least one RTA.  However, critics assert that 
RTAs are incompatible with, and stymie the multilateral trade regime, which advocates 
the eradication of trade restrictions en toto.  State trading is another important force in the 
global economy.  STEs are quasi-governmental entities that influence the level and 
direction of imports and exports, typically of agricultural commodities.280  As such, state 
trading distorts commodity markets and restricts trade.  Although there has been a public 
278 Kennedy and Woo 2002, 3.
279 RTAs that will influence the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations include the European Union (EU), 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Region 
(APEC), Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).  The FTAA, although not yet actualized, has political 
force in that potential member countries will include their FTAA interests in their negotiations at the level 
of the WTO, and vice versa. 
280 Kennedy and Woo 2002, 2.
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outcry against these agencies, they are very much a reality in most advanced country 
economies.  Ironically, however, they are no longer viable in many developing countries, 
where they have been deregulated and privatized as a condition of the governments’ 
structural adjustment agreements with the IMF and World Bank.  STEs must be reformed 
during the Doha Round of trade negotiations to facilitate truly free, and fair, trade.  At the 
very least, “STEs should be transparent in terms of their operation and marketing 
practices; STEs should be subsidy-neutral, implying that STEs should not circumvent 
domestic and export subsidies; and finally, STEs should be restricted in exercising 
market power, including the use of price discrimination and price distortions.”281
Biotechnology—specifically the production of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs)—has prompted much strife over concerns as diverse as food safety; labeling/the 
consumer’s right to know what she is consuming; the preservation of traditional 
production techniques and practices; biopiracy; the oligopolistic consolidation of 
agricultural production, distribution, and export; and the hegemonic control by 
agribusiness of global agricultural production.  The complex nature of the biotechnology 
issue has propelled it to the forefront of the agricultural trade debate.  All parties have a 
stake but certain positions have taken center stage.  The US is an ardent supporter of 
biotechnology—not surprising since it has the most acreage planted in GMOs and is 
home to the major transnational agribusiness corporations.  Both the EU and Japan are 
ardent critics of biotechnology.  EU governments and consumers in particular are 
vehemently opposed to GMOs, so much so that the EU is leading a charge at the WTO to 
institute product labeling, much to the US’s consternation.  Many developing country 
policymakers are also distrustful of biotechnology, but for reasons different from Japan 
281 Kennedy and Woo 2002, 3.
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and the EU’s.  While some developing country advocates decry the outcry against 
GMOs—claiming that the insect resistant and herbicide tolerant seeds and plants 
produced by biotechnology will increase the global food supply and therefore eradicate 
world hunger—many others are reserved about destroying traditional production 
techniques that have fed the populace for millennia and cultivated dependence on seeds 
and other inputs that must be imported, typically at prices beyond the reach of small 
farmers who form the backbone of developing country rural economies and farm sectors.  
Moreover, developing countries possess much of the genetic material that is being 
patented by agribusiness, engineered, and sold to these very countries at exorbitantly high 
prices.282  This is, understandably, a major irritant for developing country trade activists.  
Agriculture’s increasing “corporatization” into the mammoth global agribusiness 
industry has also fuelled the controversy and raised the stakes in the debate.  Claims that 
agribusiness is displacing small farmers worldwide abound in the literature on 
agricultural trade economics.283  To be sure, there is mounting evidence that agribusiness 
has co-opted a sector that used to cater exclusively to national food security and 
transformed it into an unqualified money making machine for shareholders out to make a 
profit despite the ramifications to the social structure domestically and globally.  The 
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) has documented the extent of 
agribusiness’ oligopolistic control of agriculture in the United States:
A few transnational agri-business firms dominate all agricultural 
commodity production, transportation and processing in the United States.  
Over 80 percent of US corn is exported by three firms: Cargill, ADM and 
282 The Third World Network has published much material on this subject.  Of this body of work, Vandana 
Shiva’s contributions have been particularly influential.  
283 See Frank Magdoff et al., eds., Hungry for Profit: The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the 
Environment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000).
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Zen Noh.  The top four beef-packers in the United States are Tyson 
(owner of Iowa Beef Packers), ConAgra, Cargill (owner of Excell 
Corporation), and Farmland National Beef Packing Company.  They 
control 81% of the market.  Three of these four (Smithfield replaces 
Farmland) are also the top pork packers; two (Tyson and Con Agra) are 
among the top poultry producers.  Cargill ranks among the top three of 
four companies across the sector, from beef and pork packing, to turkeys, 
animal feed, grain terminals, corn exports, soybean exports, flour milling, 
soybean crushing, and ethanol production.
These startling statistics reveal the extent to which transnational agribusiness is 
displacing small farmers worldwide.  
Why Agricultural Protectionism
Timothy Josling presented a very pragmatic assessment of why high agricultural 
protectionism is so prevalent in the international political economy despite its economic 
pitfalls for the economy and society.  “Agricultural protection, like that in other 
‘sensitive’ sectors of the economy (e.g., textiles, steel, and shipbuilding), serves one 
purpose—to protect the profits of those in the industry from erosion due to competition.  
It is the fear of reduced incomes and asset values, including land prices, rather than food 
shortages or rural depopulation that often makes it so difficult to remove high levels of 
protection.”284  This illuminates the role industry lobbying and rent-seeking plays in the 
making of agricultural policy—and, for that matter, the making of policy for any 
“sensitive” sector.285  James P. Houk proffered another, more multidimensional view.  
Houk outlined several reasons why countries shield their agriculture sectors from foreign 
competition: protect a new industry; protect national security; protect national health; 
284 Josling 1998, 9.
285 For an excellent analysis of rent-seeking see Anne Krueger’s famous 1974 article, “The Political 
Economy of the Rent Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 64 (3): 291-303.
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protect against “unfair” foreign trade policy; protect domestic programs; protect the 
balance of payments; improve the international terms of trade; provide revenue; and 
protect against painful economic adjustment.286  “The main reason that a protective web 
of trade policy evolves within every nation is that the benefits of additional trade usually 
are spread widely and thinly among numerous individual consumers and vigorous 
industries.  However, the costs and hardships, although smaller in total, almost always are 
focused on relatively few workers, farms, and industries.  These few can usually
articulate their problems clearly and press for help.”287  DeVries and Richter- Altschaffer 
specified technological progress as another rationale for government management of 
agricultural production and trade: “…agriculture not only profits but also suffers from 
rapid progress in technology, which, as an industry, can raise productivity and income 
only if the new or improved resources can be fully, or nearly fully, employed.  Contrary 
to the situation in industry with its much higher demand elasticities, such increases in 
economic productivity and income, with full employment of the improved resources, can 
only come about if prices are not pushed down—that is to say, if output is not, or not 
significantly, raised.”288  It is not surprising, therefore, that farmers in wealthy advanced 
countries demand and, more often than not, receive substantial government support—
“support for income protection, support by demand supplementation through export 
subsidies and schemes of domestic and international food aid, and, partly, support 
through supply management which their millions cannot accomplish for themselves as 
easily as can industrial producers acting individually or in concert.”289
286 Houk 1986, 21-25.
287 Houk 1986, 20-21.
288 DeVries and Richter-Altschaffer 1974, 67.
289 DeVries and Richter-Altschaffer 1974, 68.
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The protectionist sentiment has characterized international trade for centuries.  
DeVries and Richter-Altschaffer delineated three phases in the growth of agricultural 
support.290  Until relatively recently in history, the now advanced (European) countries 
were able to meet the demands for both industrial development and food security.  
However, the tide began to change in the late 19th century when émigrés to the New 
World began to clear and farm the massive tracts of virgin territory available in their new 
lands.  With the advances in grain farming and marine transport, the fruits of this toil
soon began to flood the markets of the Old World.  Hence, in phase one, European 
countries erected barriers in the form of fixed tariffs to moderate the influx of foreign 
farm goods.  However, this reaction was not uniform across the countries.  “Although by 
the middle of the century overseas food and agricultural raw materials had become 
essential for the supply of the European population and factories, domestic agriculture in 
continental Europe was not to be sacrificed to the upsurge of cheap deliveries from 
abroad.  From the end of the seventies onward, Germany and France, in particular, 
resorted to protection.  England remained true to the spirit that, a generation before, had 
led to the repeal of the Corn Laws.291  Denmark and the Netherlands—small and highly 
progressive countries—sought an entrepreneurial solution by shifting into livestock partly 
reared on cheap imported feed.”292
The second phase of agricultural protectionism like the first emanated from 
developments in the international economic system, namely the difficulties stemming 
from Great Depression and WWI.  In the early 20th century, countries retreated into 
290 See DeVries and Richter-Altschaffer 1974, 61-66.
291 Karl Polanyi discussed the harmful social impact of England’s repeal of the Corn Laws in his seminal 
work The Great Transformation.
292 DeVries and Richter-Altschaffer 1974, 62.
148
isolation, which increased national productivity and forced self-sufficiency in agriculture 
as well as industry.  Even England—which had tried to remain true to the spirit of 
liberalization that led it to repeal its Corn Laws—embraced protectionism, sheltering both 
itself and its colonies.  It was in this era that quantitative restrictions, producer subsidies, 
and bilateral trade agreements first appeared.293   In the third phase, dating from the end 
of WWII to the present, government intervention in agricultural production and trade 
became entrenched.  During this period, Europe consolidated the European Union 
including its agricultural regime, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the 
world’s trading nations created the WTO incorporating agriculture for the first time in a 
multilateral trade framework to stem the tidal wave of protectionism. DeVries and 
Richter-Altschaffer explained the transition:
Under the systems of support characteristic of this third phase of 
protection, import duties have become of lesser importance.  Fixed, 
guaranteed, or so-called target prices emerged; if set above levels of other 
countries’ exports, they require either quantitative regulation of production 
and/or trade, or variable import levies.  Direct payments to farmers, or 
subsidies for input items, with or without supply management, also 
became an important feature of support.  Exporting countries joined the 
policy of agricultural protection with their own brands of price 
management, direct or indirect export subsidies, and governmental or 
quasigovernmental marketing boards or export monopolies.294
The GATT was created during the early part of this third phase to moderate the tariff 
barriers to trade that had become pervasive during the early to mid 20th century.  
293 DeVries and Richter-Altschaffer 1974, 63.  In the United States, Congress passed the Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1929, establishing a federal farm board to support farm products by means other than a 
tariff.  The Hawley-Smooth Tariff Act of 1930 increased the protective tariff to the highest level in US 
history.  Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 authorized import quotas on agricultural 
goods when necessary to enhance domestic support programs.  The Sugar Act of 1934 went beyond import 
quotas, authorizing domestic production quotas and subsidies to domestic producers.  Europe, of course, 
was not immune to the protectionist trend.  Various countries established import monopolies for grain and 
set domestic prices at artificially high levels.  Even Denmark and the Netherlands succumbed, establishing 
import-substituting industries to produce the food grains and livestock feed that they had previously 
imported.  
294 DeVries and Richter-Altschaffer 1974, 65.
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Creation of a Multilateral Trade Regime to Liberalize Trade
During the GATT prior to the creation of the WTO, the world’s advanced 
countries were resolute in their determination to not include agriculture in multilateral 
trade negotiations.  To a large extent, the US and EU have shaped the agriculture debate 
and defined the negotiation agenda.295  To be sure, the longstanding battle between the 
US and EU over the extent to which government should subsidize and otherwise protect 
its farmers is a major complicating factor in the agricultural trade debate.  DeVries and 
Richter-Altschaffer explained the feud and its implications for international trade:
That agriculture should present a special problem in the relations between 
Europe and the United States is not surprising.  Both are industrial areas.  
Agriculture is, of course, their oldest and most basic industry.  In America 
and parts of Europe it is an export industry of great 
importance…Considering the social philosophies and political influences 
in American and European society, farm support and protection of 
agriculture are a fact and inescapable requirement.  And since national 
support policies, to be effective, require measures affecting foreign trade, 
agriculture becomes a problem in international economic relations…296
Ironically, although both the US and EU staunchly endorse the logic of free trade, 
they brazenly flaunt their own rhetoric by maintaining massively subsidized, tariffied, 
and quota-laden farm sectors.  Japan, with its refusal to open its rice and other industries 
to foreign competition, is another free trade delinquent.  Each country has an ostensibly 
sound rationale for sanctioning protectionism in agricultural trade while endorsing open 
trade for industry.  Regardless, this discrepancy smacks of a double-standard that not 
only unfairly privileges a select, powerful few at the expense of large segments of the 
295 This is changing with China’s recent accession to the WTO and its influence as a major agricultural 
power.  The developing countries have also increased their participation in influence over WTO trade 
negotiations.  
296 DeVries and Richter-Altschaffer 1974, 59.
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world’s people who rely on farming for basic sustenance, it also invalidates the argument 
for liberalized trade.  Together, the US, EU, and Japan maintain the most highly 
protectionist policies in the world trading regime.  Consequently, they have become the 
most vilified of countries in the WTO.  They are routinely castigated by countries seeking 
access to their lucrative but protected markets and civil society endeavoring to level the 
playing field in agricultural trade.
The Uruguay Round and the WTO
By the late 1980s, GATT members conceded that protectionism in agricultural 
production and trade had gotten out of hand.  Where they had previously avoided 
including agriculture in the multilateral trade framework, they recognized the political 
and economic expediency of including the sector in the Uruguay Round negotiations to 
arrest the spiral of protectionism.  A 1988 FAO study of the state of world agriculture 
explained their conundrum: “In recognition of the high levels of protection in agriculture, 
the budgetary and economic costs that they entail and of the dangers of allowing the 
present indiscipline and unpredictability of world agricultural markets to continue, the 
contracting parties to the GATT have agreed to give special attention to agriculture in the 
new Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  Specifically, the negotiations 
‘shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all measures 
affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more 
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines.’”297  The Uruguay Round was 
launched in 1986 with the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration.  According to 
297 Alexandratos 1988, 197.
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Raghavan (1990), the declaration incorporated agriculture into the negotiations to 
discipline world agricultural trade by correcting restrictions and distortions to reduce the 
uncertainty, imbalances, and instability prevalent in world agricultural markets.  The key 
players during the negotiations were—and still are—the US, EU, the Cairns Group, 
Japan, and the developing countries.298  That these positions still hold over 10 years later 
reveals the WTO’s lack of progress in achieving multilateral consensus on agricultural 
trade liberalization.  At the WTO, as in most legislative bodies multinational or 
otherwise, politico-economic power yields influence and the ability to lobby effectively 
for the inclusion of one’s interests in policymaking.  It is certainly time that Jamaica and 
the other members of CARICOM exploit this reality at the WTO.  
The Punta del Este declaration targeted several areas for reform, including two 
highly contentious issues that had been percolating between the advanced country and 
developing country blocs for decades.  These were 1) improving market access through 
the reduction of import barriers, both tariff and non-tariff and 2) disciplining, and 
ultimately eliminating, the use of direct and indirect subsidies on agricultural production 
and export.  Domestic subsidization was a particularly contentious issue between the 
developed and developing country blocs and between the US and the EU.299  Negotiating 
298 At this point in the GATT, the developing country bloc was more cohesive and homogeneous than it is 
today in 2004. As Sheila Page explained, “[a]t the beginning of the Uruguay Round, there was still an 
identifiable ‘developing country’ position, particularly as it became clear that the developed countries 
would press for developing countries to participate in all aspects of the agreement.  In all previous 
negotiations, where the central issue was ‘special and differential treatment’ for developing countries, they 
had operated as a group.  Traditional leaders like India [and Brazil] still considered that they could speak 
for the majority of developing country members.”  See Sheila Page, Developing Countries: Victims or 
Participants—Their Changing Role in International Negotiations (London: Overseas Development 
Institute, 2003), 9.  Also see Appendix D for each country’s negotiation position vis-à-vis agriculture.
299 In November 1992 the US and EU signed the Blair House Agreement to end a deadlock between the 
two countries that threatened to derail the Uruguay negotiations.  Blair House paved the way for the 
inclusion of a “blue box” caveat in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture delineating “permitted” 
subsidies, namely those included in the 1990 US Farm Bill and the EU’s CAP.  Although Blair House 
resolved the US/EU conflict, at least in the short-term, it did not resolve for developing countries the issue 
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groups were formed and work programs outlined with the goal of identifying the major 
problems and their root causes and developing a list of negotiating objectives, or 
modalities, for moderating and rectifying the problems.300  The GATT Committee on 
Trade and Agriculture was one such negotiating group.  During the early phase of the 
new round, the committee considered a number of strategies for addressing the problems 
of market access; subsidies affecting trade in agriculture; sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures and other technical issues; the review of national policies; and other issues such 
as special and differential (S&D) treatment for developing countries.301
According to the WTO, the Punta del Este Declaration contained the most 
comprehensive trade negotiating mandate to date.  It addressed traditional market access 
issues; the exceptional situations in the areas of agriculture and textiles and clothing; the 
rules of the system, including through improvement of agreements on non-tariff 
measures; and new issues in the international trade agenda, such as trade in services and 
protection of intellectual property rights.302  In effect, the Declaration set the stage for 
large-scale liberalization of trade in industrial and agricultural goods and also service-
related trade.  However, agriculture would prove to be a stumbling bloc as it had been for 
decades.  Discord over the nature and extent of agricultural reform prolonged the 
Uruguay Round negotiations for four extra years.  GATT 1994, which established the 
WTO, was eventually signed at the Marrakesh Ministerial in April 1994 after eight long 
years of negotiations.   
of noxious developed country agricultural subsidization.  If anything, it exacerbated the destructive practice 
of rich country subsidization by institutionalizing it at the WTO in the Agreement on Agriculture.
300 Negotiating modalities outline the scope of the negotiations, the methodologies to be followed during 
the negotiations, and the expected outcomes.
301 Alexandratos 1988, 198.
302 See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto01/note1. 
153
The WTO encompassed several new agreements that revolutionized the 
multilateral trade regime.303  With regards to trade in agriculture, the agreement on 
Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures are the ruling precepts.  The AoA 
integrates sections of the SPS along with language pertaining to the special conditions of 
developing countries.  It specifies that the Uruguay negotiations “have resulted in four 
main portions of the Agreement: the Agreement on Agriculture itself, the concessions 
and commitments Members are to undertake on market access, domestic support and 
export subsidies; the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; and the 
Ministerial Decision concerning Least-Developed and Net Food-importing developing 
countries.”304  Although GATT 1947 had disciplined world trade to a large degree, 
certainly in comparison the highly protectionist policies many countries observed in the 
pre-WW II era, GATT rules did not effectively regulate agricultural trade until the AoA 
was implemented in 1995.  GATT 1947 governed agricultural trade, but it contained 
many loopholes that allowed members to bend the rules to their advantage.  In the 
intermediary period between GATT 1947 and GATT 1994, countries developed creative 
non-tariff methodologies for subverting liberalized trade in agricultural goods.  Quotas 
and subsidies, both export and domestic, became de rigueur.  Members, recognizing the 
need to bring order to an increasingly unpredictable and inequitable agricultural trade 
regime, ratified the AoA to standardize agricultural trade under the GATT.  
303 Key among these are the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), the Agreement on Textiles on Clothing, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS).
304 See The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations: Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements. 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#aAgreement. 
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The WTO’s rules and commitments apply to the three principal categories of 
agricultural protection—market access, domestic support, and export competition—
which many trade experts refer to as the three pillars of the AoA.  In WTO terminology, 
market access references the various trade restrictions confronting imports; domestic 
support references the subsidies and other programmes, including those that raise or 
guarantee farmgate prices and farmers’ incomes; and export competition references the 
subsidies and other methods used to make exports artificially competitive.305  The AoA 
provided for flexibility in implementation to take into account the interest many countries 
have in protecting their rural economies, the special needs of poorer countries, and the 
interests of net food-importing countries.306  Under the AoA, agricultural products are 
now protected only by tariffs—at least in theory.  Members consented to reduce non-
tariff barriers to trade but they retained the right to impose tariffs on imports, albeit at 
reduced levels, and some countries retained the right to subsidize certain products.307
Market access involves tariffs primarily.  As such, market access liberalization under the 
WTO had two components: 1) the further reduction and/or elimination of tariffs from the 
levels allowed under GATT 1947 and the various amendments enacted thereafter and 2) 
the conversion of non-tariff barriers to tariffs in a process of “tariffication.”  Members 
agreed to reduce these newly converted tariffs over a predetermined implementation 
period by set percentages for developed and developing countries.  Developed countries 
were to reduce tariffs by an average of 36 percent over six years and developing countries 
305 See Trading into the Future: The Agreements—Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers. 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm.
306 For instance, the least developed countries (LDCs) were exempted from all commitments to reduce 
tariffs and subsidies.
307 Only those countries that subsidized exports prior to the implementation of the AoA were allowed to 
continue subsidizing.  
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by an average of 24 percent over 10 years.  The minimum cut for developed countries 
was to be 15 percent and, for developing countries, 10 percent.  The Uruguay Round also 
created the tariff rate quota (TRQ) as another component of the tariffication process.  In 
many cases, when countries converted their non-tariff barriers into tariffs, the calculated 
equivalent tariffs still posed a significant import restriction.  WTO members devised the 
TRQ to ensure minimum access opportunities for imports.  The TRQ, in effect, affords 
lower tariffs for specified product quantities within the quota and higher tariffs for 
quantities outside the quota.  “The tariffication packages also provides for the 
maintenance of current access opportunities and the establishment of minimum access 
tariff quotas (at reduced-tariff rates) where current access is less than 3 per cent of 
domestic consumption.  These minimum access tariff quotas are to be expanded to 5 
percent over the implementation period.  In the case of the ‘tariffied’ products ‘special 
safeguard’ provisions will allow additional duties to be applied in case [of] shipments at 
prices denominated in domestic currencies below a certain reference level or in case of a 
surge in imports.”308  Unfortunately, quota administration is not streamlined and many 
countries complain that, by being excluded from the quotas, their exports are unfairly 
restricted and unduly subjected to the higher outside-quota tariff rates.309  Despite their 
limitations, tariff rate quotas are generally endorsed by developing countries, at least 
those that are party to commodity arrangements that include TRQs for developing 
country exports.
With regards to domestic support, WTO terminology references subsidies 
awarded for production in terms of “boxes” with the colors of traffic lights—green 
308 See http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#aAgreement.
309 These complaints are particularly vociferous when tariff quotas are not filled with the targeted imports, 
yet the countries not privy to the quotas nonetheless have to pay the higher tariffs.
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meaning allowed, amber meaning to be reduced, and red meaning not allowed.310
Because the AoA does not explicitly forbid any support policy, the boxes essentially 
designate caveats for subsidization.  Hence, there is no red box; however, domestic 
support exceeding amber box levels is considered WTO-illegal.  The amber box 
designates all domestic support measures that distort production and trade.  Countries 
must reduce the total value of these measures.  Amber box subsidies are expressed as 
total aggregate measurement of support (AMS) and are subject to defined “de minimis” 
limits of 5% of agricultural production for developed countries and 10% for developing 
countries.  There is also a blue box designating subsidies linked to programs that limit 
production.  This box is known as the “amber box with conditions” and designates 
subsidies aimed at minimizing distortion in production.  The blue box is an exemption 
from the general rule that all subsidies linked to production must be reduced to “de 
minimis” levels.311  Some countries oppose the blue box because payments are only 
partially decoupled from production.  Green box subsidies must not distort trade, or at 
worst, must cause only minimal distortion.312  They must be government-funded and 
cannot involve price support—i.e., by charging consumers higher prices to offset costs—
and generally involve support that is decoupled from production.  Green box policies 
meeting these criteria are allowed without limits.  They include government services such 
as research and disease control, direct payments to farmers that are decoupled from 
production, and direct payments under environmental programs.  Many developing 
310 See Domestic support in agriculture: The boxes, an agriculture negotiations background fact sheet. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm.
311 See WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now (October 2002, 20). 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.pdf.  
312 The green box is defined in Annex 2 of the AoA.  A complete listing of permitted green box policies is 
provided therein.
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countries feel the green box is biased towards wealthier countries that have carved out 
safety and environment imperatives for agricultural production and trade and, through 
publicity and marketing, have secured public endorsement of government support to 
finance these “just” causes.  Financing of this sort marginalizes developing countries not 
able to compete with such lavish subsidies and not allowed to define their own 
imperatives.  “The rhetoric of liberalisation is evoked to explain that developing countries 
can not carve out appropriate exceptions for themselves for the just goal of food security.  
It is quite obvious however, as illustrated by the Green Box, that developed countries are 
able to so for the ignoble goal of economic and political self-interest.”313
Export subsidies, the final pillar of the AoA, is highly criticized by many WTO 
members, particularly the poorer nations who are neither permitted to nor can afford to 
subsidize their farmers to the extent that richer countries can.  The AoA export subsidy 
reduction mandate for developed countries is two-prong: members must reduce direct 
export subsidies to 36% below the 1986-90 base period level, and the amount of 
subsidized exports by 21 percent, over the six-year implementation period.  Developing 
countries are held to two-thirds the commitment of the advanced countries and have 10 
years to make their reductions.  The least developed countries are absolved of any 
reduction commitments.314  Despite the adjustments made for poor countries, the AoA’s 
export subsidy provisions nonetheless harmed developing country agriculture.  The AoA 
did not compel developed countries to eradicate their subsidies as it should have.  “Like 
domestic measures, many developing countries do not have export subsidies in place.  In 
most cases, these were eliminated by the imposition of Structural Adjustment 
313 Phillips 2001, 15.
314 See Appendix E for a delineation of the reduction commitments mandated by the AoA.
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Programmes without any regard for food security.  Because current tariff rates can not be 
increased, developing countries are left to compete unfairly against the highly subsidised 
exports of developed countries.”315
The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) has bearing on 
trade in agriculture because it applies to food safety and animal and plant regulations.  
The SPS validates a government’s right to enact sanitary and phytosanitary regulations 
that are necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.  However, the 
agreement holds governments to a standard of scientific legitimacy, consistency, and 
fairness in the application of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations in trade.316  To 
harmonize standards across its diverse members, the WTO encourages countries to base 
their regulations on international standards, guidelines, and regulations.  However, 
members are allowed to enact measures that are higher than international standards if 
they provide adequate scientific justification or appropriate risk assessment.  Developing 
countries view the SPS with suspicion because they fear it has been, and will be, used to 
unfairly discriminate against their exports.  This is a major source of worry for poor 
countries like Jamaica as they struggle to muster the financial resources and institutional 
machinery to comply with trade partners’ sanitary and phytosanitary measures in order to 
ensure the viability of their exports in international trade.  
WTO members, recognizing the unique situation of developing countries and the 
potential for foul play vis-à-vis poorer countries, incorporated into the AoA provisions 
recognizing the special needs of developing countries.  Developing countries outlined 
315 Phillips 2001, 16.
316 The WTO does not recognize the precautionary principle, a trade safeguard whereby governments can 
reject goods that have not been proven 100% risk free. The EU, Japan, and other countries routinely use 
the precautionary principle to reject genetically modified food imports.
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their concerns to be addressed.  Almost 10 years after Uruguay, these concerns are as 
relevant as they were in 1995.  They include, along with the concerns about developed 
country subsidization, the expectation that developing countries liberalize at (effectively) 
the same pace as the wealthier industrialized countries; developed country tariff peaks 
against products of export interest to developing countries; developed country tariff 
escalation for increased value-added; the dearth of international commodity agreements 
and the related commodity price volatility; the imminent end of preferential market 
access under PTAs due to challenge at the WTO; PTAs encouraging of specialization of a 
limited number of primary commodity exports; and the need for greater coherence 
between aid and trade policies. 
The PTA issue is both sensitive and significant.  Due to developed country 
agricultural protectionism, many developing countries are reduced to dependence on 
preferential market access to developed country markets.317   Needless to say, there 
would not be as strong a need for such arrangements if free trade in agriculture existed in 
practice and was not merely rhetoric bantered about in ideological discussions of trade 
liberalization as an economic ideal.  “[S]ome countries doubt whether preferences are 
truly beneficial because they encourage small countries to be dependent on a small 
number of uncompetitive products, discourage diversification and prevent other countries 
from supplying those products.”318  PTAs are also highly susceptible to challenge from 
WTO members that feel such arrangements discriminate against their agricultural 
317 These preferential trade agreements (PTAs) include commodity arrangements granting developing 
country parties to the agreement market access for specified tariff rate quotas (TRQs) of select goods.  
Examples include the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 
Lomé/Cotonou Agreement, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  
318 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The issues, and where we are now (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 
2002), 33.
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exports.  Of particular importance to Jamaica is the WTO challenge to the EU’s Lomé 
regime that the US mounted in 1996.319  In a major blow to Caribbean banana producers, 
the US won the case and the EU reformulated the terms of Lomé in the new Cotonou 
Agreement.320  Despite the limitations of PTAs, some countries have grown dependent on 
the arrangements as a vehicle for exporting their farm goods and want to preserve them.  
Small island countries like Jamaica and land-locked countries depending on few export 
commodities figure prominently among this group.  However, PTAs are gaining in 
disfavor.  The IMF had the following to say on the benefits, or lack thereof, of PTAs for 
developing countries: 
For a variety of reasons, preferential access schemes for poorer countries 
have not proven very effective at increasing market access for these 
countries.  Such schemes often exclude, or provide less generous benefits 
for, the highly protected products of most interest to exporters in the 
poorest countries.  They are often complex, nontransparent, and subject to 
various exemptions and conditions (including noneconomic ones) that 
limit benefits or terminate them once significant market access is 
achieved.321
Measures such as PTAs, which were designed to facilitate trade and development 
opportunities for developing countries but have since proven ineffectual in improving 
market access and promoting broad-based development, have led several developing 
country WTO members to submit proposals designating the need for separate rules for 
319 On paper, the beneficiaries were ostensibly Ecuador and other Latin American countries where large 
quantities of bananas are produced.  But the US in reality sued on behalf of its fruit-producing MNCs—i.e., 
Dole and Chiquita—operating in these regions.  
320 The EU instituted the Lomé Treaty to assist its former colonies in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
(ACP) regions in their transition to the global economy as independent countries.  Lomé included 
preferential market access for certain ACP exports, including bananas.  Under the Cotonou Agreement, 
Lomé’s successor treaty, preferential market access is limited to ACP countries that are UN-designated 
least developed countries (LDCs).  Cotonou was negotiated in 2000 and will take effect in 2008 after an 
eight year transition period to allow current non-LDC beneficiary countries time to restructure their 
economies and trading regimes to compete effectively in an open global trading regime sans preferences.
321 Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary
Fund, 2001).
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developed and developing countries.322  “Some countries say WTO arrangements should 
be more flexible so that developing countries can support and protect their agricultural 
and rural development and ensure the livelihoods of their large agrarian populations 
whose farming is quite different from the scale and methods in developing countries.  
They argue, for example, that subsidies and protection are necessary to ensure food 
security, to support small scale farming, to make up for a lack of capital, or to prevent 
rural poor from migrating into already over-congested cities.”323  Developing country 
food security, in particular, has attracted a lot of attention.  To counter food shortages in 
developing countries, the WTO’s Special Decision delineates objectives for the provision 
of food aid via grants and technical assistance for agricultural development.  The AoA 
also provides for IMF and World Bank financing for the short-term purchase of food 
imports.
However, as useful as these stop-gap measures may be, much more needs to be 
done to effectively enhance developing natural resource economies’ long-term 
competitive viability in agricultural production and trade to reduce dependency on 
external assistance and facilitate national development of the sort that provides them the 
wherewithal to either produce sufficient food for domestic consumption, with surplus for 
trade, or adequate resources to purchase—versus beg for—what they require.  Studies 
have proven that external aid is not sufficient for Third World development.  Eberhard 
Ruesse explained how a foreign “techno-managerial elite” makes assessments of need in 
322 CARICOM (G/AG/NG/W/100), the African Group (G/AG/NG/W/142), the Association of Southeast 
Asian States (G/AG/NG/W/55), and SIDS (G/AG/NG/W/97) each submitted proposals.  A group of 12 
unaffiliated developing countries (G/AG/NG/W/13) also submitted a proposal, as did several individual 
member governments.  See WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The issues, and where we are now (Geneva: 
World Trade Organization, 2002), 22.
323 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The issues, and where we are now (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 
2002), 21.
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developing countries then determines how this need is to be met.324  “The good ship 
Foreign Aid ferries gold in a never-ending round-trip between the aid organizations and 
the technocrats in the aid-recipient countries, without much opportunity for the intended 
beneficiaries to climb on board or influence direction.”325  Trade-distorting policies divert 
more income from poor countries than is realized from official development assistance 
(ODA) and debt-relief programs.326  Food aid, often used in a trade-distorting manner by 
advanced countries, is viewed suspiciously by developing countries which have come to 
regard government-funded food dumping by rich countries in poor countries as an 
insidious obstruction of their aim to enhance agricultural production, create food security, 
and facilitate national development.327
The Institute of Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) has derided export dumping, 
the practice of selling products at prices below their cost of production, as a highly 
distortive—yet commonly practiced—trade practice.  “Developing country agriculture, 
324 Eberhard Ruesse, The Ills of Aid: An Analysis of Third World Development Policies (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 2002).
325 William Easterly, Who is Accountable: a review of Eberhard Ruesse (2002), Finance & Development
40:1 (March 2003).
326 The IMF estimated ODA levels in recent years at approximately $50-60 billion per year and debt relief 
under the Historically Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative at US$1.4 billion in 2001.  Over the same 
timeframe, trade distorting subsidies, quotas, and tariffs caused developing countries to lose much more in 
trade-generated income.  
327 The US’ grant and concessional credit food aid was authorized under the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended (Public Law 480), the Food for Progress Act of 
1985, and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949.  Title XV of the Food, Agriculture, 
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (FACT Act) contains pertinent amendments of these authorities.  P.L. 
480 is intended to “combat hunger and malnutrition; promote broad-based equitable and sustainable 
development, including agricultural development; expand international trade; develop and expand export 
markets for United States agricultural commodities; and to foster and encourage the development of private 
enterprise and democratic participation in developing countries.”  P.L. 480 is also known as the Food for 
Peace program, and includes three titles.  The USDA administers Title I and the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) administers Titles II and III.  Each title has different objectives: Title I 
authorizes government-to-government sales of agricultural products under long-term credit arrangements; 
Title II authorizes donation of surplus food to meet humanitarian needs in foreign countries; and Title III 
authorizes government-to-government grants for the purpose of promoting long-term economic 
development in the least developed countries.  For more information, see 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/pl480/pl480ofst.html.
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vital for food security, rural livelihoods, poverty reduction and trade, is crippled by the 
practice of major commodities sold at well below cost of production prices in world 
markets.”328  Dumping undermines developing country economies because locally 
produced farm goods cannot compete against the cheap imports.  Indeed, surpluses 
disposed of with subsidies in international markets prompt price competition that reduces 
the market share of efficient producers who cannot employ subsidy competition.329  “This 
lowers export earnings and farm incomes or depletes the public resources of developing 
countries that export competing products.”330 Food dumping occurs in one of two 
contexts: via the sale of agricultural commodities in international trade or via a donation 
of food aid to needy countries.  According to the USDA, “[t]he United States is the 
world’s largest food aid donor, with a long tradition of generosity in providing 
humanitarian assistance to needy people throughout the world.  U.S. programs help feed 
the hungry, improve global food security, encourage education, and promote agricultural 
and economic development in poor countries.”331  Food aid, when awarded to alleviate 
hunger, certainly serves a humane and worthwhile purpose.  However, that purpose 
becomes less benevolent, even sinister, when developed countries use food aid programs 
as a pretext for dumping their agricultural surplus on unwitting or desperate poor 
countries with the intention of forging new markets by creating dependency on the 
dumped products.332  Yet, this is happening worldwide with extremely damaging 
328 Ritchie et al. 2003, 2.
329 Parikh et al. 1988, v.
330 Parikh et al. 1988, v.
331 See http://www.fas.usda.gov/food-aid.html. 
332 “In Public Law 481 (food aid), these are American foods that go there.  It’s good for our 
economy….And a little-known fact is that basically those countries that get food aid actually ultimately 
develop into very good markets for the United States and they buy additional food from us when they get 
on their feet.”  Secretary of State Madeline Albright presentation to the House of Representatives 
International Relations Committee, 11 February 1997 (cited in USIS Daily Bulletin, 13 February 1997).
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consequences for poor countries’ agricultural sectors and, by implication, national 
development.  According to the IMF, “[t]he dumping of agricultural surpluses, in the 
form of non-emergency food aid or with the help of export subsidies, has damaged farm 
production in a number of developing countries, some of which had been carefully 
nurtured under assistance programs.”333
As Wendy Phillips noted, “[c]areless use of food aid can have devastating effects 
on developing countries.  The famine relief aid provided by surplus grain from the US, 
for example, destroyed the indigenous millet market in Africa.”334  And, according to the 
Cornerhouse, a British NGO committed to creating a more democratic civil society, 
“[s]ubsidised food dumping is clearly connected to the creation of food dependence in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Three decades ago, the region was self-sufficient in basic food 
staples. Since the 1970s, however, wheat imports have increased by over 200 per cent. 
Net imports have risen three-fold from three million to nine million tons…Food dumping 
played a key role in this surge in import demand.  In the latter half of the 1980s, the US 
and the EU were selling wheat at $60 per ton in West Africa, one quarter of the price paid 
to EU farmers for their crop.”335  Also problematic is the fact that the developed countries 
regularly produce large agricultural surpluses because they award their farmers generous 
amber box domestic support subsidies linked to production in complete disregard of the 
subsidies’ injurious consequences for both developing countries and world trade in 
general.  Exporting governments exacerbate the problem in another destructive fashion—
333 Improving Market Access: Toward Greater Coherence Between Aid and Trade (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, March 2002).
334 See Wendy Phillips, Food Security: A First Step Toward More Fair Trade (Canada: World Vision 
Canada, August 2000).
335 See http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/briefing/10gefood.html, Box 2. 
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they contract with exporting companies, typically large agribusiness multinational 
corporations such as Cargill and ADM, paying them an export subsidy or awarding them 
tax exemptions to cover the cost of transportation.  These companies are then able to 
sell—i.e., dump—the products in recipient developing countries at prices that are much 
lower than the actual cost of production and transportation.  To be sure, dumping 
exemplifies how the operation of global trade rules privilege those actors possessing 
wealth and power to the disadvantage of weaker, less powerful actors.  The privileged 
few are primarily the rich countries that are able to subsidize their farmers; farmers in 
rich countries who benefit from government subsidies, generally possess more land, and 
have access to advanced technologies; and the MNCs that are subsidized by rich country 
governments to ship their surplus farm goods to poor countries for both aid and trade.
In general, developing countries are powerless against dumping.  They not only 
lack the resources for combating the scourge, but many actually welcome the food 
imports to alleviate, albeit temporarily, domestic hunger and/or satisfy the consumption 
demands of their burgeoning urban populations who, after decades of dumping, have 
become accustomed to low-priced imports.  Many countries have become dependent on 
subsidized imports, but this dependence on a seemingly boundless source of cheap food 
comes at a cost.  “Some developing countries do benefit from the subsidized disposal of 
surplus cereals on the world market.  This, however, might be only a short-term gain.  
Low prices are a disincentive to their own producers and lead, in the long run, to an 
unsustainable dependence on imports, as appears to be the case in many parts of Africa.  
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Also, these benefits of cheap cereals may not offset the loss of markets, such as the sugar 
market, which is important to a large number of developing countries.”336
Even before they committed to the AoA’s reductions on trade restrictions, 
countries like Jamaica implemented IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs 
requiring them to liberalize their trade regimes, among other reforms.  The AoA 
cemented their commitments so they are precluded from imposing new tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade.  According to the IATP, “[t]he full impact of dumped exports has 
to be considered in light of the push over the past 20 years to reduce tariffs in developing 
countries.  This push was encouraged, and locked into international law, with the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.  But more importantly, bilateral 
arrangements with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have introduced 
structural adjustment programs as a condition for access to international financing.  These 
programs have tariff reduction as a cornerstone.  The programs have also required the 
privatization of many governmental services, including agricultural marketing and 
distribution boards.  As the world price for commodities move up and down, prevailing 
prices in countries must match that price.”337  Because developing countries cannot afford 
to protect their agricultural sectors to the extent that their wealthier counterparts are able, 
their farmers are extremely vulnerable to the destructive effects of commodity price 
volatility.338  Moreover, developing countries lack the resources to capitalize on the 
special safeguard measures and exemptions that the WTO allows.  The WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement—an updated version of Article VI of the GATT—allows countries 
336 Parikh et al. 1988, v.
337 Ritchie et al. 2003, 13.
338 It is not surprising, therefore, that developing country farmers are abandoning agriculture in droves and 
flooding their cities in search of work.
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to restrict imports of products they feel are being dumped, or sold at prices below 
“normal value,” if the imports cause injury to competing domestic industries.  However, 
because the agreement requires the importing country to calculate the cause of harm, the 
dumping margin, and the actual damage to domestic production, three very resource-
intensive processes, many developing countries bypass this remedy option because it is 
simply too expensive.  The political reality of the multilateral trading system is another 
complicating factor.  Most developing countries have neither the resources nor the clout 
to challenge dumping behemoths such as the US or EU.  The threat of retaliation serves 
as another disincentive.  The IATP explained the consequences of agricultural dumping 
for developing countries like Jamaica in a 2003 report:
The structural price depression associated with agriculture dumping has 
two major effects on developing countries whose farmers produce 
competing products.  First, below-cost imports drive developing country 
farmers out of their local markets.  If the farmers do not have access to a 
safety net, they have to abandon their land.  When this happens the farm 
economy shrinks, in turn shrinking the rural economy as a whole.  This is 
happening around the world, in places as far apart as Jamaica, Burkina 
Faso and the Philippines.  Secondly, farmers who sell their products to 
exporters find their global market share undermined by the lower-cost 
competition.339
The report cites the US as one of the world’s leading dumpers of agricultural 
commodities.340
Other major dumpers include the EU, Japan, and Canada.  Together these dumpers have 
flooded the international marketplace with surplus food.    
339 Ritchie et al. 2003, 2.
340 US dumping levels approximate 40 percent for wheat, between 25 and 30 percent for corn, 30 percent 
for soybeans, 57 percent for cotton, and 20 percent for rice.  So, in effect, US-grown wheat sells on world 
markets for 40% less than what it cost to produce.  This hurts not only farmers in developing countries 
forced to compete with such low prices, but also farmers in developed countries forced to contend with lost 
income due to the depressed prices.  This displacement of developed country farmers, combined with their 
historical political influence on national policymaking, reinforces the vicious cycle of developed country 
agricultural subsidization, both domestic and export.  See Oxfam International (2003), 2-3.
168
In Jamaica, for example, the milk powder phenomenon decimated the country’s 
dairy industry.341 Beginning in the 1970s, Jamaica began importing large quantities of 
milk powder.  Consumers, attracted by its accessibility and low price, soon chose the 
powder over locally-produced fresh milk. As Oxfam explained, “Jamaican farmers first 
started giving away their milk in 1998, then using it as animal feed, and by 1999, were 
throwing it away. They threw away more than half a million litres of milk. Then farmers 
began to slaughter their animals. This was happening because cheap milk and milk 
powder from the United States and the European Union was flooding the Jamaican 
market.”342  This, of course, had harmful implications for other locally-produced products 
made with milk derivatives, namely cheese and butter.  Today, Jamaica’s dairy 
industry—one that most countries deem essential to national food security—is virtually 
non-existent. To be sure, poor net-food importing countries like Jamaica benefit greatly 
when they are afforded low prices for their food imports.  However, that benefit subsides 
significantly when their complementary food products are forced to complete on the 
international marketplace with the highly-subsidized, low-priced surplus food exports 
from developed countries.  Ultimately, poor countries will benefit more in the long-term 
if advanced countries share their technical expertise—and not just their surplus food—
with poorer countries to enhance their agricultural trade capacity and competitiveness as 
a means of jumpstarting and/or invigorating national development.  It is as simple as the 
341 According to the FAO, dairying is one of the most protected agricultural sectors in developed countries.  
Milk and other dairy products are in serious surplus in the US, Canada, and the EU.  See Alexandratos 
1988, 189 and 192.
342 See http://www.oxfam.ca/campaigns/worldFoodDay/wfd0111.html.  Stephanie Black’s documentary
Life and Debt presents a vivid and disturbing portrayal of Jamaican farmers literally pouring freshly-
produced milk into open fields because they had no hope of selling it domestically, much less 
internationally.
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ancient Chinese proverb: Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to 
fish and you feed him for a lifetime.
Intersection of Domestic and International Agricultural Trade 
Policy
The Uruguay Round, although significant for its breakthrough de jure
incorporation of agricultural issues into the multilateral trade framework, ultimately did 
not redress the distortions that are prevalent in agricultural trade.  Countries generally 
have not executed the reduction commitments negotiated during the round.  There is a 
significant divide in this regard between two primary groups of countries: the developing 
countries that sought financial assistance from the World Bank and IMF and the 
advanced countries that did not.  As part of their structural adjustment agreements with 
the World Bank and IMF—most signed prior to the Uruguay Round—the countries of the 
former group surrendered their ability to restrict their trade via tariffs or other means long 
before the Uruguay negotiations.  By comparison, the advanced countries, not bound by 
any structural adjustment conditionalities, have been free to protect their farm sectors and 
restrict foreign agricultural trade, often manipulating WTO rules to their advantage.  “In 
their rhetoric, governments of rich countries constantly stress their commitment to 
poverty reduction.  Yet these same governments use their trade policy to conduct what 
amounts to robbery against the worlds’ poor.  When developing countries export to rich-
country markets, they face tariff barriers that are four times higher than those encountered 
by rich countries.”343  As with dumping, the US, EU, and Japan lead the world in 
restricting agricultural trade.  All engage in restrictive trade practices as a matter of 
343 Oxfam International 2002, Summary pg. 3.
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policy—both de jure and de facto.  However, the US and EU’s trade policies and 
practices have pressing implications for Jamaica because they are its most significant 
trading partners and export markets outside CARICOM. 
In a not isolated case of government interventionism in economic affairs, the 
United States recently implemented a highly protectionist new farm bill.  “Much to the 
disdain of the free-trade purists, the Bush administration has shown much more 
willingness to meddle in trade disputes, going so far as to impose countervailing duties in 
the case of softwood lumber and steel.”344  On 13 May 2002, President George W. Bush 
signed into law the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, a $248.6 billion bill 
that is estimated to increase the payment of subsidies to the US agricultural sector by 80 
percent over the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act and at least $US82 billion over the next ten 
years.345  The US government made tentative attempts in the Freedom to Farm Act to 
reduce farm subsidies in compliance with reduction commitments agreed to during the 
Uruguay Round.  However, the 2002 bill represented a full-scale abandonment by the US 
of these commitments and a regression to overt protectionism in agricultural trade.  It is 
certainly understandable that a country would want to protect its farmers.  What is not 
reasonable is a country’s practice of encouraging other countries to liberalize their 
agricultural regimes in the name of free trade, while said country does the reverse and 
344 Bill Virgin, Sex, fear and changes in U.S. rules of trade, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 1 April 03.  With 
regards to the steel and softwood lumber cases, the US invoked Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 in 
2002 to impose antidumping duties for up to three years on selected imported steel after declaring that 
certain foreign steel producers were unfairly dumping steel products in the US.  In a similar action, the US 
imposed countervailing duties in 2001 on Canadian lumber to offset subsidies awarded lumber producers.  
In March 2003, the WTO ruled the US action on steel WTO-illegal.  
345 The bill targets eight crops—cotton, wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, barley, oats, and sorghum.  For more 
information see text of conference bill at 
http://agriculture.senate.gov/Briefs/2001FarmBill/END02_380.pdf; Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 
vol. 6, no. 18, 15 May 2002; Anuradha Mittal, Giving Away the Farm: the 2002 Farm Bill; and Food First 
Backgrounder, Summer 2002, Vol.  8, no. 3.
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maintains, even expands, trade restrictions simply because it has the political and 
economic clout to do so.  The new farm bill raises the question of whether the US has 
abdicated the commitment to agricultural trade liberalization which it professes so 
avowedly in multilateral negotiating fora to encourage further trade liberalization in areas 
of interest to industrial countries—i.e., services.
The EU’s agricultural cornerstone is its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  
“Created out of the need to secure guaranteed food supplies for Western Europe, the 
modern Common Agricultural Policy also now maintains and encourages rural 
development through diversification. The consumer’s needs are a key priority, requiring 
the production of high quality food which at the same time respects the environment.”346
However, many trade experts disagree with the last sentence of the CAP mission 
statement.  It is apparent to all but the Europeans that by awarding huge subsidies to 
Europe’s agricultural sectors and maintaining high tariff and non-tariff barriers against 
foreign food imports, the CAP privileges a small component of Europe’s steadily 
diminishing farming population to the detriment of its consumers as well as poor country 
producers.  As the Center for the New Europe note, “EU agricultural policies hurt farmers 
in the developing world.  They hurt consumers in Europe by raising the price of food.  
They hurt nonagricultural producers in Europe by diverting income that would otherwise 
not be spent on food…They do not materially assist the majority of European farmers.  
The main beneficiaries are a few big agri-business corporations and the politicians and 
bureaucrats who supervise the whole system.”347
346 See the European Union’s agriculture website, http://europa.eu.int/pol/agr/overview_en.htm. 
347 EU Trade Barriers Kill (Brussels: Center for the New Europe, September 2003).
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The Doha Round
Merlinda Ingco predicted in 1995, immediately after the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round, that actual reform of agricultural trade during the Round would be 
inconsequential; although the tariffication of non-tariff barriers and the binding of all 
tariffs was notable, trade would be liberalized in practice significantly less than was 
expected.348  Patrick Messerlin was even more cynical.  In his view, 
…the Uruguay negotiators (as most trade observers) were perfectly aware 
that the URAA-based liberalization would be minor.  They were the first 
to witness, during the last months of the Uruguay negotiations, WTO 
members deliberately overestimating the level of farm protection for the 
reference period (1986-88) in order to end up with an almost unchanged 
level of protection at the end (2001) of the transition period of the 
URAA…They used massively specific tariffs (for instance, one third of 
the EC and U.S. farm tariffs are specific or have a specific component) 
which are much less transparent than ad valorem tariffs, and which have 
an increasing protectionist impact when world prices decline (a frequent 
situation since 1977).349  When possible, they kept using old mechanisms 
(such as variable levies) within the limits of the new Uruguay tariff 
regime.  They subjected tariff-quotas (introduced by the Uruguay 
negotiators in order to ensure a minimum opening of farm markets) to 
opaque legal procedures which have systematically kept quota fill rates at 
a low level.  They played with the concept of “unused” subsidies, and with 
forward mechanisms for loosening, as much as possible, disciplines on 
export subsidies, etc.350
Ingco and Messerlin were certainly prescient in their observations.  Due to widespread 
utilization of “dirty” tariffication mechanisms to undermine the transparency afforded by 
the AoA and the impact of entrenched subsidization, agricultural trade remains as 
348 Merlinda D. Ingco. Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round: One Step Forward, One 
Step Back (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, August 1995).
349 Ad valorem tariffs are based on a percentage of price while specific tariffs are based on dollars per ton.  
See WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We areNow (Geneva: World Trade 
Organization, 2002).
350 Patrick A. Messerlin. Agriculture in the Doha Agenda (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, April 2003).  
Messerlin’s research targets the OECD countries “because they are the main trouble-makers…”  Discussion 
of the base period of 1986-88 as the reference point for the binding of tariffs is significant because border 
protection was at a high point at that time.  The acronym URAA signifies the Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Agriculture, or AoA.  
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restricted today as it was during the Uruguay Round.  For many countries, bound tariffs 
are higher than applied tariffs, which paves the way for even greater trade restriction.351
WTO members, realizing the downward spiral in agricultural protectionsim that occurred 
in the post-Uruguay period, are moving in the Doha Round to arrest the deterioration.  
The Doha Round commenced in November 2001 at the WTO’s fourth ministerial 
conference held in Doha, Qatar.352  With the 9-11 terrorist attack on the United States 
rallying global harmony and setting a tone of international cooperation, Members 
resolved to avoid the pitfalls that had bedeviled the Seattle Ministerial and forestalled the 
launch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.  The following statement from 
the International Federation of Agricultural Producers underscored this cooperation:
Our ambitions for the Doha Round are simple. These are: 1) to ensure that 
farmers everywhere are able to achieve a reasonable standard of living for 
the work that they do, in both exporting and importing countries; 2) to 
develop WTO trade rules that accommodate the diverse situations of 
agriculture in different countries, and the diverse aspirations of the people 
of those countries; and, 3) to rectify the serious imbalances in the 
agricultural trading system against farmers in the developing countries.353
In a momentous show of solidarity, WTO members launched the new round at the end of 
the Ministerial, agreeing to continue the WTO reform process.354  With regards to 
agriculture, Members recognized the work already accomplished under Article 20 of the 
351 According to the World Trade Organization, “[e]vidence suggests that the level of tariffs applied by 
developing countries is often far below the level of their bindings.”  See Market Access: Unfinished 
Business—Post-Uruguay Round Inventory and Issues, Special Studies 6 (Geneva: World Trade 
Organization).
352 Like the Seattle Ministerial preceding it, the Doha Ministerial was marked by controversy.  Located in 
the Middle East, Qatar was reportedly chosen for its virtually impenetrable location and its alleged 
intolerance of civil disobedience and unrest of the sort that tends to accompany meetings of international 
trade and financial organizations.  However, unlike the Seattle Ministerial, the Doha Ministerial achieved 
coherence in negotiations and launched a new round with a ministerial declaration containing defined 
proposals to be implemented over the course of the round.
353 Jack Wilkinson, president of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, in a December 2002 
open letter to Stuart Harbinson, chairman of the Special Session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture.
354 The Doha Round of negotiations is scheduled to conclude on January 1, 2005.
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AoA (Continuation of the Reform Process) and committed in the Doha Mandate to 
further reforms.355
The Doha Ministerial Declaration prioritizes special and differential treatment 
(S&D) for developing countries throughout, highlighting the need to help developing 
countries overcome their unique challenges and enhance food security and rural 
development—two key prerequisites for development and reduced dependence on 
external assistance.  The Enabling Clause, adopted under the GATT in 1979 (during the 
Tokyo Round) defines the parameters of special and differential treatment.  S&D 
provides the WTO-legal framework for the treatment of developing countries in the 
negotiations and is the basis for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).  The Doha 
Round has been dubbed the “Development Round” due in large part to the realization 
among both developed and developing countries that trade liberalization has not 
adequately met the special needs of developing countries.  Speaking to the plight of small 
island economies in adjusting to the dislocative effects of trade liberalization, Jamaica’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Seymour Mullings advised delegates at the 
Seattle Ministerial of the imperative to incorporate a development dimension into the 
WTO: 
…small economies have special needs which constrain their full and 
effective integration into the multilateral trading system…the impact of 
multilateral trade rules on small economies is, in a fundamental sense, 
disproportionate because of the very high trade to GDP ratio, 
characteristic of many small developing countries…Structural features 
such as a high degree of economic specialization, income volatility, the 
absence of economies of scale and limited institutional capacity are some 
elements which must be addressed.356
355 See WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We are Now (October 2002, 13). 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.pdf.
356 World Trade Organization. Statement to the Seattle Ministerial Third Session, 2 December 1999, 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/90, (99-51314).
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Further exacerbating these adjustment effects, products of export interest to 
developing countries—agricultural goods significant among these—continue to face high 
tariff peaks, tariff escalation, and non-tariff barriers in key advanced country markets.  
Moreover, developing countries are now facing the likely termination—in the name of 
“free” trade—of the commodity arrangements under which some of their major exports 
are granted preferential market access into advanced country markets.  Most developing 
countries still lack the resources and technical expertise necessary for competing in a 
“free” trade regime devoid of preferential trade access for developing country exports yet 
replete with developed country subsidization, use of special safeguards to restrict 
competing imports, and continued imposition of high tariffs—which, thinking 
pragmatically in light of the historical record, developed countries like the US, EU, and 
Japan are not likely to abandon prior to the scheduled 2005 end of the Doha Round or 
anytime in the near future.  Not surprisingly, given its sensitivity, the development 
dimension of the Doha Round—like agriculture, another intractable and closely related 
issue—is being held hostage by negotiating conflicts.  Developing countries are standing 
their ground and insisting that developed WTO countries recognize their unique needs, 
eradicate policies that restrict developing country trade, and extend the assistance 
necessary to help them surmount the trade-related constraints on development to which 
they are subject.  Despite their allowances for meeting developing country needs, existing 
special and differential provisions have received much criticism.  Critics say the 
concession of allowing developing countries longer phase-in periods and reduced 
commitments completely misses the point of what developing countries need and is not 
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enough sufficient for moderating the dislocative effects of liberalization.  In general, the 
special and differential provisions are overly optimistic in their expectations of 
developing countries and not sufficiently so in requirements for developed countries vis-
à-vis poorer countries.  Allowing developing countries four extra years to implement the 
AoA is nonsensical in light of the gross disparities in resources and capacity that exist 
between developed and developing countries.  
The Doha Ministerial, although conclusive in its negotiations, provoked the same 
criticisms that doomed the Seattle Ministerial and resulted in its disastrous and 
inconclusive end.  Groups from across the policy spectrum, and across the globe, united 
to censure the Doha Ministerial, claiming that it had done nothing to remove the taint of 
unequal power or rectify the lack of a level playing field within the WTO.357  Oxfam 
International published a particularly piercing critique of the WTO’s power structure:
Behind the façade of a ‘membership-driven’ organisation is a governance 
system based on a dictatorship of wealth.  Rich countries have a 
disproportionate influence.  This is partly because of a failure of 
representational democracy.  Each WTO country may have one vote, but 
eleven of its members among the least-developed countries are not even 
represented at the WTO base in Geneva.  Informal power-relations 
reinforce inequalities in negotiating capacity at the WTO.358
Oxfam and other like-minded groups say the Doha Ministerial Declaration perpetuates 
the WTO’s tendency to privilege industrialized countries at the expense of developing 
countries, giving them control over the direction of world trade policy and exacerbating 
the WTO’s unequal rules of trade.  WTO supporters dispute this argument by invoking 
357 Groups criticizing the Doha Ministerial hailed from camps representing labor, environment, 
development, poverty, Third World food security, and other interests they claim are underrepresented in 
and/or undervalued by the WTO.  Included in an almost inexhaustible list of such groups are Oxfam 
International, AFL-CIO, Third World Network, Public Citizen, and World Wildlife Fund.
358 Oxfam International 2002, Summary pg. 15.
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the organization’s one country-one vote rule and decisionmaking by consensus.  In other 
words, they claim that the developing countries, by virtue of their sheer numbers, wield 
the power in the WTO.  However, the developed countries do not form a cohesive 
negotiating bloc due largely to their disparate histories and cultures.  In addition, because 
they are so dependent on the preferential market access to developed country markets, 
they are often susceptible to their patrons’ request (demand?) that they cooperate on 
negotiating modalities of interest to the more industrialized members of the WTO.  The 
deficits of WTO power politics notwithstanding, Members have pledged in the Doha 
“development” Round to enhance the trade opportunities of poor countries by allowing 
them expanded market access whereby to sell the products they produce competitively, 
particularly agricultural goods, and extending them increased technical assistance for 
generating additional trade capacity and competitiveness.  This action was lauded across 
the globe as both the logical and humane thing to do—logical per the theory of free trade 
and humane in the interest of improving the socio-economic condition of large segments 
of the world’s people.  To improve trade relations for developing countries, developed 
countries must do more than simply treat poor countries as “special and differential,” i.e., 
via the implementation of preferential trade agreements.  A Washington Times 
contributor editorialized that “[a]t the very least, EU nations could demonstrate a good-
faith effort by adopting the agricultural reforms proposed by their own farm 
commissioner, Franz Fischler.  Mr. Fischler hasn’t asked Europe to reduce overall 
subsidies, only that subsidies be tied to environmental and animal-welfare standards 
rather than supply.359  If Europe were to adopt Mr. Fischler’s proposal, the global supply 
359 Mr. Fischler’s January 2003 proposal for reforming the CAP was opposed by several EU countries, 
namely France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Belgium.  These countries do not want to decouple CAP 
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of farm products would be expected to drop, and poor nations would have a greater 
ability to export their products…The United States could accompany any progress in 
Europe with a reduction of U.S. farm subsidies.  [However] although the Bush 
administration has outlined an ambitious plan for global agricultural reform, last year it 
approved a 10-year, $100-billion-plus farm bill.”360  Moreover, the USTR faces strong 
pressure from Congress to procure international trade legislation that benefits US 
farmers.  For example, Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), a powerful senator from America’s 
farm belt, recently announced that Congress expects USTR Robert Zoellick to negotiate a 
reformulated Agreement on Agriculture that would “result in a good deal for America’s 
farmers, ranchers and agricultural producers.”361  Senator Grassley’s comment illustrates 
the US policymaker’s preoccupation with maintaining a strong position for US farm 
interests in agricultural trade, even if it comes at a price for poorer, weaker countries.
The US and EU face significant pressure from developing country trading 
partners and global civil society to eradicate farm subsidies.  The EU, in particular, is 
“between a rock and a hard place” with regards to reforming its Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and eliminating its notoriously high export subsidies for agriculture, which 
depress global food prices and impoverish farmers in the developing world.  The EU has 
supported its farm sector historically, particularly its small farmer, for both economic and 
cultural reasons.  Europeans have always placed a premium on food security and the 
intrinsic value of the family farm to Europe’s social fabric. “Like the U.S. farm bill, the 
EU subsidies violate the principles of free trade and comparative advantage, but do so for 
support from production requirements. 
360 See A Bitter Harvest,”Washington Times editorial, 4 March 2003.
361 See BridegesWeekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 7, number 8, 5 March 2003.
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a higher cause: social stability.”362  It is indeed difficult to imagine France, Germany, or 
Switzerland without their luxuriant fields, rolling green hills, and abundant family farms.  
However, using farm subsidies to sustain this countryside, and Europe’s cultural history, 
has wrought too high a price: an interminable volatility in international commodity 
markets due to artificially depressed prices, the impoverishment of a majority of the 
world’s farmers, the destruction of rural livelihoods in many Third World countries, and 
a dependence by these countries on external food aid and imports to meet the requisites 
of food security, human well being, and national development.  
The US-Mexican experience provides an instructive illustration of the harmful 
impact of US farm subsidies on its developing country trading partners.363  Under the 
NAFTA, signed with Canada and Mexico, the US agreed to reduce agricultural tariffs but 
has not altered its subsidization practices.  Per NAFTA, the Mexican government 
eliminated all import tariffs on US agricultural imports in January 2003.  As a result, 
Mexico’s farmers, most of whom receive little to no government assistance, are now 
competing with the tariff-free entry into Mexico of heavily subsidized US farm goods.  
Two months into the new year, the impact on Mexico’s rural countryside had already 
been detrimental.  Moreover, Mexico’s transition to “free” trade with US agricultural 
interests mirrored what has been happening around the world in countries that were 
forced to drastically reduce or eliminate their import tariffs only to face entrenched 
government subsidization by and high tariff peaks in key rich country export markets.  A 
362 James O. Goldsborough, Farm problems expose weak link of NAFTA, San Diego Union-Tribune, 4 
January 2003.
363 “If one takes the Mexico of 1986-88 as a proxy for the average developing country of the early 2000s, 
the share of total support in farm value-added of a typical developing country would be eight times smaller 
than the current average OECD share (8.5 percent vs. 61.9 percent)…”  See Patrick A. Messerlin, 
Agriculture in the Doha Agenda (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, April 2003), 3.  
180
New York Times article elucidated the problem of developed country subsidization for 
poor country agricultural exporters:
The problems of rural Mexicans are echoed around the world as countries 
lower their import barriers, required by free trade treaties and the rules of 
the World Trade Organization.  When markets are open, agricultural 
products flood in from wealthy nations, which subsidize agriculture and 
allow agribusiness to export crops cheaply.  European farmers get 35 
percent of their income in government subsidies, American farmers 20 
percent.  American subsidies are at record levels…It seems paradoxical to 
argue that cheap food hurts poor people.  But three-quarters of the world’s 
poor are rural.  When subsidized imports undercut their products, they 
starve.  Agricultural subsidies, which rob developing countries of the 
ability to export crops, have become the most important dispute at the 
W.T.O.  Wealthy countries do far more to harm poor nations with these 
subsidies than they do good with foreign aid.364
Since the Doha Ministerial of November 2001, negotiations for further 
liberalization of agricultural trade have not proven any less intense or intractable than 
they were during the Uruguay Round.  In fact, the negotiations seem to be deteriorating 
rather than improving.  Some countries have not only reneged on implementing the 
Uruguay Round-mandated reduction commitments, they are reluctant to take on 
additional liberalization.  
WTO members have met since the Doha Ministerial in several mini-ministerials, 
as well as the Cancun Ministerial, to discuss agriculture (and other contentious issues) 
and resolve the impasses.365  However, they continue to debate the issue without 
364 See Tina Rosenberg, Why Mexico’s Small Corn Farmers Go Hungry, New York Times, 3 March 2003.
365 Other contentious issues include further liberalization of services under GATS; the interpretation of 
special and differential (S&D) treatment for developing countries; and the right of poor countries ravaged 
by health pandemics to breach intellectual property rights guaranteed under TRIPS and produce generics of 
patent-protected drugs.  The TRIPS debate, in particular, has taken on a moral imperative for civil society.  
At the center of the debate is the right of countries lacking the capacity to produce generics to contract with 
other countries to produce the drugs for import.  Despite tremendous opposition from the United States, 
home country to many multinational pharmaceutical firms, the Doha Ministerial granted poor countries to 
right to produce generics of patent-protected drugs for “approved” pandemics, namely HIV, tuberculosis, 
and malaria.  However, the Ministerial did not authorize second-party countries to produce such generics 
for export to poor countries lacking the requisite technical capacity to produce the drugs for themselves.  
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achieving much progress.  A continued impasse in Doha Round agricultural negotiations 
will have significant implications for developing countries like Jamaica, certainly if 
developed countries treat the impasse as license to continue subsidizing their agricultural 
sectors and restricting market access for developing country exports.  WTO members, 
rich and poor alike, blame the EU for the stalemate in agriculture.  WTO members, rich 
and poor alike, blame the EU for the stalemate on agriculture.  To be sure, “a reduction in 
agricultural subsidies and price supports, perhaps the most important goal of the current 
trade negotiating round, has long been stopped in its tracks by Europe’s inability to 
reform its own agricultural subsidy regime. As a result, it now looks as if crucial 
negotiating deadlines…will not be met. Without a doubt, the primary victims of Europe’s 
intransigence are the world’s poorest countries, whose economies would benefit far more 
from freer markets for their commodities than they would from new injections of aid 
money. Indeed, until trade barriers are lifted, any conversation about ‘helping the 
developing world’ will always have a farcical ring.”366  As discussed in previous sections 
of this paper, the EU is not the only country to blame; other countries, particularly the US 
and Japan, have steadfastly refused to dismantle their support programs and reduce tariff 
barriers to products of export interest to developing countries.  “The full potential of trade 
to reduce poverty cannot be realized unless poor countries have access to markets in rich 
countries.  Unfortunately, Northern governments reserve their most restrictive trade 
barriers for the world’s poorest people.”367  Indeed, as WTO director-general Supachai 
Brazil and India, the two developing countries which possess this technical capacity, are the leading 
proponents of extending the authorization to second-party countries.  Another contentious issue in the 
TRIPS debate is the extension of the list of “approved” pandemics to other health problems for the 
purposes of producing additional “approved” generics. 
366 United by Free Trade, Washington Post, 24 March 2003, A12.
367 Oxfam International 2002, Summary pg. 8.
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Panitchpakdi has noted, “the crucial importance of a substantial liberalizing result in 
agriculture is emphasized by participants at all levels of development…It is also a fact 
that issues of particular concern to developing countries have been prominent among 
those where [Doha Round] deadlines have so far been missed…We must, therefore, make 
progress across a range of issues, from special and differential treatment to LDC 
accessions, while also making the most of the development potential contained in the 
market access negotiations.”368
Given their strength in numbers at the WTO and the fact that developed countries 
need access to developing countries markets in order to expand, developing countries will 
exert a great deal of influence over the course of the Doha Round.  The rise of the G-20 
in Cancun, and their continued influence in the WTO, illustrates the rising strength of 
developing countries at the WTO.  However, developing countries, Jamaica included, 
must harness this strength effectively to propel meaningful change at all levels of trade—
multilateral, regional, and bilateral.  Since the world’s advanced countries swear by the 
liberal logic of development, developing countries must hold them to backing the theory 
up with action.  Petit and Subramanian encapsulated the paradox of the neoliberal theory, 
explaining why it is not spurring the type of broad-based development in developing 
agricultural economies which Smith, Ricardo, Marshall, Rostow, Balassa, and others of 
their ilk envisaged: 
Generally speaking, policy reforms favor economic growth, and as a result 
they favor the growth of international trade…For this potential impact on 
trade to occur, however, developing countries must be able to increase 
their exports of agricultural products, tropical or not, and of manufactured 
products.  It is therefore paradoxical that one of the main obstacles to the 
potential benefit of policy reform in developing countries is found within 
368 Comment made in 30 April 2003 speech to OECD ministers urging greater compromise in the Doha 
Development Agenda negotiations.
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the developed countries themselves, in the form of protectionist policies 
that hamper the growth of imports from developing countries.369
Clearly the neoliberal model of trade and development as manifested in the current 
international trade regime is not working for developing countries like Jamaica.  By 
discriminating against poor country agriculture, neoliberal trade has fostered dependency 
and underdevelopment—what Cardoso termed “associated dependent development”—in 
lieu of broad-based growth and development.  As Cardoso explained, capitalist 
development in Jamaica and other “peripheral” countries occurs only to the extent that 
the industrialized “center” permits.  Therefore, the rigged rules and double standards that 
govern trade in agricultural and other goods must be corrected if poor countries like 
Jamaica are to utilize their comparative and competitive advantages in trade to achieve 
genuine growth and development.  
369 Petit and Subramanian 1993, 78.
184
Chapter 4
Agriculture in the Jamaican Political Economy
Small states are like indecently dressed women.  They tempt the evil-minded.
Julius L. Nyerere, April 1964
To be poor and independent is very nearly an impossibility.
William Cobbett, Advice to Young Men, 1829
For in the last analysis, dependence is a state of mind.  A too-long history of colonialism seems to have 
crippled Caribbean self-confidence and Caribbean self-reliance, and a vicious cycle has been set up; 
psychological dependence leads to an ever-growing economic and cultural dependence on the outside 
world.  Fragmentation is intensified in the process.  And the greater degree of dependence and 
fragmentation further reduces local self-confidence.
Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean (1970, 502)
Overview
“Competitiveness is critical to trade, and successful trade is the path to economic 
growth and poverty reduction.”370  This premise permeates the preceding chapter on 
agriculture in the world trade regime, and rightly so because it is a basic economic 
theorem that to be competitive in global commerce, countries must build their productive 
and trade capacities and boost competitiveness.  Building competitiveness entails 
leveraging national human and natural resource endowments to expand production and 
maximize productivity.  According to neoliberal economic development theory, the 
logical place from which to catapult national production, productivity, and 
competitiveness is the economic sector that is rooted in productive activity and in which 
the country has a natural comparative advantage that is easily convertible from 
370 Comment made by Marcelo Giugale, World Bank Regional Director for Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and 
Venezuela in a 5 June 2003 press release announcing the Bank’s approval of a $20 million project to 
support trade and competitiveness in Peru.  The release also quoted John H. Stein, World Bank Task 
Manager for the project, as saying the Bank “is proud to work in partnership with Peruvian authorities to 
use the country's rich endowment of natural and human resources to develop diversified trade which, in 
turn, will serve as protection from external shocks.”
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comparative to competitive advantage via the utilization of innovation and technology to 
diversify and expand production for both the domestic and export markets.  Agriculture is 
that sector for Jamaica.  With its favorable climate, abundant rainfall, rich soil, profuse 
flora and fauna, and a large supply of unemployed and underemployed people, Jamaica 
possesses both the natural and human resource potential for becoming an agricultural 
powerhouse.  Indeed, the fact that it is not so is surprising and disheartening and raises 
the question of why.  According to a recent World Bank report on Jamaica, Jamaica’s 
competitiveness declined in the 1990s.371  This decline manifested in reduced market 
share, total factor productivity, and appreciation of the real exchange rate which hurt 
tradable goods production.  However, the Bank is optimistic about Jamaica’s future.  
“Although Jamaica faces some significant challenges in its effort to spur growth and 
create employment opportunities, the country’s assets, including its labor force and 
strong social and governance indicators, help to position the country well for a future 
economic rebound.”372
Jamaica is a small open economy that has been actively engaged in world trade 
since Columbus “discovered” the island during the European age of exploration and 
conquest.  Agriculture is one of Jamaica’s largest employers of labor, employing 25 
percent of the population.373  Because agriculture is still very much a part of Jamaica’s 
cultural fabric, many Jamaicans with careers outside agriculture farm “on the side” for 
either supplemental income or recreation.  Their earnings from these enterprises are not 
insignificant.  Indeed, one small farmer commented in an informal conversation about his 
371 Jamaica: The Road to Sustained Growth (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, January 2004).
372 Ibid.
373 See the Caribbean Regional Human Resource Development Program for Economic Competitiveness’ 
analysis of Jamaica’s agriculture and agro-processing sectors at http://www.cpechrd.org/jamagri.htm. 
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financial health that the money he earns from selling his farm goods nicely supplements 
his meager monthly pension of Ja$6000, approximately US$105.374  Unfortunately for 
this gentleman and his fellow farmers, Jamaica’s agriculture is under siege.  The 
country’s agricultural production, productivity, and competitiveness are eroding due to 
both internal negligence and external challenges.  After four decades of independence,
Jamaica remains a primary commodity producer that is highly dependent on its 
metropolitan trading partners for much of its basic subsistence needs, including 
financing, consumer goods, knowledge, services, and, despite its apparent comparative 
advantage in agriculture, even food, both raw and processed.  Jamaica’s production 
orientation, external dependence, and vulnerability in the world trading regime have had 
severe consequences for the country’s development.  This research utilizes an agriculture 
sectoral framework to assess the reasons for Jamaica’s underdevelopment and a 
deductive methodology to hypothesize possible explanations for that underdevelopment.  
As George Beckford and Kari Levitt have argued, the character of the plantation 
economy endemic in Jamaica and its relation with the external world and with the 
domestic economy “provides the single most essential insight into the mechanisms of 
Caribbean economy.”375  Beckford explained that the plantation economy introduced into 
Jamaica by its colonizers and neocolonizers consigned Jamaica to the fate of producer 
and supplier of raw materials with the sole purpose of meeting the food needs of rich 
metropolitan countries and supplying them with the industrial inputs they required for 
374 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.  The going exchange rate at the time of this 
conversation, July 2003, was Ja$57:US$1.  In previous years, the exchange rate in Jamaican dollars per US 
dollar was: 48.42 (2002), 46 (2001), 42.7 (2000), 39.04 (1999), 36.55 (1998).  See the CIA’s World 
Factbook at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/jm.html.   The wildly fluctuating exchange 
rate and constant currency depreciation illustrate Jamaica’s precarious economic condition.   
375 Levitt and Beckford in Beckford 1975, 38.
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attaining the ever greater levels of production, innovation, and development to which 
they aspired.376  Plantation economy, common in Third World countries, particularly 
those with a history of European colonialism, prioritizes primary commodity production 
for export to metropolitan countries and import of manufactured goods from these same 
countries.  During the period of European conquest and colonization of the Americas, 
metropolitan powers operating in the mercantilist tradition built up a significant European 
presence in their acquired territories by dispatching groups of colonists to work the land 
and develop commercial enterprises for the benefit of the mother countries.  Although the 
metropolitan countries did not attach importance to trade amongst themselves, they saw 
value to trade between each mother country and her colonies.  Herein, lies the genesis of 
mercantilist capitalism and plantation economics.  The Europeans recognized the win-
win potential in colonization; the mother country would invest resources into her colony 
to fuel development therein and the colony, in turn, would provide commodities not 
easily produced or readily available in her mother country, and all involved would profit 
in the process.  George Beckford and Michael Witter explained how colonialism 
predisposed Jamaica to plantation economy:
Through colonialism, the emerging capitalist powers of Europe, imposed a 
peculiar international division of labor in which the people and natural 
resources of the colony were exploited for the benefit of their ruling 
capitalist classes.  But the intermetropolitan rivalry superimposed a 
division of the colonial world into the respective empires, later called 
‘spheres of influence.’  Thus, there were Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, 
English and French colonialism through to the 19th century.  Late in the 
19th century there was to be American, Japanese, Italian, Belgian and 
German colonialism as well.  This process of subjection and exploitation –
colonialism – has left historical scars on almost every Third World 
376 Beckford was prolific on the subjects of underdevelopment, dependency, and plantation economy in 
Jamaica and the Third World.  See in particular Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation 
Economies of the Third World (1972).
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country by way of political, economic, and cultural ties with the ‘mother 
country.’377
In Jamaica, Spanish settlers began arriving in the early sixteenth century.  They 
specialized in animal husbandry and mining, using the native Indians as their primary 
labor source, and introduced two things—sugarcane and slaves—that would forever 
shape Jamaica’s destiny in the global capitalist economy as a dependent agricultural 
entity wherein primary commodity production, lack of industrial innovation, racial/class 
polarization, and abundant cheap labor predominate.  To be sure, “Jamaica’s historical 
pattern was established at the very beginning of its historical life.  Originally a tool of the 
Spanish empire and eventually of the British, it became an exploited land, useful only for 
the wealth that was culled from its soil.  This wealth went into the making of foreign 
fortunes; little was returned for the benefit of Jamaica.”378
Over thirty years ago, anthropologist Adam Kuper characterized Jamaica’s 
structural economic orientation in a way that is still very relevant today. “From a 
plantation-dominated agrarian society Jamaica has become an industrializing society, 
one-third urban, and has swung from the traditional mercantilist dependence on Britain to 
a more contemporary and sophisticated (if no less one-sided) involvement with North 
American capital and markets.”379  Jamaica’s overall dependence on and vulnerability to 
external actors and forces stems from its historical position and evolution as a primary 
commodity export-led plantation economy that was established by a dominant foreign 
power and, although independent, is still subject to the decisions and actions of dominant 
377 Beckford and Witter 1982, 27.
378 Hurwitz and Hurwitz 1971, 4.
379 Kuper 1976, 3.
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foreign powers acting from within and without.  Indeed, Jamaica’s plantation economy is 
shaped by the conditions under which its was established:
• Human resource endowment is limited by the specialization of its labor force in 
plantation work;
• The plantations allot a limited amount of land to the peasant sector because they need 
to keep land in reserve and ensure access to wage labor to preserve the plantation 
export economy;
• The economy is dependent on wage not property income hence entrepreneurship and 
property ownership is limited, which limits the national surplus and investment 
opportunities;
• The structure of demand favors imported, not locally-produced goods; and 
• The instruments of the state are oriented toward the provision of law and order, not 
the promotion of economic transformation.380
“The overall effect is that the national propertied class is born in circumstances 
which restrict its capacity for innovation and self-assertion, and stunt its growth.  The 
national economy emerges with a bias towards the production of output requiring 
traditional plantation skills and serving traditional markets…Thus, contrary to the 
theories of development economies, the plantation hinterland does not evolve from 
subsistence production to small-scale, wage employing business serving a national 
market and from there to large-scale corporate enterprise.”381  Instead, the post-colonial 
national economy is created in the image of the plantation export economy, shaped by 
metropolitan interests.  As such, Jamaica was destined to be what it has become, a 
developing country that was founded by conquest, shaped by metropolitan countries as a 
raw material supplier to more advanced countries, and relegated to this inferior position 
by virtue of its seemingly intractable external dependence exacerbated by its lack of 
development and resources for improving its position as well as a counterproductive 
380 Levitt and Beckford in Beckford 1975, 45.
381 Ibid.
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enabling environment. Indeed, “Jamaica’s international relations, particularly the 
economic relations with Britain, have always exerted tremendous influence on the 
internal affairs and the development of the society.  In fact, ever since the Spanish 
invasion and conquest, Jamaica was inserted firmly in the emerging world economy and 
henceforth was to be buffeted by powerful social and economic forces emanating from 
the big capitalist countries.”382
As Pablo González Casanova elucidated, a dominion’s colonial structure and 
metropolitan influence do not magically disappear after a colony is granted formal 
independence.383  On the contrary, the experience of colonization is typically too 
ingrained and intractable to be easily obliterated.  Consequently, formerly colonized 
territories are highly susceptible to neo-colonial control by former metropolitan powers 
and other dominant countries.  In keeping with Theotonio dos Santos’ definition of 
dependency, Jamaica’s economy was defined and shaped by a series of external entities 
which, throughout Jamaica’s history, forged a relationship of interdependence between 
their economies and Jamaica’s in which their economies expanded and became self-
sustaining while Jamaica’s chances at expansion and self-sufficiency were possible only 
as a reflection of their expansion.384 Thus, the inequities presented by the world trading 
regime have acted from without to retard Jamaica’s development from within.  In this 
regard, “Jamaica is a useful model in any enquiry about the relationship between Third 
World economic development and the international economic environment.  Here is a 
significant example of how structural dependence, as Dos Santos’ ‘reflection’ is 
382 Beckford and Witter 1982, 39.
383 Casanova in Horowitz et al., Radicalism in Latin America: A Documentary Report on Left and 
Nationalist Movements (New York: Random House, 1969), 130.
384 Chilcote 1984, 60.
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reinforced by centuries of history, culture, and agreement.  Consequently, the Jamaican 
economy is, at best, an extension of Western capitalism.”385  This relationship of 
structural dependence rooted in plantation economy continues today with the ignoble 
difference that Jamaica is now a captive market for an expanded field of metropolitan 
exporting countries, the European Union and United States primary among them.386
Consistent with Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s thesis of associated dependent 
development, Jamaica is relegated to a level of development that is associated with and 
dependent on the development attained by its metropolitan trading partners and the extent 
to which they desire to spread the wealth.387  Jamaica’s underdevelopment has manifested 
since independence as increasingly lower levels of production, productivity, and 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the levels the country recorded in the decade after 
independence and in comparison to other countries.  During the 1960s, Jamaica recorded 
an average annual growth of six percent, growth that was fueled by foreign investment 
into bauxite mining, tourism, manufacturing, and agriculture per William Arthur Lewis’ 
strategy of industrialization-by-invitation.388  The Jamaican government at this time was 
also investing heavily into import substitution industrialization (ISI) which allowed the 
385 Manley 1987, 81-82.
386 Structural dependence, plantation economy, colonialism, neocolonialism, and underdevelopment are 
virtually synonymous in this scenario.
387 For detailed discussion of associated dependent development see Cardoso (1972 and 1973) and Cardoso 
and Faletto (1979).
388 See William A. Lewis, “The Industrialization of the British West Indies” in Social and Economic 
Studies (Manchester University, 1950).  In industrialization-by- invitation, the government offered
incentives such as tax breaks to foreign corporate entities willing to set up operations in Jamaica.  However, 
Lewis probably did not intend for host country governments to give the foreign firms carte blanche, 
allowing them to exploit local resources and repatriate virtually all profits to their home countries, leaving 
negligible development on the ground.  This phenomenon has occurred in developing countries worldwide 
creating an outcry in civil society for labor protections in free trade agreements and engendering the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement to encourage corporate investment into sustainable 
economic development in host countries.  For more on CSR, see the World Bank at 
http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/csr/, the European Union at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/csr/, and the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD) at http://www.iisd.org/standards/csr.asp. 
192
country to harness its productive capacity in agriculture, build its manufacturing capacity 
by transforming primary goods in value-added processed food products, and therefore 
save valuable foreign exchange that it would have otherwise spent on imported food.  
During the 1990s, Jamaica’s growth shrank to an average annual rate of near zero 
percent.389  This research hypothesizes that Jamaica’s agricultural development is 
constrained by both externally-driven and internally-motivated factors that evolve from 
its longstanding position in the world trading regime as a plantation economy and its 
indoctrinated self-perception as such.  However, external challenges are even more 
devastating than internal negligence in that they overwhelm any product the country 
manages to produce in spite of its ignorance and/or negligence.  Consequently, this 
research argues that if Jamaica eradicates the internally-motivated constraints on 
agricultural development, but current externally-driven constraints remain unabated, 
domestic agriculture will be as marginalized in the world trading regime as if locally-
driven constraints remained constant.  While Jamaica must act expeditiously to remedy 
internally-motivated constraints on national development, the onus is also on developed 
countries and international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, World 
Bank, and IMF—all controlled by developed countries—to eradicate the externally-
389 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) acknowledge that Jamaica “struggled to achieve economic growth with real 
growth rates averaging a comparatively poor 0.1% throughout” the 1990s.  “Fiscal deficit and a huge debt 
burden have kept real interest rates high, restricting domestic investment and dampening the island's 
entrepreneurial energy.  Meanwhile, the exchange rate has tended to appreciate, encouraging imports and 
discouraging exports.”  See http://www.unctad-undp.org/cas/jamaica.htm.  However, according to a recent 
World Bank study, Jamaica’s GDP growth during the period is widely underestimated.  The study claims 
that real GDP growth from 1990 to 2000 averaged almost one to three per cent per year.  See Jamaica: The 
Road to Sustained Growth (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, January 2004).  Regardless of which 
organization one decides to believe, the country’s growth rate has declined tremendously since 
independence despite implementation of neoliberal economic policies that promised sustained growth and 
development.
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driven constraints that marginalize poor natural resource economies like Jamaica in the 
world trading regime by denuding their comparative advantage in agriculture.390
Jamaica as Plantation Economy
Jamaica’s agriculture sector is characteristic of other tropical developing 
countries. Agriculture, along with bauxite and tourism, is a leading contributor to 
Jamaica’s economy; it provides significant foreign exchange earnings and employs a 
large percentage of the population.  Because Jamaica is a developing Third World 
economy where many Jamaicans still earn their living from the land, agriculture is an 
even more integral part of the local economy than in the more advanced First World 
economies.  Production output is dominated by the main export crops, namely sugar, 
bananas, citrus, cocoa, coffee, coconuts, and spices.  Of these, the largest foreign 
exchange earners are sugar, bananas, citrus, pimento, cocoa, and coffee.  Jamaica also 
produces a variety of domestic food crops, including yams, cassavas, a variety of 
vegetables, and numerous tree fruits.  Jamaica’s agriculture sector evolved out of and is 
steeped in the plantation economy.  The structure of agriculture is dualistic with a large-
scale estate system and a small-scale subsistence system.391  The former produces the 
bulk of the export crops while the latter produces domestic food crops and some export 
crops.  Applying the theory of plantation economy to the global economy and world 
trading regime, Jamaica is one large plantation created and supported by external forces 
390 Voting shares in the IMF and Word Bank are dictated by member countries’ size and influence in the 
global economy.  In Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country Perspectives (Anthem 
Press, 2003), Ariel Buira and his co-authors contended that developed countries have not kept their promise 
made in the Monterrey Consensus to increase developing countries’ voice in the Bretton Woods 
institutions.  
391 Singh 1995, 229.
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for the purpose of serving metropolitan needs for raw materials and cheap labor.  Within 
Jamaica itself, the plantation takes the form of the large-scale commercial estate, the 
agricultural sub-sector that is most externally oriented.  With the exception of the 
government-controlled sugar estates, Jamaica’s plantation system is dominated by 
wealthy, commercial elites who employ landless or land-poor farmers to work their 
estates, typically located on Jamaica’s most fertile, arable land.  In contrast, the small-
scale system is dominated by Jamaica’s ubiquitous resource-poor small farmers—many 
of them tied to the plantations in order to earn regular wages—working small, hilly plots 
of approximately one acre.  Historically marginalized in the export economy, this sector 
is becoming increasingly important to Jamaica’s agricultural future.  Indeed, in light of 
the impending demise of preferences, the longstanding vehicle for export of Jamaica’s 
traditional exports, and the eventuality of traditional exports facing open competition on 
world markets, experts increasingly acknowledge the unique niche goods produced in the 
small-scale sector as the wave of Jamaica’s future.
Several scholars constructed theories of plantation economy pertaining to the 
Caribbean.  Prominent among them are George Beckford, Lloyd Best, Norman Girvan, 
Owen Jefferson, Clive Thomas, and Havelock Brewster.  As discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this paper, these scholars belong to the radical school of new political economy, a close 
cousin of the dependency school, which sees foreign investment into Third World 
economies as the tool that enables external actors to gain control of the local 
socioeconomy, subjugate domestic resources to foreign capital and control, and 
perpetuate the colonial structure of foreign domination.  According to the radical school, 
foreign investment creates local dependence on the investor’s continued investing, 
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stymies local innovation and self-reliance, and causes perpetual underdevelopment—a 
scenario that Cardoso labeled “associated dependent development.”  To be sure, the 
plantation economy typical of Third World countries renders them particularly 
susceptible to an intrusion of foreign capital and control.  From their beginning as 
colonial territories, they were cultivated by external actors as appendages of metropolitan 
economies.  Countries like Jamaica served, and continue to serve, metropolitan entities as 
plantations, feeding them the raw materials, natural resources, and cheap labor they need 
to grow and develop.  In the process, Jamaica experienced, and continues to experience, a 
development that is associated with and dependent on the development attained by its 
metropolitan country investors and stakeholders.  
George Beckford’s theory of plantation economy is particularly relevant to 
the Jamaican context.  Beckford, a Jamaican economist and academician, wrote several 
landmark texts on the evolution of underdevelopment, dependency, and plantation 
economy in developing countries generally and Jamaica particularly.  His ideas are 
grounded in Lloyd Best’s work, particularly “Outlines of a Model of Pure Plantation
Economy” published in 1968 in the Journal of Social and Economic Studies.  In 
Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World, 
Beckford used the concept of plantation economy to address the agricultural dimension of 
underdevelopment and dependency in developing countries.  Beckford analyzed the 
influence plantations had on human activity in countries where the plantation is the 
dominant economic and social institution and blamed the plantation influence for these 
countries’ pervasive underdevelopment.392  As Beckford contended, the plantation 
392 Beckford 1983, xvi.
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influence on underdevelopment is manifested from without and within; external relations 
alone do not cause persistent underdevelopment.  Beckford assessed local economic, 
social, and political organization to identify the factors that impede development in 
plantation economies and societies.  He argued that the institutional environment of Third 
World economy and society lends itself to the plantation influence, which facilitates 
continuous underdevelopment therein.393
Beckford asked—as does this research—why the plantation economies have been 
left behind in the global economy.  “Why is it that after four hundred years of direct 
participation in the modern world economy the plantation economies of the world still 
find themselves underdeveloped countries with the bulk of their inhabitants living (rather, 
existing) in the most wretched conditions of poverty?”394  He hypothesized that there are 
factors intrinsic to the plantation system that impede development and he set out—as 
does this research—to uncover these forces, both internally-motivated and externally-
driven.  Beckford used agriculture as his framework for analysis because he believed 
patterns of agricultural organization are essential to the study of development and 
underdevelopment.  Indeed, agriculture is typically the first primary economic activity 
from which countries evolve.  Moreover, agriculture constitutes a large percentage of 
Third World economies and is still a leading employer of labor in these countries, 
Jamaica included.  Beckford maintained that the metropolitan vertically-integrated 
multinational enterprise, known popularly as transnational corporations (TNCs) or 
multinational corporations (MNCs), institutionalized the primary commodity plantation 
economy throughout the Third World and stymied the development of value-added 
393 Ibid.
394 Beckford 1983, xxi-xxii.
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production therein.  “The normal pattern is one with the main company head-quarters in a 
metropolitan country where product elaboration and distribution are carried out and 
where allied high-value production and service activities are located; plantation and some 
allied operations in the Third World countries; and other product elaboration and 
distribution in other metropolitan countries.”395  As Beckford illustrated, these enterprises 
have been in Jamaica and other developing countries for years, centuries even, and have 
long been the locus of metropolitan country policymaking vis-à-vis developing countries.  
Indeed, this was strikingly evident in the United States’ challenge to the European 
Union’s Lomé-ACP banana regime benefiting Europe’s former colonies in Africa, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific (the ACP countries).396  Since no bananas are grown in the 
U.S., the only logical conclusion is that the U.S. mounted the case on behalf of its U.S.-
domiciled fruit MNCs that produce bananas in Central and South America.
The plantation economy became the primary production system in Jamaica and 
other sugar-growing colonies of the British Caribbean for three reasons: firstly, planters 
could count on an unlimited supply of unskilled cheap labor with which to cultivate the 
cane; secondly, Caribbean sugar monopolized the British market for most of the early 
colonial period; and finally, planters could obtain all consumption and production goods 
cheaply from abroad.397  The foundation of the colonial plantocracy and the plantation 
economy was laid in Jamaica in 1662 when the first royalist governor, Lord Windsor, 
arrived with provisions for the colony’s settlement.  “By a Royal Proclamation dated 
395 Beckford 1983, 142.
396 For details about the case see the World Trade Organization at http://www.wto.org/, the European Union 
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/07_00/memo_00_40.htm, and the United States 
Mission to the European Union at http://www.useu.be/issues/bananadossier.html.
397 Eisner 1974, 189.
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Whitehall, 14 December 1661, it was decreed that for the following two years 30 acres of 
land would be granted to any male or female over 12 years of age who would guarantee 
to plant them.  The land was to be held in free tenure for ever, subject only to the 
payment of a nominal quit rent, the surrender of all gold and silver to the Crown and the 
payment of a 20 per cent duty on all fisheries and other mines.”398  However, because it 
was not always feasible to award land grants of 30 uniformly productive acres, many 
early colonists soon tired of farming and sold their land allotment to better equipped 
planters.  As Craton and Walvin note, consolidation was inevitable and planters 
possessing the most capital and best labor proved to be the most successful.  The high 
mortality rate of the planters along with the large number lacking adequate capital to 
properly utilize their land fueled consolidation.  The stage was now set for the 
entrenchment of a plantation economy; all that was needed was a suitable crop and 
adequate labor.  Sugar cane would prove to be the answer to the former and slave labor to 
the latter.
Primary commodity export-oriented agriculture escalated rapidly in Jamaica, 
fuelling Britain’s industrial revolution and setting the stage for perpetual dependence in 
Jamaica and its other Caribbean territories.  The British government’s primary concern 
was the development of Britain and only Britain; Jamaica and its other colonial 
territories—including what would eventually become the United States of America—
existed only to serve the mother country by enhancing its national wealth, power, and 
prestige.  The colonies were not to produce products that competed with anything already 
produced in the mother country.  Indeed, the colonies were to specialize in only a few 
products, all primary commodities, in which the mother country had not yet developed a 
398 Craton and Walvin 1970, 17.
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competitive advantage in production and export.  The seeds of Jamaica's economic 
dependency were thus sown by the early British plantocracy and the structures of 
production and trade they instituted.  Michelle Harrison elaborated:
From the outset, colonial legislation was established to tax refined sugar 
heavily and thus strangle at birth an island refining industry - a policy that 
was pursued throughout the Caribbean and which has been to the 
permanent detriment of the region.  As their economies were geared, for 
the indefinite future, towards export agriculture, the islands of the region 
were unable to harness for themselves that part of the production process 
with the greatest potential for 'value-added' linkages and indigenous 
economic growth.  The subservient role of Jamaica, and the other islands 
of the region, was firmly reinforced as the international economy 
emerged.399
In true mercantilist fashion, Britain groomed Jamaica to supply unprocessed food 
not produced at home in Britain and other “exotic” primary commodities cheap and buy 
metropolitan manufactured exports as well as staple food items not produced locally at 
inflated prices.  According to an official of the National Workers Union, “the British did 
not encourage value-added production because they wanted to ensure that they made 
maximum profit off the primary goods they imported cheap and converted into finished 
goods.  This fostered Jamaica’s dependency on the colonizing power(s) for markets and 
finished goods.”400  This uneven system of trade between colonizer and colonized has 
endured for centuries and now characterizes Jamaica’s trade with all its developed 
country trading partners, particularly the U.S. and EU, which critics of the system have 
labeled contemporary neo-colonizers of the now politically independent, but still 
economically dependent, former colonial territory.  Indeed, Jamaica seems to be stuck as 
a mercantilist dominion of the developed countries, unable to play catch-up with its 
399 Harrison 2001, 100.
400 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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colonizers, which long ago moved through the stages of mercantile and industrial 
capitalism and are now ensconced in the stage of financial capitalism and its corollary, 
the knowledge based economy.401  Judging from its slow progress, Jamaica simply has 
not grasped the basic premise of the mercantilist revisionists, namely Friedrich List and 
Alexander Hamilton, that in order to advance a developing country must cultivate a 
diversified economy and a strong manufacturing sector to increase its productive capacity 
and stimulate growth and development.  Indeed, to foster sustained development, the 
country must move from primary agricultural production to manufacturing by utilizing 
and maximizing the nation’s natural and human resource capacity.  In Jamaica’s case, it 
must somehow muster the political will and economic wherewithal to move into value-
added production for both domestic consumption and export.  In today’s globalized 
knowledge-based economy entrenched in the neo-liberal capitalist ethos, a country must 
innovate and diversify in order to compete and, ideally, thrive.402  To be sure, primary 
commodity production—although an important economic mainstay for Jamaica given its 
history and comparative advantage imbued in its favorable climate, profuse vegetation, 
and underutilized labor—must be accompanied by more advanced production that adds 
401 Daniel Bell forecasted the rise of a knowledge-based economy in The Coming of a Post-Industrial 
Society (1973).  Bell’s knowledge-based, post-industrial society has three components that are very much 
in evidence today: a shift from manufacturing to services; the centrality of the new science-based industries; 
and the rise of new technical elites as well as a new principle of stratification.
402 A distinction is made here between liberal and neo-liberal capitalism.  If liberal capitalism as 
characterized by the classical liberal economists were the actual ethos, Jamaica could thrive on primary 
production because countries would not hoard, nor would they protect their domestic industries.  Moreover, 
capital would be immobile and there would be no such thing as financial capitalism, or even industrial 
capitalism.  Hence, countries would trade based on comparative, not competitive, advantage.  However, the 
actual ethos of the world trading regime is a perversion of the liberal capitalist ideal.  This perversion, the 
neo-liberal ethos, rewards protectionist, uneven trade and thus privileges the rich at the expense of the poor.  
Hence, in order to survive, Jamaica and other developing countries must play the neo-liberal game, 
emulating what countries that espouse the neo-liberal ideology did to attain their politico-economic 
strength, i.e., utilize state interventionism in the face of underdevelopment and inability to compete to 
cultivate the requisite technological and manufacturing capacity for producing value-added goods and 
services to jumpstart productivity, competitiveness, and development.
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value to a country’s output and thus builds its human capital as well as increases its 
foreign exchange earnings, which, according to classical liberal economic theory, should 
be reinvested into local production to hasten the country’s progress along the capitalist 
path of development.
With the introduction of the plantation economy in Jamaica, a plantocracy 
evolved with European landholders at the top of the socioeconomic structure, slaves at 
the bottom, and poor whites—i.e.,, whites who did not own land and/or slaves—in the 
middle.  Given the planters and their employees’ penchant for sexual relations with their 
slaves, a sizeable mulatto class soon developed.  These persons, together with poor 
whites and immigrants from Asia and North Africa, would comprise the middle class 
after Emancipation.  Investors—many of them absentee landowners who hired agents to 
run their estates for them—tended to purchase small land holdings and consolidate them 
into large plantation estates as soon as they acquired the requisite capital for 
amalgamation.  Consequently, large-scale sugar farming quickly became the province of 
a small, wealthy elite—a structural characteristic that has continued throughout the 
centuries to the present day.  However, as Eric Williams pointed out “…cane cultivation 
was one thing, the production of sugar, another.  The one was a question of agriculture 
and largely one of labour, the other of industry, capital and technology.  The former 
demanded chiefly the labourer, the latter required the capitalist and technician.”403
Jamaica’s early sugar producers, like those throughout the British Caribbean, produced 
the lowest product forms in the sugar production process, primarily cane juice and a 
rough form of raw sugar to be refined in the importing countries of Europe.  Centuries 
later, Jamaica’s sugar producers still produce cane juice and raw sugar to be refined 
403 Williams 1984, 26.
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abroad.  The fact that Jamaica does not have a single sugar refinery on the island 
illustrates the country’s astonishing and implausible reality of underdevelopment and 
external dependence.  This structural characteristic of the early sugar industry was to 
shape the trajectory of Jamaica’s entire agriculture sector and its national economy, 
retarding internal development of technological and industrial capacity and forever 
orienting the country towards dependence on external sources for markets, resources, and 
leadership.  
It is not an exaggeration to say that Jamaica’s entire socio-economic structure is 
grounded in the patterns established by the plantation economy and its prized commodity, 
sugar.  As Michelle Harrison noted, “[a]lthough the wealth extracted from the Caribbean 
became the catalyst for change in Europe, the impact upon the islands themselves of 
European settlement and colonization was profound and complete.  The Caribbean region 
is unique, in fact, in that it is entirely post-colonial.  Over the course of three centuries, 
under the jurisdiction of Europe, its economic and social structure was completely 
conditioned by sugar production.  Under the abomination of slavery new societies were 
born, and through the confines of plantation agriculture, new economies were shaped.”404
A Jamaica Agricultural Development Foundation official described the significance of 
Jamaica’s colonial past:
The colonial past has been the most decisive factor.  We have always 
focused on what the colonizing power wanted out of Jamaica.  Land use 
was devised to accommodate Britain’s agenda; the most arable land was 
put into sugar and banana with the small farmer largely left out.  There 
was land fragmentation into small parcels after independence, but this was 
not productive because subsequent agricultural production on these 
smaller parcels was highly inefficient.  Plantation agriculture also geared 
technology towards monoculture, a highly inefficient system of farming.  
From independence to the present time Jamaica has highlighted the sugar 
404 Harrison 2001, 91.
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industry despite its intrinsic inefficiencies.  Consequently, there is 
insufficient investment in non-traditional products where the margins are 
better and that allow for greater competition in niche market situations.405
Another longstanding structural characteristic, that of a dual farm structure, also 
evolved during this early colonial period.  This dual structure produced inefficiencies and 
retarded Jamaica’s agricultural development.  Slaves were allowed to cultivate root crops 
and other food items in small “garden” plots.  This was the beginning of what would 
evolve into the peasant class after Emancipation when the ex-slaves left the plantations in 
droves to eke out a living in whatever land they could access as small-scale independent 
farmers.  Today their descendants cultivate Jamaica’s numerous small hillside farms of 
five or less acres, which provided the bulk of foodstuffs for domestic consumption prior 
to the onslaught of cheap imported food beginning in the 1980s.406  According to the 
Jamaica Sustainable Development Network, Jamaica’s structural dichotomy in 
agricultural production has impeded its development potential.407  Almost 300 years after 
Emancipation, the sector is still not harmonized.  Rather, it is comprised of two related 
but distinct sub-sectors: large-scale plantation agriculture and small-scale peasant 
agriculture.  
Large-scale farmers retain the most resource rich lands, i.e.,, the coastal plains 
and interior valleys both of which have fertile soil for farming, while smallholders farm 
small plots in Jamaica’s mountainous terrain.  Despite their privileged land allocation and 
405 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
406 The onslaught began after Jamaica liberalized its import controls per its IMF/World Bank mandated 
structural adjustment conditionalities and escalated after implementation of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture.  According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Jamaica’s food 
import bill increased by 51.7 percent from 1990-2000.  It’s earnings from agricultural exports, on the other 
hand, increased by only 21.2 percent over the same period.  See 
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y4632E/y4632e05.htm. 
407 The Jamaica Sustainable Development Network discusses this structural dichotomy in its profile of 
Jamaica’s agriculture sector located at www.jsdnp.org.jm/susAgriculture-agricJA.htm. 
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access to resources in comparison to peasant farmers, Jamaica’s large-scale plantation 
elite has not leveraged agriculture to boost the country’s development.  Until recently 
with rising global awareness of the need to diversify national economies beyond 
production/export of raw materials in order to compete in the highly innovative 
knowledge-based global economy, Jamaica’s plantation elites generally endorsed a 
sectoral agenda focused on primary commodity export-led agriculture. In so doing, they 
advanced Jamaica’s economic marginalization by collaborating with external forces 
vested in maintaining primary commodity plantation economy in Jamaica and other 
developing countries to buoy their own farmers and industrialization processes as well as 
ensure perpetual markets for their finished exports.  Jamaica’s plantation elite bought into 
the logic that anything from “foreign” was naturally better than anything produced 
locally, a state of mind that evolved during the early British colonial period and still 
permeates contemporary Jamaican society.  In the words of a Private Sector Organization 
of Jamaica (PSOJ) official, “our colonial past fostered the common mentality that if 
something does not come from overseas it doesn’t make sense.  We have no belief in our 
own system.  From the colonial period people have been the white man’s puppet, focused 
on being what the white man wants us to be.  We seem incapable of looking into our own 
situation, evaluating the underlying reasons for our problems, and trying to improve our 
situation.”408  Walter Rodney popularized this line of thought with reference to the 
Caribbean context.  Rodney postulated in the early 1970s that neocolonialism would rob 
Jamaicans and other peoples throughout the newly independent countries of true 
408 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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nationhood, self-reliance, and ultimately self-sufficiency.409   He argued that these 
countries would remain perpetually wedded to, dependent on, and marginalized by their 
former colonizers.  The local elite, with one foot in the local economy and the other in the 
metropolitan economy in order to retain their power at home as well as enrich their 
pocketbooks, would prove to be the facilitative agent of a dependent-clientelist 
relationship that would keep the former colonies in a state of underdevelopment and 
dependency on external resources and markets—i.e., mired in the plantation economy.  
Ironically, a key cause of Jamaica’s problems is the external inclination and 
predisposition of the country’s wealthiest and most powerful.  As the dependistas 
Cardoso, Pablo Casanova, and Ernest Mandel contended, the developing country’s 
fortune is tied to the interests of united local and foreign capital; the interests of local 
elites join together with those of metropolitan interests such that unequal exchange 
becomes the mechanism by which the developing country’s interests is subjugated to 
those of it’s metropolitan countries.  “In short, a close relationship developed between the 
foreign capitalists and the local capitalists who depended on them for finance, 
technology, supplies and marketing.  It was a client relationship, and as such justifies us 
calling the Jamaican bourgeoisie a client (or comprador) bourgeoisie.”410  Put simply, 
Jamaica’s predicament of underdevelopment and dependency is a manifestation of 
external and internal forces working on Jamaica from without and within to preserve the 
country’s marginalized position vis-à-vis the international political economy.  External 
and internal actors work symbiotically to condition the country as an appendage of the 
409 Rodney wrote two landmark texts on the subject.  See How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972) and 
The Groundings with My Brothers (1975).
410 Beckford and Witter 1982, 67.
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global economy such that the power and hegemony of united foreign and local special 
interests, i.e., economic elites, is preserved and the interests of domestic elites are 
served.411  “In many developing nations, politicians representing middle-class interests 
have gained control of the state in the post-independence era.  The concentration of 
resources in the state, and the control of the middle class over these resources, constituted 
the basis of bureaucratic control over the middle classes.”412  Indeed, according to much 
anecdotal evidence obtained on the ground, Jamaica’s “first families” have always shaped 
the direction of policy largely in their own interests—i.e., to stifle entrepreneurship, 
innovation, and reform of the sort that challenges the status quo and their stronghold on 
Jamaica’s economy.413  This is the essence of clientelism.414  According to Carlene Edie, 
clientelism in the domestic context is perpetuated by the structure of global imbalances of 
power and wealth.  Clientelism feeds external dependency and vice versa.  “The political 
leaders of many developing nations have become dependent on the resources of powerful 
international actors for domestic programs and for the survival of their regimes.  
International resource transfers have been employed by the middle class for translating its 
class power into control of the state.  As a consequence, the ruling middle class has often 
accommodated international actors in order to obtain the transfer of strategic resources 
411 There is much overlap between Jamaica’s economic and political elites.  A significant proportion of the 
country’s politicians own key businesses and possess sizeable per capita wealth.  As such, one hand feeds 
the other.  Wealth is a major prerequisite for election to public office.  In Jamaica, with its strict class lines, 
huge disparity of wealth, and predisposition to tribal politics, economic power denotes influence, conveys 
authority, and assures political legitimacy.  Robert Putnam described a related phenomenon in Making 
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1994) in which he demonstrates how a non-inclusive 
civil society stratified on the basis on wealth and tribal politics can preclude economic development.  
412 Edie 1991, 9.
413 A small group of largely non-black families control Jamaica’s key industries, including sugar, rum, and 
banana.
414 It is also a manifestation of a perverse control of the state by a non-inclusive civil society.  Joel S. 
Migdal discussed this phenomenon with regards to Egypt, Sierra Leone, Israel, and Mexico in Strong 
Societies and Weak States (1988).  Carl Stone has also written on clientelism in Jamaica.  See Democracy 
and Clientelism in Jamaica (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1980).
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required to make domestic clientelism possible.”415  Elite clientelism and the external 
dependency it fosters have affected Jamaica’s peasantry disproportionately.  “Perhaps the 
greatest pressure has been felt by the peasantry: pressure from plantations, from mining, 
and from tourism, all competing with the poor peasant for the limited land base that 
Jamaica possesses…The effect of the relative decline of the peasantry has had far 
reaching effects on the Jamaica economy.”416
Although they espouse the rhetoric of economic growth and development, those 
possessing the resources for leveraging Jamaica’s economy have not demonstrated an 
adequate commitment to sustained national development  and self-sufficiency.  An 
illustrative example is the flight of local capital to the U.S. and European markets during 
Michael Manley’s first term in the 1970s.  When Manley attempted to propel 
socioeconomic equality and economic independence by encouraging worker 
cooperatives, spearheading the Land Lease land distribution program, nationalizing key 
industries, and galvanizing import substitution industrialization, local economic elites, 
persuaded by foreign business interests vested in retaining a presence in Jamaica due to 
its large stores of mineral (bauxite and alumina) wealth, rebelled by undermining the 
regime and sending their money abroad, which compounded the effects on the national 
economy of the oil shocks of the 1970s and commodity terms of trade crisis of the 
1980s.417  In addition, many of Jamaica’s educational and professional elites simply fled 
415 Edie 1991, 9-10.
416 Beckford and Witter 1982, 68.
417 For a discussion of Jamaica’s democratic socialist interlude and the socioeconomic change that occurred therein 
see Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Democratic Socialism in Jamaica: The Political Movement and 
Social Transformation in Dependent Capitalism (1986).  Using an approach similar to that utilized by Barrington 
Moore (1966), Stephens and Stephens, in collaboration with Dietrich Rueschemeyer, contended in Capitalist 
Development & Democracy (1992) that power relations between classes determine a society’s democratic potential.  
They argued that three clusters of power determine a country’s chances for democratic transition and consolidation: 
the balance of power among different classes and class coalitions; the structure, strength, and autonomy of the state 
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the country.  Lack of business confidence in the government trickled down to the people 
causing a massive outcry against the regime, considerable social unrest, and calls in 
support of signing Jamaica up with the International Monetary Fund to secure an inflow 
of external funding.  As Edie explained, Manley’s democratic socialist regimes of 1972-
1980 faced potent opposition from Jamaica’s conservative forces in both the Jamaica 
Labor Party (JLP) and Manley’s own People’s National Party (PNP), Jamaica’s primary 
political parties, as well as in the United States.  Scholars allege that Jamaica’s attempts 
at instituting democratic socialism were sabotaged by external forces that, in their 
displeasure with Manley’s Castro-leaning tendencies, withdrew essential capitalist 
resources required for the state’s survival and encouraged their local elite clients to do the 
same.418  “Among the various CARICOM countries Jamaica was the first to experience 
economic disequilibria, commencing in the early 1970s.  Structural defects became 
apparent as the economy experienced a secular decline throughout the latter half of the 
1970s and into the 1980s.  Fiscal and external deficits widened and debt accumulated.  
The agricultural sector, which was a major contributor to the national economy, also 
experienced a drastic reduction.  Accordingly, Jamaica sought assistance from the 
multilateral and bilateral international institutions to assist with its recovery programme 
commencing in the early 1980s.”419
apparatus and its interaction with civil society; and the impact of transnational relations on the balance of class 
power and on state-society relations (p. 5).  With regards to the impact of transnational relations, the authors argued 
that in Latin America and the Caribbean external forces have “shaped the class structure in ways inimical for 
democratization” (p. 9).
418 For a detailed discussion of Manley’s democratic socialist measures and retaliation against those 
measures see Beckford and Witter 1982, 90-91.  Retaliation included: slowdown in production and 
investment; credit blockade by the U.S.; foreign media attacks on Jamaica’s tourist industry; capital flight 
and elite migration; and destabilization from without by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
419 Singh 1995, 230.
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Manley’s discrediting led to his defeat in 1980 by the JLP’s Edward Seaga whose 
regimes of 1980-1989 witnessed a shift in policy from democratic socialism to neoliberal 
free market economics as embodied in the Washington Consensus and based on the 
structural adjustment conditionalities to which Jamaica agreed through various IMF 
stabilization agreements, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank structural 
adjustment loans, and U.S. Agency for International Development conditionality.  
Jamaica sought stabilization assistance from the IMF in the late 1970s and contracted 
agreements for a Standby Arrangement and an Extended Fund Facility, both of which 
were suspended before the decade ended because Jamaica failed to meet its targets and 
carry out comprehensive reform.420  However, Jamaica would eventually contract another 
seven IMF programs of support before concluding after its final Extended Fund Facility 
in 1992 that they caused more harm than good.  With regards to World Bank loans, 
Jamaica has contracted 70 projects since 1965.  Of these, 10 were adjustment loans 
projects.421  Although Jamaica is no longer obligated to adhere to IMF rhetoric, it 
continues to do so as if by rote.  Indeed, although structural adjustment conditionalities 
no longer constrain Jamaica’s decision-making on a de jure basis, they have de facto 
influence because Jamaica has to answer to the IMF and World Bank as long as it owes 
them money and as long as it requires the IMF imprimatur for securing financing from 
investment banks.  Hence, “we need to remember that issues of agriculture are not 
420 Singh 1995, 252.









separate from Jamaica’s indebtedness.  Government cannot alienate the World Bank and 
IMF.  It continually has to make tradeoffs.”422
Upon implementing programs the IMF and World Bank programs, Jamaica 
moved to privatize, deregulate, and liberalize all sectors of its economy and accumulated 
massive amounts of debt in the process.  Dr. Michael Witter, professor of Economics at 
the University of the West Indies/Mona, explained in the documentary Life and Debt that 
“the IMF wanted us to devalue our currency and since our society is so heavily dependent 
on imported food, fuel, etc. when we devalue the cost of the things we import increases 
for the citizens.423  As a result, our economy today is much more under the control of 
foreigners, not so much through direct ownership but through the mechanism of debt.  In 
the 1970s we owed US$800 million.  By the end of the 1980s we owed US$4 billion.  
Nowadays we owe US$7 billion.  So our debt is rising and all the while our capacity to 
export to produce is decreasing.”  The debt crisis that began in the 1980s spiraled to 
unsustainable proportions and continues unabated.  Structural adjustment began at the 
macroeconomic level with the liberalization of imports.  In 1982 under the first structural 
adjustment loan (SAL), the Seaga government removed 64 (out of 364) items under 
quantitative restrictions (QRs), replacing the QRs with equivalent tariff protection.424
The government also downscaled the prevailing import licensing system.  Three years 
later, the remaining items under quantitative restrictions were removed.  
422 This point was stressed at a pre-WTO Cancun Ministerial briefing of the CARICOM Regional 
Negotiating Machinery held in Jamaica in July 2003.  According to a Ministry of Agriculture official in 
attendance, all potential mechanisms for equalizing the playing field for Jamaica in world agricultural trade 
must be juxtaposed against the country’s obligations per its structural adjustment conditionalities.  “Just 
because a remedy is available doesn’t mean Jamaica can use it.”  From the researcher’s personal interview 
transcript.
423 For a written summary of Stephanie Black’s documentary Life and Debt see New York Films at 
http://www.newyorkerfilms.com/t_elements/life_debt/life_debt_pk.pdf.
424 Singh 1995, 135.
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Structural adjustment aimed to promote growth through export expansion.  To 
their credit, the policies targeted both traditional and non-traditional exports as loci of 
growth.  However, the one-size-fits-all formula of structural adjustment had a devastating 
effect on Jamaica’s agriculture sector.425  Commodity boards were obliterated, the 
number of extension officers in the field severely reduced, food subsidies eliminated, 
import quantitative restrictions removed, and import tariffs slashed.  Moreover, the 
policies had negligible effect on equalizing producer prices, which experts cite as the 
most dominant influence on production response.426  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the performance of agriculture under structural adjustment has been poor.  “Major 
traditional export commodities did not recover from the deterioration in production 
experienced in the late 1970s.  Production levels in 1992 were only about one-half of the 
1970 levels for sugar, bananas and citrus.  Only in the domestic food production sub-
sector were modest gains recorded over the period 1981-1992.”427  Ten years later in 
2002, production levels for sugar and bananas have declined even further while those for 
domestic food have been decimated by the emphasis of adjustment on export crops and 
by import competition, namely the flood of cheap foreign subsidized and/or dumped food 
items.  Jamaica produced 2,603 tons of sugar in 1988, 2,602 tons in 1992, and 1,993 tons 
425 The IMF has publicly acknowledged the error of its ways.  In a striking admission of the misguided 
nature of its one-size-fits-all model of adjustment, the need to ground structural adjustment programs in the 
needs of the specific local context to maximize program efficacy, and the significance of social imperatives 
in development versus strictly macroeconomic objectives, a recent IMF publication stated: “The larger 
debate must address more fundamental questions of program design: questions of how to extend or modify 
the so-called Washington Consensus and embed it into the Monterrey Consensus on development finance.  
Stan Fischer recently summed up that issue neatly by noting that while the Washington Consensus is a 
‘useful shorthand description of a major part of a desirable basic policy orientation,’ real-world policy 
recommendations must be more nuanced and comprehensive.”  See James M. Boughton, Who’s in Charge? 
Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs WP/03/191 (Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund, 2003).
426 Singh 1995, 256.
427 Singh 1995, 244.
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in 2002.  With regards to bananas, Jamaica produced 156,313 metric tons in 1988, 
217,081 metric tons in 1992, and 200,837 metric tons in 2002.428  According to the 
University of London’s School of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, sugar 
comprised 11.53 percent of Jamaica’s total exports in 1972 and 7.46 percent in 1997.  For 
bananas, those figures are 4.05 percent in 1972 and 3.38 percent in 1997.429
The pace of liberalization begun by Seaga in the 1980s escalated during the PNP 
regimes of the 1990s, especially after the Uruguay Round of the WTO.430  Many 
Jamaicans believe the government’s pace of liberalization was too rapid.  According to a 
Confederation of Trade Unions official:
The problem is that the IMF and World Bank are heavily staffed with 
macroeconomists touting dogma that if countries create the “right” 
macroeconomic conditions (aka liberalization and privatization),
productivity will automatically ensue.  But common sense says this is not 
true.  How can a country increase productivity if it cuts expenditure on 
social programs such as health, education, transportation, and housing?  
This logic is completely nonsensical and it has devastated Jamaica.  But 
it’s Jamaica’s fault because it should not have accepted and implemented 
the logic without first studying its implications.431
Cheap food imports from Europe and the U.S. flooded Jamaica, dislocating and 
marginalizing local farmers who simply could not compete with inefficient foreign 
farmers benefiting from massive production and export subsidies afforded them by their 
rich and powerful governments that allow, even encourage, rich country farmers to 
428 See STATIN 2003, Table 2.1 for production statistics for sugar and bananas.   
429 See Fiona Atkins, Jamaica’s Terms of Trade: a Problem of Resource Curse or Dutch Disease at 
http://www.econ.bbk.ac.uk/wp/ewp/ewp0301.pdf.  The author presented an econometric analysis of 
Jamaica’s (declining) terms of trade, using data abstracted from STATIN’s Statistical Yearbook of 
Jamaica.  
430 Michael Manley returned to power in 1989 a changed man.  He disavowed democratic socialism and 
continued where Seaga had left off, but with even more commitment to macroeconomic reform.  He 
explained in the documentary Life and Debt that he had no choice but to implore the IMF for financial 
assistance to stem the tide of social unrest that was plaguing the country at the time: “Going to the IMF and 
signing an agreement with them was a terrible experience.  It’s like living a walking contradiction.  It was 
one of the bitter experiences of my public life.”  
431 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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overproduce food, the surplus of which is dumped in poor countries. According to a 
Ministry of Agriculture official, “our key trade problem is that we import most of our 
main staples—rice, flour, and cornmeal—and do not consume much of our locally-
produced starches such as yam and dasheen because, although imported, the calorie 
weight of the former carbohydrate group is much cheaper and can be stretched further 
than that of the latter.  We also import much milk powder, oils and fats, and processed 
fish.  These imports form a large portion of our food basket.”432  Unfortunately for poor 
country farmers, consumers find this food irresistible for its affordability, variety, and 
“rich country” allure.  With the advent of television and more recently Internet 
technology, people worldwide have a birdseye view into the way the rich world lives and 
desire the same way of life, however materialist and unsustainable given their country’s 
low per capita incomes.  Jamaicans are no exception.  
Indeed, wealthy elites in developing countries are often the most ardent supporters 
of import liberalization because it allows them access to the foreign goods they crave to 
approximate metropolitan lifestyles.  A Jamaican elite interviewed for this research 
illustrated this point in his commentary about the impact of cheap food imports on 
Jamaica’s farmers: “why should consumers be forced to pay more to maintain local 
production?  If the U.S. government wants to subside my food consumption then more 
power to it.  Why should I complain about U.S. and EU subsidization if it allows me to 
access to a greater variety of food at cheap prices?”433  These elites typically couch their 
432 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
433 When asked if food security matters, this elite remarked: “No, because I eat every day and I don’t grow 
any food.  Jamaica’s small size makes the food security issue a nonstarter.  In case of famine, people would 
give us food whereas it would be highly unlikely for China given the tremendous size of its population.  It’s 
not likely that other countries will use food as a weapon against us because likely ‘adversaries,’ namely the 
US, have other points of leverage to use.”
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support for full developing country import liberalization in the argument that it reduces 
global poverty because it leads to greater choice and cheaper prices.  This is the liberal 
free trade argument that dominates much of the contemporary literature on trade and 
often obscures the existence and/or perniciousness of developed country agricultural 
protectionism.  An article in Foreign Policy, for instance, argued that agricultural 
protectionism in a rich country does not necessarily worsen global poverty because if rich 
countries were to eliminate subsidies to domestic producers and quotas on foreign 
imports their agricultural production would decline, the global price of food would 
increase, and net food importing countries will suffer.  “Certainly, if agricultural trade is 
liberalized and prices rise, some poor countries will become net agricultural exporters, 
but many will not.”434  That may be so, but the argument is nonetheless unconvincing 
when one-sided import liberalization erodes national food production, productivity, 
competitiveness, food security, and ultimately national security in agriculture-dependent 
countries that have little else on which to bank their economic futures in a process of 
sustained, self-reinforcing development.
Unfortunately, the WTO has not alleviated the problem.  On the contrary, 
although the WTO’s mission requires it to liberalize and equalize world trade, 
agricultural protectionism has become even more intractable under the WTO.  Developed 
country subsidies and tariff barriers against products of export interest to Jamaica and 
other developing countries—namely agricultural goods—continue unabated despite the 
commitments these countries made in the Uruguay Round.435  On the other hand, 
434 Arvind Panagariya, “International Trade,” Foreign Policy (Nov/Dec 2003): 20-28.
435 Some developing countries are also highly protectionist.  However, these countries tend to have high 
tariff barriers on industrial products, not agricultural goods.  Interestingly, rich countries are clamoring at 
the WTO for countries to further liberalize industrial and services trade while poor countries are agitating 
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developing countries maintain very low tariffs against food imports and utilize few to no 
tariff rate quotas.  Moreover, many, like Jamaica, lack the resources to subsidize their
farmers.  The World Bank characterizes Jamaica as “a very open economy” that 
introduced capital account convertibility in 1991.  Jamaica in 2002 had an average tariff 
rate of 8.9 percent, reduced from an “already moderate” rate of 20.3 percent since 
1991.436  As a CARICOM member, Jamaica assesses a common external tariff (CET) of 
between zero and forty percent on goods from non-CARICOM members; goods from 
CARICOM members enter duty-free. Jamaica’s economy is very open and trade 
dependent.  The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
acknowledges that before the Uruguay Round ended Jamaica had already implemented 
various structural reforms specified in the Agreement on Agriculture.  These included: 
elimination of all quantitative import restrictions; elimination of the use of reference 
prices as a matter of policy; tariffication of non-tariff barriers such that no tariff exceeded 
100 percent; reduction of duties from 200 percent in several cases to 40 percent; 
elimination of most agricultural credit subsidies and other forms of subsidies and controls 
associated with regulation by commodity marketing boards; elimination of food 
subsidies; divestment of public companies; and tariff reduction over a period of three to 
for rich countries to make good on the commitments they made during the Uruguay Round with respect to 
agriculture.  Developing countries are reluctant to make additional commitments in the absence of rich 
country reduction of agricultural protectionism.  With the breakdown of talks in Cancun, largely over 
agriculture, WTO negotiations have reached an impasse.
436 See Jamaica: The Road to Sustained Growth (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, January 2004). In a 23 
October 1998 press release the WTO noted that Jamaica lowered its import duties from rates as high as 
200% to maximum levels of 30% for industrial products and 40% for agricultural goods.  See 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp85_e.htm.  Jamaica assesses additional duties, such as customs 
and stamp duties, on some imports to protect local industries.
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seven years according to the CARICOM’s common external tariff.437  In the Uruguay 
Round, Jamaica bound all agricultural tariffs at 100 percent but this bound rate is 
theoretical in that is it superceded by the much lower applied CARICOM common 
external tariff to which Jamaica is obligated by regional treaty obligation.438  Jamaica is 
precluded by its WTO commitments from utilizing tariff rate quotas (TRQs), which 
obligate countries to charge applied tariffs to only in-quota countries and allows them to 
inflate tariffs for out-of-quota countries.  With regards to subsidies, Jamaica provides 
minimal green box domestic support—approximately US$8 million per year, a minuscule 
amount when compared to its average annual agricultural GDP of US$480 million—and 
no export subsidies (FAO 2000).  With regards to safeguards and trade remedy measures, 
Jamaica cannot utilize the Special Safeguard (SSG) Provision of the AoA because it did 
not implement tariffication during the Uruguay Round.439  Indeed, although Jamaica has a 
Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Commission, the WTO’s anti-dumping and countervailing 
recourses have generally been out of Jamaica’s reach due to their high cost of 
administration and utilization.
The State of Jamaica’s Macroeconomy
The World Bank classifies Jamaica as a ‘globalizer’ meaning that it is one of the 
top one-third of developing countries to have increased trade relative to gross domestic 
437 Agriculture, Trade and Food Security Issues and Options in the WTO Negotiations from the Perspective 
of Developing Countries, Vol. II Country Case Studies, Chapter 7-Jamaica (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2000).  See http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/X8731e/x8731e00.htm. 
438 The CET went into effect in 1991.
439 Of course, Jamaica had tariffied its non-tariff barriers much earlier as part of its structural adjustment 
conditionalities.  Yet, it was nonetheless denied access to the SSG.
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product (GDP) between 1975-79 and 1995-97.440  According to the Bank’s research, the 
weighted average growth rate for globalizing countries increased from 3.5 percent to 5 
percent between the 1980s and 1990s.  The growth rate for non-globalizing countries 
increased from 0.8 percent to a mere 1.4 percent over the same period.  Jamaica’s GDP in 
2002 was US$8.4 billion, current prices.  Per capita GDP in 2002 was US$3,203.  GDP 
growth measured in annual % change was one percent in 2002 and an average of zero 
percent over the period 1995-2002.441  Interestingly, Jamaica’s economic performance 
during the 1980s and 90s was the exact opposite of the expectation for globalizers.  
Indeed, while it experienced annual GDP growth of 6.3 percent from 1952 to 1972, 
growth has been stagnant for the last three decades.442  Despite Jamaica’s attempts at 
liberalization per the neoliberal prescription for growth, the country simply has not 
realized the promise of sustained, self-reinforcing growth.  This paper asserts that the 
country’s declining agricultural production, productivity, and competitiveness is a major 
cause of the problem.
In 2002 Jamaica’s real GDP in agriculture, forestry, and fishing was Ja$1,331 
million, a drop of 8.3 percent from 2001, and agriculture constituted 6.6 of total real 
GDP, a drop from 7.3 percent in 2001.443  Jamaica’s real GDP growth rate for agriculture 
in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 was -13.7 percent, -1.5 percent, 1.3 percent,   
440 See David Dollar and A. Kraay, Trade, Growth, and Poverty, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2615 
(World Bank: Washington, D.C., 2001)
441 The data in this and the preceding two sentences is taken from the World Bank’s most recent report on 
Jamaica.  See Jamaica: The Road to Sustained Growth (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, January 2004).
442 See Jamaica: The Road to Sustained Growth (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, January 2004).
443 See PIOJ 2003, 8.1.  The PIOJ curiously attributes the decline in agriculture GDP entirely to climactic 
forces.  “The decline in GDP in agriculture was due to the effects of the November 2001 flood rains in 
addition to heavy rainfall in the months of May/June and September 2002.  These events resulted in the 
destruction of crops, livestock, agricultural assets and infrastructure…The effect of the floods also 
contributed to the decline in the Manufacturing sector, particularly, the Agro Processing industry” (v).  
GDP is measured in producers’ values at constant (1986) prices.
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-10.9 percent, 5.2 percent, and -8.3 percent respectively.444  These figures account to an 
absurdly low overall percentage point contribution to growth of -0.6 percent when 
considered in the context of the country’s suitability to agricultural production and export 
per David Ricardo’s logic of trade by comparative advantage.  From 1997 to 2000 
agriculture’s contribution to GDP was 7.9 percent, 7.8 percent, 8.0 percent, and 7.0 
percent respectively.445  Output for domestic crops declined in 2002 from 2001 by 11.3 
percent and for export crops by 5.8 percent.446  Agricultural output declined overall from 
2001 by 7.4 percent.447  From January to September 2002, export earnings from 
agriculture totaled US$108.8 million in comparison to US$112.7 million for the same 
time period in 2001.448  Traditional products earned US$45 million and non-traditional 
products earned US$64.8 million.449  According to the Statistical Institute of Jamaica, 
which classifies agricultural crops into three categories—export; vegetables, pulses, and 
legumes; and other—the agricultural sector experienced a general decline in output in 
2002.450  Overall, only coffee, ginger, and onions showed increases in production above 
the 2001 levels.  A majority of the traditional export crops decreased in the quantity 
produced.451  The vegetables, pulses, and legumes showed varying levels of decline in 
444 PIOJ 2003, 3.3.
445 PIOJ 2003, 3.4.
446 PIOJ 2003, 8.1.
447 Ibid.
448 Ibid.
449 Ibid.  Sugar, previously reported as a traditional (primary) product, is now reported as a manufactured 
product.
450 Production Statistics 2002 (Jamaica: Statistical Institute of Jamaica, 2003), i.  The traditional export 
crops include coconut, citrus, sugar cane, bananas, and coffee.  Pulses and vegetables include pumpkins, 
carrots, cabbages, peas and beans, cucumbers, tomatoes, peanuts, and peppers.  “Other” crops include 
sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, yams, cocoes and dasheens, onions, cassava, and rice.  For the purposes of 
this research project, products in the vegetable/pulse/legume and other categories are considered domestic 
crops in keeping with their primarily domestic consumption.  The statistics in the remainder of this 
paragraph are presented in Production Statistics 2002.
451 According to information gleaned from interviews with farmers and commodity board officials, citrus 
and coconut were plagued by disease, citrus by the tristeza virus and coconut by the lethal yellowing 
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production.  In the other crops category, all with the exception of onion declined 
considerably in production.  Rice, Irish potatoes, and sweet potatoes had the highest rates 
of decline with 69.7 percent, 19.6 percent, and 19.5 percent respectively.  This pattern of 
production decline is even more striking when assessed over a longer historical period.  
In 1988 Jamaica produced 19,800 metric tons of sweet potatoes and 9,893 metric tons of 
Irish potatoes.  In 1995 those production figures were 30,560 and 17,036 respectively.  In 
2002 they were 20,012 and 5,314.  With regards to Jamaica’s oldest export crops, 
Jamaica produced 2,603,000 tons of sugar in 1988, 2,340,000 in 1995, and 1,993,000 
tons in 2002.  For banana the figures are 156,313 metric tons in 1988, 237,797 metric 
tons in 1995, and 200,837 metric tons in 2002.  For coffee the figures are 12,192 metric 
tons in 1988, 15,398 metric tons in 1995, and 13,566 metric tons in 2002.  Amongst the 
domestic crops, the performance of potatoes is illustrative and leads the discerning 
analyst to consider the effect of advanced country subsidization and/or dumping in 
Jamaica of comparable products.452
Looking at the macro picture, Jamaica’s debt to GDP is 150 percent, 
unemployment is 15.1 percent, and its economy is growing at an annual rate of 
approximately one percent.453  Jamaica’s current account has been in deficit for several 
disease.  Sugar and banana are plagued by a disease of an inorganic form—dependence on the consistently 
high prices granted under the EU-ACP Lome preferential trade regime, which fostered complacency and 
lack of innovation amongst both producers and policymakers.
452 The Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledges that “potatoes are 
covered by a variety of general, non-crop-specific programs.  Some of these include production assistance 
programs such as Federal crop insurance, disaster assistance, and western irrigation subsidies.  Fresh 
potatoes and various processed potato products are eligible for various export promotion programs funded 
by the USDA, State departments of agriculture, and private industry.  Federal food purchase and donation 
programs such as the National School Lunch Program, the Commodity Supplemental Food Program, and 
the Food for Peace Program (P.L. 480) also include potatoes and potato products.”  See 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/potatoes/policy.htm.  
453 See Jamaica: The Road to Sustained Growth (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, January 2004). The 
reporting of Jamaica’s debt to GDP ratio varies by reporting entity.  According to Bear Stearns, the 
investment banking and securities firm the Government of Jamaica has contracted, Jamaica’s public sector 
220
years; in 2001 and 2002 for January to November it was –740.6 and –941.4 US$ million 
respectively.454  Jamaica’s current account deficit widened by US$216.8 or 11.8 percent 
of gross GDP from January to September 2002.455  This expansion was due largely to the 
US$181.1 million expansion in the goods account deficit.  The merchandise trade deficit 
expanded to 22 percent of GDP due to an increase in imports and a decrease in exports; 
exports decreased by US$142.7 million to US$991.2 million while imports increased by 
US$38.4 million to US$2320.7 million.456  For agriculture, traditional exports showed a 
small increase of 0.7 percent while nontraditional exports showed a large decline 6.0 
percent.457  In the traditional food export category, coffee performed the best, showing an 
export increase of 8.3 percent, which helped balance out the declines for banana, citrus, 
and cocoa: 2.9 percent, -44.4 percent, and –22.0 percent respectively.458  Exports of 
sugar, now classified as a manufactured good, declined by 6.2 percent.459
Jamaica’s real GDP increased by 1.0 percent in 2002.  Total goods-production 
decreased by 0.4 percent while services-production increased by 1.8 percent.  Within the 
debt stands at 150 percent of GDP and its domestic debt is 94.1 percent (as of July 2003).  According to 
Jamaica’s Ministry of Finance, Jamaica’s external debt at the end of 2002 stood at $US 4,347.46 mn and its 
external debt/GDP was 58.06 percent.  See 
http://www.mof.gov.jm/dmu/download/2003/extdebt/edi0212cy.pdf.  According to the Bank of Jamaica, 
Jamaica’s direct external debt at the end of November 2003 stood at $US 3,790.7 mn and its total 
debt/GDP in 1999 (the Bank’s most recent available data) was 115.14 percent.  See 
http://www.boj.org.jm/economicdata.asp.  
454 Statistical Digest April 2003 (Jamaica: Bank of Jamaica, 99).
455 PIOJ 2003, 4.2.
456 Ibid.
457 PIOJ 2003, 4.2-4.4.
458 Ibid.  Jamaica’s coffee has unique qualities which make it very competitive in world trade.  According 
to a Coffee Industry Board official, Jamaican coffee has held its own on world markets due to brand 
equity—half its value is emotional (historical) and the other half is due to its natural attributes, namely taste 
and aroma.  In comparison, there is nothing particularly unique or special about Jamaica’s sugar or 
bananas.  Jamaica produces three types of coffee: Blue Mountain 1, High Mountain Supreme, and Jamaica 
Prime.  Of these Blue Mountain 1 is the best regarded and the most expensive.  High Mountain Supreme 
and Jamaica Prime, although not as select, still fetch high prices on world markets.  In July 2003 Blue 
Mountain 1 coffee sold for US$12.50/lb and High Mountain Supreme for US$6.85/lb.  In comparison, 
coffee traded on the coffee commodity market in New York City sold for US$.60/lb.  A majority of 
Jamaica’s coffee is exported to Japan.  From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
459 Ibid.
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goods-production category, agriculture and manufacturing were the losing sectors, 
declining by 8.3 percent and 0.2 percent respectively.  Mining and Quarrying was the 
most fruitful sector, increasing by 3.4 percent due largely to an expansion of bauxite and 
alumina production.  Jamaica’s declining goods production together with its reliance on 
service provision and extraction of its exhaustible mineral stores begs the question of 
how a national economy can thrive without vibrant productive sectors, particularly 
agriculture and manufacturing, and is a cause of concern for many Jamaicans.  An official 
of Dairy Industries Ltd. offered an interesting explanation for Jamaica’s seemingly 
misguided sectoral prioritization and lack of balanced, self-reinforcing development: 
“[Jamaicans] took over as managers in the 60s and proceeded to live like our colonial 
masters.  To escape from Jamaica’s legacy of slavery and colonialism, we aimed for 
service jobs in law, medicine, etc.  But service jobs have to be built on productive 
activities such as farming, engineering, etc.  Jamaica has too many lawyers and doctors 
and not enough work to sustain them because there is not enough productive activity 
going on.  We have lots of potential and our crops have superior taste.  Why haven’t we 
presented them to the food consuming population around the world?  If we leveraged 
agro-processing appropriately there would be enough productive activity to drive the 
economy.”460  The issue is, of course, much more nuanced.  Nonetheless, the commentary 
illustrates the conundrum at issue in this research project, essentially why despite 
Jamaica’s natural and human resource endowment the country has not leveraged its 
intrinsic comparative advantage in agriculture to contribute more significantly to national 
economic growth and development vis-à-vis the global economy.  In other words, what 
460 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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are the constraints, both internally-motivated and externally-driven, on agricultural 
productivity, competitiveness, and national development?
Assessment of Jamaica’s Agricultural Decline
Trade experts posit several explanations for the agricultural failings of countries 
like Jamaica.  These explanations impugn either externally-driven or domestically-
motivated forces but all relate to and evolve from Jamaica’s history and standing as a 
plantation economy in world trade.  Externally-motivated constraints on Jamaica’s 
agriculture limit access to locally produced goods in rich foreign markets as well as pose 
insurmountable, unfair competition for locally produced goods in the local market.  These 
challenges include developed country subsidization of their farm sectors, utilization of 
border tariff barriers against developing country agricultural imports, and dumping of 
agricultural surplus in poor countries under the guise of food aid—all egregious practices 
that are permissible under the World Trade Organization (WTO).461  “In addition to the 
direct subsidies that the rich countries offer their farmers, they impose import tariffs on 
agricultural imports that can be as high as 60 percent.  This protectionism inflicts a 
double dose of damage on developing countries.  It raises barriers to their agricultural 
exports—a main source of hard currency—and threatens them with competition on their 
own domestic markets from agricultural exports of rich countries, which become cheap 
461 These externally-driven constraints on Jamaica’s development are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
3.  As noted by a CARICOM Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) official at a RNM briefing on 
agriculture in trade negotiations held in Jamaica in July 2003, developed country subsidies are conveyed 
into their food aid programs.  Therefore, when Jamaica accepts such aid it helps perpetuate inefficiency in 
international food production and trade, prop up subsidized developed country farmers, undermine its own 
farmers, and—in light of agriculture’s role in development—derail its own national development.
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as a result of government subsidies.”462  Sugar, Jamaica’s leading traditional export, is a 
striking case in point.  According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the average 
allowed WTO tariff for sugar is 74 percent.  The U.S. imposes an average tariff rate for 
sugar of over 90 percent while the EU imposes an average rate of close to 150 percent.  
With regards to export subsidies, in 2000/01 the EU subsidized its sugar producers to the 
effect of US$340 million.  The U.S. operates two re-export programs, the Refined Sugar 
and Sugar-Containing Products Re-Export Programs, to help U.S. producers of value 
added sugar products compete in global markets.  Under these programs, U.S. producers 
import raw sugar under a tariff rate quota, process it, and receive governmental assistance 
to re-export the refined product.  The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) of the 
USDA also administers export credit guarantee programs to help buyers in importing 
countries finance U.S. agricultural exports.  These programs provide credit to buyers who 
would otherwise lack the necessary financing for purchase without CCC guarantees.463
With regards to domestic support subsidization, in 1998/99 the EU gave its sugar 
producers US$6 billion in amber box support while the U.S. gave its producers US$1 
billion in amber box support.464  Such protectionism by rich countries poses an almost 
insurmountable burden on developing country agricultural production and 
competitiveness in both export and local markets.
Rich country agricultural subsidies and border barrier mechanisms such as tariff 
peaks and tariff escalation restrict market access to developing countries’ traditional 
462 Samira Dawani, “Freeing Up World Agricultural Trade,” The Lebanase Daily Star Online (28 January 
2003).
463 See the USDA at http://www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/exp-cred-guar.html. 
464 See USDA/Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) at 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/WTO/commodities2002/Sugar3.pdf and USDA/Economic 
Research Service (ERS) at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmPolicy/2002sugar.htm. 
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exports and dissuade poor country diversification and industrialization.  Sugar illustrates 
the power of border barriers.  Take the United States for example.  The U.S. sugar 
industry is one of the country’s most highly protected commodities.  Whereas the 
production and export of U.S. sugar is highly subsidized and exported widely below the 
cost of production, sugar imports into the country are restricted to entry by tariff rate 
quota (TRQ).  Sugar imports not privy to the quotas are subjected to extremely high 
tariffs, and the more refined the product the higher the tariff.  Given the level of 
protectionism endemic to the industry, it is not surprising that sugar was a major sticking 
point in the recent U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement negotiations.465  Given its 
history as sugar producer and the centrality of sugar earnings in its economy, Jamaica has 
a vested interest in this issue.  Ironically, Jamaica is hard pressed to criticize this 
discriminatory tariff regime because specific quantities of its raw sugar is granted duty-
free quota access to the U.S. and European markets, the U.S. under the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative and Europe under the Lomé/Cotonou Agreements.  Herein lies a fundamental 
tragedy of Jamaica’s dependency and underdevelopment.  Jamaica’s continued operation 
in the plantation economy, with characteristic clientelist dependence on advanced country 
“munificence” for production and export guidance, propels a development that is 
restricted to that very “munificence” versus a development that is based on the country’s 
comparative and competitive advantages.  
Some scholars attribute Jamaica’s agricultural decline to the country’s 
underdevelopment and external dependency wrought by its marginalization in and by the 
world trading regime.  Michelle Harrison, for example, argued that “deeply embedded 
structures of underdevelopment meant that the agricultural sector failed to benefit from 
465 The agreement was concluded in February 2004.  The U.S. refused to expand access to Australian sugar.
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the general economic growth that the island experienced in the post-Second World War 
period during which the strategy of industrialization-by-invitation reigned.  As bauxite 
mining, tourism, and manufacturing emerged to become Jamaica’s principal foreign 
exchange earners, relative agricultural productivity actually declined.  Despite [largely 
public] investment in the sector, production of sugar and other commercial crops has 
continued to fall; moreover, as domestic production has fallen further, more and more of 
the food that Jamaicans eat has to be imported.  At the national level this has had 
disastrous consequences for the macro economy, but at the local level it has meant the 
greater entrenchment of rural poverty.”466  Other external challenges that have eroded 
Jamaica’s agriculture include the one-model- fits-all structural adjustment methodology 
designed by the IMF and World Bank and implemented by Jamaica and other developing 
countries as a precondition for securing international financial assistance.  In addition, the 
preferential trade arrangements that have shielded Jamaica’s traditional export agriculture 
since independence—with both positive and negative consequences—and which are 
bedrock of the country’s economy, are now threatened under the WTO.  As discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 3 of this paper, the Lomé Agreement—instituted by the European Union 
(EU) in 1975 as a way to help member countries’ former colonies in Africa, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific (the ACP countries) transition into self-government—was the 
first of these preferential arrangements to benefit Jamaica.  Other PTAs, including the 
United States’ Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and Canada’s CARIBCAN, have played 
a major role in Jamaica’s economy.  But Lomé has been the most advantageous by far; it 
has virtually preserved Jamaica’s sugar and banana industries by granting them entrée to 
the European market in large quota quantities and at prices fixed above world market 
466 Harrison 2001, 10.
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prices.  Much to Jamaica and other beneficiary countries’ dismay and chagrin, other 
countries have challenged these preferential arrangements at the WTO on several counts; 
the challengers assert that the arrangements violate the WTO tenets of most favored 
nation, nondiscrimination, and reciprocity.  The most damaging challenge to date was 
mounted in 1996 by the U.S. against the Lomé-ACP banana regime, which the U.S. 
claimed unfairly locks exports from more efficient banana producing countries out of the 
lucrative European market.  The U.S. won the case after a prolonged legal battle at the 
WTO, forcing the EU to reformulate Lomé.  The Lomé Agreement, renamed the Cotonou 
Agreement after Cotonou, Benin where the agreement was renegotiated in 2000, 
extended preferences to 2006 when they will be eliminated.  Not satisfied with this 
phased elimination, other countries have mounted their own challenges at the WTO.  In 
July 2003 a tripartite coalition comprised of Brazil, Australia, and Thailand challenged 
the Lomé/Cotonou-ACP sugar regime at the WTO claiming as the U.S. did before them 
that the preferences awarded the ACP countries unfairly lock exports from more efficient 
sugar producing countries out of the lucrative European market.
Jamaica is concerned about developed country subsidization, dumping, and tariff 
barriers.  However, the impending demise of the PTA is an immediate and pressing 
concern.  Jamaicans, from government officials to taxi drivers, are worried that, without 
the PTA, Jamaica will no longer be able to sell its goods due to its small size and 
economies of scale, high cost of production, lack of productive and marketing resources, 
and the developed countries’ pervasive utilization of protectionist trade practices like 
agricultural subsidization, dumping, tariff peaks, and tariff escalation.  Because the PTA 
has been Jamaica’s primary export vehicle since independence, there is much angst on 
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the ground about how the end of preferences will affect Jamaica’s economic future.  
However, Jamaicans have a love-hate relationship with preferences.  The PTAs served as 
export vehicles into rich country markets for Jamaica’s traditional exports, awarding a 
fixed price for targeted commodities imported under the arrangements regardless of 
prevailing global market prices and conditions.  Notwithstanding the advantages of 
preferences, critics allege that these arrangements fostered complacency, apathy, and 
dependency in Jamaica’s agriculture community.  They say the PTAs programmed 
Jamaican farmers, processors, and distributors to accept the primary commodity 
plantation agriculture model as their lot, never aspiring to more than the production and 
export of raw farm goods.  According to an official of the Caribbean Agricultural 
Research and Development Institute (CARDI), preferences perpetuated primary 
production and export to Europe and stifled local industrial developments and 
initiatives.467  Unfortunately, Jamaica’s producers became quite content with the export 
outlet and income potential afforded by PTAs, so much so that the country’s production 
of key export products has dropped precipitously in recent years, which has caused the 
country to fall short on some PTA quotas, a completely counterproductive and 
counterintuitive consequence of PTAs.  
Although some critics indict PTAs as the source of Jamaica’s reduced agricultural 
productivity and competitiveness, others blame Jamaicans’ own lack of foresight and 
innovativeness.  While they concur that PTAs fostered external dependency in 
beneficiary countries, they say the blame cannot be attributed to any intrinsic 
malevolence on the part of sponsoring countries whose primary motivation for extending 
the arrangements was a desire to help poorer countries develop.  As an official of the 
467 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ) commented, “preferences facilitate 
development while encouraging dependency.  We couldn’t have gotten where we are 
without preferences.  However, sponsoring countries never intended for recipient 
countries to be beneficiaries indefinitely.  There was always the expectation that Jamaica 
would eventually be able to step up to the plate.  Any inability to do so is our own doing.  
We have had enough time under preferences to make adjustments and transition but did 
not utilize the assistance for the purpose(s) for which it was given.  Jamaica wasted the 
opportunity.”468  Echoing these thoughts, a Development Bank of Jamaica official 
contended, “Lomé served its purpose.  We could have diversified but we were too 
dependent on export earnings from sugar and bananas.  The onus for diversification was 
on Jamaica.  We should have taken the initiative realizing that preferences would not last 
forever.”469  While many Jamaicans bemoan the impending demise of preferences, some 
welcome it.  A principal of Walkerswood Foods, for instance, explained how preferences 
derail the transition of a primary commodity producing country to value-added 
production: “Walkerswood has not received any benefit from these initiatives because we 
are a value-added producer.  Preferences are geared towards primary goods.  Preferences 
affect us in that we can’t use Jamaican-produced sugar in our products because the vast 
majority of our sugar goes to fill quotas, not to supply domestic consumers or processors.  
We have to import the brown sugar used in our jerk seasoning from other countries.”470
468 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
469 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
470 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.  Walkerswood Foods is an agro-processor located in 
the parish of St. Ann near the popular tourist area of Ocho Rios.  The company produces jerk seasonings 
and a variety of sauces, 85 percent of which is exported to other Caribbean countries, North America, and 
the United Kingdom.  It is one of Jamaica’s fastest growing companies and is cited by many as an agro-
processing model to be emulated by other Jamaican companies.  Walkerswood works with several 
organizations to empower local farmers and invigorate Jamaica’s agriculture sector.  
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His comments are striking and troublesome given Jamaica’s history and status as a 
primarily sugar producing country.  
Along with the challenge to PTAs, the international trade regime has become 
increasingly discriminatory against Jamaica’s and other developing countries’ 
agricultural exports, both primary and value-added.  Despite the reforms invoked under 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) almost 10 years ago, Jamaica’s 
exports still do not have the kind of non-PTA market access in rich country markets—
particularly its two largest trading partners, the U.S. and EU—that one would expect in 
an ostensibly free trade regime.  Jamaica’s agriculture is also being undermined by an 
onslaught of cheap, imported food that is flooding the Jamaican market and sold below 
cost, which poor country governments and consumers find hard to resist.471  Much of this 
food is produced in, and exported by, the U.S. and EU with the assistance of massive 
domestic and export subsidies.  According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO), “[s]ubsidies to farmers in the developed world have negative 
ramifications for agriculture in the developing world in a number of ways.  By enabling 
farmers and agro-companies to sell on the international market at prices far below 
production value, they leave growers in the developing world unable to compete. They 
also encourage excess supply, which further lowers world agricultural prices -- reducing 
471 For proof that advanced country subsidies are undermining Jamaica’s agriculture see Oxfam Briefing 
Paper 31, Stop the Dumping! How EU Agricultural Subsidies Are Damaging Livelihoods in the Developing 
World, at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/bp31_dumping.htm. According to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the largest category of food imports is cereal, consisting mainly of rice, maize, 
wheat and flour.  This group averaged 83% of total food imports in the period 1989-1999.  This is the 
fastest growing area of food imports.  The second highest category of food imports is fish and meats.  This 
group averaged 12 percent for the period 1989-1999.  Poultry—primarily chicken necks, backs, and leg 
quarters—was the largest component.  See Update on the State of Food Security in Jamaica at 
www.moa.gov.jm/policies/update_on_the_state_of_food_secu.htm. 
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the money that poor farmers make, or pushing them out of the business entirely.”472  The 
FAO has also denounced advanced country tariff peaks and escalation for developing 
country farm exports.  “Such ‘tariff peaks’ -- sometimes running as high as 350 percent --
are often concentrated in products that are of export interest to developing countries.
These include major agricultural staple food products, such as sugar, cereals and fish; 
tobacco and certain alcoholic beverages; fruits and vegetables; and food industry 
products with high sugar content.”473  The World Bank has also criticized developed 
country farm protectionism for its harmful impact on developing country agricultural 
production and competitiveness: 
Bank research has shown that agricultural subsidies in rich countries of 
about $300 billion a year suppress world prices, undermining developing 
country exports. The subsidies are roughly six times total development 
aid. A new Bank study found that full elimination of agricultural 
protection and production subsidies in the rich countries would increase 
global trade in agriculture by 17 percent, with agricultural and food 
exports from low and middle-income countries rising by 24 percent. As a 
result, total annual rural income in these countries would rise by about $60 
billion, or roughly 6 percent.474
Even the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
IMF have underscored the downside of developed country agricultural protectionism for 
developing country socioeconomies.  The heads of the World Bank, OECD, and IMF 
made the following commentary in a September 2003 IMF press release: 
472 See press release Subsidies, food imports and tariffs key issues for developing countries at 
http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/focus/2003/wto2.htm. 
473 See September 2003 press release Subsidies, food imports and tariffs key issues for developing countries
at http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/focus/2003/wto2.htm. 
474 See November 2002 press release World Bank Chief Economist Urges Cuts in Rich Country 




Agriculture is of particular importance to the economic prospects of many 
developing countries, and reforming the current practices in global farm 
trade holds perhaps the most immediate scope for bettering the livelihoods 
of the world's poor. Yet, developed countries impose tariffs on agriculture 
that are 8 to 10 times higher than on industrial goods. Many continue to 
use various forms of export subsidies that drive down world prices and 
take markets away from farmers in poorer countries. In every sector 
except agriculture, these same countries long ago agreed to prohibit export 
subsidies. Agricultural support costs the average household in the EU, 
Japan, and United States more than a thousand U.S. dollars a year. Much 
of this support depresses rural incomes in developing countries while 
benefiting primarily the wealthiest farmers in rich countries, and does little 
to accomplish the environmental and rural community goals that 
developed countries strive to pursue.475
As discussed in Chapter 3 of this paper, rich country domestic subsidies benefit 
their largest and most prolific farmers, most of whom enjoy an above average standard of 
living, while export subsidies privilege the large agribusiness transnational corporations 
(TNCs) domiciled in the U.S. and Europe that export the agricultural surpluses produced 
with the aid of domestic support.  Whereas the average American farmer is thriving and 
makes a good living, the average Jamaican farmer is not so lucky.476  Due to dislocating 
import competition, many Jamaican farmers are being pushed out of farming and are 
fleeing their rural homes for the overcrowded ghettoes of Kingston.  Although Jamaica’s 
implementation of the AoA liberalized Jamaica’s market for food imports—essentially 
reinforcing the agricultural liberalization that Jamaica had undertaken previously under 
its IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs—the agricultural markets of its 
developed country trading partners are not similarly liberalized.   In the aftermath of the 
475 See Declaration by the Heads of the IMF, OECD and World Bank at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2003/pr03150.htm. 
476 According to a report on farm incomes in OECD countries, farm households enjoy incomes that are, on 
average, close to those in the rest of society.  Moreover, they often possess significant wealth, particularly 
from farm assets.  See Farm Household Incomes: Issues and Policy Responses (OECD, January 2003).  
With regards to the United States, the USDA reports farm households as relatively better off than the 
average U.S. household.  See Ashok K. Mishra et al., Income, Wealth, and the Economic Well-Being of 
Farm Households (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2002).  
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Uruguay Round and throughout the 1990s, Jamaica’s food imports more than doubled 
and by the end of the decade accounted for 14 percent of imports and 11 percent of the 
total trade deficit.477
1982 1992 2001
Total imports (cif), in US$millions 1,380 1,775 3,197
Food 119 107 269
Fuel and energy 407 316 416
Capital goods 326 293 566
Source: The World Bank.  See http://www.worldbank.org/data478
Given these figures, it is not surprising that Jamaica’s agricultural production, 
productivity, and competitiveness are declining.  
With regards to internally-motivated constraints on poor country agricultural 
development, one popular explanation is the modernization school theory that a country’s 
lack of economic development is due to internal deficiencies that impeded its 
development momentum causing it to deviate from the proper evolutionary development 
path that was taken by the advanced countries.  Although modernization theory has been 
rightly assailed as ethnocentric and oblivious to the complexities endemic to the 
particular poor country context that mitigate against growth and development, it has some 
relevance to Jamaica in that Jamaicans have contributed to their country’s agricultural 
underdevelopment.  Jamaica’s internal negligence is significant and should be addressed 
by a tripartite coalition of government, industry, and civil society with immediacy and 
urgency.  Jamaica’s internal negligence stems from several shortcomings, all tied to the 
477 Weiss 2003, 1. 
478 See Appendices F-I for additional illustrative tables and graphs.
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country’s status in the world trading regime as a plantation economy, which has fostered 
complacency with the status quo.  These include the lack of an appropriate development 
model; the undervaluing of agriculture as a development priority; the weak nature of the 
state; the inequitable distribution of land, which marginalizes the highly productive small 
farmers and negates their contribution to national production output; and an 
overwhelming inertia and lack of political will for change.  These shortcomings are 
anathema to sustained national development and have sprouted a number of constraints 
that perpetuate underdevelopment and external dependency.  Persons interviewed on the 
ground in Jamaica had much to say about the ways in which Jamaicans have contributed 
to their country’s underdevelopment.  A majority of interviewees cited the following 
factors as the most pressing internally-motivated constraints on agricultural 
development:479
• inadequate and/or inappropriate use of technology; 
• too much emphasis on outdated, unable to compete traditional export products (i.e.,, 
sugar and bananas) and too little on the country’s unique non-traditional crops;
• inadequate emphasis placed on research and development (R&D); 
• lack of irrigation, especially for the farming majority toiling in the hills;
• poor farming infrastructure, especially roads for transporting goods from farmgate to 
market;
• high rate of crime, especially predial larceny;
• seemingly intractable dependence on imported food, especially carbohydrates (i.e., 
rice, cornmeal, and flour) for domestic consumption;
• government shortsightedness, inaction, and/or malfeasance; 
• government’s downgrading of agriculture to prioritize tourism and services;
• private sector apathy and dependence on government to mobilize growth when 
industry, not government, should be the driver of economic development; 
• government’s too rapid acceptance of structural adjustment conditionalites that 
marginalized agriculture;
• commodity marketing boards weakened by structural adjustment commitments; 
• high cost of capital due to prevailing high interest rates which makes attaining 
funding for retooling prohibitive;
• high cost of inputs, most of which must be imported;
479 The factors are not listed in any particular order.
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• public policy burdened by social concerns (i.e.,, the sugar industry is artificially 
maintained as the country’s largest employer of labor);
• dependence on preferential trade arrangements as export vehicles; 
• inadequate supply of primary goods to meet quotas under preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) and supply agro-processors; and
• lack of effective, integrated distribution and marketing systems.
Consistent with Cardoso’s conception of poor country development as 
associated dependent development due to a confluence of internal and external forces that 
predisposes poor countries to underdevelopment or, at best, limited development derived 
from that attained by their rich country metropolises, this research asserts the following 
forces as the most persuasive explanatory variables for Jamaica’s agricultural 
deterioration and underdevelopment.  Because external challenges can overwhelm any 
product the country manages to produce with or without the presence of internally-
motivated constraints, external variables are deemed to have more explanatory force.
Externally-driven constraints: 
• Rich country tariff barriers and agricultural production and export subsidies which 
encourage overproduction of surpluses that are shipped to poor countries like Jamaica 
and sold at artificially low prices that undermine domestic production, productivity, 
and competitiveness;
• Too-rapid trade liberalization under IMF/World Bank mandated programs which 
imposed structural adjustment conditionalities without sufficient due diligence 
regarding the potential societal and economic consequences of the liberalization; and
• Food dumping under food aid programs, a corollary of rich country agricultural 
subsidization, which undermines poor country production, productivity, and 
competitiveness.
Internally-motivated
• Apathy and complacent dependence on PTAs for their guaranteed high price points for 
primary commodity exports;
• Too little attention paid to unique, non-traditional farm products and agro-processing 
as the next logical step forward beyond production/export of primary commodities; 
and
• An inappropriate development model that is based entirely on narrow structural 
adjustment policy dictated by neoliberal ideals with little consideration for local 
particularities that necessitate unique treatment.  This development model has 
marginalized Jamaica’s agriculture sector, its small farmers in particular.  
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Taken together, these constraints have institutionalized the plantation economy in 
Jamaica, exacerbated its external dependency, and limited its development potential to 
associated dependent development.  Given the magnitude of its external dependency and 
underdevelopment, Jamaica should realistically assess its ability to compete in the 
knowledge-based world trading regime with an economy that is based largely on tourism 
and productive sectors grounded in primary production for export.  Jamaica definitely 
needs to acknowledge tourism’s vulnerability to external shocks, the inevitable 
exhaustion of its bauxite/alumina stores, and the challenges to preferential trade 
arrangements upon which its major agricultural exports depend.  To compete more 
effectively in the world trading regime, Jamaica must build on its natural comparative 
advantage in agriculture by diversifying targeted production to include niche non-
traditional products, cultivating a stronger agro-processing sector to add value to the 
country’s agricultural exports and build stronger backward linkages to farmers and 
forward linkages to the tourist, bauxite, and manufacturing sectors.  If done properly, and 
if externally-driven constraints are moderated, these efforts should increase the country’s 
earnings in world trade and facilitate sustained, self-reinforcing development.  
236
Chapter 5
Agriculture, Trade, and Development: The Way Forward for 
Jamaica
It takes a certain brashness to attack the accepted economic legends but none at all to perpetuate them.
So they are perpetuated.
John Kenneth Galbraith, The Liberal Hour, 1960
Political sovereignty is but a mockery without the means of meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease.  
Self-determination is but a slogan if the future holds no hope.
John F. Kennedy, 1961
Emancipate yourselves from mental slavery, none but ourselves can free our minds.
Bob Marley, Redemption Song
Overview
Agriculture is a key component of most countries’ economies due to its 
significance to food security and culture.  Jamaica is no exception.  However, 
agriculture’s significance in the Jamaican political economy goes beyond its cultural and 
food security implications; it is a matter of survival for many Jamaicans.  Consequently, 
the sector’s underperformance has major implications for Jamaica’s socio-economy, 
including government, industry, and society.  Unfortunately, despite its ideal conditions 
for agriculture—abundant lands, fertile soil, favorable climate, and lots of cheap labor—
Jamaica’s agricultural products no longer command the kind of clout and prices in global 
markets that it once did.  The neoliberal world-trading regime is extremely inhospitable 
towards developing country agriculture.  As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, contradictions 
pervade the regime from within and without.  These contradictions hastened the massive 
decline that has befallen Jamaica’s agriculture sector over the past 30 years.  This chapter 
argues that Jamaica must assess the reasons for this decline and take steps to reverse it in 
order to propel development that is sustained and self-reinforcing, and not the associated 
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dependent development grounded in the plantation economy to which it has grown 
accustomed.  
Sadly, whereas Jamaica’s agriculture is declining, the country has a rapidly 
growing informal economy that sustains farmers displaced from agriculture as well as the 
country’s countless other unemployed persons.  According to an official of Grace, 
Kennedy, and Company, “we have developed a sophisticated informal sector to escape 
the strictures of the formal economy.  This informal economy involves everything from 
tax evasion, illegal importation, and general operation outside of the official system.  It 
accounts for 50% of our economic activity and accounts for the visual signs of prosperity, 
for example the ubiquitous cell phone and plethora of imported Japanese cars.  It’s the 
formal economy that is not in good shape.”480  A local pundit classified Jamaica’s 
economy as a “ghetto” economy.  In his words, 
The Jamaican national economy has just too many of the features of the 
ghetto economy, trapping it in the no-growth and poverty conditions 
which have come to be the persistent state of affairs…The ghetto economy 
is largely an informal economy. Government regulatory mechanisms are 
weak and ineffective, or absent. People live by beating the system, indeed 
are marginalised rather than included by the system. A recent study, which 
got a lot of media play, is estimating the 'legal' informal economy at 43.5 
per cent of GDP. The study divided up the informal sector into three 
categories: Pure tax evasion, the irregular economy which covers the 
production of legal goods and services in unregistered and untaxed 
operations, and illegal activities. That study did not attempt to measure the 
strictly illegal economy, that is, economic activities which not only breach 
tax and regulatory laws but the criminal law.  When this criminal economy 
is tacked on to the estimate of the size of the informal economy, clearly 
the total size or the informal sector exceeds 50 per cent of real GDP just 
like in the ghetto.481
The remittance is a key component of Jamaica’s informal economy.  Jamaica’s 
vibrant informal economy, fueled largely by remittances sent by expatriate Jamaicans to 
480 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
481 Martin Henry, “The Ghetto Economy,” Jamaica Gleaner, 23 January 2003.
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family and friends in the home country, accounts for the appearance of individual and 
national wealth one perceives when viewing the conspicuous consumption of vehicles 
imported second-hand from Japan at 100 percent duty and the rampant utilization of 
U.S.-style food/clothing/lifestyle practices throughout Jamaica that is incomprehensible 
when evaluated on the basis of the country’s officially reported low per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) statistics.  In the words of a Jamaica Gleaner editorialist, 
“Jamaica is in the throes of a perennial economic crisis that has benefited enormously 
from the hundreds of millions of vital U.S. dollars, which have shored up our net 
international reserves, kept many families from starving, and allowed us to continue with 
our failed economic policies.  Remittances, some no doubt coming from the drug trade, 
are major sources of foreign exchange and constitute one of the pillars of the Jamaican 
economy.”482
Jamaicans displaced from farming and other industries have been fleeing Jamaica 
in droves to find sustainable work abroad in countries like the USA, England, and 
Canada.  Fortunately for those they leave behind, they have been generous with their 
earnings and religiously send money home.  According to the Bank of Jamaica, US$1.15 
billion in remittance income flowed into Jamaica in 2002.  In comparison, tourism, 
Jamaica’s leading source of foreign exchange, earned approximately US$1.8 billion 
while agriculture earned a meager US108.8 million for the first three quarters of 2002, 
January to September.483  Although a significant source of national revenue, the 
remittance is not a productive activity.  Indeed, remittances are completely divorced from 
productive activities such as agriculture and manufacturing upon which natural resource 
482 Delroy Chuck, “Exporting Human Capital,” Jamaica Gleaner, 29 January 2003.
483 Sugar is no longer factored as part of agriculture in national income reporting.  It is now factored as 
manufacturing income.  Sugar earned US$66.2 million in 2002.
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economies like Jamaica should be grounded in order to thrive.484  “The remittances 
gained and eventually sent constitute little more than social welfare benefits, while the 
creative effort and abundant energy of our people are used to build and fortify the 
economies of the countries in which they work…[C]ountries that consistently depend on 
remittances will forever remain poor.”485  Clearly, Jamaica’s growth and development is 
predicated on its production and export of goods—both primary and secondary—and 
services, not the plantation economy, remittances, or a purely tourism-based economy.  
Why Jamaica Must Transcend the Outmoded and Injurious 
Plantation Economy Model
As a primary commodity producer grounded in the plantation economy driven by 
the mutually reinforcing forces of domestic clientelism and external dependency, Jamaica 
faces the predicament of associated dependent development in a world-trading regime 
and global economy girded in the neoliberal ethos of development.  Unfortunately for 
Jamaica, which has had stagnant growth for over a decade and is behind the technological 
curve, global commerce is now predicated on technological innovation and value-added 
production consistent with the knowledge based economy.  Also working to Jamaica’s 
detriment is the sad fact that the world-trading regime sanctions rich country trade 
protectionism in sectors of export interest to poor countries—i.e., primary commodities—
which virtually ensures poor country economic marginalization.  As George Beckford 
484 This argument can also be made for tourism.
485 Delroy Chuck, “Exporting Human Capital,” Jamaica Gleaner, 29 January 2003.  The IMF agrees.  
According to a recent IMF working paper, remittances have a negative effect on economic growth and 
create a significant moral hazard problem.  “Transforming remittance flows into development capital would 
require changing the very nature of remittances, from compensatory transfers to investments.”  See Ralph 
Chami et al., Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, September 2003).
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portended in Persistent Poverty, metropolitan enterprises—i.e., multinational 
corporations domiciled in metropolitan countries—specializing in diversified production 
in vertically-integrated systems are de rigueur in the new global economy. Because 
Jamaica has always been an appendage of some metropolitan country and host to any 
number of metropolitan enterprises, it has achieved a measure of development that is tied 
to that attained by its metropolitan country trading partners and affiliates.  However, the 
verdict is out on whether this is sustained, self-reinforcing development that affords the 
country and its citizens economic viability that emanates from Jamaica’s own productive 
activity, versus what it imports using valuable and often limited foreign exchange 
earnings or the peddling of economically vulnerable tourism.
Jamaica, to its merit, produces several agricultural and mineral goods for export.  
Yet, contrary to the logic of trade by comparative advantage, it remains underdeveloped 
and poor.  A key reason for this is the type of good Jamaica tends to produce for export.  
This good, the primary commodity, once a valuable source of income during the pre-
industrial age is no longer as valuable in today’s post-industrial knowledge-based 
economic system in which countries trade by competitive, not comparative, advantage 
facilitated by income earned from capital mobility and massive investment into strategic 
domestic sectors.  Agriculture, by virtue of its importance to food and national security, is 
one of these strategic sectors.  As discussed earlier in this paper, rich countries subsidize 
their agriculture sectors heavily.  Poor countries simply cannot compete.  Even if they 
could afford to do so, their IMF and World Bank structural adjustment agreements and 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture preclude most from subsidizing their stakeholders in 
agriculture and other economic sectors.  To be sure, the playing field in global commerce 
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is titled against poor countries.  Unfortunately, poor countries exacerbate the situation 
from within by privileging certain classes and their economic interests, which are often 
aligned with external forces, while perpetuating systems of inequity against other, less 
powerful groups.  Jamaica’s small farmer belongs to the latter class.  Liberalized “free”
trade as practiced in the global economy has decimated Jamaica’s overall agriculture 
sector, but the system has affected the small farmer disproportionately from both without 
and within.  This has had serious consequences for Jamaica’s productive basis and its 
ability to transform the national economy from primary commodity plantation 
producer/exporter to the value-added manufacturing bastion it needs to become to 
compete effectively in the world-trading regime and afford all its people a sustained, self-
reinforcing measure of development, social welfare, and quality of life.
Many Jamaicans—bombarded as they are by messages from advanced and 
transition economies via cable television and the Internet of the imperative of 
technological innovation, investment, manufacturing capability, and research and 
development—recognize the need for this economic transformation as a prerequisite for 
moving the country and its people forward.  A Sugar Industry of Jamaica official stated in 
an interview that Jamaica needs to move towards vertical production ending with value 
added agro-processing.  “We need to try to be as close to self-sufficient as possible in 
order to use self-sufficiency as a bargaining weapon to stem the high prices of imports.  
Agriculture is very important but it’s how we move with it.  We cannot accept it as a 
basic industry.”486  However, with the exception of a few companies such as Grace 
Kennedy, Walkerswood, Lasco, and Red Stripe, Jamaica’s politico-economic elite has 
not made the transition to value-added production a priority of policy or action.  On the 
486 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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contrary, they seem stuck in and wedded to the plantation economy.  A Bustamante 
Industrial Trade Union (BITU) official interprets the holdup as follows:
The machinery is not in place so there is lots of wasted potential.  
Consider, for example, the many fruits and vegetables that grow wild in 
Jamaica that bear annually, fall off the trees, and rot on the ground.  We 
could and should be harvesting and processing these fruits and vegetables 
for both local use and export instead of allowing them to go to waste.  
Unfortunately, the high utility costs in Jamaica have affected production.  
The unstable $Ja also detracts interest in a transformation to value-added 
production.  Moreover, poor infrastructure (i.e., frequent power cuts) 
retards manufacturing.  Not surprisingly, companies like Grace Kennedy 
are importing their raw products or doing their value-added production 
outside of Jamaica.  When I was last in Miami, I bought a can of Grace’s 
coconut juice and was shocked to see on the label that it was produced in 
the Philippines.487
According to a principal of Dairy Industries, Limited, the transition would be beneficial 
but is not likely.  “Our regulatory bodies are not even aware of their roles and function 
when they should be the agents of change.  They are dragging their feet and are oblivious 
to the looming timeline.  The Bureau of Standards, for example, is not properly equipped 
as an auditor, so how can it lead the national standardizing effort?  The private sector has 
a vested interest and will make sure the transition occurs.  But government bureaucracy 
and red tape impedes private sector efficiency.”488
The fundamental question at issue is why and how Jamaica’s power structure can 
dither at a time when national production and productivity are plummeting, the debt 
burden is escalating, the informal economy (including the illicit drug economy) is more 
vibrant than the formal economy, and large numbers of people are consigned to 
subsisting on the goodwill of friends and family abroad who faithfully send them 
remittances.  In the words of a local pundit,
487 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
488 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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Just how Jamaica, a small economy, plans to survive in a globalised world 
is definitely the most fundamental issue to engage and focus our minds.  
The era and challenge of globalisation demand that Jamaica overhauls its 
economy to find ways and means to create and increase wealth and 
provide the economic environment for its producers to compete globally.  
Jamaica cannot continue to live on charity and on the present shameful 
economic path, with our leaders prancing on the world stage with begging 
bowls in hand, seeking loans, welcoming remittances, accepting grants 
and negotiating preferential and needed trade concessions.489
Clearly, something must be done to hasten the country’s development beyond subsistence 
on borrowed funds, remittances, tourism, and income earned from preferential trade.  
Jamaica should not continue to bank its economic future on such unpredictable and, 
ultimately, unsustainable sources as the charitable goodwill of metropolitan countries and 
economic activities like tourism that are not grounded in productive activity.  Neither 
source is guaranteed in the new global economy, which disparages special and 
differential treatment for poor countries in the spirit of liberalization and 
nondiscrimination and renders economic activity that is entirely reliant on metropolitan 
country vacationers highly unstable and transitory due to the plethora of recently 
mandated post 9-11 antiterrorism legislation.  Certainly, in our post 9-11 age where 
people worldwide are afraid to travel for fear of being attacked, hijacked, or 
commandeered by terrorists in world regions they perceive as unstable or rogue, it is 
foolish indeed to invest a country’s hope for economic growth and development on 
tourism.  This is especially true for Jamaica because many potential visitors deem it 
unstable, rogue, and therefore unsuitable as a vacation destination due to its proximity to, 
and activity in, the Latin American drug economy, as well as its notoriously high crime 
rate.  Hence, in the words of Patricia Francis, president of the Jamaica Promotions 
Corporation (JAMPRO), Jamaica must find a sustainable—i.e., rooted in both primary 
489 Delroy Chuck, “Survival of Small Economies,” Jamaica Gleaner, 20 August 2003.
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and value-added production—way to earn its way out of its predicament of 
underdevelopment and dependency.
Lamentably, however, Jamaica seems to be stuck in primary production for 
export—i.e., the plantation economy.  In the words of a Statistical Institute of Jamaica 
official, “Jamaica is too invested in primary production.  There is not enough 
agribusiness going on.  We could do more.  Not only are we under-producing, primary 
goods are not fetching the prices they used to.  This is impacting our ability to earn.”490
According to an official of the Banana Industry Board, Jamaica’s entire agriculture 
sector, both production and export, is the outcome of the country’s colonial past.  “Our 
major products were what the colonial masters wanted so that’s what we did.  We are 
now locked into these products and having our prior masters as our major trading partners 
because after independence it was difficult to revolutionize the entire productive and 
trading structure while forging a new nation.  Eventually our ability to compete eroded 
because these (former colonial) trading partners no longer desired our traditional 
products.”491
Indeed, the plantation economy served Jamaica well in the world-trading regime 
as long as Jamaica focused on producing the primary goods that met rich country needs 
for the tropical foodstuffs and industrial inputs that they could not or would not deign to 
produce.  Jamaica’s agricultural goods fared well locally and in global markets as long as 
Europe and the U.S., the country’s primary trading partners, lacked the capability for 
producing comparable products or otherwise needed Jamaica’s foodstuffs.  When 
metropolitan countries no longer needed Jamaica’s products because they had devised 
490 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
491 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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methodologies for producing comparable goods at home or in lower cost countries, 
external financing for agriculture evaporated and Jamaica’s agricultural market share in 
both its export and local markets evaporated.  This process of economic marginalization 
from without manifested in three key stages.  Firstly, Europe and the U.S. began 
producing sugar beet, the primary alternative to cane sugar, and eventually sugar 
substitutes such as saccharin and aspartame.  Secondly, U.S. agribusiness MNCs began 
cultivating bananas for export in low cost Central and South American countries such as 
Costa Rica and Ecuador.  Thirdly, Europe and the U.S. institutionalized massive systems 
of domestic and export agricultural subsidization that encourage overproduction in these 
countries and finance export of their farm surpluses and waste to developing countries 
like Jamaica to be sold at artificially low prices against which already besieged poor 
country farmers cannot compete.  Jamaica’s small-scale farmers, who produce domestic 
food crops that are vulnerable to import competition—i.e., yam, cassava, dasheen, and 
other carbohydrate sources which Jamaicans have historically rejected in favor of cheap 
imported rice, flour, and cornmeal—have long faced this dislocating competition from 
First World agriculture.  Consequently, it is not surprising that the situation aroused 
widespread public attention only when the world-trading regime challenged the 
hegemony of Jamaica’s plantation elite now facing imminent termination of preferences 
that have shielded traditional export crops, namely sugar and bananas, from competition 
since independence.    
By all accounts, Jamaica’s economic elite has not been an effective agent of 
change because it expects government, not business, to engender development.  
However, the private sector has traditionally been the agent of agricultural development.  
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“Historically, it is the private sector (operating within a positive economic environment) 
which has led development in agriculture in the developed world and yet its significant 
involvement in agriculture in much of the developing world is limited – restricted to few 
countries and few, normally export-oriented, enterprises.”492  According to a Coffee 
Industry Board official, Jamaica’s private sector is engaged only when something affects 
it personally—basically a ‘what’s in it for me’ attitude.  “The private sector is not 
engaged in the WTO negotiations.  It is sleeping and when it wakes up it will be too late.  
Government’s negotiations are not getting enough private sector input to shape the 
negotiations in business interests.  The private sector depends too heavily on Government 
for protection and handholding.  Private sector apathy is a big constraint on Jamaica’s 
development.”493  An official of the Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions concurred: 
“The private sector still thinks we’re in the industrial age.  With a few exceptions (Grace, 
Appleton, Sandals, etc.) most businesses still have not grasped the requirements for 
competing in the new global economy.  The private sector thinks Government has the 
power to protect them.  It’s a realization issue.”494
Eric Williams presented one explanation for the relative impotence of Caribbean 
business elites in the world-trading regime:
The strategic business decisions affecting the economies are made outside 
the national boundaries—by foreign companies and by large international 
firms.  The original mercantilism of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries has been replaced by the neo-mercantilism of the second half of 
the twentieth century.  Instead of the British or European merchant firm 
and the absentee sugar plantation owner, the allocation of resources in the 
Caribbean is now controlled by the large international corporations…The 
locus of economic decision-making and the dynamics of economic growth 
492 John Meadley, “A More Significant Role for the Private Sector in Agricultural Development,” 
Developing World Agriculture (London: Grosvenor Press International, 1990), 14.
493 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
494 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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continue to rest well outside the territorial boundaries of the Caribbean 
territories.495
Local elites go along with the program in exchange for power and influence on the 
ground.  In the process they are lulled into a sense of complacency and satisfaction with 
the status quo as long as they are guaranteed their share of the pie in a “big man, little 
world” scenario.  This is not surprising given the widely purported parasitic relationship 
that exists between Jamaica’s business elite and the country’s economy.  According to a 
local pundit, “[t]he black middle class controls the PNP and comprises the vast majority 
of central Government employees as well as independent professionals.  This is a group 
relatively isolated from the real economy. Their parents were at the core of the rural small 
farming economy but they are not. Their entire existence is premised on a portion of the 
wealth which others produce being re-distributed to them. This they achieve by 
controlling the state (not just 'the Government') and using taxation to finance substantial 
real improvements in their standard of living.”496  However, Jamaica’s elites are 
awakening from their fog as it becomes increasingly obvious that “free” trade as 
currently practiced will obliterate Jamaica’s producers if it is not managed by developing 
country governments acting in concert with the private sector and labor in the interest of 
civil society, not individual self-interest.
In general, Jamaica’s elites tend to subscribe to the logic of neoliberal 
development.  However, whereas reinvestment into the local economy is a fundamental 
tenet of liberal development theory, Jamaica’s elites have not reinvested into the 
country’s productive sectors like they should to propel self-reinforcing development.  
They would rather invest in government paper to capitalize on the exorbitantly high 
495 Williams 1970, 500-501.
496 Don Robotham, “Sacrificing for Ja’s Development,” Jamaica Gleaner, 11 May 2003.
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capitalization rates set by Government than retool their businesses and, by implication, 
Jamaica’s industries for effective competition in the world-trading regime.  This does not 
surprise those familiar with private sector investment tendencies.  “Despite the apparent 
attributes of the private sector, its participation in the developing countries – especially in 
the natural resource sector, is limited.  Why?  Basically, the problem is risk and choice.  
The private sector can choose where it will put its resources and in general they will go 
where the risk is lowest – or where the reward/risk ratio is highest.”497  A Jamaica 
Agricultural Development Foundation official surmised that Jamaica’s productivity is at 
an all-time low because investment in the productive sector is not taking place; given 
current high interest rates investors would rather invest in government paper than in 
agriculture with all its associated risks.  According to a local citrus businessman who has 
reinvested, “we have to constantly reinvest because we have a vision of where we want to 
go.  But, looking over the past 12 years, we would have been better off if we had left that 
money in the bank and reaped the benefits of the high interest rate regime.  But we have 
not prioritized individual and/or corporate profit over national development because 
that’s ultimately bad business.  The risk-return-effort calculation dictates a company’s 
willingness to reinvest in the local economy and community.”498
For many years, decades even, the private sector got away with not innovating, 
retooling, and reinvesting because Jamaica’s markets were relatively closed and the 
population relied on their output for domestic consumption.  However, their subscription 
to neoliberal development theory may have backfired on them.  Neoliberal policy led 
Jamaica to deregulate, privatize, and liberalize first under structural adjustment and 
497 John Meadley, “A More Significant Role for the Private Sector in Agricultural Development,” 
Developing World Agriculture (London: Grosvenor Press International, 1990), 15.
498 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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ultimately under the WTO, thus opening the country’s markets to a flood of cheap 
imports and threatening the economic elites’ very viability in the face of “free” trade.  
Jamaica’s economic elite must now retool, revamp, and reinvest in the country’s 
productive sectors, agriculture included, or face obsolescence in the global economy.  
The private sector must lead the charge in diversifying Jamaica’s agriculture sector and 
expanding agro-processing.  Key industry functions in need of stepped-up private sector 
participation include input supply, production, marketing and processing, and transport 
and warehousing.499  The private sector must act quickly because Jamaica’s continued 
emphasis on primary commodity production for export to its historical trading partners 
will compound its marginalization in the world trade regime by developed country 
agricultural subsidization, food dumping, tariff barriers, and sanitary/phytosanitary 
measures used as non-tariff barriers.  The phenomenon of unequal exchange will 
manifest in agricultural production and trade precisely as the dependistas conceptualized 
it.  Moreover, the phenomenon will ultimately drive increasing numbers of local 
economic elites out of business because they can no longer compete in the regime they 
collaborated with external forces to institute in Jamaica, presumably to their ultimate 
benefit.
Outlook for Jamaica’s Agriculture Sector
Faced with the reality of harmful advanced country agricultural protectionism, the 
impending termination of preference, and its own negligence, Jamaica has had to face up 
499 John Meadley, “A More Significant Role for the Private Sector in Agricultural Development,” 
Developing World Agriculture (London: Grosvenor Press International, 1990), 118-19.
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to the reality of its declining agriculture sector and poorly performing agricultural 
industries that have been the cornerstone of its economy for centuries.  The challenges 
have prompted some experts, both local and foreign, to dismiss the sector’s potential for 
contributing to national development.  However, many advocates remain despite 
widespread pessimism.  A Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade official 
outlined the manifold reasons why agriculture is so important in and to the Jamaican 
economy:  
The notion of foreign exchange earnings is important but is not all 
encompassing in terms of national priorities.  There is also the matter of 
social and cultural considerations.  There are two key aspects of 
agriculture: foreign exports and local displacement.  The more we produce 
the less we spend on imports.  But productivity depends on the cost of 
production, which is very high in Jamaica.  Agriculture has economic 
value as well as social and cultural value.  In rural areas agriculture is the 
mainstay of the economy.  Hence there will be severe repercussions in 
Jamaica’s rural areas if agriculture goes.  Sugar in particular is under 
threat.  Its earnings under preferences are not insignificant.  Plus it 
contributes greatly to employment and supplementary activities in a large 
multiplier effect throughout the industry.  It is not so simple to shut down 
the industry and expect another to easily take its place.  The prevalence of 
tariff peaks and escalation in world trade has hampered our transition to 
value-added production.  Hence our strategy is to prolong preferences as 
long as possible in order to delay the demise of sugar and other 
uncompetitive agricultural industries and use the extended transition time 
to increase national competitiveness via diversification.500
The comments posed by a Ministry of Commerce official during a personal 
interview are also striking.  He portended a dismal outlook for Jamaica’s agriculture 
sector.  “We have been primary producers and price-takers for too long.  Nothing can be 
done to facilitate competition with imports.  Jamaica will always have an agriculture 
sector but it will never again earn the type of foreign exchange that it did in the past and 
500 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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of which it dreams for the future.”501  Another interviewee, this one a foreign expert 
contracted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to help build 
Jamaica’s trade capacity and increase its economic competitiveness, pronounced 
Jamaica’s traditional export agriculture “dead.”  He noted that Jamaica’s agriculture is 
suffering from the increased openness wrought by trade liberalization in that Jamaican 
producers, like those of other Caribbean countries, simply cannot get their costs down to 
competitive levels in comparison to lower cost developing country agricultural exporters.  
In his opinion, Jamaica’s agricultural producers, like the producers in other Jamaican 
enterprises, suffer from the inability to innovate and think outside the box of the way they 
have done things for decades, even centuries, and continue to utilize production 
methodologies that are grossly inefficient and unproductive in today’s knowledge-based 
and technology-driven global economy.  
However, not everyone is this pessimistic.  Indeed, a majority of Jamaican 
interviewees believe that a strong, productive agriculture sector is essential for Jamaica’s 
development.  Therefore, the government should prioritize agriculture and not redirect 
expenditure from agriculture to other strong foreign exchange earning sectors, as has 
been its practice, particularly with regards to tourism.  A Rural Agricultural Development 
Authority (RADA) official commented that agriculture is a mainstay because it is not as 
vulnerable to external shocks.  Moreover, the percentage of the populace that depends on 
agriculture is understated because agriculture’s contribution to GDP is based on the 
export of primary production; sugar and processed agricultural goods are included in 
manufacturing statistics.  Therefore, agriculture drives a lot of industries and there is a lot 
of opportunity for development of agro-industry.  Indeed, “we need to replace imports 
501 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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with local production to improve the local economy.”502  A local small farmer, frustrated 
with the sector’s state of decline, argued that agriculture simply cannot disintegrate:
If agriculture goes down the country will die.  We have to feed ourselves.  
What happens when foreign exchange gets so expensive that we can’t buy 
imported food?  The U.S. is also flooding us with subsidized food.  The 
population needs to be more educated about the need to eat what we grow.  
Michael Manley was on the right track [with his Eat What You Grow 
program] but nobody would listen.  Without food we can’t live; we can’t 
eat money.  It’s a shame that prime agricultural lands are now being used 
to build housing.  Also, the U.S. farmworker program, which uses 
Jamaican migrant labor, robs us of our workers.  But I understand why 
they go.  They can make a lot more money than they ever could in Jamaica 
and come back and build a nice little house where I would have to work 
years here to do the same thing.503
Two Ministry of Agriculture officials offered hopeful views on the sector’s potential.  
The first argued that Jamaica’s agriculture sector is not obsolete because: 
We have the capacity and capability.  We have lands that should be 
cultivated.  Moreover, food security mandates that Jamaica produce some 
of the food it consumes, particularly vegetables, fruits, meats, fish, and 
some dairy.  That is not to say that we shouldn’t import other foods that 
we cannot produce efficiently.  But basic human respect dictates that 
countries produce some of the food their people eat.  Jamaica also has 
capability to produce for export, namely coffee, cocoa, spices, indigenous 
cuisine, etc.  Traditional products should be produced more for domestic 
consumption.  We must change the focus of these industries to emphasize 
their byproducts for export—i.e., for sugar: rum, refined sugar, and 
confectionaries.  There is also a strong link between agriculture and 
tourism to be further leveraged with opportunities to promote indigenous 
Jamaican cuisine.504
The second acknowledged that while some industries are obsolete, the entire sector 
should not be written off.  
Indeed, agriculture is still the largest employer of labor of any sector and 
the largest user of land space.  However, we must rationalize the whole 
sector and be willing to accept that we may have to eliminate and/or 
downsize some sub-sectors such as banana and sugar.  But if this occurs, 
502 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
503 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
504 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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what will happen to our thousands of acres of land that were previously in 
sugar and bananas and the workers that worked on these lands?  This 
conundrum is the reason why agriculture will always have a place in 
Jamaica.  Nonetheless, we must rationalize the sector by evaluating what 
is marginal or not and shift from marginal industries to promising ones.  
Some people and places have made this shift—i.e., some former sugar 
lands are now in shrimp mariculture.  Expenditure in agriculture must 
continue at a level in keeping with the sector’s redirected potential given 
global trends.  Government must increase its emphasis on agriculture but 
in so doing, insist that production is efficient and ensures a good return on 
investment.505
The main government-funded agricultural program is the four-year Agriculture 
Support Services Project (ASSP) geared at increasing the sector’s productivity and 
competitiveness in the export and local markets.  The ASSP aims to improve agricultural 
research and development, extension and marketing services, and the country’s sanitary, 
phytosanitary, and food safety systems to better meet the increasingly stringent 
requirements of importing countries.506  Other government agricultural initiatives geared 
at enhancing crop and livestock development, agricultural marketing, and infrastructure 
rehabilitation include: Fruit Tree Crop, Citrus Replanting, Banana Support, Agriculture 
Infrastructure, Domestic Food Crop Production and Marketing, Eastern Jamaica 
Agricultural Support, Jamaica Milk Marketing, and National Irrigation Development.507
Key programs aimed at increasing the sector’s productivity and competitiveness include 
the Jamaica Agricultural Society (JAS), the Agri-Business Council (ABC), the 
Agricultural Credit Board (ACB), the Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development 
505 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
506 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, issued regulations in October 2003 
requiring all manufacturers and distributors to register with the agency, and all food importers to notify it 
when they export products to the U.S.  These regulations are in accordance with the bioterrorism law that 
Congress passed in 2002.  These regulations require documentation of where imported food is grown and
processed and gives the FDA authority to intercept food imports at U.S. borders.  See Marc Kaufman, 
“New Food Import Rules Issued: FDA Hopes Regulations Will Protect Shipments From Terrorists,” 
Washington Post, 10 October 2003.
507 Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2002 (Jamaica: Planning Institute of Jamaica, April 2003), 8.3.
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Institute (CARDI), the Jamaica Agricultural Development Foundation (JADF), the Inter-
American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), the Rural Agricultural 
Development Authority (RADA), the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), the 
Caribbean Regional Human Resource Development Program for Economic 
Competitiveness (CPEC), and the Jamaica 4-H Club.508
The government is actively pursuing several strategies to enhance Jamaica’s 
agricultural production, productivity and competitiveness.  Foremost among these are: 1) 
repair and/or provision of infrastructure essential to agricultural activities such as roads 
and irrigation; 2) provision of public sector development bank funding; 3) provision of 
research, development, and extension services; 4) development of a coordinated 
regulatory framework to facilitate exports; and 5) implementation of projects and 
programs geared at improving production, productivity, and competitiveness in the 
sector.509  The government recognizes that the country’s skewed land distribution has had 
a deleterious impact on national and agricultural production, productivity, and 
competitiveness.  Consequently, it has also initiated new land reform initiatives to redress 
unequal land tenure and distribution.  These include: Project Land Lease, Project Food 
Farms; Self-Supporting Farmers’ Development Programme, Land Development and 
Utilization Act, and a Land Reform and Rural Development Programme.510  However, 
given the continued disparity in the size, slope, and infrastructural capacity of land 
holdings, the efficacy of these programs remains to be seen.  According to the 1996 
census of agriculture, approximately four percent of Jamaica’s landholders controlled 65 
508 The researcher met with representatives from these and other stakeholder organizations while 
conducting field research in Jamaica.  
509 Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2002 (Jamaica: Planning Institute of Jamaica, April 2003), 8.2.
510 STATIN 2000, 269.
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percent of the country’s fertile alluvial plains land.  In general, these holdings are large, 
flat, and accessible to infrastructural support, including feeder roads and irrigation.  In 
contrast, 96 percent of landholders controlled 35 percent of the country’s agricultural 
land comprised primarily of small, hilly plots lacking feeder roads, irrigation, and other 
infrastructural support and averaging approximately one acre.511  Business controls a 
large segment of Jamaica’s fertile alluvial lands.  At the time of the 1996 census, 
individuals controlled approximately 67 percent of land holdings and private companies 
controlled 27 percent.512  Approximately 52 percent of the land controlled by individual 
holders was five hectares or less while 90 percent of the land controlled by private 
companies was 200 hectares or more.  Jamaica’s skewed distribution of land is a direct 
outgrowth of the country’s history of plantation slavery.  That history manifests today in 
the form of the dual plantation estate/small scale farming structure in which the former 
occupies the large tracts of the country’s most arable land while the latter occupies small
segments of the country’s most marginal land.  
A related but distinct problem is the large amount of arable agricultural land that 
is uncultivated.  Whereas Jamaica’s hilly areas are generally over-exploited, large 
segments of its arable land in the coastal and plains regions are fallow or in ruinate.  This 
makes little socioeconomic sense.  Indeed, a major concern on the ground is the 
government’s assignment of lands under its control away from agriculture to other, 
largely non-productive, industries—first bauxite, then tourism, and most recently housing 
development.  An official of the Banana Industry Board stressed the following point with 
regards to the conversion of fertile coastal lands to tourist resorts: “Government is slanted 
511 STATIN 1998.
512 STATIN 2000, 275.
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towards tourism but tourism is too vulnerable to external forces.513  We can’t put our eggs 
in one basket, begging people to come here.  This is still colonialism and represents a 
backward move towards slavery.  We need to produce to earn stable foreign exchange… 
If people can’t earn to buy it won’t matter how cheap food imports are.  Moreover, 
complete reliance on imports opens us up to dumping.”514  According to the 1996 census, 
44 percent of farmland was cultivated in crops, 23 percent was in pasture, 21 percent was 
in ruinate and fallow, and the remaining 12 percent was forest, swamp land, developed 
real estate, or otherwise uncultivable land.515   The wealth of flat, arable land lying 
uncultivated or occupied in non-agricultural enterprises is striking when one drives along 
Jamaica’s northern coast and in its western interior.  Stark, mined-out bauxite land 
dominates the northern terrain while housing development is prominent throughout the 
fertile parishes of St. Elizabeth and Westmoreland.  In addition, large tracts of arable land 
overrun with weeds dot the landscape.  So much idle land in a production-deficient, net 
food importing country with numerous land-starved small farmers defies logic and 
comprehension.
Agriculture’s significance in Jamaica extends beyond mere statistics.  To be sure, 
the sector is more important than is indicated by the seven to eight percent of GDP that it 
has contributed in recent years.  Not only is agriculture a primary employer of labor, it 
has both backward and forward linkages to other industries and sectors.  Moreover, 
because the rural unemployed the world over tends to migrate to their countries’ city and 
tourist centers, agriculture is critical for containing rural-urban drift and societal 
513 Tourism’s vulnerability to external shocks was particularly evident after the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001.  People around the world stopped traveling and the number of tourists visiting Jamaica 
plummeted for months after the attacks.  
514 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
515 STATIN 2002, 2.
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implosion manifested by the overcrowding and heightened crime that typically 
accompany mass migration to already congested and volatile city and tourist centers.  
Agriculture has vital linkages with tourism, bauxite, and manufacturing.  To be sure, the 
tourist sector represents a vital, albeit under-exploited outlet for Jamaica’s agricultural 
goods.  Given the relatively small quantity of locally-produced food that is currently 
consumed in Jamaica’s many tourist hotels and resorts, much more can be done to take 
advantage of this relationship.  As noted at the St. Mary Agri-Expo 2004 by the general 
manager of Beaches Boscobel Hotel, “the hotel depends on agriculture for all the 
products that we use because the farmers produce really great stuff that the hotel is using 
up, so it's partnership so we have to work together. We can't do without them and they 
can't do without us and that's the essence of the whole thing.”516
With regards to bauxite, an increasing amount of mined-out lands is being 
reconverted to agricultural use.  Walkerswood Foods, for example, has partnered with the 
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), the Rural Agricultural 
Development Authority (RADA), and the Jamaica Bauxite Institute (JBI) to reintroduce 
farming on mined-out bauxite lands.517  Through this IICA-administered partnership, 
Walkerswood allocates JBI-owned land to a collective of several pepper farmers, all of 
whom are guaranteed a market by Walkerswood Foods for their peppers, scallion, and 
pimento.  The project aims to introduce the drip irrigation system, implement the concept 
of farmer stroke marketing to support value-added production, and ingrain the system of 
contract farming to generate consistency of raw material supply to agro-processors.  By 
all accounts the project appears to be successful.  A farmer supplying Walkerswood 
516 “Business Info System to Help Farmers Market Produce,” Jamaica Observer, 18 November 2003.
517 The researcher learned about this and similar projects in interviews with representatives of IICA, 
Walkerswood Foods, and CARDI.  
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testified to its success and highlights the imperative to further exploit the symbiotic 
relationship that exists between agriculture and tourism: 
We have gotten a fair shot supplying Walkerswood.  Walkerswood will 
provide inputs (i.e., fertilizer) when necessary—not so for farmers 
producing on their own.  Being in a cooperative really helps.  What 
hampers Jamaica’s small farmers is our tendency to produce a glut—not 
so for us because we can always get rid of our peppers.  Many small 
farmers don’t have a market for their products.  Imports are flogging 
farmers because people will buy these cheaper food items.  The way to 
help farmers is to give us a market for our products, both at home and 
abroad.  If imports can flood into Jamaica then Government should create 
export markets for us as well.  The tourism sector is a good place to 
start—it uses mainly imported food, which prevents local farmers from 
selling their products to the hotels.  Government should see to it that the 
hotels buy our goods.518
IICA is also cooperating with JBI and CARDI to introduce goat farming in 
Clarendon.  It is funding Ja$20 million to increase the production and productivity of 
goats to address national food self-sufficiency.  IICA plans to supply Clarendon farmers 
with goats and anticipates a multiplier effect to satellite areas.  The project aims to 
increase domestic production of goat meat, milk, and milk derivatives (i.e., cheese) to 
supply both the domestic and export markets.  As with the bauxite and tourism sectors, 
the possibilities for forward linkages with the manufacturing sector are endless.  The 
most promising of these is value-added production that builds upon Jamaica’s plentiful 
raw flora and vegetation and their byproducts to produce refined end products that are by 
definition capable of earning significantly more on export markets—barring the 
imposition of tariff escalation by importing countries—and which will reduce the 
518 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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country’s import imperative, thus saving valuable foreign exchange which should be 
reinvested in production or earmarked for domestic savings.519
National Priorities for Agriculture
The government, while not abandoning its traditional advocacy for the 
continuation of PTAs, is gradually shifting the focus of its trade policy from the
preservation of preferential market access to a more proactive approach aimed at 
developing its economic sectors, including agriculture, to more effectively meet the 
challenges of globalization and liberalization.520  This policy, which guided external trade 
in 2002, has three objectives: “to create new and diversified exports for market 
penetration; to steadily reduce the share of imports relative to outputs; and to increase the 
flow of net positive returns from overseas assets that have been generating significant 
remittances and other capital flows for Jamaica.”521  The government’s goals for 
agriculture are as follows:522
• Increase and sustain its contribution to the general growth and development of the 
country;
• Increase production and productivity in order to: 
o make a substantial contribution to meeting the food and nutritional 
requirements of the population, 
o reduce reliance on food imports through greater domestic food production, 
519 Neville Duncan, director of the Sir Arthur Institute of Social and Economic Studies at the University of 
the West Indies (UWI) Mona, has implored Jamaica to increase its national savings rate from 20 percent of 
GDP to 35-40 percent of GDP in order to attain social transformation and development.   See “Jamaicans 
Should Increase Savings to 40 Percent,” Jamaica Gleaner, 10 October 2003.  In the wake of financial 
liberalization of the 1980s and increasing liberalization and globalization in the 1990s, numerous vehicles 
for saving and investment exist in Jamaica.  These include commercial banks, merchant banks, trust 
companies, building societies, credit unions, insurance companies, unit trusts, and securities dealers as well 
as the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), the Financial Services Commission (FSC), the development banks, and the 
Stock Exchange.  For more information see the Bank of Jamaica’s Quarterly Monetary Policy Report, vol. 
3, no. 4.
520 PIOJ 2003, 4.1.
521 PIOJ 2003, 4.1-4.2.
522 See the Ministry of Agriculture’s website at http://www.jis.gov.jm/agriculture/index.asp. 
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o expand exports of agricultural commodities to maximize foreign exchange 
earnings,
o encourage agro-industrial development; 
• Improve the quality of rural life by increasing farm incomes and by expanding rural 
infrastructure and services; 
• Foster the development of appropriate technology through research and development 
and ensure the transfer of this technology to farmers; 
• Stem environmental degradation in general and in the critical watershed areas in 
particular, and pursue development strategies aimed at achieving long-term 
conservation objectives and promoting the efficient use of natural resources; 
• Continue to provide training opportunities for youth in agriculture; and 
• Reduce unemployment, under-employment and minimise rural-urban migration by 
creating increased employment opportunities in agriculture and related activities.
These are ambitious goals to say the least.  Accomplishing them will require not 
only a massive investment of resources—financial, human, technological, and 
institutional—but also a collaborative effort imbued with significant will among 
stakeholders across the public and private sectors as well as civil society.  Government-
industry-civil society collaboration—with each group playing its natural role effectively 
and efficiently—is a crucial component of Jamaica’s agriculture and overall development 
strategies.  An official of the Jamaica Agricultural Development Foundation explained:
Jamaica’s development requires a proper national agriculture policy.  To 
preempt the problem of investor uncertainty government needs to be clear 
about the assistance it will provide farmers that is not subject to challenge 
at the WTO and identify and make available the necessary technology.  
Ideally, government should identify needed technology and the private 
sector should provide it.  At the end of the day, agriculture must be treated 
as a business because investors need to have a degree of certainty about 
the stability of the sector in order to make rational investment decisions 
and be confident that they will earn a decent return on their investment.  
The public sector must provide the proper infrastructure to ensure that 
farmers have access to the means of production.  We also need to 
rationalize the products we are going to focus on.  Reforming fiscal and 
monetary policy to increase the amount of funds that is available to 
agriculture is another imperative.523
523 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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Ruttan and Hayami’s induced innovation model may be just the prescription for fostering 
cooperative innovation towards agricultural development in Jamaica.524  In the induced 
innovation model, technical change is intrinsic to the development process.  The model 
incorporates induced innovation in the private and public sectors and institutional 
innovation.  Induced innovation in the private sector is the process by which firms 
maximize inventive activity and innovative behavior to maximize production and 
productivity.  Induced innovation in the public sector is the process by which public 
research institutions respond to farmers’ demand for new and advanced technology to 
enable them to respond effectively to shifts in relative factor prices.  This is the 
“socialization” of agricultural research.  Finally, institutional innovation is the process by 
which institutions that direct technological change are induced to empower individuals 
and society to capitalize on new technical opportunities that are available in the 
information knowledge-based economy.  Indeed, as Douglass North proposed, the key 
ingredient for economic growth and development is the evolution of institutions that 
facilitate cooperative solutions to complex exchange.
Practical Internally-Motivated Methodologies for Promoting 
Economic Independence and Development through Agriculture 
and, by Implication, Curbing Associated Dependent Development
Jamaica by itself cannot do much to moderate the externally-driven constraints on 
its development.  However, it can do much to improve the internally-motivated 
constraints.  This distinction is important because, as stated by an official of the 
Statistical Institute of Jamaica, “externally-driven constraints only determine our market 
524 Vernon W. Ruttan and Yujiro Hayami, “Strategies for Agricultural Development,” Food Research 
Institute Studies in Agricultural Economics, Trade, and Development,, (Vol. XI, No. 2, 129-148, 1972).
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access, our ability to penetrate international markets.  But internally-motivated 
constraints shape our ability to produce, how much we produce, and what we produce to 
position ourselves for penetrating international markets.”525  Another interviewee 
cogently described Jamaica’s dilemma:
We must determine how we can utilize our unique characteristics and 
figure out what we can produce efficiently in adequate quantities so we 
don’t fall out of the game.  Because we are late in the game, many 
countries have copied Jamaica’s immature efforts at leveraging our exotics 
and have captured and capitalized on markets where we should have been 
established long ago.  We need to cultivate larger acreages of exotics.  We 
think too much in the short-term—i.e., the push to maintain preferences —
instead of leveraging our potential, which lies in long-term cultivation 
such as fruit orchards.  There is a definite proliferation of industries 
wherein we should be active players but where we are losing ground 
because we are not really in the game.  Some good projects—i.e., 
production of goat cheese given Jamaica’s large number of goats—have 
been proposed but many have fallen by the wayside because they are 
centered on persons, not institutionalized.  Jamaica and our development 
projects need institutional strengthening.526
A Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions principal offered another perspective:
National attitude [lack of political will] is the major constraint.  Jamaica is 
basically a conservative society.  Politicians don’t want to move beyond 
incremental risk.  Michael Manley was the exception; he was willing to 
take risks to propel change and progress.  PJ Patterson is an incrementalist, 
which will get us nowhere.  Jamaica needs profound change so we must 
take quantum leaps.  Government will maintain the status quo as long as 
the system is not falling apart.  We must recognize where we are, what we 
need to do, and DO IT.  We can then fight external constraints effectively.  
Limited access to credit, rich country agricultural subsidization, and other 
constraints can all be fixed but we must do internal stocktaking and 
address domestic issues first.527
Effective state action is the primary methodology for effecting developmental 
change.  The Jamaican state has been vilified from without and within as incompetent, 
negligent, and corrupt.  Jamaicans, especially those serving in the public sector, must 
525 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
526 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
527 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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recognize that the state is responsible for economic transformation because only it can 
create the conditions—infrastructure, enabling policy environment, sectoral linkages, 
attractive climate for investment and retooling—for growth.  A Rural Agricultural 
Development Authority (RADA) official declared regarding agriculture, “the state must 
create the environment for attracting investment.  It must create incentives, not subsidies.  
Currently agriculture must go through inequitable competition [with other sectoral 
interests] to get funding.  The government should have a special window to facilitate 
agricultural development.”528  Unfortunately, according to a principal of Jamaica’s 
Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), “Jamaica is a bit behind in its preparation 
to really interact with the global economy.  However, the political directorate is unaware 
of this.  The degree of stakeholder awareness is not where it should be—there is a 
disparity between the awareness level and the requirements for facilitating progress.  We 
need to have more doers to get unison.  There are not enough dynamic programs to turn 
basic production into real efficient programs.  Due to the unforeseen pressures by virtue 
of our loan agreements, structural adjustment has not allowed the evolution of dynamic 
programs.”529 This interviewee elaborated on why effective state action is essential for 
facilitating agricultural development:
Government needs to take inventory of the infrastructure support 
necessary for moving sectors forward.  Key infrastructure issues for 
agriculture include roads, water, and facilities for the handling and 
processing of food in the name of food security.  This requires a national 
effort.  The haberdasher mentality has caused many countries to lose their 
pants.  When you abort productive capacity in the interest of buying and 
selling you will eventually become marginalized.   Jamaica’s haberdasher 
interest in importing milk and milk products instead of producing them 
itself decimated its dairy industry.530
528 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
529 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
530 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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Jamaica should follow Peter Evans’ advice and challenge the traditional classical 
liberal interpretation of comparative advantage—which is really only valid in a world 
wherein states trade primary commodities and wherein capital is immobile—i.e., NOT 
the contemporary global economy.  Jamaica needs to recognize that modern states must 
“fit their aspirations and activities into a global division of labor” that values 
industrialization and, increasingly, the ability to compete in a constantly evolving 
knowledge-based information economy.531  Traditional comparative advantage theory has 
questionable validity because it emphasizes structure rather than agency and obscures the 
fact that states do not have to passively accept the fate of primary commodity 
producer/exporter.  States can indeed stimulate industrial transformation; to do so they 
must become developmental by transitioning beyond the basic stages of custodian and 
demiurge to midwifery and husbandry.532  As Albert Hirschman has asserted and Peter 
Evans elaborated, states must recognize that some sectors create a “multidimensional 
conspiracy in favor of development, inducing entrepreneurial energies, creating positive 
spillovers in the rest of the economy, and molding political interest groups into a 
developmental coalition.”533  In a nutshell, Jamaica needs to reassess the latent potential 
inherent in its store of farm products—many of them unique and growing organically 
without the use of pesticides and fertilizers—as well as the country’s growing 
531 Evans 1995, 6.
532 Evans 1995, 13-14.
533 Hirschman 1977, 96 and Evans 1995, 7.  However, as Evans explains, “one era’s multidimensional 
conspiracy may become another’s ‘lagging sector.’” (8).  This is why Jamaica can never replicate the 
remarkable success of the East Asian Tigers—Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong—despite 
comparisons and assertions to the contrary.  The Tigers developed their respective industrial and service-
based capacities under internal conditions not present in Jamaica and external investment of the sort that 
Jamaica simply does not receive.  For Hirschman’s work see “A Generalized Linkage Approach to
Development, with Special Reference to Staples,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 25 
(supplement): 67-98.
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international brand equity and embrace agro-industry as a key sector for generating a 
multidimensional conspiracy in favor of national development.
To transcend the plantation economy and effect self-reinforcing development, 
Jamaica must move beyond the plantation primary commodity model and embrace its 
potential for expansive agro-industry, creating and exporting unique value-added 
foodstuffs for both the domestic and international markets.  Many Jamaicans sanction this 
proposition.  According to an Export-Import Bank of Jamaica loan officer who works 
with several agro-processor clients,
The country recognizes that movement into higher value-added production 
is the only way to maximize national return.  The Ministry of Agriculture 
frequently highlights value-added production as the way forward but does 
not follow up with concentrated plan of action due most likely to the 
enormous costs involved in such a transition.  Walkerswood, the St. Ann 
food processing company, is a national treasure but is also a banker’s risk.  
Government should help these types of companies by providing tax breaks 
and allowing them to import manufacturing equipment with concessions.  
This type of assistance is lacking.  
Companies don’t have the capacity to make the transition to value-added 
production on their own.  The have to seek financing from commercial 
banks and therefore subject themselves to prevailing high interest rates.  
Indeed, agro-processors typically used commercial banks to finance their 
capital expansions.  This is not the way to go because of the limited 
availability of capital for financing capital expansion, the high cost of 
available capital, the lack of a venture capital window, and the private 
sector’s reluctance to invest in technology.  However, if we do not retool 
we will not be able to compete in the global economy.  Indeed, external 
forces drove the retooling that Grace Kennedy and J Wray & Nephew 
recently undertook.  Unfortunately, the average agro-processor does not 
have this level of resources so they are resisting the decision to buy new 
equipment for retooling.  The average size of business in small economies 
doesn’t allow for the economies of scale to spread the cost of capital 
acquisition over a wide area—i.e., as in the United States.534
Peter Evans explained why Jamaica should make the transition to value-added production 
despite the difficulties involved:
534 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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States with transformative aspirations are, almost by definition, looking 
for ways to participate in “leading” sectors and shed “lagging” ones.  
Gilpin (1987, 99) argues that “every state, rightly or wrongly, wants to be 
as close as possible to the innovative end of ‘the product cycle’ where, it is 
believed, the highest ‘value-added’ is located.”535  These states are not just 
hoping to generate domestic sectors with higher profit rates.  They are also 
hoping to generate the occupational and social structures associated with 
“high technology industry.”  They are hoping to generate a 
multidimensional conspiracy in favor of development.536
To that end, the state must construct the country’s comparative advantage and create the 
conditions necessary for harnessing and leveraging the country’s unique products and 
global brand equity and propelling industrial development—i.e., agro-industry—in the 
agriculture sector.  “In a global economy where most value is added at several removes 
from natural resources, the global division of labor presents itself as an opportunity for 
agency, not just as an exogenous constraint.”537  It would be a shame if Jamaica missed 
out on its opportunity for self-reinforcing industrial development in agriculture because it 
has grown complacent with its longtime status in the global division of labor hierarchy as 
raw material supplier and sun/sand/sea peddler and its related fate of associated 
dependent development.
Development and implementation of a comprehensive, workable development 
plan that emphasizes both primary agriculture and agro-industry is another key 
methodology for effecting developmental change in natural resource economies like 
Jamaica.  Because effective state involvement is dependent on the reconstruction of state-
society relations to create “synergistic promotional relations,”538 the Jamaican state 
should work with agriculture stakeholders in civil society, namely industry and labor, to 
535 The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
536 Evans 1995, 10.
537 Evans 1995, 8.
538 Evans 1995, 14 and 17.
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develop a national strategy for growth and self-reinforcing development.  This 
development plan must emphasize sectoral linkages to fully exploit the natural forward 
and backward linkages that exist between farming and agro-industrial manufacturing, 
tourist resorts, and the potential utilization of mined-out bauxite/alumina lands for 
agricultural activities.  This is a practical solution to the problem of hotels needing 
foodstuffs to serve their patrons, industry needing unprocessed raw materials to refine, 
and farmers having large stores of foodstuffs they often cannot dispose of because they 
lack the proper marketing mechanisms and outlets.539  A Ministry of Agriculture official 
summarized the marketing problem as follows:
Marketing, specifically the lack of a coordinated marketing system, 
continues to be a major constraint on production (quantity) and 
distribution.  RADA is working on a system called ABIS.  We are trying 
to use technology to drive our transition.  Even small farmers have cell 
phones, which have proven instrumental for effective communication.  We 
have tried several approaches to marketing in the past but all failed.  We
recognize that an effective, integrated marketing regime will underpin any 
development that will take place.540
Stakeholders should work to facilitate a partnership between farmers, hotels, and 
agro-industry wherein farmers are provided the marketing support they need for 
disposing of their crops and the hotels and industry are guaranteed the supply quantities 
they require for operation purposes.  The Jamaica Bauxite Institute/ Inter-American 
Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture/Walkerswood partnership model discussed 
previously is an excellent one to emulate and replicate, certainly by the tourist resorts, 
which currently import the vast majority of foodstuffs served to patrons.  The Jamaica 
539 While interviewing a Walkerswood principal in the presence of a local small farmer from a neighboring 
community, the researcher observed the farmer respond with shock and horror to the principal’s comment 
that Walkerswood is routinely unable to source enough Jamaica-produced peppers and escallion for its jerk 
seasonings.  The farmer remarked that many farmers in his community are forced to discard large amounts 
of peppers every year because they are unable to sell them.  
540 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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Agricultural Society (JAS) should also collaborate more closely with industry groups 
such as the Jamaica Manufacturers Association (JMA) and Jamaica Exporters 
Association (JEA) to push Jamaica’s agricultural goods in domestic and export markets.  
Indeed, as stated by JMA president Doreen Frankson, “collaboration between the JAS 
and JMA is the way we have to go…In our association we have a lot of agro-processors 
who need agricultural produce.  We want to collaborate and work with them [JAS] as 
they grow what we need.”541  Barring chronic shortages of locally-produced food, 
unreasonably inflated prices, or inaccessibility of supply, it defies logic why tourist 
resorts and agro-industry claiming to support Jamaica’s developmental strategy would 
need to source foreign foodstuffs when comparable products are available in Jamaica.  
This realization is catching on in civil society.  According to a National Workers Union 
interviewee, “we will use our lobby power to establish linkages—i.e., lobby hotels to 
utilize locally produced agricultural goods in lieu of imports.  We also need to establish a 
better network of people in agriculture.  Representation is currently too 
localized/specialized where the various industries are doing their own thing—i.e., via the 
various commodity boards per industry.  There is very little cross-communication across 
the industries.  We should address micro issues only after we repair the macro 
problems.”542
The national collaborative strategy should emphasize the following agricultural 
priorities to create broad-based development: 
• Increase diversification of the country’s export-oriented production;
• Improve farming infrastructure, namely roads/transportation, irrigation, and the 
extension system providing farmers with a communication and education network;
541 “Farmers and Manufacturers to Formalize Local Alliance,” Jamaica Gleaner, 10 September 2003.
542 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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• Enhance research and development (R&D) to facilitate continuous product innovation 
and ensure that producers and distributors satisfy their trading partners’ sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) regulations and are equipped to navigate the technical barriers to 
trade (TBT) commonly practiced in the world-trading regime;
• Improve and expand education and training to equip the populace with the tools 
needed to compete in the new knowledge-based global economy;
• Create incentives for employment generation and investment in new technologies;
• Improve the enabling environment to attract greater levels of investment, both foreign 
and local;
• Improve the accessibility of financing for local producers to facilitate expenditure on 
capital goods for retooling their enterprises and expanding capacity;
• Rationalize the basket of agricultural products to prioritize and leverage and products 
to phase out; and
• Create streamlined marketing and distribution systems to empower farmers by 
providing them viable outlets through which to sell their goods;
Expansion of agro-industry should undoubtedly be central to the national development 
strategy.  This expansion should, in addition to finding new secondary uses for sugar and 
banana, build upon and utilize Jamaica’s large stores of non-traditional, unique products 
whose potential have been largely untapped in the plantation economy’s focus on 
traditional primary commodities.  As one Ministry of Agriculture official commented, 
“we don’t recognize how diversified our agriculture sector is.  We produced 60-70 
domestic food crops earning Ja$20 billion as gross farmgate value last year [2002].  
These products are primarily fruits, vegetables, legumes, roots and tubers, and herbs and 
spices.  We probably need to prioritize which ones we will focus on because some have 
far more economic potential than others.  We must therefore be realistic about sizing the 
sector; we must ask ourselves what is it that we can efficiently produce then identify, 
leverage, and market the winners using the most competitive producers and phase out the 
losers.”543  However, farmers cannot simply grow food.  They need to package and 
market it as well.  Therefore, Jamaica’s producers must take quantum leaps towards more 
543 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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effective organization encompassing the various links in the production chain: 
formulation, distribution, branding, and marketing.  Some—namely Grace Kennedy, 
Jamaica Producers, Walkerswood, Red Stripe, and J Wray & Nephew—have done this 
successfully but others need to follow their lead to facilitate a multiplier effect on the 
country’s development.
Interestingly, some companies like Grace Kennedy and Jamaica Producers have 
attained success in part due to a rationalization of production away from Jamaica.  An 
interviewee explained the phenomenon: “Because of unit price competition issues, 
companies have had to re-evaluate how they can keep Jamaica as part of their business.  
They are not leaning on Jamaica as much as they used to.  This is what world trade 
does—it forces companies to do business in line with consumer/market preferences and 
demand.  Jamaica’s high costs militate against efficient production here.”544  A principal 
of Grace Kennedy elaborated:
The fact that we are still operating on an economic model that stresses that 
the means of production are more important than the factors of production 
has impeded growth and development opportunities for Jamaica.  Owning 
a sugar plant producing bulk or byproducts for export has nothing to do 
with whether the plant has to be physically located in Jamaica.  We’re 
stuck on the idea that the transition has to happen in Jamaica.  To be a 
successful coffee drink businessman, does it make greater business sense 
to own the coffee plants or the patent on coffee liqueur production?  We’re 
unlike the Swiss in this regard.  The Swiss don’t produce any sugar or 
cocoa, yet Swiss chocolatiers produce some of the most expensive 
chocolate in the world.  
We need to shift our self-identification as distributors to brand-owner.  
Grace has made this shift.  We must move beyond primary commodity 
production and focus on leveraging our intellectual property wherever it 
exists, realizing that R&D is more than just planting something locally.  
R&D can also identify/extract the genetic material of crops so that they 
544 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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can be planted wherever thy will thrive—in our case, both inside and
outside of Jamaica wherever the potential exists.545
A majority of interviewees cited among the key products to leverage Jamaica’s 
exotic tree fruits that are in wide demand globally.  These tree fruits include mango (of 
which Jamaica produces several varieties), papaya, pineapple, and passion fruit.  Other 
possibilities include guava, coconut, cocoa, and ackee.  Along with banana, these fruits—
with the possible exception of ackee, which is traditionally consumed as a vegetable 
accompaniment to salted dried cod in the national dish, ackee and saltfish—have almost 
unlimited potential because they can either be sold raw or processed by agro-industry into 
juices, jams, and jellies, and dried for snacks such as trail mix.  A majority of 
interviewees also cited several root/tuber and herb/spice possibilities.  The root/tubers are 
primarily yam and dasheen and the herb/spices include thyme, pimento, scotch bonnet 
pepper, ginger, and nutmeg.546  Ironically, Jamaica already has significant international 
brand equity in these spices—i.e., the Jamaican jerk chicken phenomenon evident across 
the globe—but it has not properly leveraged this equity.  Consequently, non-Jamaican 
firms have co-opted this equity and are manufacturing inferior versions of traditional jerk 
seasoning, with the inevitable dilution of the brand.  A case in point is McCormick’s jerk 
seasoning, which, to the sophisticated palate accustomed to traditional Jamaican cuisine, 
tastes like regular seasoning salt.  Yet, many non-Caribbean consumers accept it as 
545 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
546 Pimento is especially promising.  See The Pimento Industry, Jamaica Gleaner, 31 January 2004.  
“World prices are high and rising and have been doing so for years.  The superior rating of the Jamaican 
product is very evident from a comparison of prices for the commodity from different sources.  The 
average monthly New York Spot Price for Jamaican pimento was US$6.  Mexican and Guatemalan 
pimento fetched on US$1.50 and US$1.65 per pound, respectively.”  Both externally-driven and internally-
motivated constraints have limited the development of Jamaica’s pimento industry.  “Traditionally, the 
pimento industry has suffered from the twin problems of being a largely gathering industry and poor 
harvesting techniques…Another major drawback is the export of the world’s best pimento mostly as a 
primary product, the unprocessed berries…”
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authentic and tasty jerk seasoning because it is one of a few brands—in many cases the 
only brand—available to them in their grocery stores.547  The dearth of authentic 
Jamaican-produced options in developed country markets stems from two problems, one 
internally-motivated and the other externally-driven: 1) inadequate marketing and 
distribution systems and 2) rich country tariff escalation for processed foodstuffs, which 
discourages Jamaica’s export of the product into developed country markets.  
A majority of interviewees suggested that the plan for agriculture should fully 
exploit niche markets abroad.  However, in their opinion, “niche” extends beyond its 
traditional definition—i.e., the Jamaican expatriate community living in Miami, New 
York City, and Miami—to encapsulate the rapidly growing developed country markets 
for organically grown food and food products with nutreceutical properties.548  The bulk 
of Jamaica’s primary crops are produced without the aid of fertilizers or pesticides.  Due 
to the Jamaica’s longstanding plantation economy focus on traditional export crops, most 
of the country’s farm goods grow naturally and are left to rot where they fall of their 
trees.  This is a travesty, especially when considered in the context of the “Whole 
Foods/Fresh Fields” phenomenon where rich country consumers are increasingly 
disavowing the chemically produced and/or genetically-modified food that typifies the 
food options sold in grocery stores worldwide in favor of “natural” food sold by 
alternative grocery stores such as Whole Foods.  
547 Some critics attribute this problem more so to the intractability of tariff escalation in developed country 
markets than to Jamaica’s negligence.  According to the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 2004, 
rich country tariff peaks and escalation on developing country exports are significantly higher than those 
imposed on developed country exports.  “Overall rich countries collect from developing countries about 
twice the tariff revenue per dollar of imports that they collect from other rich countries.”  
548 Nutreceutical products have medicinal and/or fragrance qualities.
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With regard to nutreceuticals, a local businessman referenced Canasol, or ganja 
eye drops, a reportedly effective remedy for glaucoma.  Canasol, a marijuana derivative, 
was developed by a Jamaican chemist and is registered in, and marketed from, Jamaica.  
It is in such high demand globally that physicians in the United States are importing 
Canasol directly from Jamaican distributors in the absence of formal FDA approval.549
However, Jamaica’s nutreceutical options are by no means limited to narcotics.  Other, 
more socially acceptable and marketable nutreceutical possibilities cited by interviewees 
included: ginger and pimento oils for fragrance, sorrel extract for use as a heart attack 
preventative, and pepper derivative to facilitate weight loss.550  Jamaica produces so 
many fruits, vegetables, and herbs/spices that the list of possibilities with nutreceutical 
value is endless, limited only by the country’s lack of resources for research and 
development.  Because many of these products are unique to Jamaica, it clearly has an 
advantage that it should grasp by building the productive capacity necessary for 
harnessing the products and leveraging them globally.  The same logic applies to the 
foodstuffs that Jamaica produces naturally without chemicals.  Jamaica should leverage 
these products globally by harnessing, branding, and marketing them as organic food to 
capitalize on the “Whole Foods/Fresh Fields” phenomenon.  
Private sector buy-in to and support of the national development strategy is 
crucial to its success.  Indeed, effective private sector action is another key methodology 
for effecting developmental change in Jamaica.  Unfortunately, despite the country’s 
549 This businessman ventured that Canasol’s patent holder has not pursued FDA approval because the 
process would likely be protracted, cost-prohibitive, and futile given U.S. government rhetoric on the war 
against drugs.  “Rhetoric” is used here in keeping with the interviewee’s assertion that the U.S. is fighting 
its war on drugs only in and against countries from which large quantities of narcotics are sent to its 
markets.  “Despite the fact that marijuana is the U.S.’ third largest cash crop and drug usage there has 
reached epidemic proportions, the U.S. is not fighting the war within its own borders with the same 
intensity it uses outside its borders.”
550 Jamaicans use the sorrel plant for juice, particularly at Christmas.
274
abundant entrepreneurial spirit, Jamaica’s private sector seems largely impotent and 
incapable of harnessing and capitalizing on the energy.  A Planning Institute of Jamaica 
official elucidated reasons for this limitation:
The population is overly dependent on a state that wants to be 
paternalistic.  We need a rethinking of the role of the state and the private 
sector.  The state needs to create the infrastructure for public goods—
namely education, health, and law and order—while the private sector 
must be entrepreneurial, consistently looking for opportunities and 
maximizing them.  The massive inflow into Jamaica of the foreign private 
sector after the financial crisis of the 1980s and 1990s was due to the local 
private sector’s complacency and dependence on government patronage.  
As a case in point, Digicel, Jamaica’s largest cell phone company, 
couldn’t find a local partner when it first attempted to penetrate the 
Jamaican market.  Now the local private sector is kicking itself for not 
acting to capitalize on a great opportunity.  Our private sector simply lacks 
entrepreneurship and visionary qualities.551
According to another interviewee, “our private sector has lost its edge and motivation to 
expand.  It is too established and comfortable.  We need new entrants but the 
infrastructure is not there to allow them entry.  Development banks don’t have the 
resources to fund this sort of arrangement and money costs too much at commercial 
banks.  This is where the growth is.  We need to harness all the entrepreneurial activity 
that is evident in Jamaica.  The private sector is also limited by an overpowering 
bureaucracy and too much red tape.  So it is much easier to import than export, which is 
why Jamaica has so little export e-commerce.”552  A Jamaica Producers principal 
described the problem as follows: 
Jamaica does not produce much that is not produced by other tropical 
countries.  With value-added products, you must be able to distinguish 
your product as unique and special.  It’s ultimately about branding, 
accessing both local and foreign supermarkets, surmounting credit risks, 
and getting importers on board.  It is not easy to convince importers and 
supermarkets to carry your product.  Products must have good-looking 
551 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
552 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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packaging and proper labeling.  In Jamaica there is a very high cost of 
production.  Companies must have long pockets to succeed; they have to 
be able to lose money for three to four years in order to crack the 
market.  This is not an option for most companies.553
A Jamaica Exporters’ Association official agreed in part.  
Many of Jamaica’s farmers are on their way out because they cannot 
produce enough to meet demand and compete due to small economies of 
scale.  Jamaica, unfortunately, does not have the resources to provide 
support like that provided farmers in OECD countries.  Jamaica’s farmers 
are crying out for technology transfer and training but there are no 
resources available to fund such initiatives.  Further compounding 
problems is the dearth of development bank financing for agriculture.  
Funds are provided by commercial banks but at very high rates and with 
severe terms.  This reduces private sector’s (including farmers) access to 
capital.  Because of the financial regime—namely high interest rates and 
inflation—large investors are bypassing agriculture for investment in 
government issued bonds because they promise a significantly higher and 
faster yield.   Investment would address the problems of irrigation and 
supply fluctuations.554
In mainstream economic theory, the private sector generates capital and 
producing capital is essential for growth and development.  “Cash comes from the 
creation of wealth; from production; from marketing of produce; and from reinvestment –
a role largely filled by the private sector regardless of whether the government has a 
socialist or capitalist slant.”555  Pursuant to this contention, Hernando de Soto argued that 
the main reason why the developing world has not benefited from capitalism is because it 
is unable to produce capital.556  If he is correct, Jamaica’s private sector, especially its 
farmers and agro-producers, must be provided easy access to capital for investing into 
their enterprises.  However, capital expenditure and retooling is what Jamaica’s 
agricultural enterprises need, not investment in government paper as has been the private 
553 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
554 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
555 John Meadley, “A More Significant Role for the Private Sector in Agricultural Development,” 
Developing World Agriculture (London: Grosvenor Press International, 1990), 14.
556 de Soto 2000.
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sector—at least the moneyed elite with resources to spare—practice in response to the 
recent all-time highs in the country’s interest rate.  
A renowned economist based at the University of the West Indies/Mona described 
this aspect of the private sector’s challenge:
The private sector is not ignorant but it hasn’t done anything with what it 
has learned.  It is not sufficiently proactive in transforming the way it does 
business.  It is too comfortable making money in government paper than 
in trying to mobilize and transform the basis of productive economy.  
Jamaica’s private sector tends to be margin-gatherers, not true 
industrialists invested in revolutionizing the cost structure.  Jamaica’s 
private sector has never been captains of industry.  The new generation is 
more interested in finance but, because its view towards business is so 
insular, foreigners will overwhelm it in the long-term.  It is not invested in 
studying marketing, technology, etc.  The younger generation is also not 
as entrepreneurial as its predecessors.  It relies too much on government 
protection.  This dependence on government patronage is a legacy of 
slavery and colonialism.557
Another interviewee, a National Workers Union official, elaborated this perspective.  
“Our productive sector doesn’t understand that the industrial age is over, that countries no 
longer control their borders or fiscal policy.  With a few exceptions (Grace Kennedy, 
Appleton Rum, Sandals Resorts, etc.) most Jamaican businesses still have not grasped the 
requirements for competing in the new global economy.  The private sector thinks 
government has the power to protect them.  It’s a realization issue.”558  Notwithstanding 
the private sector’s relative unpreparedness and lack of capacity, a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade official called for private sector mobilization to spearhead 
Jamaica’s development:
Jamaica’s trade imbalance plus its low levels of growth equals a highly 
challenged economy.  The question at issue is has the worst passed or is 
the worse still to come.  The answer depends on the private sector because 
business must be the country’s engine of growth.  The competitiveness 
557 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
558 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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and agility of business is key.  Trinidad retooled 15 years ago, way ahead 
of other Caribbean countries and before the great global push toward 
liberalization.  This enabled it, some would say, to increase its 
productivity and efficiency to compete effectively in the emerging global 
economy.  
If Jamaica retools now it would be doing so at the cutting edge.  We must 
innovate or die.  The private sector, upon reaching this realization, will not 
likely elect suicide.  Unfortunately, the macroeconomic environment has 
been difficult to navigate for both the private and public sectors.  There is 
now less room for government to do proactive intervention to incentivize 
sectors.  But, at the end of the day, it is up to companies to make 
themselves more competitive by eradicating the significant inefficiencies 
that exist at the operational level.  We do many things well.  The key is to 
do more.559
Groups working to build Jamaican private sector capacity agree that industry 
preparedness is a prerequisite for Jamaica’s management of the challenges of 
globalization.  To that end, the Caribbean Regional Human Resource Development 
Program for Economic Competitiveness (CPEC) and other organizations are trying to 
shift the paradigm to encourage active business participation and minimize the effects of 
dislocation.560  An interviewee described CPEC’s activities in this regard:
We are preparing the private sector to meet international marketing 
requirements, i.e., certification, and adopt best practices for industries, i.e., 
the hazard analysis critical control point (HAACP), an international food 
safety standard.  This is crucial for access to external markets.  For 
example, the United States banned tinned ackees due to fear of toxin.  
When the ban was lifted, four companies were prepared and ready to 
export once again due largely to training and assistance provided by 
CPEC.  CPEC is now training other companies to meet the standards in 
order to export.  We are also training the Bureau of Standards to prepare 
the enabling environment.  In addition, we have developed a code of 
practice for the ackee industry.  CPEC’s work has increased awareness 
about the need to be certified.  Our mission is to improve standards and 
prepare companies for attaining certification.  We provide training in 
business, marketing, product development, and technology.
559 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
560 CPEC is funded by the Canadian Development Agency to help Jamaica’s private sector innovate and 
build trade capacity.  CPEC provides grant funds to tourism and agriculture, the two sectors that were 
deemed in consultations with the private sector to be most likely to produce opportunity for growth.  
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CPEC is also working with other organizations, i.e., IICA, to train rural 
women in computer technology, environmental management, food safety, 
marketing, etc.  We are pleased with the success of our organic farming 
project, which produces fruits (mainly papaya), vegetables, coffee, herbs 
and spices (mainly pimento).  This industry has a good chance of 
becoming competitive internationally.  To this end, an island-wide 
sensitization program is underway.  We have trained 14 inspectors who 
are now able to train others for a multiplier effect.  CPEC is working with 
other donor organizations such as JAMPRO to develop a quality manual 
and organic farming standards.  Our collective efforts have increased the 
number of acres in certified organic produce from 300/400 to over 1,000 
(covering three farms) in the country.  We hope to exploit the intrinsic 
linkages between agriculture and tourism by encouraging hotels to use 
locally produced food.561
The Jamaica Cluster Competitive Project (JCCP) is another initiative focused on 
improving private sector production, productivity, and competitiveness.  The cluster 
concept is a new approach that seeks to address the development and implementation of 
competitive strategies at the inter and intra firm level.”562  The project encompasses three 
clusters targeting Jamaica’s most promising sectors: agri-business, tourism, and 
entertainment.  Industry mobilization has been positive thus far, particularly in the agri-
business cluster.  However, the project has identified several problems that limit the 
international competitiveness of Jamaica’s producers.  Tantamount among these is the 
lack of a reliable supply of key products.  For example, the lack of scotch bonnet peppers 
has stalled the creation of a pepper mash company, one of several JCCP ventures geared 
at strengthening Jamaica’s jerk and hot pepper sauce industry.563
561 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
562 Alphea Saunders, “Project Identifies Gaps in Jamaican Industry,” Jamaica Gleaner, 22 October 2003.  
The JCCP project is funded by the Jamaican government, the Department of International Development 
(DFID), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Jamaica Exporters Association 
(JEA).  It is administered by the Jamaica Exporters Association. 
563 As discussed in Chapter 4, this lack of peppers is due not only to declining production but also to 
Jamaica’s poor marketing and distribution infrastructure.  According to several interviewees on the ground, 
Jamaica has many pepper producers who are regularly compelled to discard their pepper harvests because 
they cannot get the product to market.
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Effective civil society action is yet another key methodology for effecting 
developmental change in Jamaica’s agriculture sector.  As argued above for other 
agriculture stakeholders, labor and other interest groups should not only work with the 
state and industry to formulate the national development strategy, it must also collaborate 
with its partners to implement the plan.  Action by the country’s labor unions is 
particularly crucial.  Jamaica has a long history of trade unionism and its unions have 
large membership bases and wield much power in society.  As one National Workers 
Union (NWU) explained, labor has impeded Jamaica’s agricultural development at 
various stages.  “For example, it fought mechanization even though this was a logical 
decision in the face of guaranteed prices under preferences.  Labor has never represented 
farmers per se [it represented industrial workers] but it could have done more to use its 
collective strength to protect the interests of agricultural workers as a group, both 
unionized and non-unionized.”564  A government consultant on agriculture agreed that 
labor has militated against agricultural development.  “High wage rates as they relate to 
(declining) production and poor management-labor relations are major deterrents to 
development.  The Jamaican state evolved from a strong labor union movement so labor-
management relations have traditionally been very volatile.  Unions, unfortunately, 
cannot control their workers so there is a lot of indiscipline in the labor force, which is 
directly related to the country’s low levels of production.”565  Two officials of the 
Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) disagreed.  They claimed that labor has 
always promoted Jamaica’s agricultural development.  “Coming out of the slave society, 
workers tended to have more trust in unions than in management.  By controlling 
564 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript. 
565 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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workers, labor helped keep order and therefore enhance productivity.  Labor did not resist 
mechanization, but we have historically opposed throwing away workers without 
improving pay or working conditions.”566
Labor undoubtedly plays an influential part in a country’s development.  In the 
case of Jamaica, labor can promote agro-industrial development by encouraging
innovation, technological capacity, and increased technical capability in agriculture, even 
at the expense of job loss and/or reduced wages for some groups of workers.  Labor’s 
continued advocacy for maintaining primary sugar production in light of its importance to 
national employment will ultimately be futile if the country as a whole flounders in the 
international political economy because it cannot compete on the basis of raw sugar 
(banana, cocoa, coffee, etc.) production and export alone.  Labor should lobby for worker 
retraining and education instead of fighting to sustain uncompetitive industries simply 
because they provide employment for the masses.  The writing is on the wall: Jamaica 
must diversify beyond primary commodity production and export in order to compete in 
the new knowledge-base economy and labor must get on board.  
Relinquishing preferences is a fifth methodology for effecting developmental 
change in Jamaica’s agriculture sector.  As one Ministry of Agriculture interviewee 
noted, “a lot of our problems began with preferences because being privy to guaranteed 
prices for our goods reduced our incentive to perform.  We have emerged as very 
inefficient producers of all our traditional commodities.”567  Therefore, when preferences 
under Lomé/Cotonou end in 2006, Jamaica should concede their termination instead of 
fighting to maintain them indefinitely.  A Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade 
566 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
567 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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conceded that preferences, along with developed country tariff escalation, have deterred 
Jamaica’s transition to value-added production.  He nonetheless believes, as explained 
below, that Jamaica has much to benefit from continued access to preferences:
Some people argue that preferences, by providing guaranteed prices and 
advantages, have deterred innovation in Jamaica and increased our 
dependency.  However, I think we need to use the opportunity allowed by 
preferences to move up the value chain to increase prices and 
competitiveness.  But we don’t want to make this transition without the 
underpinnings of a safety net—in this case guaranteed access to the EU 
market for our key agricultural exports.  We will not simply rollover and 
play dead on preferences; we will fight for their extension.  We must 
remember that the preferences were never intended as benign and 
magnanimous gestures for our benefit alone.  Europe needed a guaranteed 
supply of our sugar for its consumption and manufacturing, i.e., liquor and 
confectionary processing.  It cannot just toss us to the winds now that it no 
longer needs our sugar.568
Many development scholars, including George Beckford, argue vehemently against the 
prolongation of preferences.  To be sure, the collaboration of vested interests from 
without and within in maintaining preferences “provides a prop to an economy which is 
fundamentally unviable.  Occasional windfalls brought by fortuitous changes in market 
conditions [such as the EU’s decision to extend Lomé/Cotonou until 2006] provide 
additional supports but the economy remains in a precarious balance…In this event, there 
will be economic growth and development of a type which further strengthens the 
hinterland-metropole relationship”569 or, in Cardoso’s vernacular, promotes associated 
dependent development.  Postponing transformation has real costs.  These include “the 
potential gain of income, employment and an internal dynamic which could have resulted 
had protection been abandoned.  A severance of the metropolitan ties is a precondition of 
568 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
569 Levitt and Beckford in Beckford 1975, 47.
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structural transformation.  A genuine programme of import-displacement and output and 
market diversification cannot proceed until the preferential props are withdrawn.”570
Consolidation of Caribbean regional integration is a sixth methodology for 
effecting developmental change in Jamaica’s agriculture sector.571  Unfortunately, the 
Caribbean Community’s (CARICOM) ability to contribute to development in the region 
is limited by the constraints of member state underdevelopment, dependence, and their 
tendency to pursue nationalistic, not regional solutions to pressing economic problems.572
These forces have fostered disincentives for full-fledged integration.  Critics assert that 
because national interest is so predominant and entrenched, CARICOM has never been 
serious about economic or political integration.573  CARICOM is alleged to be an 
exercise in regionalization, not integration; it is a regionalized economy and polity in 
which the preservation of the institution of the nation-state is paramount.574  Personality 
politics, elite politics, and interest group lobbying are said to encumber effective policy 
making at the regional level and implementation at the national level.  Put simply, 
national governments are pursuing domestic politics infused with an elite perspective 
within a regional framework.575  To attain any semblance of collective self-reliance, 
CARICOM members must transcend its present regime of nominal multilateral 
cooperation and incorporate a higher degree of politico-economic integration.576
Actualization of the common market and effective implementation at the national level of 
rational decisions made at the regional level is imperative in this regard.  CARICOM 
570 Levitt and Beckford in Beckford 1975, 46-47.
571 See Appendix J for a backgrounder on the regional trade arrangement (RTA) as an agent of 
development for member states.
572 Axline 1978, 969.
573 Payne and Sutton 2001, 174
574 Payne and Sutton 2001, 174
575 Payne and Sutton 2001, 174
576 Erisman 1992, 138.
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must also address several agricultural policy imperatives to foster sustained development 
in member states.  It must encourage production and export diversification, export market 
penetration, improved productivity, and enhanced competitiveness.
Integration via CARICOM is essential for helping individual member states 
manage the vagaries of the globalizing economy and for promoting development in the 
region.  William Demas outlined three reasons for the Caribbean economic integration: 
“the need to widen markets; the need to pool and combine natural resources and to 
programme regional economic activities; and the need to strengthen our collective 
bargaining power vis-à-vis powerful external entities and forces.”577  According to Eric 
Williams, “the real case for unity in Commonwealth Caribbean countries rests on the 
creation of a more unified front in dealing with the outside world—diplomacy, foreign 
trade, foreign investment and similar matters.  Without such a unified front the territories 
will continue to be playthings of outside Governments and outside investors.  To increase 
the ‘countervailing power’ of the small individual units vis-à-vis the strong outside 
Governments and outside companies requires that they should aim at nothing less than 
the creation of a single center of decisionmaking vis-à-vis the outside world.”578  In other 
words, integration strengthens state autonomy by promoting the “concertation of national 
strengths through the process of regional diplomatic community-building, such that 
alienation of one unit within the community has as its consequences the estrangement of 
the whole community.”579  As Demas explained, “[a] greater degree of economic 
577 Demas in Beckford 1975, 74.
578 Williams 1970, 514.
579 Vaughan A. Lewis, “The Commonwealth Caribbean and Self-Determination in the International 
System” in Lewis, ed., Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean (Jamaica: 
University of the West Indies), 245. 
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independence for each country can, paradoxically, be achieved only through meaningful 
economic integration in the region.  This is the ‘paradox of sovereignty.’”580
The Caribbean region has certainly had its ups and downs since CARICOM’s 
inception.  CARICOM member countries are small, open microstates that have had a 
collective history of colonialism and underdevelopment.  A majority of the states are 
islands.  Sustainable development in small states like these is impeded by their capacity 
limitations in key areas such as product and factor markets, public and private sector 
administrative and institutional structures, and negotiating power and leverage vis-à-vis 
external countries and organizations.581  Regional cooperation provides a means of 
ameliorating size-related capacity constraints to development and is thus an integral part 
of Caribbean development strategy.582  Because individual member states are highly 
susceptible to external influence, CARICOM has been called an example of externally 
vulnerable integration.583  According to Gary Voss, president of the Caribbean 
Association of Industry and commerce, “the Caribbean as a whole does not have a 
strategic plan and does not know where it wants to be in the year 2010 and beyond…It is 
negotiating arrangements but is not quite sure what arrangements it needs because it 
doesn’t know where it is going.  It’s a rather damning statement to make but I think its 
true.”584  Others disagree.  For instance, David Lewis, deputy director of Caribbean Latin 
American Action, acknowledged as a positive development CARICOM’s evolution into 
“an effective voice for fifteen nations speaking as one bloc, giving them all much 
stronger negotiating power than their combined population of twelve million would 
580 Demas in Beckford 1975, 74.
581 Blake 2001, 481.
582 Blake 2001, 481.
583 Bernal 1994, 171.
584 CARICOM chided as ‘aimless,’ Jamaica Gleaner, 17 April 2002.
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otherwise give them in the international arena.”585  The degree of functional cooperation 
and foreign policy coordination is fairly strong.  However, CARICOM has been less 
successful with regards to economic integration.  This more expansive integration effort 
is constrained to a large degree by the small size, limited resources and external 
orientation of CARICOM’s member states as well as the similarity of their economies 
and productive structures.  Despite CARICOM's weaknesses, it has been a positive force 
for Caribbean development in the international political economy and it can accomplish 
much more yet.  To be sure, CARICOM states can use strength in numbers to promote 
national and regional agricultural development by challenging at the multilateral and 
regional levels rich country tariff barriers, production and export subsidies, and food 
dumping.  Such action can go a long way towards weakening exernally-driven constraints 
that undermine developing country agricultural production, productivity, and 
competitiveness.  CARICOM, by pointing the finger inward and spotlighting member 
country agricultural shortcomings—such as lack of piped irrigation, poor roads and other 
farming infrastructure, lack of integrated distribution and marketing systems, and high 
rate of predial larceny—can also force national action towards the banishment of 
internally-motivated constraints on national agricultural development and, therefore, 
regional development. 
Evaluating Jamaica’s Agricultural Performance in the Framework 
of Development Theory
The evidence discussed above and in previous chapters demonstrates that several 
externally-driven and internally-motivated constraints have limited Jamaica’s agricultural 
585 Luxner 1999.
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development.  These constraints are not mutually exclusive.  A scholar economist 
interviewed for this study commented on the interplay between externally-driven and 
internally-motivated forces in fostering underdevelopment and dependency in Jamaica:
Which has been a more significant constraint on development—internally-
motivated factors or externally-driven forces?  They are intertwined, i.e., 
the credit market is weak because the Inter-American Development Bank 
required that Government not subsidize sectors.  But we must take 
responsibility for ourselves.  We must find a way to feed ourselves.  Plus 
we have enough special things to cultivate for supplying export markets.  
We need to move beyond the small country mentality, but we don’t have 
enough marketing capacity.  Everything we did previously was under a 
pre-determined marketing strategy—i.e., take it or leave it.  But we alone 
make ackee, pimento, and Blue Mountain coffee, so we now need to 
master direct monopoly packaging and marketing.586
Unfortunately for Jamaica, the plantation economy export-led model of development 
emphasized primary commodity production for export and import of staple goods without 
a concomitant increase in knowledge-based value-added production, which appears to 
have deepened the country’s underdevelopment and dependence on external sources.  Not 
only was the plantation model not fully utilized to enhance Jamaica’s export 
development, but its improper utilization hampered the expansion of the small- scale sub-
sector, which should have been treated as an essential complement to export agriculture, 
certainly with regards to generating food security and increasing product diversification 
in order to grow the export base.  “The origin of Jamaican agriculture was based on crops 
produced for the international market on plantations financed by external capital and a 
slave labour system.  The mono cropping of export crops generated vulnerable, open 
economies, dependent on food imports which further deterred the development of small-
farm food production.  Unlike more developed economies the role of Jamaican 
agriculture was not to provide food for its local population but for export.  The economy 
586 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
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in turn, relied on foreign exchange earned from the export of crops to import more staple 
food.  The bulk of the food for local consumption was imported.  The import of staple 
food is still a major trend of the Jamaican economy.”587  These structural characteristics 
of production—the dual farm dichotomy, the emphasis on primary commodity 
production for export, and the import of finished goods—have bedeviled Jamaica’s 
agricultural industries from their early days to the present.  They fostered continuity in 
primary commodity production, lack of technological innovation, and dependency on 
foreign countries for export markets for Jamaican primary commodities and imports of 
manufactured foods and other items that Jamaica lacks the ability to produce.  The world-
trading regime, by privileging rich country farm production and export and undermining 
developing country production and export, already at a disadvantage in its general 
primary commodity orientation, has only exacerbated these challenges.
Despite this discrimination and foul play in agricultural trade, Jamaica remains 
wedded to an archaic plantation agriculture model steeped in primary commodity export-
led production.  An agricultural trade regime hostile to developing country primary 
commodity export-led production indicates that it is time to radically alter Jamaica’s 
production model to prioritize value-added production along with primary production, 
leveraging and capitalizing on the country’s most promising food products.  Above all, 
Jamaica must promote economic independence in the agriculture sector and the economy 
overall by following the five steps outlined by William Demas: redressing agricultural 
stagnation; effecting changes in policies and institutions; encouraging changes in values 
and attitudes; acquisition of technological know-how; and invigoration of Caribbean 
587 See the Jamaica Sustainable Development Network’s profile of Jamaica’s agriculture sector located at 
www.jsdnp.org.jm/susAgriculture-agricJA.htm. 
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integration.588  To do this, Jamaica’s agriculture stakeholders across the public sector, 
private sector, and civil society must rally and cooperate to address the country’s internal 
deficiencies impeding agricultural development and competitiveness within and beyond 
primary production and export.  Not all Jamaicans think such a cultural mindshift is 
possible.  According to an official of the Ministry of Commerce, “supporting local 
production would support jobs and growth.  But it is ambitious and improbable because it 
requires people to be irrational.  It will be difficult to turn the national psyche around 
from imports and the expanded savings and choice they represent to consumption of 
locally produced goods to drive national development.  Many Jamaicans do not 
understand the relationship between imports, food security, and agricultural/national 
development and many more are not inclined to care as long as their immediate needs are 
being met.”589
The difficulty notwithstanding, Jamaicans must be educated to understand that 
buying and eating the food their farmers produce, even in the midst of a sea of cheap, 
hyper-pigmented, and oversized imported food, is a matter of both food and national 
security.590  “A policy of buy cheap irrespective of basic national consideration is at best 
myopic and at worst destructive and demotivational.”591  Jamaican farmers, processors, 
exporters, and by implication, Jamaican production capability, jobs, and the national 
economy cannot thrive amidst an onslaught of foreign goods in the absence of local 
consumer support.  As noted by Minister of Agriculture, Roger Clarke, “if the people of 
588 Demas in Beckford 1975, 71-74.
589 From the researcher’s personal interview transcript.
590 See “Let’s Boost Local Cuisine,” Jamaica Gleaner, 30 November 2003.  “We cannot be comfortable 
with a situation in which the 2002 import bill for food was some $23.2 billion.  A 23 percent decline in 
agricultural production over the period 1995 to 2002 accounted for the loss of an estimated 33,200 jobs in 
the sector.  These figures are sobering indeed and call us as a nation to stop and look at where we are 
going.”
591 “Farmers and Manufacturers to Formalize Local Alliance,” Jamaica Gleaner, 10 September 2003.
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Jamaica make up their minds to support local agriculture, no WTO (World Trade 
Organization) can stop them.  Every time we buy foreign goods we are putting farmers 
and workers to work in other countries and causing our people to go on the scrap heap of 
idleness and crime…I believe that that partnership between the people of Jamaica and the 
farmers of Jamaica can be done to the benefit of all Jamaicans.”592  In addition, 
developing countries must advocate in their own interest at the regional and multilateral 
levels to force a power and paradigm shift in world trade.  In this regard, Jamaica must 
look beyond its own borders towards its neighbors in the Caribbean to build a politico-
economic alliance that can, through strength in numbers, lobby for truly free trade for 
their agricultural products, both primary and value-added, as well as other goods.
Indeed, it is time for Jamaica to reassess its underdevelopment and dependency in 
the context of development theory.  Clearly, the neoliberal model is not working for 
Jamaica.  Despite Jamaica’s implementation of full-scale liberalization, privatization, and 
deregulation in keeping with its structural adjustment commitments and WTO 
membership, the country has not experienced the kind of growth envisioned by the 
Washington Consensus.  Indeed, agriculture has declined precipitously when it should 
have expanded.  Jamaica should reevaluate what certain prescient dependistas advocated 
some years ago.  Some dependency school propositions are unworkable today because 
globalization is so entrenched and the world’s economies are quite interconnected.  
However, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto’s thesis of associated dependent 
development is fitting to the Jamaican context.  To be sure, development in peripheral 
Jamaica is tied to and dependent on forces emanating from the center—namely the U.S. 
592 See “Business Info System to Help Farmers Market Local Produce,” Jamaica Observer, 18 November 
2003.
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and EU, Jamaica’s primary trading partners.  With regards to agriculture, these forces are 
U.S. and EU agricultural protectionism, which precipitates food dumping in the local 
market and restricted access to Jamaica’s exports in external markets.  Raúl Prebisch was 
also correct in arguing that international trade reinforced the uneven development 
instigated and perpetuated by colonialism, which had altered the institutional, production, 
and socio-economic structures of the colonized territories towards the First World, and, 
consequently, had generated structural problems in these territories which would forever 
disadvantage them in trade amongst themselves and, even more so, with their former 
colonizers and other First World countries.  His focus on the developing country 
government’s role in hastening industrialization to place the periphery on a path of 
autonomous, self-sustaining growth and development was also on point.  However, his 
proposed means of hastening industrialization—that marginalized countries withdraw 
from international trade into import-substitution—is impractical and risky in today’s 
globalized economy.  Andre Gunder Frank’s proposed class struggle against the 
imperialism embodied by international and domestic capital is implausible for this reason 
as well as the fact that socialism and its antecedent, class struggle, were discredited with 
the fall of the Soviet Union.  Jamaica is so plugged into international trade and the global 
economy, and Jamaicans so steeped in consumer habits and tastes conditioned by global 
trends dictated by rich countries, that outright withdrawal from the system—assuming 
that the government could muster the political will to support such a radical move—
would be highly disruptive, socially and economically.  As Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
Enzo Faletto and Samir Amin acknowledged, a revolutionary break from the liberal 
capitalist trade regime in favor of insulated production as a means of fostering self-
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reliance and self-sufficiency, however attractive to those who bemoan the harmful effects 
of neoliberal economic policies on developing countries, is highly unlikely in Jamaica as 
such a transformation would require the improbable support of domestic elites who are 
tied to international capital—and international capital to them—and vested in maintaining 
the status quo.  Breaking from the liberal capitalist world order would also rankle 
ordinary Jamaicans so accustomed to foreign tastes and habits that popular rebellion 
would likely ensue.  This rebellion would probably be even deadlier than the popular 
revolt of the 1970s in reaction to Michael Manley’s attempts to disengage Jamaica from 
the global economy in an effort to buoy import-substitution industrialization and 
engender national self-sufficiency.  
“While it is true that one must make the economy less open in order to promote 
internally-propelled development, to seal off one’s economy completely is to choose 
economic stagnation and a much lower standard of living.  There is an optimum degree of 
economic contact with the outside world which is required to promote economic 
independence and internally-propelled development.  The real issue is to determine the 
optimum degree of openness in every particular case.  What is required is a controlled 
and regulated relationship with the metropolitan countries, in order to avoid the danger of 
economic satellisation or even absorption into the metropolitan economy or 
economies.”593  Hence, liberalized trade and participation in the world-trading regime, 
albeit with provisos and corrections for moderating both externally-driven and internally-
motivated constraints on agriculture, leveling the playing field, and improving Jamaica’s 
terms of trade is clearly the only option.  “Jamaica has embraced a liberal trade regime as 
a matter of policy, but it has to be conscious of the contributions that the agricultural 
593 Demas in Beckford 1975, 63.
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sector makes to employment and social stability, not only in the rural but also in urban 
areas, and so needs to ensure that the social and economic situation of the farming 
population is not undermined by trade liberalization” (FAO 2000).  Managed trade that 
leverages the agricultural industries and goods in which Jamaica has comparative and 
competitive advantages, encompassing both traditional and non-traditional industries and 
goods and expanding agro-processing, is the path Jamaica should pursue.  In the words of 
a local pundit:
Free trade is the ideology of the age and protectionism the discarded evil.  
But in the real flesh and blood world bits of both, at one time or another, 
are essential human devices to organize production, trade and society most 
beneficially…Free trade and protectionism, once stripped of their 
ideological extremes, are both useful tools which can be balanced for 
general benefit, social stability and community development suited to each
nation’s traditions and needs.  Finding an ideology in between is the art we 
have to learn.594




This dissertation has examined the reasons for Jamaica’s underdevelopment and 
external dependency by evaluating the relationship that has existed for centuries between 
agriculture, trade, and socioeconomic development both within the country and in the 
world trading regime.  Based on Jamaica’s factor endowment, it should have attained 
greater levels of growth and development than it has experienced.  In addition, Jamaica, 
given its resource potential, should not be so resource dependent on external actors, 
organizations, and institutions.  Jamaica has a vast natural resource capacity and a 
substantial unemployed and underemployed population, which makes the country ideally 
suited for agriculture.  Indeed, Jamaica has been a primarily agricultural producer and 
exporter for much of its history.  Like in other small developing countries, agriculture is a 
major employer of labor, employing over 25 percent of the population.  Yet Jamaica’s 
agricultural production, productivity, and international competitiveness have declined 
significantly over the past 30 years.  This dissertation asked why and explored several 
possible explanations, ultimately choosing one as the most persuasive explanation for the 
agricultural and national socioeconomic decline facing Jamaica and similarly situated 
developing countries.
The dissertation utilized a case study methodology to assess the relevance of 
dependency theory to the historical relationship between Jamaica’s agricultural 
production and trade and the international political economy and the extent to which this 
relationship has fostered development in Jamaica.  This methodology highlighting a 
country case that is largely agricultural, was colonized by a European metropolitan 
power, and has been integrally integrated into the world trading regime since it first was 
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colonized, allowed the researcher to infer from the findings a generalized conclusion for 
the Caribbean and much of the Third World.  The Commonwealth Caribbean was chosen 
for analysis due to its geopolitical significance as the United States “third border.”  
Studying the region also afforded the opportunity to evaluate the major obstacles to 
development facing the overwhelmingly poor countries of a region that, given its 
proximity to and longstanding interaction with North America, one would expect to be 
infinitely more developed.  The Jamaican experience is portrayed as representative of 
countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the Third World at large because it is one 
of the region’s most open economies.  Jamaica is also one of the world’s most 
structurally adjusted countries and one with which extra-regional organizations, 
countries, and people are extremely engaged.  Hence, it afforded the researcher the 
perfect case study for analyzing the effect of externally-driven and domestically-
motivated forces on sectoral and national development.
Jamaica is without question a poor country with underdeveloped productive 
capacity and a questionable dependence on outside actors for resources, particularly 
production inputs, funding, luxury goods, fuel, and food.  In the world trading regime, 
Jamaica is classified and treated as a natural resource economy specializing in primary 
commodity for export.  This has rendered Jamaica vulnerable to various abuses intrinsic 
to a world trading regime that sanctions rich country agricultural protectionism that 
restricts the primary commodity exports in which Jamaica and other developing countries 
specialize.  These abuses include agricultural domestic and export subsidies, tariff peaks 
and escalation, tariff rate quotas, and food dumping—all sanctioned by the World Trade 
Organization.  In light of Jamaica’s suitability to agriculture, Jamaica’s historical 
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integration in world agricultural trade, and the potential agriculture has for 
socioeconomic development, this dissertation utilized an agricultural sectoral framework 
in which to analyze the reasons for Jamaica’s underdevelopment and external 
dependency.
One would think that a country like Jamaica—endowed as it is with a favorable 
climate, rich soil, plentiful labor, and profuse flora and fauna—is producing enough 
agricultural goods for domestic consumption plus surpluses for export.  However, 
Jamaica is a net food importer that is incapable of feeding its own population and is 
completely dependent on external producers for numerous food products, including staple 
goods such as carbohydrate sources, dairy, poultry, and even horticultural fruits and 
vegetables of which Jamaica should be a prolific producer and exporter given its factor 
endowment.  Moreover, Jamaica’s GDP growth rate and per capita GDP are rather low.  
Jamaica also regularly suffers a trade deficit and has substantial debt.  In 2000, Jamaica’s 
exports earned $1.7 billion while the country imported $3 billion worth of goods.  In 
2002 Jamaica had a GDP real growth rate of 1.1 percent and per capita GDP of $3,700 
adjusted for purchasing power parity.  Jamaica’s debt to GDP is 150 percent and 
unemployment is 15.1 percent.  
Jamaica’s economic problems are due in large part to its enduring specialization 
in primary commodity production and its negligible agro-industrial capacity.  The 
unfortunate predisposition towards primary production has been cultivated throughout 
Jamaica’s history by both external and domestic forces.  Externally-driven constraints on 
Jamaica’s development include the colonial legacy of plantation economy emphasizing 
production of a few primary commodities for export and import of processed goods from 
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abroad; multilateral and bilateral trade arrangements that discriminate against processed 
exports that would increase Jamaica’s value-added and encourage the full maximization 
of Jamaican agro-industry; IMF and World Bank structural adjustment lending that 
swelled the country’s debt and debt service obligations and diminished reinvestment into 
the economy, and; rich country agricultural subsidies that encourage overproduction of 
surpluses which are dumped in poor countries like Jamaica under the guise of food aid or 
sold at artificially low prices that undermine domestic production, productivity, and 
competitiveness.  These externally-driven constraints impeded Jamaica’s development by 
exacerbating the colonial plantation economic legacy of underdevelopment and 
associated dependent development.  Domestically-motivated constraints on Jamaica’s 
development include the country’s infamously weak institutions in both the public and 
private spheres, which have contributed to the government’s inability or refusal to craft a 
comprehensive national development policy that has agricultural development as a 
cornerstone; inadequate and/or inappropriate use of technology; poor farming 
infrastructure; private sector apathy and dependence on government to mobilize growth; 
and tribal politics based on clientelism and rent-seeking—all of which have entrenched 
the retardate plantation economy in Jamaica.
The dissertation explored several hypotheses positing varying explanations for 
Jamaica’s declining agricultural performance, decreasing food security, and overall 
underdevelopment.  The hypotheses address the externally-driven and domestically-
motivated forces that have constrained Jamaica’s development throughout its history.  
These hypotheses are grounded in the development theory literature, from early classical 
mercantilism to contemporary neoliberalism and everything in-between in the trajectory 
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of development theory.  The dissertation utilized two key development paradigms—
neoliberalism and dependencia—to explore and explain the constraints on Jamaica’s 
development.  Neoliberalism, a descendant of mainstream classical liberal political 
economy and its antecedent, neoclassical political economy, is currently the dominant
development paradigm.  Dependencia, on the other hand, is a radical departure from 
mainstream theory in that it is a close cousin of Marxist political economy and a 
descendant of mercantilism espoused by Friedrich List and Alexander Hamilton, which 
encourages developing countries like Jamaica to utilize trade protectionism to nurture 
domestic industry.  The U.S., Germany, Japan, and other industrialized countries 
employed this model to attain their economic stature.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
Jamaica and other poor countries find it attractive and have employed it—albeit 
inappropriately—at times in their own economic histories.  
While, theoretically, neoliberalism—a model that has been pushed on developing 
countries—should have promoted economic development, the Jamaican case illustrates 
clearly that the CARICOM states are not functioning effectively in a neoliberal 
environment, not so much of their own doing, but because of the lack of an appropriate 
neoliberal model in the world trading regime where the use of subsidies and trade barriers 
is rampant. While there are elements of neoliberalism evident in Jamaica—i.e., 
liberalized markets, privatized industries, and deregulated public services—the failure of 
the international community to correct the imbalances of neoliberalism means that 
despite years of neoliberal reforms, Jamaica still suffers severe underdevelopment and 
dependency.  Neoliberalism’s focus on the free-market economy as the agent of growth 
and development—and, alternatively, the lack of a free-market economy as the cause of 
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economic decline—is frankly hypocritical.  Jamaica has been a “free-market” economy 
for at least three decades since it first implemented its IMF/World Bank structural 
adjustment conditionalities requiring that the country privatize, deregulate, and liberalize 
its trade and financial regimes.  Yet it has had negligible growth rates and development.  
On the other hand, the U.S. and EU, Jamaica’s primary trading partners, continue to 
attain high growth rates despite their longstanding protectionist agricultural trade 
practices.  Clearly, another explanatory framework is more befitting the Jamaican 
experience in the world trading regime.  Dependencia is just that framework.
Dependency theory suggests that Jamaica’s dependence on and vulnerability to 
external forces is due to its evolution and status in the world trading regime as a primary 
commodity export-led plantation economy that was established by a dominant foreign 
power and is still subject post-independence to external forces acting from both outside 
and inside the country.  From its colonization by Spain onwards, Jamaica’s economy was 
defined and shaped by various external entities that cultivated relationships of 
interdependence between their economies and Jamaica’s such that their economies grew 
and developed while Jamaica’s growth and development were limited to and contingent 
on their expansion.  Throughout Jamaica’s history, agents of these external forces have 
acted from within to institutionalize the country’s underdevelopment and external 
dependency.  Consistent with the analyses of Pablo González Casanova, Ernst Mandel, 
and Samir Amin, internal colonialism/imperialism perpetuates the pernicious character 
and tendencies of colonial society that retard nascent national autonomy and self-
sufficiency.  Internal colonialism is structural in that it stems from the policies of the 
newly independent state as well as the colonizing power, which continues after 
299
independence to exploit its former colony in a new imperialist relationship of 
neocolonialism.  Jamaica’s local elite collaborates with the neocolonizing country, or 
other external force, in a process of external exploitation from within.  Such action is not 
surprising because the local elite has vested interests in both the local and metropolitan 
economies in order to protect their power domestically and continue to expand their 
wealth through external economic activities.  Thus, it is in their best interest to work 
together with powerful external entities to institute conditions in Jamaica that benefit both 
directly.  
This dependent-clientelist relationship has entrenched the plantation economy in 
Jamaica and kept the country in a perpetual state of underdevelopment and dependency 
on external resources and markets.  Unfortunately for Jamaica’s agriculture sector and its 
stakeholders, many policymakers charged with developing agriculture are part of this 
dependent-clientelist elite class of Jamaicans.  In addition, elements of the private sector 
and civil society have worked from within to entrench destabilizing norms in Jamaica 
that they imported from external governments, institutions (i.e., the international financial 
institutions), and multinational corporations to protect their own interests aligned with 
and vested in these very external entities.  As Mandel argued, the developing country’s 
fortune is tied to the interests of united local and foreign capital.  Metropolitan interests 
unite with those of local elites in this dependent-clientelist relationship such that the 
phenomenon of unequal exchange becomes the primary form of exploitation.  Caribbean 
proponents of the radical new political economy school of development theory—among 
them, Walter Rodney, George Beckford, Norman Girvan, Carl Stone, Michael Witter, 
Lloyd Best, Owen Jefferson, and Michael Manley—understood this linkage and argued 
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that foreign direct investment (FDI), the primary means of foreign insertion into 
Caribbean economies, was the conduit through which self-interested external forces co-
opted domestic societies and caused perpetual underdevelopment.  Jamaica’s fortune is 
thereby tied to the interests of united foreign and local capital, and powerful external 
forces are conveyed and institutionalized internally by domestic elites.  Any growth 
resulting from this dependent-clientelist relationship is ultimately unsustainable.  Indeed, 
as Samir Amin explained, growth in peripheral countries that is tied to growth in 
metropolitan countries is the development of underdevelopment and, per Cardoso’s 
analysis, the foundation of associated dependent development
Of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 1 and explored throughout the research, 
the dissertation deemed all but one inconclusive because they are skewed towards either 
purely domestic or external forces when both forces have contributed—albeit not 
equally—to Jamaica’s underdevelopment and dependency.595  External and internal 
forces did not create Jamaica’s underdevelopment and dependency in a vacuum.  They 
did so together in a mutually reinforcing relationship of external dependency and 
domestic clientelism.  As discussed above and in previous chapters, both externally-
driven and internally-motivated forces have exacerbated Jamaica’s underdevelopment by 
entrenching and consolidating the colonial legacy of plantation economy elucidated by 
George Beckford and associated dependent development outlined by Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso.  Hence, the dissertation deemed Hypothesis #3 to have the most persuasive 
explanatory force regarding Jamaica’s underdevelopment and dependency.  This 
hypothesis emphasizes the symbiotic role played by the external and internal forces 
595 As argued elsewhere in this dissertation, external variables are deemed to have more explanatory force 
because external challenges can overwhelm any product Jamaica manages to produce with or without the 
presence of internally-motivated constraints.
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discussed above in perpetuating Jamaica’s colonial plantation economic legacy of 
underdevelopment and associated dependent development.
From a theoretical perspective, this dissertation vindicates the explanatory force 
and relevance to the developing country experience of several non-mainstream 
development paradigms.  These include plantation economy, dependency-
clientelism, and mercantilism, which are all consolidated as dependencia in this 
dissertation.  Despite assertions to the contrary, dependency theory is still a 
relevant explanatory framework for utilization in assessing many developing 
countries’ politico-economic experience and condition.  As noted earlier, Jamaica 
is a liberal democratic capitalist regime per the neoliberal prescription embodied 
in the Washington Consensus.  However, Jamaica has not experienced the kind of 
growth and development that neoliberalism promises.  Jamaica is not unique in 
this regard.  Countless other developing countries throughout Latin America, the 
Caribbean, and Africa also implemented structural adjustment conditionalities in 
the 1970s-1990s and liberalized their trade and finance regimes.  Like Jamaica, 
they too are waiting for the growth and development promised by the neoliberal 
model.  These countries are mired in a state of dependent capitalism that fosters 
associated dependent development and militates against sustained, self-
reinforcing growth needed for balanced, autonomous development.  In Jamaica’s 
case, growth due to tourism and remittances is a clear manifestation of 
unsustainable dependent capitalism.  Tourism and remittances were Jamaica’s 
largest sources of national income in 2003.  However, these activities are 
unsustainable because they are not based in production and are extremely 
susceptible to external shocks.  As Cardoso asserted, dependent capitalism 
remains underdeveloped because it must respond to the demands of transnational 
capital and because it cannot independently ensure capital accumulation.  
The path to balanced, autonomous development for Jamaica and similarly situated 
countries lies in finding a way to moderate this dependence.  First and foremost, the local 
population—encompassing the public and private sectors as well as civil society—must 
acknowledge domestically-motivated constraints on development and work towards 
eliminating them.  For Jamaica, cooperation by domestic elites in formulating and 
implementing a comprehensive national development strategy that emphasizes productive 
activities to which Jamaica is ideally suited—i.e., agriculture—is crucial in this regard.  
Domestic policymakers, businessmen, and civil society leaders must collaborate more, 
using the country’s democratic process to build political will for implementing a new 
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strategy that recognizes the implausibility of primary commodity export-led growth, 
emphasizes increased local production of primary and secondary (and eventually tertiary) 
goods for both domestic consumption and export, and builds the local infrastructure 
necessary for transforming the country’s productive capacity from primary commodity 
production to expanded value-added production.  To compete more effectively in the 
world trading regime, Jamaicans must build on their country’s natural comparative 
advantage in agriculture and leverage its brand equity in international cuisine—i.e., the 
jerk phenomenon.  Effective state action is the primary methodology for effecting 
developmental change in agriculture.  To be sure, the state must create the conditions for 
growth.  These conditions include vastly improved social and farming infrastructures, a 
more facilitative enabling policy environment, streamlined sectoral linkages, and an 
attractive climate for investment for growth.  Ordinary Jamaicans must push 
policymakers to work with industry to create these conditions as well as diversify 
agricultural production, cultivate a stronger agro-processing sector to add value to the 
country’s agricultural exports, and build stronger linkages among the farming, tourism, 
bauxite, and manufacturing sectors.  As evidenced by recent articles in the Jamaica 
Gleaner and Jamaica Observer, this process of political action from below is currently 
occurring in Jamaica.  As increasing numbers of ordinary Jamaicans gain access to 
information about the precarious condition of Jamaica’s agriculture sector and overall 
economy, popular activism on behalf of Jamaica-produced goods is increasing.  The 
“Buy Jamaica” campaign recently initiated by the Jamaica Agricultural Society in 
collaboration with the Jamaica Manufacturers Association is significant in the regard.  
Local farmers are also becoming empowered and are pushing government to expand 
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linkages between farming and tourism so that they can expand their access to Jamaica’s 
many tourist resorts and hotels.
Cooperation by external entities such as the World Trade Organization, World 
Bank, and IMF, and powerful advanced country state actors that wield significant 
influence in and over developing country fortunes is also vital.  Action by these entities is 
essential for moderating, if not eliminating, rich country trade barriers to developing 
country agricultural and other export products in order to put these countries on the road 
towards balanced, autonomous development.  Remedial action by poor country domestic 
actors cannot by itself propel development.  Such action needs a supportive global 
enabling environment to succeed in its mission.  To that end, elimination of agricultural 
subsidies, tariff barriers, and quotas against developing country farm goods is essential.  
Action by regional integrative arrangements is another key methodology for increasing 
agricultural development in developing countries.  With respect to Jamaica and other 
member states, CARICOM must extend its traditional focus on elites to the masses in 
order to generate sufficient political support in its member states for consolidation of 
Caribbean regional integration that fosters collective self-reliance.  CARICOM must 
incorporate the voices of all segments of the Caribbean’s people in a comprehensive 
regional development strategy that better reflects and addresses member states’ unique 
needs.  In effect, the traditional leaders of CARICOM, namely Caribbean elites, must 
transition the organization beyond elite politics and employ a more pluralist outlook that 
fosters inclusivity, collaboration, and unity.  Maybe then, member state representatives 
would embrace full integration by transitioning CARICOM from a customs union to a 
common market and reject their tendency towards nationalism, personality politics, and 
304
elite politics, which impede transformative decision-making and action for regional 
development.  As recommended for Jamaica and other developing natural resource 
economies, CARICOM should also prioritize agriculture as a cornerstone of any regional 
development strategy it creates.  Indeed, CARICOM should encourage production and 
export diversification, export market penetration, improved productivity, and enhanced 
competitiveness in and for member states.  In so doing, CARICOM member states will 
better navigate the world trading regime and engender the type of self-reliant 
development that will go a long way towards eradicating their dependency, 
underdevelopment, and marginalization.  
This dissertation concluded that constraints from without and within have 
exacerbated associated dependent development in Jamaica, the Caribbean, and much of 
the Third World by retarding agricultural development, worsening socioeconomic 
welfare, and stymieing self-reinforcing, sustainable growth and development.  This 
finding vindicates as valid explanatory frameworks the theoretical constructs of 
underdevelopment and dependency asserted by members of the dependencia school of 
economic development theory.  These constructs, which are quite evident in the Jamaican 
experience and those of many countries in the Caribbean and Third Word, include the 
colonial legacy of plantation economy (George Beckford), internal 
colonialism/imperialism (Pablo González Casanova, Ernst Mandel, and Samir Amin), 
dependency-clientelism (Carlene Edie), and associated dependent development 
(Fernando Henrique Cardozo).  This dissertation encourages Jamaicans and people in 
similarly situated developing countries to throw off the yoke of associated dependent 
development by collaborating with others in society to create and implement a 
305
comprehensive development plan that leverages the country’s factor endowment in 
productive activity.  Jamaica’s factor endowment is in agriculture.  Therefore, the 
decisionmakers in Jamaica should prioritize agriculture and encourage expansion of 
production, increased productivity, export diversification, and expanded agro-industry to 
facilitate a balanced, self-reinforcing development that is based in sustainable productive 
activity.
In conclusion, of the possible explanations for Jamaica’s underdevelopment and 
dependency posed in Chapter 1, this dissertation determined Hypothesis #3 as the most 
conclusive explanation for the underdevelopment and dependency that is prevalent in the 
case of Jamaica, other CARICOM states, and much of the Third World.  
H3: Embedded structures of underdevelopment established by external forces and 
entrenched by domestic forces perpetuated the colonial plantation economic 
legacy of underdevelopment and associated dependent development.
This hypothesis explored the existence in Jamaica of embedded structures of 
underdevelopment that are attributable to both externally-driven and internally-motivated 
forces.  These include, among others: Jamaica’s pervasive land inequality, stagnation of 
domestic agriculture, dependence on PTAs as export vehicles, high cost of capital which 
limits producer access to funds for retooling, insufficient output diversification for both 
export and domestic consumption, and declining productive capacity.  The dissertation 
found hypotheses #1 and #3 inconclusive.  
Hypothesis #1 and related sub-hypotheses addressed the external pressures that 
have retarded development from without as a possible explanation for Jamaica’s 
underdevelopment.  Such forces include the legacy of plantation economy; World Bank-
International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment conditionalities; rich country 
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protectionism in agricultural trade; and bilateral preferential trade arrangements that 
fostered dependency and apathy in Jamaica, thereby hindering its development.  The 
research evaluated the following hypothesis and related sub-hypotheses:
H1: External factors retarded Jamaica’s development by exacerbating the colonial 
plantation economic legacy of underdevelopment and associated dependent development.  
H1a: Structural adjustment lending retarded Jamaica’s development by 
skyrocketing the country’s debt and debt service obligations, which diminished 
reinvestment into the economy; by pushing increasingly large numbers of small 
farmers off the land and into urban unemployment; and by entrenching the 
emphasis on export-led development based on select primary exports to the 
detriment of cultivating full agro-industrial capacity fundamental to developed 
country economies and attaining food security.
H1b: Multilateral and bilateral trade arrangements retarded Jamaica’s 
development by discriminating against processed exports that would increase 
Jamaica’s value-added, thereby discouraging the full maximization of Jamaican 
agro-industry; by protecting developed country market hegemony in not 
penalizing the perpetuation by those countries of high tariff barriers to products of 
developing country export interest; and by attacking the preferential trade 
arrangement (PTA) as antithetical to the “free” trade regime, forcing a challenge 
to the premise that developing countries, by nature of their underdevelopment, are 
entitled to special and differential (S&D) treatment while transitioning to the 
“free” trade regime.
H1c: Rich country agricultural subsidies, domestic and export, encourage 
overproduction of surpluses that are “dumped” in poor countries like Jamaica 
under the guise of food aid or sold at artificially low prices that undermine 
domestic production, productivity, and competitiveness.  
The research found all these hypotheses inconclusive because they distort the analysis by 
prejudicing externally-driven forces as the sole cause of Jamaica’s underdevelopment and 
dependency.  While structural adjustment lending, multilateral and bilateral trade 
arrangements, and rich country agricultural protectionism certainly contributed to 
Jamaica’s marginalization in the world trading regime, they do not, individually or 
collectively, constitute the only cause of Jamaica’s associated dependent development.  
Internally-motivated forces also played a part.
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Hypothesis #2 and related sub-hypotheses addressed the internal forces that have 
impeded development from within.  These forces foster inefficiency and instability, 
which impede economic growth and development.  They include: weak institutions in 
both the public and private spheres; inadequate and/or inappropriate use of technology; 
poor farming infrastructure, especially roads for transporting goods from farmgate to 
market; private sector apathy and dependence on government to mobilize growth; and 
tribal politics based on clientelism and rent-seeking, which has entrenched the retardate 
plantation economy in Jamaica.  The research evaluated the following hypothesis and 
related sub-hypotheses:
H2: Domestically motivated forces impeded Jamaica’s development from within by 
perpetuating the colonial plantation economic legacy of underdevelopment and 
associated dependent development.  
H2a: Tribal politics and clientelism impeded Jamaica’s development by allowing 
business elites to co-opt government to further their middle/upper class agenda 
which typically coincided with the interests of international business, not the 
interest of the Jamaican masses, many of whom are small farmers.
H2b: Apathetic and complacent dependence on PTAs for their guaranteed high 
price points for primary commodity exports precipitated quota shortfalls and 
discouraged innovation and expansion into higher value production.
H2c: Weak institutions, manifested in a dearth of transformative agricultural 
reform projects and initiatives and in pervasive bureaucratic inefficiencies and 
malfeasance, impeded Jamaica’s development.
The research deemed all these hypotheses inconclusive because they distort the analysis 
by prejudicing domestically-motivated forces as the sole cause of Jamaica’s 
underdevelopment and dependency.  While these and other internally-motivated forces 
undoubtedly contributed to Jamaica’s marginalization in the world trading regime, they 
do not, individually or collectively, constitute the only cause of Jamaica’s associated 
dependent development.  Externally-driven forces also played a part.
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The research indicts various embedded structures of underdevelopment that were 
(and continue to be) established by external forces and entrenched by domestic forces.  
These structures of underdevelopment include, along with those mentioned above, the 
following: the system of export led primary commodity agriculture based on 
monocropping of a few commodities; limited development of the country’s productive 
capacity latent in its factor endowment; trade accommodation in the face of metropolitan 
country trade protectionism, and; the non-inclusive nature of government, which is 
dominated by elites endowed with both political and economic power, contributing the 
big man-small man characteristic of Jamaican society that feeds the country’s political 
tribalism, economic oppression of the masses, and crime.  Without question, these 
externally-driven and domestically-motivated forces acted in tandem throughout 
Jamaica’s history to perpetuate the colonial plantation economic legacy of 
underdevelopment and associated dependent development.  Unfortunately for Jamaica’s 
productive capacity, food security, and even national security, these forces continue 
unchecked and threaten to forever marginalize Jamaica as a poor, primary commodity 
exporting and net food importing natural resource economy in a world trading regime 
where knowledge-based production and trade based on competitive advantage are the 
norms of the day.  As argued throughout this research, Jamaicans must act expeditiously 
to capitalize on Jamaica’s resource endowment and international brand equity by
enhancing productive capacity, diversifying its export base, and expanding agro-industry 





Appendix A: Backgrounder on Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs) Benefiting Jamaica
A preferential trade agreement (PTA) is a bilateral trade agreement between a group of 
aligned developing countries and a single developed country or in the case of the European 
Union, a group of aligned developed countries.  As is the case of the EU’s preferential trade 
agreements with beneficiary countries—its Lomé Conventions with former colonies in African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries for example—some PTAs include commodity 
arrangements giving beneficiaries duty-free and sometimes quota-free access to the developed 
country market for certain agricultural goods.   Commodity arrangements have come under fire 
given the current global economic climate reflecting the dominance of neoliberal conceptions of 
trade and development and the expectation that all WTO members extend equal treatment 
towards other member countries.596  Bilateral trade agreements are so popular today that they 
have become ubiquitous, particularly after the breakdown of last year’s WTO’s Cancun 
Ministerial.  Countries negotiate these agreements for economic, political, national security, and 
other reasons.  The bilateral agreement has become the means by which countries, both 
developing and advanced, will try to make the economic and political gains that they are not 
afforded in the multilateral trading regime.  “The granting of non-reciprocal trade preferences to 
developing countries by developed countries on a unilateral basis has been a traditional 
mechanism for developed-developing country trade relationships.  Such preferential trading 
schemes include the CBI, CARIBCAN, and ATPA in the Western Hemisphere; SPARTECA in 
Oceania; the cross-regional Lomé Convention; and the GSP with global coverage.”597  Given 
their importance to Jamaica, the primary PTAs at issue in this research project are the U.S.’ 
596 This equal treatment is termed most-favored nation (MFN) treatment in WTO vernacular.
597 Mendoza et al. 1999, Ch. 4.
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Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), Canada's CARIBCAN, and the European Community's Lomé 
Convention.  Brief histories of each arrangement follow.  
President Reagan announced the Caribbean Basin Initiative in February 1982 at an 
Organization of American States (OAS) meeting.  The program became law in 1984 as the 
Caribbean Basin Economy Recovery Act (CBERA) and, from the start, was widely perceived in 
the U.S. and many Caribbean countries as a magnanimous gesture by the U.S. to help Caribbean 
countries develop industries and boost their export capacity.  However, critics perceived the CBI 
as a manifestation of the U.S.’ push for hegemony in the western hemisphere and the world at 
large.  According to Bakan et al., “[t]he Caribbean Basin Initiative was one of the earliest 
expressions of the ‘new reality’ in American foreign policy-making.  Presented as an Economic 
Recovery Act, and indeed forcefully pressing the small Caribbean island states to reorient their 
trade towards the U.S., the CBI was nonetheless a building block in the construction of a new 
North American trade bloc under U.S. hegemony…[W]ith greater or lesser degrees of 
reluctance, Caribbean governments and opinion leaders have felt obliged to co-operate in 
implementing the CBI policies, even when these appear not to serve the best interests of their 
countries or the region.”598  To fully understand the U.S.’ rationale for granting such a small, 
seemingly insignificant region large-scale trade and aid concessions, one must probe the 
Caribbean’s geopolitical strategic importance and potential threat to U.S. hegemony.599  To be 
sure, “[t]he CBI, accompanied as it was by very large increases of U.S. military aid and force 
commitments in the region, was in this sense a traditional U.S. policy response, but with a 
significant new twist—the attempt to redirect Caribbean trade and economic links away from 
598 Bakan et al. 1993, 1-2.
599 In light of the region’s various revolutionary movements—Cuba’s communist movement; El Salvador’s 
guerilla resistance movement; Nicaragua’s Sandinista revolution; and Grenada’s New Jewel movement—
the U.S. has reason to fear the Caribbean’s potential to threaten its hegemony.
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regional multilateral relations (and away from traditional links to other industrial powers such as 
Canada and the UK) towards bilateral ties to the U.S., under the auspices of ‘free trade.’”600  The 
CBI has three primary components: bilateral aid, tax incentives for U.S. corporations operating 
in the region, and concessionary trade arrangements.601  Utilizing the logic that trade contributes 
to growth more so than aid, beneficiary countries view the third component as the most 
important.  However, during its negotiations process, the U.S. Congress bowed to domestic 
special interests and denied duty-free status to many proposed Caribbean products that contribute 
most to growth, including textiles, apparel, petroleum, petroleum products, and leather goods.  
Moreover, the products granted duty-free access were subjected to quotas and other non-tariff 
barriers to trade, including safeguard action.602  Despite its promise of plenty, the CBI has not 
realized any significant export growth for beneficiary countries.  On the contrary, the program—
even as the expanded CBI II—has had positive results for the U.S. and dismal results for the 
Caribbean.603  It is instructive to note that over a five-year period from 1984 to June 1989, 
“[t]otal U.S. imports from CBI beneficiaries…declined over this period by over 27 percent while 
U.S. exports to these countries rose by 80 percent.  As a result, U.S. trade surplus with the region 
increased.”604  Since that time, benefits to the Caribbean have not increased significantly.  
Indeed, an argument can be made—and will be by this research—that the CBI has reinforced 
dependent development in countries of the region instead of propelling self-sustaining 
development.
600 Bakan et al. 1993, 5.
601 Ibid., 2.
602 Under the CBI, Caribbean sugar exports including syrup and molasses are subject to quota.  Due to a 
loophole in WTO law, governments can institute a safeguard action when they deem imports a threat to 
domestic industry.  The U.S. recently utilized its safeguard option to impose tariffs of up to 30% on 
imported steel.
603 CBI II became law in August 1990.  A third modification, the Caribbean Basin Trade Preference Act 
(CBTPA) or CBI 2000, became law in 2000. 
604 Bakan et al. 1993, 8
313
The Canadian government announced CARIBCAN in February 1986 and it became law 
four months later in June 1986.  CARIBCAN is very similar to the CBI in that it extends duty 
free access to a wide range of Caribbean exports, not including certain key export products such 
as textiles, clothing, footwear, luggage, handbags, leather garments, methanol, and lubricating 
oils.  Although CARIBCAN has helped Jamaica and other beneficiary countries increase their 
export earnings to a degree, Caribbean government leaders have complained that the program is 
outdated and should be expanded.  Jamaica’s prime minister, for example, recently complained 
that CARIBCAN has “not lived up to expectations.”  This dissatisfaction led CARICOM’s 
leaders to approach Prime Minister Chrétien at the 2001 Canada-CARICOM Summit with a 
request that Canada and CARICOM negotiate a stronger free trade agreement broadening 
CARIBCAN to more products and additional trade-related areas.  The Canadian government is 
currently reviewing that proposal.  This research will evaluate CARIBCAN’s effect on 
Caribbean development and will explore the possibilities of a reformulated agreement.
The European Union first instituted the Lomé Convention (Lomé I) in 1975 to benefit the 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states that were previously colonies of EU member 
nations.  Three subsequent modifications followed; Lomé IV went into effect in 1990 and 
remained in force through February 2000.  A successor agreement to Lomé IV, the Cotonou 
Convention, was renegotiated shortly thereafter in June 2000.  However, the parties agreed to a 
transition period of eight years during which time Lomé’s provisions will persist to allow the 
beneficiary countries time to restructure their economies and trading regimes to compete 
effectively in an open global trading regime sans preferences.  
Lomé provided for “non-reciprocity, for protection of traditional arrangements, and for 
no difference in treatment between independent Caribbean countries and the self-governing 
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territories of EC member states in the region.”605  The Convention had three components: trade 
provisions; aid provisions; and a political facet.  All three components were brought into 
question by the U.S.’ 1996 case at the WTO challenging the EU-ACP banana commodity 
arrangements.  This case contributed in large part to Lomé’s reformulation, severely restricting 
its commodity protocols to only those ACP beneficiaries designated least developed countries 
(LDCs) by the United Nations.  Understandably, this Cotonou reformulation is a key concern for 
the other ACP countries soon to be expelled from Lomé beneficiary status, including the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.  While the loss of EU aid is an issue, Lomé’s trade provisions have 
always been more significant to Caribbean beneficiary countries due to their relatively high per 
capita income vis-à-vis African and Pacific beneficiary countries.  Trade provisions included 
privileged commercial access, trade preferences, and guaranteed quotas for certain agricultural 
products, all of which allowed Caribbean beneficiaries to achieve a measure of growth.  Lomé 
also included special trade protocols for ACP sugar, bananas, rum and rice exports—all key 
income generators for the Caribbean ACP countries.  Losing these preferences will no doubt 
damage these vulnerable economies.  This research assesses the extent to which Lomé helped 
grow Jamaica’s economy and put the country on a path towards autonomous, self-reinforcing 




Appendix B: Interview Questions
I. Impact of globalization and trade liberalization on development
A. General trade
1. How do you view Jamaica’s politico-economic condition vis-à-vis the global economy?
2. How do you view Jamaica’s economy—developed, underdeveloped, developing, and/or 
dependent?  Why?
3. What is Jamaica’s place/role in the global economy?  Is this place adequate for maximizing 
national development and self-sufficiency?  If not, what place/role would be adequate?
4. What factors—internal and/or external—have constrained Jamaica’s development?  
Facilitated dependency?
5. What are the key problem areas that have impeded growth opportunities, investment, and 
employment in Jamaica?
6. How has Jamaica’s colonial past shaped the country?  The agricultural sector?
7. Is a strong, productive agricultural sector essential for Jamaica’s development? 
8. In light of the previous and foreseen challenges to developing country commodity 
arrangements is agriculture obsolete?  Should Caribbean governments redirect expenditure 
from agriculture to other strong FOREX earning sectors, namely tourism?
9. How has Jamaica adapted to the challenges of changing patterns of trade and technological 
innovation?
10. Has the WTO benefited or harmed Jamaica’s agriculture?  How?
11. Does the WTO discriminate against products of export interest to developing countries?
12. What factors are constraining Jamaica’s trade capacity and competitiveness?  What is being 
done to overcome these constraints?
13. How has foreign investment—both portfolio capital and FDI via the multinational 
corporation (MNC)—affected Jamaica’s development?  Its agriculture sector?
14. Can Jamaica realistically segue from primary commodity exporter to exporter of mainly agro-
industrial products, transforming raw agricultural goods via the creation of value-added?  Is 
such a transition desirable for Jamaica?  Why or why not?
15. What role, if any, remains for the state in promoting industrialization and growth in this new 
era of liberalization and globalization? 
B. Preferential trade agreements
1. Have bilateral arrangements with the US and EU—such as the CBI and Lomé—facilitated 
development for Jamaica?  Or, have they encouraged Jamaica to be dependent on these 
countries and on the export-led model of development emphasizing traditional commodity 
exports, thereby discouraging diversification into industry?
2. Will Jamaica and other Caribbean countries survive economically (without incurring 
additional debt to offset the transition) after its bananas and sugar no longer qualify for duty-
free access into the EU?  
316
C. Structural adjustment 
1. How has Jamaica’s experience with IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs shaped 
its political and economic development?  Its agriculture sector?
2. How has the government’s implementation of Bank/Fund structural adjustment 
conditionalities affected the agricultural sector?  Could the government have implemented 
structural adjustment conditionalities more efficiently and productively?  Has the government 
exacerbated the impact of structural adjustment conditionalities on agricultural development? 
D. Regional integration
1. Has CARICOM been a help or hindrance to development in Jamaica?  
2. Can CARICOM help Jamaica and the larger Caribbean achieve genuine development?  
3. How do you rate CARICOM’s effectiveness as a regional trade bloc and potential as a single 
market economy?  Is the region positioned to meet its international trade obligations with 
respect to a single market economy?  How is CARICOM facilitating the region’s transition?
4. How is the region preparing for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)?  
E. Agriculture (Section added during field research in Jamaica in attempt to probe further 
than allowed by questions in Section A into the constraints on agriculture)
1. What are the direct problems facing agriculture, especially the traditional export products, i.e. 
sugar, banana, and coffee?
2. In what agricultural products can Jamaica be competitive in the world trading regime?
3. Where do you see the Jamaican small farmer in local production and in the global economy?
4. What forces are impeding Jamaica’s full-fledged transition to agro-industrial processing and 
export versus primary production/export?
F. Labor (Section added during field research in Jamaica to allow for questions 
specifically targeted to labor union interviewees)
1. What are Labor’s concerns vis-à-vis agriculture?
2. Has Labor helped or impeded Jamaica’s agricultural development?
3. What vision does Labor have for agriculture?  Jamaica?  What role will Labor play to realize 
this vision?
4. Was/is Jamaica’s agricultural development retarded by traditional labor-intensity, i.e. by 
resisting mechanization, innovation, and increased technical capacity.
II. Public-private sector participation and partnership
1. How can the private sector enhance Jamaica’s agricultural productivity and competitiveness?  
Has the private sector been engaged in these activities?
2. Is the region’s private sector positioned to become a competitive engine for growth?
3. What are the most binding economic and institutional constraints on private-sector activities 
in Jamaica and CARICOM?
4. Why have macroeconomic reforms in CARICOM countries been insufficient to bring about 
faster private investment and economic growth?  
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III. Rural development and poverty
1. Is rural development a necessary prerequisite for national development?  What is the state of rural 
Jamaica?
2. How have macroeconomic reforms and structural adjustment, generally, and the liberalization of 
agriculture and price reforms, specifically, affected rural incomes, agricultural efficiency, and rural 
labor productivity? 
IV. Governance: Fostering efficiency and participation
1. What has been Jamaica/CARICOM’s experience with governmental reform—i.e., the nature, 
pace, and agenda of?
2. On the integrity of government: how would you define integrity?  Why is it relevant with 
respect to economic or social development?  How has Jamaica/CARICOM fared with regards 
to the design of effective rules and regulations for combating corruption and/or rent-seeking?
3. How have Jamaica’s institutions fostered or impeded development?
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Appendix C: Backgrounder on the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)
The WTO monitors and enforces international trade rules and is the forum 
wherein member countries negotiate and dispute these rules.  It is the successor to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) multilateral trading system.  The 
GATT was created in 1947, in the aftermath of World War II, to encourage member 
countries to remove barriers to trade to facilitate economic growth and prosperity for all.  
Over the years, GATT members met in “rounds” to negotiate further trade liberalization.  
To date, eight rounds have occurred in the GATT regime.  The Uruguay Round, the most 
recent to date, resulted in the creation of the WTO to administer trade agreements, 
facilitate trade negotiations and resolve trade disputes.  It ended in 1994 after nearly eight 
years of negotiations.  Many developing countries signed on to the WTO, marking the 
first time they formally endorsed the GATT and the existence of a multilateral trading 
regime. 
The WTO expanded the GATT’s reach and scope.  For starters, the WTO 
required signatories to phase out quotas on textiles and clothing over a ten-year period.  
The WTO, unlike the GATT, also applied to trade in services, intellectual property rights, 
investment and government purchases.  Signatories agreed to accept WTO rules as a 
single package and not simply selected rules as had applied in the GATT regime.  To 
operationalize the WTO’s rules, countries must amend existing domestic laws or 
implement new ones; countries may bring suit against other countries that neglect to do 
so.  Where the GATT had no enforcement mechanism, the WTO includes a binding 
dispute settlement mechanism.  Although the WTO cannot compel a country to 
implement its rules, it can compensate an injured country by allowing it to impose 
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retaliatory tariff measures against the offending country’s goods equivalent to the value 
of the loss incurred.  Alternatively, the offending country may decide to implement the 
WTO’s rules after all and lower its barriers to imports from the injured country.
The WTO’s principles are: 1) trade without discrimination, embodied in the most 
favored nation (MFN) and national treatment principles; 2) elimination of barriers to 
trade, both tariff and non-tariff; 3) predictability through binding; 4) competition through 
elimination of unfair practices such as export subsidies and dumping; and 5) special and 
differential treatment for developing countries to facilitate their integration into the world 
trading system.  Its highest decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference, a 
biennial meeting of cabinet level trade officials from member countries.  The 1999 
Seattle Ministerial is renowned for its turnout of activist groups protesting the adverse 
impact of trade liberalization on developing countries, labor, and the environment.  The 
most recent ministerial occurred in November 2001 in Doha, Qatar.  The Doha 
Ministerial launched the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations now underway at 
the WTO.
Currently, 146 countries are members of the WTO, including the economic 
superpowers—the United States, Japan, Canada and the European Union (EU)—which 
collectively provide “Quad” leadership for the organization.  Developing countries 
constitute the majority of the WTO’s membership and represent a powerful voting bloc.  
Brazil and India, leaders of the recently formed G-20 of developing countries, are two of 
the most powerful developing country members.  Members submit proposals for reform 
as self-agents or as part of multi-country coalitions and alignments.  Jamaica has 
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submitted proposals as part of two country coalitions: CARICOM and the small island 
developing states (SIDS).
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Appendix D: Key WTO Players and their Negotiation Position vis-
à-vis Agriculture
Country Position
United States • Liberalization
• Maintenance of domestic subsidization program
European Union • Gradual managed liberalization
• Maintenance of domestic subsidization program, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP)
• Address the supply-demand imbalance
Japan • Maintenance of protectionist policies
Cairns Group • Widespread liberalization including the elimination of export 
subsidies, reductions in import restrictions and subsidies
Other developing countries 
(including net food importing 
developing countries such as 
Jamaica)
• Emphasize the link between agriculture and development
• Protect developing country agricultural markets to ensure development 
• Gain better market access to developed country markets
Source: Wendy Phillips, Why Children Stay Hungry: Agricultural Trade, Food Security and the WTO
(Canada: World Vision, 2001).
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Appendix E: Reduction Commitments Mandated by the WTO 









Average cut for all 
agricultural products
–36% –24%
Minimum cut per product –15% –10%
Domestic support




Value of subsidies –36% –24%
Subsidized quantities –21% –14%
Source: WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The issues, and where we are now (World Trade Organization 
2002), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.pdf.
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US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000 US$'000
1970 -183,330 525,400 342,070 335,210 6,860
1971 -213,820 533,050 339,230 330,230 9,000
1972 -245,850 636,030 390,180 379,950 10,230
1973 -286,390 676,630 390,240 382,800 7,440
1974 -204,610 935,520 730,910 718,440 12,470
1975 -272,000 1,123,550 851,550 836,970 14,580
1976 -280,260 912,760 632,500 616,960 15,540
1977 -22,880 746,850 723,970 711,210 12,760
1978 -82,630 864,700 782,070 772,170 9,900
1979 -188,090 1,002,820 814,730 806,330 8,400
1980 -216,160 1,173,820 957,660 935,460 22,200
1981 -491,690 1,467,110 975,420 966,240 9,180
1982 -607,380 1,375,920 768,540 746,670 21,870
1983 -595,190 1,280,930 685,740 673,140 12,600
1984 -480,891 1,183,241 702,350 687,860 14,490
1985 -575,047 1,143,603 568,556 535,100 33,456
1986 -378,275 969,113 590,838 567,161 23,677
1987 -524,263 1,234,273 710,010 692,380 17,630
1988 -566,403 1,449,449 883,046 861,172 21,874
1989 -872,871 1,873,282 1,000,411 965,254 35,157
1990 -784,901 1,942,392 1,157,491 1,122,681 34,810
1991 -677,847 1,828,576 1,150,729 1,056,637 94,092
1992 -721,793 1,775,396 1,053,603 1,031,830 21,773
1993 -1,113,867 2,189,243 1,075,376 1,058,322 17,054
1994 -1,013,575 2,233,199 1,219,624 1,184,245 35,379
1995 -1,395,024 2,831,778 1,436,754 1,388,130 48,624
1996 -1,546,409 2,933,657 1,387,248 1,346,973 40,275
1997 -1,740,478 3,127,801 1,387,323 1,354,646 32,677
1998 -1,713,128 3,029,433 1,316,305 1,265,911 50,394
1999 -1,713,858 2,959,531 1,245,673 1,211,167 34,506
2000 -2,006,193 3,307,210 1,301,017 1,259,145 41,872
2001 -2,179,457 3,402,587 1,223,130 197,191 25,939
Source:  External Trade 2001, Statistical Institute of Jamaica (2002)
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Source: Pocket Book of Statistics 2000, Statistical Institute of Jamaica (2002)

























Source: Production Statistics 2002, Statistical Institute of Jamaica (2003)
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Source: Production Statistics 2002, Statistical Institute of Jamaica (2003)
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Appendix J: Backgrounder on the Regional Trade Arrangement 
(RTA) as an Agent of Development for Member States
Given the prominence of the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in the world trade regime and the growth they have generated for their 
poorest member countries, an increasing number of countries are buying into the logic of 
regional trade arrangements (RTAs), both hemispheric sub-hemispheric, as a means of 
stimulating economic development and fostering growth via expanded trade.606  Indeed, 
countries have even risen above geographical and cultural differences to forge alliances with 
distant countries at similar levels of economic development.607  The record demonstrates that 
regional trade arrangements permit individual countries to expand their trade opportunities, 
establish economies of scale, and negotiate with external countries and organizations as part of a 
bloc.  In addition, regional trade arrangements allow countries to trade openly with other 
countries while retaining the protection of a quasi-free market arrangement.  
Regional trade arrangements have existed for many years.  They first arose in the 
developing world in response to European colonialism to help the former territories transition 
into independent, self-reliant countries.  In light of their fragile politico-economic institutions, 
inexperience at self-governance, and concomitant vulnerability in the global economy, the 
member countries recognized they needed to marshal strength and resources in numbers.  They 
also understood the potential economies of scale that could be realized from merging their 
production processes in region-wide industrialization schemes.  These countries became 
increasingly committed to integration as their advanced country counterparts increasingly 
606 The EU and NAFTA are examples of a hemispheric trade alliance while CARICOM and Mercosur 
exemplify a sub-hemispheric trade alliance.
607 For example, the Group of African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries negotiate in the world trading 
regime as a bloc of less developed countries.  In another example, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
forum (APEC) promotes open trade and economic cooperation among its 21 differentiated member 
economies.
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frustrated their exports and, in defiance of the logic of comparative advantage which the 
advanced countries espoused so strongly in persuading developing countries not to industrialize, 
thwarted their efforts to gain full access to the advanced country markets.  
Many developing countries view the regional trade arrangement as a source of protection 
and security.  Such countries believe they cannot go it alone effectively in the morass that is the 
world trading regime.  They believe the World Trade Organization, although established to 
administer international trade relations and level the playing field in the world trade regime, 
neither provides sufficient protection nor engenders equity in trade relations.  In many instances 
worldwide, mini-economies and countries at low levels of economic development have either 
allied in new regional trade arrangements or have deepened the integrative potential of existing 
arrangements because they doubt their chances at competing effectively in the world trading 
regime outside of an alliance.  Due to these and other factors, international trade is more likely to 
take place within trading arrangements than between unaligned countries.  The past five decades 
have witnessed an explosion in regional trade arrangements worldwide amongst similarly 
situated—geographically, economically, and politically—countries.  As noted by Ambassador 
Christopher R. Thomas, a former Organization of American States assistant secretary general, 
political independence and economic interdependence go hand in hand and this combination 
increasingly characterizes international trade.608  The EU and NAFTA are lauded as the models 
of regional trade integrative arrangements.  However, smaller-scale trade arrangements—
bilateral, preferential, and sub-hemispheric free trade agreements for example—are also
becoming key players in international trade.
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is the primary instrument of Caribbean 
regional integration.  It encompasses a secondary instrument of sub-regional integration, 
608 www.oas.org/EN/PINFO/ASG/dominica.htm.
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the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which is recognized as an 
Associate Institute within the Treaty of Chaguaramas that established CARICOM.609
CARICOM’s mission is “to provide dynamic leadership and service, in partnership with 
Community institutions and Groups, toward the attainment of a viable, internationally 
competitive and sustainable Community, with improved quality of life for all.”610
CARICOM was established as the Caribbean Community and Common Market on 1 
August 1973 by the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which was signed by the prime ministers of 
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.  In February 2002, the treaty was 
modified as the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community 
Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (the Revised Treaty) and 
CARICOM was reformulated as the Caribbean Community, incorporating a single 
market or CSME.  CARICOM's secretariat is located in Georgetown, Guyana and its 
secretary-general is Edwin Carrington.  The fifteen member countries are: Antigua and 
Barbuda, the Bahamas (a member of the Community but not the Common Market), 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
CARICOM has three pillars of regional integration: economic integration, 
functional cooperation, and foreign policy coordination.  Economic integration implies a 
common market based on the principles of free trade, a common external tariff, 
commitment to the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade, harmonized fiscal incentives 
and free intra-regional capital mobility.  Functional cooperation targets issues such as 
health, education, labor, finance, agriculture, industry, communications, transport, 
609 Blake 2001, 482.
610 http://www.caricom.org.
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energy, mining and natural resources, science and technology, the law, information and 
women's affairs.  Foreign policy coordination involves the negotiation of political and 
economic affairs with extra-regional countries and organizations.  
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